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Abstract 
The task of drafting the standard of human rights is largely complete, and 
monitoring and enforcement institutions are functioning as intended. However 
limited that intent may have been, research has shown that the violation of human 
rights, particularly civil and political rights, are prevalent in many African 
countries. In this thesis, the focus is on realising effective enforcement of civil and 
political rights, using the normative and institutional framework of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to inform the understanding and challenges 
to African regional enforcement. This thesis places emphasis on advancing 
thoughts that are normatively and institutionally open to improvement in the 
African human rights system. It proposes a reform to the African Charter system 
that considers the African Court and African Commission jurisprudence instead of 
transplanting from other regional or international treaties.  
This thesis reviews the African Charter as well as scholarly arguments on 
civil and political rights protection. First, it analyses the international protection of 
contemporary human rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in addition to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. This 
is done to emphasise the relevance and recognition of civil and political rights in 
the international sphere and to lay a foundation on which the normative and 
institutional protection of the African Charter is analysed. Thereafter, it relates the 
African Charter normative and institutional protection to member states 
obligations in order to understand the general overview of the prospects and 
challenges of the African Charter civil and political rights enforcement. Using 
Nigeria, Tanzania and Benin as case studies to understand state party 
implementation of African Charter civil and political rights provisions, it examines 
whether African countries meet their African Charter obligations. In conclusion, 
this thesis demonstrates that with appropriate reforms, the African Charter civil 
and political rights provisions can be effectively enforced.  
 
v 
 
 
Keywords: Human rights, African Charter, African Union, Organisation of African 
Unity, African Court, African Commission, International Human rights, Civil and 
Political Rights, Domestic Enforcement, National Institutions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
List of acronyms  
 
ACHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights 
AHSG Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
AG Attorney General 
AU African Union 
CAR Central African Republic 
CBDH Coimmission Beninoise des Droits de l’Homme  
CESR Centre for Economic and Social Rights 
CHRGG Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance  
CLO  Civil Liberties Organisation 
CPA Criminal Procedure Act  
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights  
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring 
Group 
EU European Union  
FOIA Freedom of Information Act  
HRC Human Rights Committee 
HRGCC Human Rights and Good Governance Commission  
ICC International Criminal Court  
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights  
ICJ International Court of Justice  
IHRDA Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa  
LDA Lunatic Detention Act 
vii 
 
 
N Note  
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NHRC National Human Rights Commission  
NHRIs National Human Rights Institutions 
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
OHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
P Page 
Pt Part 
PAP Pan African Parliament 
PARA Paragraph  
SERAP Social Economic Rights and Accountability Project  
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK United Kingdom  
UN United Nations 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC United Nations Security Council  
US/USA United States/United States of America  
V Versus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
Table of contents  
Declaration................................................................................................. i 
Dedication ................................................................................................. ii 
Acknowledgement ..................................................................................... iii 
Abstract ................................................................................................... iv 
List of acronyms ....................................................................................... vi 
Table of contents ..................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1 
1.0 Introduction ...................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background and statement of the problem ....................................... 12 
1.2 Argument .................................................................................... 14 
1.3 Justification of the thesis ............................................................... 15 
1.3.1 Justification for analysing the African Charter .............................. 15 
1.3.2 Justification for studying civil and political rights ............................ 16 
1.3.3 Justification for studying ‘realising effective enforcement’ ............. 18 
1.4 Research aim and objectives .......................................................... 19 
1.5  Research questions ...................................................................... 19 
1.6 Contribution of the thesis ............................................................... 20 
1.7 Overview of literature .................................................................... 21 
1.7.1 Universalism and regional human rights literature ....................... 22 
ix 
 
 
1.7.2 Inspiring literature on the African Charter system ........................ 27 
1.8 Research methodology .................................................................. 34 
1.8.1 Overview of methodology and methods ......................................... 34 
1.8.2 Legal research methods .............................................................. 35 
1.9 Overview of chapters ..................................................................... 38 
CHAPTER TWO: THE BACKGROUND, CONTEXT AND NATURE OF CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS: IN PURSUIT OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS PROTECTION ............................................................... 41 
2.0. Introduction .............................................................................. 41 
2.1 The meaning of civil and political rights ........................................... 41 
2.2 Philosophical foundation of human rights ......................................... 43 
2.2.1.  Natural law/right theory ....................................................... 44 
2.2.2.  Positive rights (law) theory ................................................... 48 
2.3 Foundation and context of contemporary international human rights: The 
international pursuit of effectiveness in civil and political rights protection .... 51 
2.3.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights ....................................... 54 
2.3.2 International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights ..................... 57 
2.4 Regional protection of civil and political rights .................................. 80 
2.4.1 The European Convention on Human Rights ................................ 81 
2.4.2  American Convention on Human Rights ..................................... 86 
x 
 
 
2.5  Conclusion ................................................................................... 91 
CHAPTER THREE: NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
PROTECTION UNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER .............................................. 93 
3.0 Introduction. ................................................................................... 93 
3.1 Historical overview and emergence of the African Charter .................. 93 
3.2 Significant features of the African Charter: Underlying basis for 
interpretation ....................................................................................... 99 
3.2.1 Inclusion of various human rights categories ............................ 100 
3.2.2 Claw-back clauses ................................................................. 103 
3.2.3 Individual and state duties ..................................................... 106 
3.2.4 Absence of derogation clause .................................................. 108 
3.2.5 Peoples’ rights ...................................................................... 110 
3.3 African Charter civil and political rights norms and case law jurisprudence
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..112 
3.3.1 Prohibition of discrimination .................................................... 113 
3.3.2  Right to equality before the law .............................................. 120 
3.3.3  Right to life.......................................................................... 123 
3.3.4 Prohibition of torture and cruel treatment ................................. 131 
3.3.5 Right to personal liberty and security of the person ................... 136 
3.3.6  Right to a fair trial ................................................................ 139 
xi 
 
 
3.3.7 Freedom of conscience and religion ......................................... 148 
3.3.8 Right to receive information and freedom of expression ............. 152 
3.3.9 Right to freedom of association ............................................... 156 
3.3.10 Right to freedom of assembly .................................................. 159 
3.3.11 Right to freedom of movement and residence ............................ 162 
3.3.12 Right to participate freely in the government of one’s country ...... 165 
3.3.13 Right to property .................................................................... 168 
3.4 The complementing African Commission resolutions, principles and 
guidelines accompanying the African Charter .......................................... 172 
3.4.1 African Commission Declaration of Principles on Freedom of 
Expression in Africa .......................................................................... 172 
3.4.2 African Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Association and 
Assembly in Africa ............................................................................ 173 
3.4.3 African Commission Resolution Urging States to Envisage a Moratorium 
on Death Penalty .............................................................................. 175 
3.4.4 African Commission Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….176 
3.4.5 African Commission Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the 
Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (Robben Island Guidelines) in Africa .............................. 177 
3.5 Conclusion ................................................................................. 179 
xii 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF AFRICAN CHARTER CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ............. 180 
4.0. Introduction ............................................................................ 180 
4.1 Human rights protection in Africa: The emergence and role of the OAU
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..180 
4.1.2  The transformation of the OAU to AU ...................................... 186 
4.1.2  Relevant AU organs to human rights protection ........................ 189 
4.2 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ................... 191 
4.2.1  The mandate and functions of the African Commission .............. 195 
4.2.2  Remedial authority of the African Commission .......................... 210 
4.2.3 African Commission special mechanisms .................................. 213 
4.3 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights ............................ 214 
4.3.1 The history and establishment of the African Court .................... 215 
4.3.2 Mandate and jurisdiction of the African Court ............................ 218 
4.3.3 Access to the African Court ..................................................... 220 
4.3.4 Admissibility and the relationship between the African Court and the 
African Commission .......................................................................... 223 
4.3.5 Remedies authority under the Court Protocol and enforceability of 
African Court decisions ...................................................................... 225 
4.4 Conclusion .................................................................................... 227 
xiii 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: STATE PARTY OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER: 
USING NIGERIA, TANZANIA, AND BENIN TO HIGHLIGHT DOMESTIC 
ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ...................................... 230 
5.0. Introduction ............................................................................ 230 
5.1 Rationale and justification for the choice of countries ...................... 231 
5.1.1 Legal system ........................................................................ 233 
5.1.2 Scope of domestic protection of civil and political rights ............. 234 
5.1.3 Engagement with the African Charter and its Court Protocol ....... 236 
5.2 State party obligations under the African Charter and the Court Protocol
 ......................................................................................................... 237 
5.2.1 Obligation to provide legislative or other measures of protection . 238 
5.2.2 State party obligation to guarantee the independence of the courts 
and establish appropriate national institutions ...................................... 240 
5.2.3 State party obligation to comply with findings of the African Court and 
African Commission .......................................................................... 244 
5.3 Analysis of the scope of domestic protection of civil and political rights
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..254 
5.3.1 Nigeria ................................................................................. 255 
5.3.2 Tanzania .............................................................................. 269 
5.3.3  Benin .................................................................................. 283 
5.4 Conclusion .................................................................................... 295 
xiv 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: ASSESSING THE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
UNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER ............................................................... 297 
6.0. Introduction ............................................................................ 297 
6.1 Assessing the African Charter political and institutional framework ....... 297 
6.1.1  Assessing the African Commission .......................................... 298 
6.1.2 Assessing the African Court .................................................... 310 
6.1.3 Assessing the AU political role in African Charter enforcement ..... 315 
6.2 Assessing normative provisions of the African Charter ..................... 319 
6.2.1 Assessing African Charter civil and political rights norms ............ 320 
6. 3  Assessing state party obligations under the African Charter ........... 323 
6.3.1 Constitutional protection of civil and political rights norms .......... 323 
6.4 Conclusion ................................................................................. 327 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................... 329 
7.0  Introduction .............................................................................. 329 
7.1 Limitations of the thesis ............................................................... 329 
7.1.1 Common study limitations ...................................................... 332 
7.2  Summary of findings .................................................................. 333 
7.3 Recommendations....................................................................... 338 
7.3.1 Establishment of a human rights department within the AU headed by 
the Commissioner for Human Rights ................................................... 338 
xv 
 
 
7.3 2 Participation of national judicial institutions in the enforcement of the 
African Charter institutions’ decisions .................................................. 341 
7.3.3 Empower NHRIs to monitor the enforcement of the African Court and 
African Commission decisions ............................................................. 343 
7.3.4 AU use of sanctions against defaulting state parties ................... 344 
7.3.5 Composition and access to the African Court and African Commission
 ...................................................................................................... 345 
7.3.6 Publicity of African Court and African Commission activities ........... 347 
7.4 Challenges in achieving the above recommendations ......................... 348 
7.5 Conclusion ................................................................................. 349 
Table of Cases ....................................................................................... 351 
African Commission ............................................................................. 351 
African Court ...................................................................................... 355 
Benin ................................................................................................. 357 
Nigeria ............................................................................................... 357 
Tanzania ............................................................................................ 359 
International cases .............................................................................. 360 
Table of national statutes and constitutions ............................................... 361 
Table of international treaties and conventions .......................................... 363 
Bibliography .......................................................................................... 365 
xvi 
 
 
Articles .............................................................................................. 365 
Textbooks .......................................................................................... 393 
Dissertations ...................................................................................... 400 
Chapters in books ............................................................................... 400 
Online resources ................................................................................. 407 
Appendices............................................................................................ 424 
Appendix I - Information about member states’ compliance with the African 
Commission decisions between 1987 and 2018 ....................................... 424 
Appendix II - Information about member state compliance with African Court 
decisions ............................................................................................ 497 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
1.0 Introduction  
The struggle for human rights recognition has evolved alongside world events and 
revolutions. Alongside these came mechanisms for human rights protection and 
promotion. For instance, contemporary discourse on human rights protection at 
the global level is traced to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), 
enacted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) in 1948 to forestall a 
repetition of the atrocities of World War II.1 The success of the UDHR as a 
pacesetter of contemporary human rights law has a tremendous positive impact 
on international human rights discourse.2 Whereas the UDHR acts as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,3 it has influenced many 
international and domestic human rights instruments across the globe.4 This 
development ranks among the most significant accomplishment of the 
international community since 1945. At present, the normative standards of 
human rights are disproportionate to their enforcement because international 
human rights law enforcement lacks uniformity, which necessitates the need for 
                                       
1 Zeid Al-Hassan, ‘The United Nations at 70’ (2015) 6 European Human Rights Law Review, 555; George 
Mugwanya, Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African Regional Human Rights 
System (Transnational Publishers, 2003) 16. See also, paragraph 6 of the preamble to Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights.  
2 Miia Halme-Tuomisaari and Pamela Slotte, ‘Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights: Introduction’ in Pamela 
Slotte and Miia Halme-Tuomisaari (eds), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 
2015) 6; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2015) 5; For a 
more detailed discussion of the UN and promotion of human rights; see, Myres McDougal and Gerhard Bebr, 
‘Human Rights in the United Nations’ (1964) American Journal of International Law, 603; William Wagner, ‘The 
Emergency of International Human Rights Law, Universal Human Rights, The United Nations, and the Telos of 
Human Dignity’ (2005) 3 Ave Maria Law Review, 197; George Edwards, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Human 
Rights Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from the Birth of the United Nations to the 21st Century: Ten 
Attributes of Highly Successful Human Rights NGOs’ (2010) 18 Michigan State Journal of International Law 
167. 
3 Paragraph 8 preamble to the UDHR.  
4 Andrew Clapham,  Human rights: A Very Short Introduction (note 2 above) 5; Javaid Rehman, International 
Human Rights Law (2nd edn, Pearson Education Limited, 2010) 10; Dejo Ololu, An Integrative Rights-based 
Approach to Human Rights Development in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, 2009) 22; Harold Koh and 
Lawrence Gostin, ‘Introduction: The Human Rights Imperative’ in Stanley Herr, ‘et al’ (eds), The Human Rights 
of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Different by Equal (Oxford University Press, 2003) 1. Examples of 
international human rights instruments influenced by the UDHR include the American Convention (preamble, 
paragraph 5) and ICCPR (preamble, paragrapg 4).  
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reforms to appropriate human rights instruments when and where necessary to 
meet human rights concerns. 
 The contemporary international effort to codify human rights has been 
progressive. For instance, in addition to the UDHR at the international level, the 
UN further enacted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966 (ICESCR) as distinct instruments for diverse human rights categories.5 With 
the UN adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR, human rights under the UN auspices 
comprise rights distilled from these three crucial UN instruments, sometimes 
referred to as the International Bill of Rights.6 However, despite the UN approach, 
some member states’ of the UN soon after the adoption of the UDHR adopted a 
continental (regional) approach.7 At present, mechanisms for human rights 
protection attract attention both under the UN and the regional systems. 
 Regional human rights systems have created another form of human rights 
assessment following the success recorded by the first regional human rights 
treaty, the European Convention on Human and Rights 1950 (ECHR).8 The ECHR 
success brought about the UN General Assembly Resolution 32/127 of 16 
December 1977 encouraging states to consider the establishment of regional 
machinery for human rights protection.9 While the emergence of regional human 
                                       
5 The United Nations General Assembly adopted the ICCPR on 19 December 1966 and it came into force on 23 
March 1976 after meeting Article 49 (1) requirement on ratification. The ICCPR has a record of 169 state party 
ratification, 6 state party signatories, and 22 no action. See, United Nations Human Rights Status of ratification, 
available at >http://indicators.ohchr.org/< accessed 31 May 2018. Similarly, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the ICESER on 16 December 1966 and it came into force on 3 January 1976. See also, 
Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Mission Accomplished? An Impact Assessment of the UDHR in Africa’ (2008/2009) 30 
Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 335.  
6 According to Jack Donnelly, International bill of Rights comprises of the UDHR, ICCPR and the ICESER. See 
Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights (4th edn, Westview Press, 2013) 7. Further discussion on the relevant 
UN instrument to this study will be undertaken in chapter two.  
7A regional human rights approach allows UN member states to adopt human rights systems with a view to localise 
international human rights norms and standards, reflecting the particular human rights concerns of the continent. 
See, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘An Overview of Regional Human 
Rights System’, available at > https://bangkok.ohchr.org/programme/regional-systems.aspx< accessed 05 
September 2019.  
8 Rhona Smith, International Human Rights (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2012) 86. 
9 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 32/127, available at > 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/32/ares32r127.pdf< accessed on 18 March 2019.  
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rights systems in international human rights discourse has come to stay, it is 
adjudged to be a distinct human rights system with its norms, institutions and 
jurisprudence.10 A practical example is the American Convention on Human Rights 
(American Convention) 1969.11 Another example is the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) 1981 and its enforcement mechanisms- the 
African Commission and the African Court.12  
  The evolution of the African regional human rights started after the 
independence of many African countries in the late 1950s and the subsequent 
pressure on them to recognise the UDHR due to their UN membership.13 This is 
because the European colonisation rules rested on a set of coercive practices that 
violated democratic values and human rights.14 Hence, the emergence of 
independent African countries came with high human rights expectations from 
within and outside the region.15 Unfortunately, however, this expectation was 
dashed in many countries. Instead, many of the newly independent African 
countries were plunged into various internal armed conflicts; for instance, military 
dictatorship shortened the implanted constitutional democratic system the colonial 
masters propagated.16 In some countries such as Tanzania and Nigeria, opposition 
politicians were treated as enemies by the ruling elites, amid heightened political 
                                       
10 Lea Shaver, ‘The Inter-American Human Rights System: An Effective Institution for Regional Human Rights 
Protection’ (2010) 9(4) Washington University Global University Studies Law Review, 639; Christof Hynes, 
David Padilla and Leo Zwaak, ‘A Schematic Comparison of Regional Human Rights’ (2005) 5 African Human 
Rights Law Journal, 308.  
11 The American Convention was adopted on 22 November 1969 and became effective on 18 July 1978. Detailed 
discussion on the American Convention is found in chapter 2.  
12 The African Charter was adopted by the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) General Assembly on 27 June 
1981 in Nairobi, Kenya and came into force on 21 October 1986 after meeting the absolute majority ratification. 
See OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5. As of January 2019, fifty-four of fifty-five member states of the African 
Union have ratified the African Charter. Morocco was readmitted into the African Union in January 2017 and at 
present, is in the process of ratifying the African Charter. The Charter comprises three categories of rights- civil 
and political rights; social, economic and cultural rights, and group rights.  
13 Osita Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems (Macmillan, 1984) 23. 
14 Alice Conklin, ‘Colonialism and Human Rights, A Contradition in Terms? The Case of France and West Africa, 
1895-1914’ (1998) 103 American Historical Review, 419.  
15 Oji Umozuruike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997) 22. 
16 Instances of countries where conflicts erupted included Nigeria (civil war of 1967); Sudan (First Sudanese Civil 
War 1955-1972); Libya and Egypt (1977 Libyan-Egyptian War); Somalia (Algerian Ethio-Somali War of 1977-
1978). See, Alade Fawole, ‘A Continent in Crisis: Internal Crisis and External Interventions in Africa’ (2004) 103 
African Affairs, 297. 
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rivalry; multiparty democratic systems were turned into one party or authoritarian 
systems; and, military coup d’états swept across many states in the continent.17 
In all these events, violations of international civil and political rights were 
common, with little or no interference from the OAU.18 
An overall assessment by researchers reveals that human rights suffered a 
significant blow in many post-independent African countries.19 For instance, the 
undemocratic rule that swept many of these countries deteriorated into open 
hatred and discrimination amongst ethnicities. As a result, there were killings, 
torture and other human rights violations, and the expulsion of non-nationals from 
some other African countries.20 Given these instances, the human rights situation 
in Africa distressed international and local observers and scholars. For instance, 
while Ikome argued that many African states attained political independence as 
fragmented states,21 Eno submitted that the European colonial masters left the 
continent in disarray and a deplorable shape at the time of the independence of 
many African countries.22 However, these assertions cannot be entirely accurate 
given that human rights violations perpetrated by the new African leaders were 
as a result of their failure to take human rights seriously. Instead, in their quest 
                                       
17 Oji Umozuruike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right (n 15 above) 22. Take, for instance, 
Nigeria, soon after gaining independence in 1960 witnessed two coup d’états and a civil war between 1960 and 
1970, and this resulted in the death of millions of people and the destruction of property. See Wanye Nafziger, 
‘The Political Economy of Nigeiria’s Relentless Conflicts’ (2010) 5 (2) The Economics of Peace and Security 
Journal, 10. 
18 Ben Kioko, ‘The Right of Intervention under the African Union Constitutive Act: From Non-Interferece to Non-
Intervention’ (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross, 807; Makau Mutua, ‘The Politics of Human 
Rights: Beyond the Abolitionist Paradigm in Africa’ (1996) 17 (3) Michigan Journal of International Law, 591.  
19 Ibid. see also, Oji Umozuruike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right (n 15 above) 24. 
20 Notable amongst these examples include, Uganda deportation of all non-Ugandan citizens in the 1970s, Ghana’s 
deportation of all foreigners between 1969 and 1970, Cameroon’s deportation of Nigerians soon after 
independence, and many other examples. See, Aderanti Adepoju, ‘Illegals and Expulsion in Africa: The Nigerian 
Experience’ (1984) 18 (3) The International Migration Review, 426. 
21 According to Ikome, many African states at independence lacked physical or institutional infrastructure to 
engender development and compete favourably with European counterparts. Francis Ikome, From the Lagos Plan 
of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD):  The Political Economy of African 
Regional Initiatives (PHD Thesis, Department of International Relations – University of Witwatersrand, 
December 2004) 1. 
22 Robert Eno, Human Rights, Human Development and Peace: Inseparable Ingredients in Africa’s Quest for 
Prosperity (PHD Thesis, School of Law- University of Witwatersrand, January 2008) 4. 
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to consolidate power and control, African leaders gave human rights protection 
and enforcement a back seat.  
Currently, regional human rights safeguards in the African continent are 
intensely debated, mainly, under the African Charter and its institutions- the 
African Commission and the African Court.23 The African Charter comprises the 
following categories of rights- civil and political rights, peoples’ rights and socio-
economic rights, and as of July 2019, fifty-four of the fifty-five member states of 
the African Union (AU) have ratified the African Charter.24 In addition to the 
ratification of the African Charter, many AU member states are also signatories to 
other international human rights treaties such as the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, and 
other AU human rights treaties.25 Being a state party to these instruments 
demands some human rights obligations, which states ought to respect.  
For instance, article 1 of the African Charter specifically mandates state 
parties to recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter by 
adopting legislative or other measures to give effect to them. To meet this 
                                       
23 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Eyeing the Promised Land: The Wearisome Quest for an Effective Regional Human 
Rights Enforcement Mechanism in Africa’ (2014) 1 Transnational Human Rights Review, 179; Nsongurua 
Udombana, ‘Mission Accomplished? An Impact Assessment of the UDHR in Africa’ (n 5 above); Morris 
Mbondenyi, International Human Rights and their Enforcement in Africa (Law Africa Publishing, 2011); Makau 
Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties’, 
(1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law, 342; Osita Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems 
(n 13 above); Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practices and Institutions 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001); EI-Obaid Ahmed EI-Obaid and Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, ‘Human Rights 
in Africa -A New Perspective on Linking the Past to the Present’ (1996) McGill Law Journal, 819; Oji 
Umozuruike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right (n 15 above); Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1983) 77 American Journal of International Law, 902; Oji Umozuruike, 
‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Suggestions for more Effectiveness’ (2007) 13 Annual 
survey of international and comparative law, 1; Fatsah Onguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2003); Ziyad Motola, ‘Human Rights in Africa: A Cultural, Ideological, and Legal Examination’ 
(1998-1999) 12 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 373; Christof Heyns, ‘The African Human 
Rights System: In need of Reform’ (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, 155; Vincent Nmehielle, 
‘Development of the African Human Rights System in the Last Decade’ (2004) 11 (3) Human Rights Brief, 6; 
Magnus kilander, ‘Human Rights Developments in the African Union during 2014’ (2015) 15 African Human 
Rights Law Journal, 537; Racheal Murray and Lloyd Amanda ‘Institutions with Responsibility for Human Rights 
Protection under the African Union’ (2004) 48 (2) Journal of African Law, 165.  
24 Details on list of ratification is found on African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Ratificatiuon Table, 
available at > https://www.achpr.org/ratificationtable?id=49< last accessed 05 September 2019.  
25 Such include Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
2003; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990; African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance 2011.  
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mandate, state parties are expected to enshrine human rights in domestic 
legislation and constitutions. At present, many African state constitutions contain 
human rights provisions.26 That notwithstanding, human rights violations by state 
actors, especially in the civil and political rights category, have remained rife in 
many African countries.27 This is not to suggest that African countries are alone in 
human rights violations.28 This concern is legitimate and must be taken seriously 
by ensuring state parties meet their international human rights treaty obligations. 
To this end, it is essential to note that despite the highlighted international, 
regional and domestic recognition of human rights as a distinct branch of law with 
its norms and institutions, the concept of human rights has remained difficult to 
define.29  
 Human rights discourse shows that the international community has not 
been able to define human rights in any of the existing human rights instruments. 
Whether this is intentional due to the cultural and economic divide cannot be 
ascertained. However, since the recognition of human rights by the international 
community, several scholars have offered various definitions. The most common 
definition is that human rights are inherent to the condition of humanity and 
cannot be taken away except in the circumstances considered and reasonably 
provided by law.30 This definition seems to be acceptable and reflects the idea of 
contemporary human rights instruments. Similarly, Donnelly,31 Villiers,32 
                                       
26 Examples are sections 33-46 of 1999 Constitution of Nigeria; articles 8-40 of 1990 Constitution of Benin; and, 
articles 12-30 of 1977 Constitution of Tanzania.  
27 Amnesty International, Africa 2017/2018, available at > https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/report-
africa/< accessed 10 April 2019; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UN Human 
Rights Report 2017, available at > 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/OHCHRreport2017/allegati/Downloads/1_Whole_Report_2017.pdf< accessed 
10 April 2019; Human Rights Watch, Africa, available at >https://www.hrw.org/africa< accessed 10 April 2019.  
28 Human rights violation is also visible in some Asian countries such as Saudi Arabia, China and Yemen, and 
South America countries such as Venezuela. 
29 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Evolving International Human Rights System’ (2006) 100 (4) The American Journal 
of International Law, 783; Osita Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems (n 13 above) 1. 
30 Magdalena Supulveda, ‘et al’, Human Rights Reference Handbook (3rd edn, University for Peace Press, 2004) 
3.   
31 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights: In Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, 2013) 17; Jack 
Donnelly, International Human Rights: Dilemmas in World Politics (2nd edn, Westview Press, 1998) 18.  
32 Peter Villiers, Human Rights: A Practical Guide for Managers (Kogan Page Limited, 2001) 1. 
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Dembour33 and Howard34 associated human rights as being inherent to every 
human being, a right which is owed to the entire human family. The above 
definitions support the universal ideology of human rights, which suggests that 
every individual is entitled to human rights. Indeed, the central ideology of 
universal human rights promoters is that human rights should be applied at all 
times irrespective of culture, political background, economic situation and moral 
values attributable to any state.35  
Furthermore, a human right has been defined as ‘a universal moral right, 
something which all men, everywhere, at all times ought to have, something which 
no one may be deprived of without a grave affront to justice, something which is 
owing to every human being simply because he is human’.36 Similarly, while 
Gordon defines human rights as moral rights of high priority,37 Baehr thinks that 
human rights are values, standards or rules regulating state actions towards their 
citizens and non-citizens.38 However, understanding human rights on the basis of 
morality that are not internationally agreed can be detrimental to an international 
consensus and understanding of human rights because of the culturally diverse 
nature of the globe. For instance, protection of rights may be subject to domestic 
religious/cultural values or legal system, which makes it problematic to advance 
the UN human rights approach under the UDHR.   
Human rights definition has been attempted from its legal relationship 
characteristics. For instance, human rights law provides a relationship between 
the state and the individual on the one hand, and between the state and the 
                                       
33 Marie- Beneditcte Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 1. 
34 Rhoda Howard, Human Rights and the Search for Community (Westview Press, 1995) 57. 
35 Ibid; IIgu Ozler, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Progress and Challenges’ (2018) 32 (4) Ethics 
and International Affairs, 395; Durga Das Basu, Human Rights in Constitutional Law (Prentice-Hall of India, 
1994) 5. However, such an approach seems to be too generalised because not all entitlements to human beings 
can be classified as human rights in our relativistic world. According to Henkin, human rights are universal rights 
accruing to all human beings that are fundamental to human existence, which can neither be forfeited, transferred 
nor waived. See, Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press, 1990) 2. 
36 Alison Rentein, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (Sage, 1990) 47. 
37 John-Stewart Gordon ‘Human Rights and Cultural Identity’ (2015) 8 (2) Baltic Journal of Law and Politics, 
112.  
38 Peter Baehr, Human Rights: Universality in Practice (Palgrave Macmillan Press Limited, 1999) 1. 
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international community, on the other.39 In this regard, abuse of human rights 
establishes a possibility of investigation and litigation in either the international 
(regional) or national institutions.40 Hence, Easterly41 defines human rights as ‘one 
where a human rights crusader could identify WHOSE rights are being violated 
and WHO is the violator’. In his analysis, Easterly further asserts that such an 
understanding of human rights is what has historically led to human rights 
progress across the globe.42 The main benefit of this definition is that it provides 
a clear understanding of the parties to human rights complaints. 
In spite of the above attempts at defining human rights, there is no 
unanimity of view in the definition of human rights by legal and political writers.43 
In this vein, Gasiokwu concluded that every attempted definition of human rights 
is often blighted by the authors’ philosophical and ideological predisposition.44 
Despite the absence of an internationally accepted definition of human rights, one 
thing that is certain in the 21st century is that human beings have rights: human 
rights. Hence, the difficulty of accepting an international definition of human rights 
is not a problem in the contemporary world because virtually every international 
human rights treaty contains a list of rights which member states must recognise, 
respect and enforce. Nevertheless, enforcement of international law is linked with 
recognition.  
For many decades since the international recognition of contemporary 
human rights, enforcement is very often problematic.45 Nakagaki refers to 
                                       
39 Todd Landman, ‘The Scope of Human Rights: From Background Concept to Indicators’ (2005) Paper prepared 
for the AHRI-COST Action meeting, Oslo, available at >http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/R22302.pdf<  accessed 
26 September 2018. 
40 Sirkku Hellsten, ‘Human Rights in Africa: From Communitarian Values to Utilitarian Practice’ (2004) 5 (2) 
Human Rights Review, 61.  
41 William Easterly, ‘Poverty is not a Human Rights Violation’ (Aid Watch, 5 June 2009), available at > 
http://www.nyudri.org/aidwatcharchive/2009/06/amnesty-international-responds-to-poverty-is-not-a-human-
rights-violation< accessed 26 September, 2018. 
42 Ibid.  
43 John-Stewart Gordon ‘Human Rights and Cultural Identity’ (n 37 above); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: A 
Very Short Introduction (n 2 above) 5; Christian Fernandez and David Puyana, ‘Building Human Rights, Peace 
and Development within the United Nations’ (2015) 3 Russia Law Journal, 58.  
44 Martin Gasiokwu, Human Rights: History, Ideology and Law (Fab Anieh Ltd, 2003) 1. 
45 Douglas Donoho, ‘Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century’ (2006) 35 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 1.  
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implementation gaps as the difference between laws on paper and how they 
function in practice, which can be caused by a combination of political, legal, 
economic, social and cultural factors.46 According to Nakagki, a state is bound to 
enforce rights that are recognised in its statutes as well as fulfil obligations in 
international treaties to which it is a party.47 In this regard, considerable 
international and regional efforts have been expended over time to improve 
human rights enforcement due to gaps in international human rights protection.48 
The extensive scope of human rights has led to the involvement of other 
international and sub-regional institutions in the enforcement of human rights in 
Africa. For instance, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC)49, 
and subregional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Court50 and Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Tribunal.51 The ICC is an international independent judicial institution for 
                                       
46 Maiko Nakagaki, ‘Closing the Implementation Gap’ in Centre for International Private Enterprise and Global 
Integrity (eds), Improving Public Governance: Closing the Implementation Gap between Law and Practice, 
(2013) Centre for International Private Enterprise, available at > https://www.cipe.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/GI-CIPE_Implementation-Gap_for-web.pdf< accessed 14 June 2018. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Douglas Donoho, ‘Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century’ (n 45 above). 
49 The Rome Statute was adopted in 1998 as the first permanent international tribunal to prosecute heinous crimes 
and by meeting Article 126 requirement, the Rome Statute came into force on July 1, 2002. The ICC is a creation 
of the Rome Statute, which is the product of extensive efforts to commit states towards an international judicial 
system, resulting from the successful outings of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals respectively, as well as the 
ad hoc tribunals for the trial of Rwandan and Yugoslavian genocides.  The ICC is an international independent 
judicial institution for prosecutions of heinous international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes. See, Benjamin Appel, ‘In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court: Does the ICC Deter 
Human Rights Violations?’ (2016) 62 (1) Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3; Catherine Gegout, ‘The International 
Criminal Court: Limit, Potential and Conditions for the Promotion of Justice and Peace’ (2013) 5 Third World 
Quarterly, 800; Enyew Alebachew, ‘The Relationship between International Criminal Court and Africa: From 
Cooperation to Confrontation? (2015) 3 Bahir Dar University Journal of Law, 1. 
50 The West African sub-regional institution known and called ECOWAS was established on May 28, 1975, by 
Heads of States and Governments in West Africa sequel to the signing of the treaty of Lagos. It originally 
comprises of sixteen states within the West African sub-region, but Mauritania opted out in 2000. These are Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Cape Verde. For further details, see, Femi Falana, ECOWAS Court: Law and 
Practice (Legaltex Publishing Company, 2010) 1; Muhammed Ladan,  Introduction to ECOWAS, Community 
Law, Integration, Migration, Human Rights, Access to Justice, Peace and Security (Ahmadu Bello University 
Press, 2009) 1.  
51 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a political and economic institution that provides a 
framework for regional integration. Although the SADC started as the Frontline States whose objective was 
political liberation of Southern Africa, it was preceded by the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC), which was formed on April 01, 1980 with the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration.  
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prosecutions of heinous international crimes such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.52 As a court of last resort in the fight to end impunity 
and grievous crimes, its jurisdiction covers crimes committed by State Parties and 
non-State Parties where such state willingly accepts the court’s jurisdiction or 
where a situation is referred to the prosecutor by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) under article 13 (b). On the other hand, sub-regional bodies such 
as the ECOWAS and SADC focus more on inter-governmental relations through 
the advancement of economic integration in West Africa. The trends towards sub-
regionalism are in part, an outcome of the necessity of pooling national resources 
for protection in a divided world buffeted on all sides by conflicts and economic 
crisis.53 In 1992, however, ECOWAS commissioned a review of its founding treaty, 
and the resultant report recommended a shift from an exclusive focus on inter-
governmental relations to other factors including human rights.54 The Revised 
ECOWAS Treaty as part of its fundamental principles, urged states parties to 
among other objectives to recognise, promote and protect the human and people’s 
rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights.55 The recognition of human rights as a fundamental value in the 
Revised Treaty is of great importance as it assimilates human rights into common 
political values underpinning integration that will lead to the establishment of an 
economic union. Similarly, the Treaty of the SADC being mindful of the need to 
involve the people of the region further recognised human rights as one of its 
principles.56 However, in recent years, SADC governments have taken 
retrogressive steps to weaken and undermine key human rights protection 
mechanisms – SADC Tribunal, by stripping it of its mandate to receive complaints 
                                       
52 See generally, Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 2012. Serious international crime is defined in article 2 (b) of the Organized 
Crime Convention as meaning ‘conduct constituting an offence punishable by maximum of deprivation of liberty 
of at least four years or a more serious penalty’. See also, article 5-8 of the Rome Statute.   
53 Henry Alisigwe, ‘Regionalism as a Tool for International Economic Development’ in Uba Nnabue (ed) Themes 
on Law of Development (ApplauseB Multi-Sectors Ltd, 2017) 273.  
54 Femi Falana, ECOWAS Court: Law and Practice (n 50 above) 3.  
55 See Article 4(g) of the Revised Treaty. In the main, the Community Court was clothed with a human rights 
jurisdiction. See also, Muhammed Ladan,  Introduction to ECOWAS, Community Law, Integration, Migration, 
Human Rights, Access to Justice, Peace and Security (n 50 above) 268.  
56 Paragraph 7 to the preamble of the SADC and article 4 (c) of the SADC Treaty.  
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from individuals and organisations, leaves it only to adjudicate between member 
states disputes.57 
The fundamental question of this thesis is: are human rights adequately 
recognised and enforced under the African Charter, especially the civil and political 
rights category?58 Where the answer to this question is positive, then one is left 
with the challenges of enforcement. However, where the answer is negative and 
indicates normative inadequacies as to coincide with the justification for this 
thesis, it raises other fundamental questions. It will be highlighted in this thesis 
that both normative shortcomings and weak enforcement mechanisms erode the 
essence of having regional human rights systems as safety nets. Therefore, this 
thesis will demonstrate that with appropriate reforms to the African Charter 
frameworks, the civil and political rights provisions can be effectively realised. 
Such reform has become necessary given the increasing violations of civil and 
political rights in many African countries and the ineptitude of existing AU organs 
in meeting their human rights obligations.59 Meanwhile, this thesis will examine 
the provisions of the UDHR, ICCPR, the ECHR and American Convention as a 
foundation for the analysis of the African Charter protection of civil and political 
rights. Specifically, it is essential to note that these human rights instruments 
                                       
57 Human Rights Watch, ‘SADC: Recommit to Human Rights Protection’ (2017) available at > 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/07/sadc-recommit-human-rights-protection< accessed 19 October 2019.  
58 In this study, therefore, while the term ‘African human rights system’ refers to the numerous human rights 
norms and their institutions under the African Union, the term ‘African Charter system’ remains specific to the 
African Charter and its enforcement institutions; namely, the African Commission and African Court. Further, in 
the light of the above discussion, categories of rights are used to refer to various classification or generation of 
human rights; namely, civil and political rights, socio-economic rights, and group or collective rights. 
59 Extensive discussion on the AU is conducted in chapter 4 to evaluate the role and relevance of the AU to 
regional human rights enforcement.  
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predate the African Charter and have the potential to act as a source of inspiration 
to African Charter jurisprudence60 and reforms.61  
1.1 Background and statement of the problem  
The world over, human rights litigators, activists, and scholars actively seek for 
means to ensure effective enforcement of human rights. This is evident following 
the international, regional and national struggle to effectively guarantee the full 
enjoyment of rights enshrined in various human rights instruments. However, in 
spite of the normative success in different human rights instruments, the focus on 
human rights has shifted to the enforcement of the distinct human rights 
instruments, including the African Charter.62 In this regard, overcoming 
enforcement gaps would require approaches that focus on improving the quality 
of laws and enhancing entities that have the mandate of enforcement.63 This study 
is undertaken because institutions and norms for human rights protection in Africa 
are inadequate to guarantee the effective realisation of civil and political rights 
enforcement.  
Human rights, primarily civil and political rights violations have remained 
rife in many African countries. Evidenced in the case law jurisprudence at the 
African Court and the African Commission, complaints against arbitrary killing, 
                                       
60 Article 60 provides that the African ‘Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and 
peoples’ rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples’ rights, the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of human 
and peoples’ rights as well as provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialised Agencies of the 
United Nations’. However, article 61 enshrines that ‘the Commission shall also take into consideration, as 
subsidiary measures to determine the principles of law, other general or specific international conventions, laying 
down rules expressly recognised by member states of the Organisation of African Unity, African practices 
consistent with international norms on human and peoples’ rights, customs generally accepted as law, general 
principles of law recognised by African states as well as legal precedents and doctrine’.  
61 Article 68 of the African Charter enshrines that the African Charter may be amended at the request of a state 
party. 
62 Hurst Hannum, ‘Reinvigorating Human Rights for the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law 
Review, 409; Eric Posner, ‘The Case against Human Rights’ available at > 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights< accessed 14 December 2018; 
Terry Collinsworth, ‘The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanism’ (2002) 15 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, 183. 
63 Maiko Nakagaki, ‘et al, ‘Closing the Implementation Gap’ in Centre for International Private Enterprise and 
Global Integrity (eds) Improving Public Governance: Closing the Implementation Gap between Law and Practice 
(n 46 above). 
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torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, oppression of press freedom, 
restriction on movement and expression, severe discrimination and killing of 
unarmed protesters have remained dominant across the African continent.64 
However, these violations seem to have more resonance in states which are under 
oppressive regimes,65 pre and post-electoral violence,66 internal armed conflicts,67 
and terrorism.68 Part of the reason for the poor realisation of effective enforcement 
of the African Charter rights is because the African Charter lacks ‘teeth’ to ensure 
its implementation,69 and other peculiar challenges such as restricted access to 
the African Charter institutions70 and poor state party compliance with decisions 
                                       
64 See generally, chapter 3 discussion on case law jurisprudence and the several reports of international human 
rights bodies on several African states such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, amongst others. For 
instance, between January and May 2019, armed security agents in Nigeria, Sudan, Mali and Benin have killed 
many unarmed protesters. See, BBC News, ‘Sudan Crisis: Official admits to 46 Protest Deaths’ 2019, 06 June, 
available at > https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-48535165< accessed 23 September 2019.  
65 According to Freedom House Report 2018, several African states including Ethiopia, Libya, Central African 
Republic, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Nigeria, South Sudan, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mauritania, 
Chad, Algeria, Angola, Congo, and South Sudan are some of the leading states with the least civil liberties and 
political rights. Furthermore, elections have over time brought about violence in some African states such as 
Nigeria, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Ethiopia. See, Analysis from Freedom 
House: Freedom in the World 2018, available > https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-
2018<, accessed 28 June 2018.  
66 Electoral violence is another dominant factor in many African states. See, Arthur Goldsmith, ‘Elections and 
Civil Violence in New Multiparty Regimes: Evidence from Africa’ (2015) 52 (5) Journal of Peace Research, 607.   
67 Some of the states affected by armed conflicts in Africa are South Sudan, Central African Republic, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya and Somalia. Electoral violence prior and after the Nigeria 2019 
elections resulted in the destruction of property and killing of over 39 persons. See, ‘Dozens killed in election 
violence in Nigeria’ available at >https://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/west-africa/2019/02/25/dozens-killed-in-
election-violence-in-nigeria/< accessed 24 May 2019.  
68 According to 2017 Global Terrorism Index, available at > 
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf< accessed 22 June 2018, the 
following African states are engulfed in different forms of terrorism: Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Libya, Egypt and 
Somalia. Terrorism is a major threat to civil and political rights enjoyment in many African countries in a twofold 
way. First, the armed groups have no obligation to abide by international human rights treaties. Secondly, 
governments in their quest to fight terrorism either limit the enjoyment of some human rights such as the right to 
freedom of expression and the press, prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment, and right to personal liberty.   
69 According to Claude Welch, not establishing a judicial body for enforcement is an indictment on the African 
region and a clear signal of refusal to give up bad human rights habits. Although the creation of the African Court 
may have remedied this defect, it seems not to have wholly solved the challenge facing the region. See, Claude 
Welch, Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Roles and Strategies of Non-Governmental Organisations (University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1995) 151.  
70 Kevin Hopkins, 'The Effect of an African Court on the Domestic Legal Order of African States', (2002) 2 (2) 
African Human Rights Law Journal, 235. Article 58 of the African charter mandates the African Commission to 
draw the attention of the Assembly of Head of States and Government to cases when it finds series of serious or 
massive violations of human and peoples’ rights and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government may further 
request the African Commission to undertake an in-depth study of this violations.  
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of the Court and the Commission.71 Notwithstanding, this thesis will demonstrate 
that the following may be contributory to poor civil and political rights enforcement 
in many African countries- (i) absence of a human rights department in the African 
Union (ii) inadequate post-adjudication procedure for enforcement of findings (iii) 
inadequate pressure from the AU on member states, and (iv) inadequate or 
conflicting constitutional protection in many African countries. In all, there is no 
gainsaying that the success of the African Charter depends on the willingness of 
African states to incorporate, respect and enforce human rights in their national 
laws even when in conflict with national courts, laws or ideologies.  
1.2 Argument  
Contemporary challenges in the area of international human rights discourse have 
moved from the desirability of rights to enforcement. In its entirety, one can agree 
that the process of norm-setting has been positively achieved through the 
adoption of the UDHR, ICCPR, and other UN and regional human rights treaties. 
On the regional level, efforts are being made to promote and protect human rights 
in Africa using the African Charter and its mechanisms. In the same vein, the 
European regional human rights system has been applauded for protecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms using the ECHR and its Protocols.72 However, 
the same cannot be said about the effectiveness of the African regional system.73 
This is because the African Charter norms and institutions are inadequate to 
                                       
71 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa: Assessing the Role of the African 
Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1987-2018)’ (2018) 7 International Human Rights Law 
Review, 1.   
72 James Hart, ‘The European Human Rights System’ (2010) 102 Law Librarian Journal, 533; Jean Allen, 
‘Comparing the European and the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights’ in Jean Allen (ed) A Century of 
International Adjudication: The Rule of Law and its Limits (T. M. C. Asser Press, 2000) 93; Jean-Claude Mignon, 
‘European Court of Human Rights is not Perfect, but it’s still Precious’ (April 19, 2012) The Guardian, available 
at > https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/apr/19/european-court-of-human-rights-human-rights< accessed 22 
March 2019. However, the European system cannot be said to be wholly comprehensive, it is also facing 
difficulties such as backlog of cases and state party compliance with decisions.  
73 George Mugwanya, Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African Regional Human 
Rights System, (note 1 above) pg 26. However, it is also argued that that the adoption of the African Charter 
reflected the will and aspirations of the African people and therefore has met the standards of an international bill 
of rights. See generally, El-Obaid Ahmed and Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, ‘Human Rights in Africa: A New 
Perspective on Linking the Past to the Future’ (n 23 above). See also, James Fawcett, The Application of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Clarendon Press, 1987); John Wright, ‘The European Convention on 
Human Rights: An Analysis and Appraisal’ (1977) 3 (2) Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 119.  
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effectively guarantee human rights protection across the continent.74 This 
assertion is founded on human rights abuse history in many African countries and 
several ongoing violations across all regions of the continent.75 Therefore, in the 
absence of effective enforcement of human rights treaties, the idea of ‘free human 
beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want’76 
remain empty thoughts. On this note, this thesis will argue that despite making 
some progress in the area of human rights law protection, Africa has not 
adequately realised the effective enforcement of civil and political rights.   
1.3 Justification of the thesis 
This thesis consists of different components prompting an interesting subject in 
need of scholarly justification. This section is relevant because it looks at the 
underpinning reasons for conducting this research.  
1.3.1 Justification for analysing the African Charter  
The context of the African Charter norms and enforcement institutions have 
continued to attract scholarly attention due to the unfortunate human rights 
situation in many African countries. Therefore, this analysis of the African Charter 
is essential for two primary reasons. First, the African Charter, as the core regional 
human rights instrument, contains different categories of rights, which permit 
scholarly appraisal of any of the categories of rights. As will be seen in the 
literature review, while the socio-economic rights and peoples’ rights have 
received considerable attention, there is a paucity of academic literature on a 
holistic analysis of the African Charter civil and political rights. Where such 
literature exists, such analysis focuses on specific rights that form part of the civil 
                                       
74 Vincent Nmehielle, ‘Development of the African Human Rights System in the Last Decade’ (n 23 above); Osita 
Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems (n 13 above). 
75 At present, the following countries are undergoing one form of conflict or another- Sudan, South Sudan, Mali, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Burundi, Somalia, Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Uganda, 
Egypt, Nigeria, and Niger. Suffice to mention that human rights abuses in these countries are caused by one or 
more of the following- totalitarian leadership, terrorism, lack of rule of law, lack of independent judiciary, poor 
electoral procedures, and internal armed conflicts. See, Amnesty International, ‘Rights Today in Africa-2018’, 
available at > https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/12/rights-today-2018-africa/< accessed 29 
September 2019.  
76 See paragraph 3 to the preamble of the ICCPR.  
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and political rights at the national level but not as a group of rights/category 
promulgated by the African Charter.  
Secondly, the drafters of the African Charter did not intend it to be static.77 
Although the African Charter has witnessed some level of transformation such as 
the establishment of the African Commission and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples Court,78 it is still awaiting the coming into force of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights. On this note, new insights towards realising the Charter 
rights can be accommodated given the opportunity provided in articles 66 and 
68.79 Primarily, the idea of articles 66 and 68 demonstrate that the Charter is 
dynamic and can be amended or reformed. Principally, this thesis analyses the 
African Charter civil and political rights category with a view to suggesting effective 
means of enforcement.80  
1.3.2 Justification for studying civil and political rights  
Civil and political rights have both instrumental and intrinsic value to human 
dignity. The inherent value of civil and political rights focuses on the legitimacy of 
civil and political rights which will not be denied to any individual on the basis of 
race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, or disability while the instrumental value 
focuses on the realisation of civil and political rights as a means of enhancing 
human dignity and equality.81 Civil and political rights promote individual 
entitlement to an entirely adequate scheme of equal fundamental liberties.82 
Therefore, the realisation of civil and political rights creates a duty for state parties 
to ensure that their institutions do not interfere in the protection and observance 
of these rights. In other words, the enjoyment of civil and political rights has the 
                                       
77 Articles 66 and 68 of the African Charter permits the enactment of Special Protocols or agreements, if necessary, 
and the amendment of the present Charter.  
78 This has been applauded as a significant evolution in the African Charter system. See, Nsongurua Udombana, 
‘Towards the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than Never’ (2000) 3 (2) Yale Human 
Rights and Development Journal, 1. 
79 See note 69 above.  
80 An ‘analysis’ principally involves a detailed examination or inquiry into something. See generally, English 
Oxford Living Dictionary, available at > https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/analysis< accessed 11 
December 2018. 
81 See the preamble to the ICCPR, paragraphs 1 and 3. 
82 John Rewls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press, 2001) 42. 
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potential to restrict government interference in issues such as the individual 
ownership of property.83 However, guaranteeing this category of rights does not 
involve enormous economic or financial resources, unlike socio-economic rights.84 
Civil and political rights enjoy universal recognition and acceptance.85 In the 
international sphere, while this category of rights forms the bulk of the UDHR, the 
UN through the ICCPR has further accepted it as the binding rights of individuals. 
In addition, the ICCPR has been adjudged one of the most important human rights 
treaties in the contemporary world, given its universal coverage of rights and 
broad application to individuals.86 Such recognition accorded to civil and political 
rights is evident in African countries’ constitutions which guarantee most civil and 
political rights as fundamental rights as against socio-economic rights which are 
recognised as Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy.87 
In comparison with socio-economic rights, some international human rights 
instruments forbid violations of certain civil and political rights by state parties 
even in time of war or public emergencies.88 No socio-economic right enjoys this 
privilege. Whereas this attests the importance of civil and political rights to human 
dignity and existence, it indicates international rejection of some of the pre-World 
Wars atrocities such as slavery, torture, and arbitrary deprivation of life. In this 
regard, there is a need for academic research towards realising effective 
enforcement of this category of human rights.  
                                       
83 Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights (Yale University Press, 1998) 216-217. 
84 While this position is maintained because some socio-economic rights such as the right to healthcare, education 
and work require huge financial commitment in terms of construction, recruitment, training and remuneration. 
However, such is not required for the enjoyment of many civil and political rights. This is not to suggest that the 
use of law enforcement agents to maintain peace and order or the conduct of elections do not impose financial 
burden on government.  
85 Berta Hernandez-Truyol, ‘Civil and Political Rights- An Introduction’ (1997) University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review, 223. 
86 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials 
and Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2013) 4. To further show the level of interest by African 
States in the enforcement of civil and political rights, all African states have ratified the ICCPR expect South 
Sudan and Western Sahara whereas the ICSECR is ratified by all African States except South Sudan, 
Mozambique, Botswana, and Western Sahara. See, Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, available at > 
http://indicators.ohchr.org/< accessed 18 March 2019.  
87 For instance, see chapter 2 and 4 of 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.  
88 For instance, see article 4 of ICCPR and article 15 of ECHR. 
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1.3.3 Justification for studying ‘realising effective enforcement’ 
Human rights are meaningless when they cannot be exercised; hence, 
enforcement is vital to international law. Enforcement remains a significant 
problem facing international law, and this is primarily due to the principle of 
sovereignty.89 Enforcement signifies the efforts in making sure a rule, standard, 
policy or court order is appropriately followed.90 Thus, enforcement is a relative 
term that is synonymous with fulfilling rights and privileges highlighted in 
international laws. In practice, state parties, while ratifying international treaties 
commit themselves to its realisation, which includes compliance with the decisions 
from related monitoring and enforcement bodies.91 However, this has turned out 
to be the most difficult challenge facing 21st-century international human rights 
law.92 Therefore, in the absence of effective enforcement, efforts put together 
during negotiation and enactment of international human rights treaties are a 
waste of time and resources. 
In order to achieve effective enforcement, international human rights 
instruments have monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.93 Therefore, realising 
effective enforcement of the African Charter provisions entails the use of the 
African Court and the African Commission to compel state party obedience or the 
use of national courts and other related institutions against persons and 
government agencies, where African Charter rights and freedoms are recognised 
in state party legislation or constitution. However, the power of these institutions 
to compel obedience to the provisions of these treaties may vary.  
                                       
89 Andrew Guzman, ‘The Consent Problem in International Law’ (2011) Berkeley Program in Law and 
Economics, Work Papers, available at > https://escholarship.org/content/qt04x8x174/qt04x8x174.pdf< accessed 
11 December 2018; Anu Bradford and Omri Ben-Shahar, ‘Efficient Enforcement in International Law’ (2010) 
Chicago Journal of International Law, 375. 
90 Blacks Law Free Online Dictionary, (2nd edn), available at > https://thelawdictionary.org/enforcement/< 
accessed 11 December 2018.  
91 Roger-Claude Liwanga, ‘From Commitment to Compliance: Enforceability of Remedial Orders of African 
Human Rights Bodies’ (2015) 41 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 99. 
92 Douglas Donoho, ‘Human Rights Enforcement in the 21st Century’ (n 45 above) 1. 
93 For example, while the ICCPR is enforced and monitored through the Human Rights Committee, the various 
regional human rights treaties are enforced through specific regional institutions established for such purpose.  
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1.4 Research aim and objectives  
Civil and political rights promote ‘the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and 
political freedom and freedom from fear and want’.94 To enjoy such freedom, the 
international community need to strengthen human rights instruments to enhance 
effective realisation. Thus, this thesis will add to existing knowledge of the African 
human rights system and will suggest new insights into how civil and political 
rights can be effectively enforced. As such, this study seeks to explore: 
i. How effective enforcement of civil and political rights can be realised by 
examining the African Charter normative and institutional provisions.  
1.5  Research questions 
The central question this thesis seeks to investigate is:  
“How and what extent can the enforcement of civil and political rights in the African 
Charter be effectively realised in contemporary Africa?”   
The sub-questions arising from the research question are: 
i. What are the prospects and challenges to effective enforcement of 
the African Charter civil and political rights provisions? 
ii. To what extent does the African Charter meet the international 
standard on civil and political rights?  
iii. How has the African Charter institutions interpreted and applied civil 
and political rights provisions and to what extent have state parties 
met their obligations under the African Charter?  
                                       
94 See generally, preamble to the ICCPR, paragraph 3. 
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1.6 Contribution of the thesis 
Previous studies of the African human rights system have dealt in detail with issues 
such as socio-economic rights,95 the country-based human rights approach,96 the 
separate analysis of the African Charter institutions,97 or the evaluation of the 
African Charter system.98 These studies have raised different issues on the 
challenges facing the African human rights system. Nonetheless, this thesis will 
go further by analysing the entire African Charter civil and political rights, how 
these rights have been interpreted, and the state party compliance with civil and 
political rights decisions from the African Charter institutions. In so doing, this 
thesis will provide a piece of updated information on state party compliance with 
decisions from the African Charter institutions.99 In particular, this thesis will 
contribute to knowledge in many ways: 
 Firstly, this thesis closes the gap in literature by analysing civil and political 
rights provisions under the African Charter. It advances the academic 
debate on the African human rights system by adding to the body of 
literature on the African Charter system and international civil and political 
                                       
95 Tulia Ackson, ‘Justiciability of Socio-economic Rights in Tanzania’ (2015) 23 (3) African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 359; Oguagu Ikpeze, ‘Non-Justiciability of Chapter II of the Nigerian 
Constitution as an Impediment to Economic Rights and Development’ (2015) 5 (18) 48; Christain-Jr Nkongolo, 
‘The Justiciability of Socio-economic Rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Appraisal 
and Perspective Three Decades After its Adoption’ (2014) 22 (3) African Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 492; Taiwo Olaiya, ‘Interrogating the Non-Justiciability of Constitutional Directive Principles and Public 
Policy Failure in Nigeria’ (2015) 8 (3) Journal of Politics and Law, 23; Ajepe Shehu, ‘The Enforcement of Social 
and Economic Rights in Africa: The Nigerian Experience’ (2013) 2 Afe Babalola University Journal of 
Sustainable Development Law and Policy, 101.  
96 John Mubangizi, ‘Some Reflections on Two Decades of Human Rights Protection in South Africa: Lessons and 
Challenges’ (2014) 22 (3) African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 512; Micheal Wambali, ‘The 
Enforcement of Basic Rights and Freedoms and the State of Judicial Activism in Tanzania’ (2009) 53 Journal of 
African Law, 34. 
97 Gina Bekker, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Remedies for Human Rights 
Violations’ (2013) 13 (3) Human Rights Review, 499; Michelo Hansungule, ‘African Courts and the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Anton Bosl and Joseph Diescho (eds), Human Rights in Africa: 
Legal Perspectives on their Protection and Promotion (Macmillan, 2009) 233; Gina Bekker, ‘The African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the Interest of African States’ (2007) 51 Journal of African Law, 
151. 
98 Ziyad Motala, ‘Human Rights in Africa: A Cultural. Ideological and Legal Examination’ (n 23 above). 
99 The only attempt at investigating the implementation and compliance of the findings of the regional institutions 
was by Racheal Murray and Debra Long, The Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2015). This work, however, concentrated only on the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights without understudying the African Court findings.  
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rights under the ICCPR by submitting contemporary issues in this subject 
area.  
 Secondly, through an analysis of civil and political rights norms and case 
law jurisprudence, this thesis will evaluate whether the African Charter 
meets the international standard on civil and political rights. Therefore, it 
fits into a more extensive research geared towards understanding the 
international concept, origin, development and pursuit of human rights with 
particular reference to civil and political rights.  
 Thirdly, this study advances academic knowledge of state party compliance 
with the decisions of the African Court and African Commission. This 
contribution is necessary because it will highlight the difference between 
human rights theory and practice, and the overall state party attitude 
towards their human rights obligations.  
 Finally, this study will suggest new insights for realising the effective 
enforcement of civil and political rights and the African Charter in general. 
Hence, this research findings would act as a guide for policymakers in 
reforming the regional human rights system.  
1.7 Overview of literature  
Particularly in the international human rights context, there is a wealth of scholarly 
writing to demonstrate its progress, prospects and challenges. Against this 
backdrop, a review of literature is necessary for academic research of this sort 
because it sets out to acknowledge and critique existing research on the subject 
of this thesis. However, this thesis does not attempt to review the exhaustive list 
of literature in the international human rights field but would concentrate on 
relevant articles under the following two categories: universalism and regional 
human rights; and, the African Charter system.  
 Reviewing the literature under these headings is directly relevant to the aim 
and objective of the thesis. For instance, while the literature on universalism and 
regional human rights is essential to demonstrate international efforts and 
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agreement on the minimum standard of rights, the literature on the African 
Charter system will illustrate the progress and challenges that face the regional 
system.100 In this vein, the relevant primary and secondary source is vital to this 
section. For instance, while literature contained in non-governmental 
organisations reports are expository to expose human rights situations in 
countries, the several human rights treaties101 and resolutions102 drafted by the 
OAU (now, AU) towards adequate human rights protection are examined against 
the reality and practice in concerned state parties.103  
1.7.1 Universalism and regional human rights literature  
This section is relevant to this thesis because it forms the basis of chapter two, 
which partly examines the UN standards of civil and political rights under the UDHR 
and the ICCPR. The standards set in these instruments form the basis on which 
the African Charter normative provisions are appraised in order to verify if they 
meet the international standard on civil and political rights. Thus, the first 
                                       
100 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa: Assessing the Role of the African 
Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (n 71 above); Tom Daly and Micha Wiebusch, ‘The 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Mapping Resistance against a young Court’ (2018) 14 (2) 
International Journal of Law in Context, 294; Edward Kannayo, Human rights in Africa: Problems and Prospects 
(1980) A Report prepared for the International League for Human Rights (Human Rights Working Paper); Fatsah 
Onguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity 
and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (n 23 above); Ziyad Motola, ‘Human Rights in Africa: A cultural, 
Ideological and Legal Examination’ (n 23 above); Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (n 23 above); Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Suggestions for 
more (n 23 above); Rachel Murray, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1987-2000: An Overview 
of its Prospects and Problems’ (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal, 1; Vincent Nmehielle, ‘Development 
of the African Human Rights System in the Last Decade’ (n 23 above); Osita Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some 
Selected Problems (n 13 above); Makau Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprints: An 
Evaluation of the Language of Duties’ (n 23 above); EI-Obaid Ahmed EI-Obaid and Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, 
Human Rights in Africa: A New Perspective on Linking the Past to the Future (n 23 above). 
101 See for instance, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981, The African Charter on the rights 
and Welfare of the Child 1990, Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women 2003; African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance 2007. 
102 See for instance, African Commission Resolution on Migration and Human Rights 2007, Resolution on the 
Protection against Violence and other human rights Violations against Persons on the basis of the real or Imputed 
Sexual Orientation on Gender Identity 2014.  
103 This is because some African human rights system literature focuses on diverser rights such as women’s rights, 
rights of the elderly, etc., and jurisdiction. See, for instance, Bukola Faturoti, ‘Women’s Rights in Africa: An 
Examination of African Human Rights System in the Context of CEDAW and the Universalism Versus Cultural 
Relativism Debate’ (2016) 3 Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, 149; Kehinde Anifalaje, ‘Implementation of 
the Right to Social Security in Nigeria’ (2017) 17 (2) African Journal of Human Rights, 413; Micheal Wambali, 
‘The Enforcement of Basic Rights and Freedoms and the State of Judicial Activism in Tanzania’ (n 96 above).  
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significant feature identified as a useful foundation for this thesis relates to the 
debate among scholars on the application and recognition of a common standard 
of international human rights. This debate gained prominence following the 
adoption of the UDHR, which is acclaimed as comprising a common standard for 
human rights.104 However, this debate has been informed by the divide arising 
from the clash of socio-cultural and ideological differences between various 
scholars and political leaders.105  
Eide and Gudmundur106 emphasised that the philosophical source of the 
UDHR after World War II are the intrinsic human dignity and inalienable nature of 
rights. Whether this emphasis is correct, one can argue that the atrocities of World 
War II exposed the capacity of nations to debase the human being. Thus, in the 
absence of such international standards, there may be a repeat of such atrocities. 
Further, Donnelly107 and Lassen108 agree that human rights are based on natural 
law and remain the rights of every individual solely by their being human and 
irrespective of any contingencies or conditions. These scholars have two things in 
common. The first is the consensus on a universal right approach, which is justified 
based on the inherent dignity and freedom of human persons. The second is that 
a common standard presupposes a common idea for the new international order.  
A significant feature identified by the proponents of the universal human 
rights approach is that human rights standards must be applied and justified at all 
times irrespective of religion, political, culture, or the social and economic 
background of states’.109 This approach supports total conformity to the shared 
                                       
104 Article 1 of the UDHR provides that ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’. 
105 Brooke Ackerly, Universal Human Rights in a World of Difference (Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
Kathryn McNeilly, ‘Reclaiming the Radical in Universal Human Rights’ (2015) 4 International Human Rights 
Law Review, 256. 
106 Asbjorn Eide and Alfredsson Gudmundur, ‘Introduction’ in Asbjorn Eideet al (eds), The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights: A Commentary (Scandinavian University Press, 1992) 5. 
107 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly, 281; Jack 
Donnelly, ‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights (1984) 6 (4) Human Rights Quarterly, 400. 
108 Eva Lassen, ‘Universalism and Relativism’ in Jack Donnelly and Rhona Howard (eds), International 
Handbook on Human Rights (Greenwood Press, 1987) 39.  
109 The World Human Rights Conference further strengthened this idea following the adoption of the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action in 1993. See, paragraphs 1, 5, and 32. For a full understanding of the Vienna 
24 
 
 
perception of the standard to safeguard and preserve harmony in international 
communities for the existence and dignity of all persons. To further achieve this, 
more international instruments were adopted in 1966 to constitute a 
comprehensive codification of human rights and fundamental freedoms. On this 
note, however, Nowak110 asserts that the UDHR and the 1966 International 
Covenants represent the most authoritative minimum standard of contemporary 
human rights discourse. The adoption of further instruments at the global level 
attests to the UN determination to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small.111 Acceptance of a universal human rights approach 
is evident in the increasing practice of states to ratify UN human rights 
instruments.112  
This ideology has not gone down well with several stakeholders due to to 
its idea of human rights protection which places more value on the individual and 
is often characterised as a reflection of Western liberalism.113 As a result, such 
ideas of Western imperialism amongst other grounds have formed the basis for 
opposing a universal approach to an international human rights standard by 
proponents of the cultural relativism school of thought. Notably, proponents of 
cultural relativism are mostly scholars from the African and Asian regions.114 For 
example, African scholars argue that a universal human rights idea is inadequately 
suited to the peculiar nature of Africa’s values and situation.115 However, their 
                                       
Declaration and Programme of Action, visit, > 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx< accessed 18 March 2019.  
110 Manfred Nowak, United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N. P. Engel 
Publishers, 1993) xviii. 
111 Paragraph 2 Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
112 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, 1989) 49.  
113 Asbjorn Eide and Alfredsson Gudmumdur, ‘Introduction’ in Asbjorn Eideet et al (eds), The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary (n 106 above) 5. As will be discussed in chapter 2.2, the position 
of the individual and Western involvement in international human rights corpus is traced back to both Magna 
Carta and early revolutions in Europe and America.  
114 However, the discussion in this thesis would concentrate on the African approach to cultural relativism because 
of its direct relevance.  
115 See, for instance, Josiah Cobbah, ‘African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective’, 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly, 309; Thaddeus Metz, ‘African Values and Human Rights as Two Sides of the 
same Coin: A Reply to Oyowe’ (2014) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, 306; Makau Mutua, ‘The Banjul 
Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprints: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties’ (n 23 above); Surya 
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arguments do not contain a dissenting view on whether the UDHR standard of 
human rights is inadequate to protect human dignity.116  
Accordingly, An-Na’im,117 Mutua,118 Subedi,119 Lawry-White,120 have all 
argued that the world comprises diverse cultures, traditions, political ideologies 
and religions which cannot be understood, covered and controlled by a single set 
of encoded standards. These scholars based their arguments on the need for 
respect of strong, diverse values and local autonomy, which were lacking in some 
of the international human rights instruments. What these scholars may have 
failed to consider, however, is that explicit recognition of cultural sensitivity in 
human rights discourse has the potential to limit and sacrifice human rights on 
the altar of narrow-minded leaders or repugnant cultural values.121 
On the other hand, Lenzerini agrees that efforts to have an effective human 
rights system will require upholding human rights recognised in the cultural needs 
of societies while at the same time safeguarding a certain degree of rights for 
international human rights harmony. He further maintained that this concept 
would ensure that all persons enjoy the minimum human rights guarantee, which 
will be considered as sacred and essential for global integration.122 Similarly, 
Ibhawoh argued that the increasing globalisation of the international system and 
the interaction of diverse nations, cultures, and socio-religious ideas based on the 
universal human rights standards would be counterproductive if commendable 
                                       
Subedi, ‘Are the Principles of Human Rights “Western” Ideas? An Analysis of the Claim of the “Asian” Concept 
of the Human Rights from the Perspectives of Hinduism’ (1999) 30 (1) California Western International Law 
Journal, 45; Makau Mutua, ‘The Ideology of Human Rights’ (1996) 36, Virginia Journal of International Law, 
592. See also, Joseph Asomah, ‘Cultural Rights Versus Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the Trokosi Practice 
in Ghana and the role of Civil Society’ (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal 129.   
116 Alfred Hennelly and John Langan, (eds), Human Rights in Americas: The Struggle for Consensus (Georgetown 
University Press, 1982) 1. 
117 Abdullahi An-Na’im, ‘Human Rights in the Muslim World’ (1990) 3 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 23. 
118 Makau Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprints: An Evaluation of the Language of 
Duties’ (n 23 above).  
119 Surya Subedi, ‘Are the Principles of Human Rights “Western” Ideas? An Analysis of the Claim of the “Asian” 
Concept of the Human Rights from the Perspectives of Hinduism’ (n 115 above). 
120 Merryl Lawry-White, ‘Universality and Cosmopolitanism: Some Insights from the World of Moral Damage’ 
(2014) 3 (3) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, 719. 
121 This is because some cultural values, especially those with religious backing, may be supported by leaders 
even when they conflict with basic recognised human rights.  
122 Federico Lenzerini, Culturalization of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2014).  
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cultural values are ignored.123 However, it may seem difficult for the world to agree 
which commendable cultural values it would comprise, given that values may also 
vary from one state to another. However, Asomah, in his analysis, opined that 
cultural rights should cease to exist when its observance promotes the violation 
of the rights of others.124 The implication is that human rights will take prominence 
over custom whenever a violation occurs.  
However, given this nuance of the contemporary human rights system and 
the universalism and cultural relativism debate, the regional human rights 
arrangement has become relevant to the effective realisation of human rights 
enforcement. It is significant because it recognises, and can be traced to the local 
politics, values, and history of the particular region.125 Thus, Smith, in his work, 
admitted that regional systems are homogenous insofar as member states have 
similar political and cultural accounts.126 To a great extent, however, Houghton 
agrees that a regional human rights system promotes a universal element of 
human rights while also being culturally sensitive and without posing a barrier to 
the human rights universal ideologies.127 For example, Mbaye and Ndiaye128 in 
extolling the African Charter accept that it is today recognised as representing an 
African concept of rights and remains an extraordinary and powerful instrument 
of liberalisation and an unprecedented event in the history of Africa. In addition, 
it is significant to mention that the African Charter reaffirmed the universal 
promotion and protection of human rights as having due regard to the UDHR while 
                                       
123 Bonny Ibhawoh, ‘Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in 
the African State’ (2000) 22 (3) Human Rights Quarterly, 838.  
124 Joseph Asomah, ‘Cultural Rights Versus Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the Trokosi Practice in Ghana 
and the role of Civil Society’ (n 115 above).  
125 Rosa Freedman, Failing to Protect: The UN and the Politicisation of Human Rights (Hurst and Company, 
2014) pg 152, 160-161. 
126 Rhona Smith, International Human Rights (n 8 above) pg 87. 
127 Ruth Houghton,’ Publication Review of Rosa Freedman Failing to Protect: The UN and the Politicisation of 
Human Rights’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law, 171. 
128 Keba Mbaye and Birame Ndiaye, ‘The Organisation of African Unity’ in Karel Visak and Philip Alston (eds), 
The International Dimension of Human Rights (2nd edn, Greenwood Press, 1982) 583. 
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also taking into consideration the historical tradition and values of African 
civilisation.129  
 The idea of a regional human rights system has reduced the impact of the 
universalism and cultural relativism debate, while also providing a unique platform 
for effective enforcement of human rights. Viljoen,130 in discussing African regional 
protection, concentrated more on Africa’s contribution to international human 
rights development. In his work, he identified some attributes of the African 
human rights system that have added value to universal human rights discourse; 
for instance, the inclusion and justiciability of various categories of rights.131 
Mutua132 agrees that another contribution is the novel creation of peoples’ rights 
to reflect the pre-colonial African societies’ communal foundation without 
underscoring the individual scope of the international human rights system. He 
acknowledged that individual rights were defined in group or peoples’ rights 
through which the individual would express such rights.133 However, one will agree 
that the atmosphere of the debate over human rights standards seems to have 
reduced in Africa since the adoption of the African Charter. This polarised debate 
appears to have given way to a broad consensus that there is indeed a set of 
standard rights which Africa has accepted through its indigenous human rights 
standard. Therefore, contemporary human rights discourse has shifted to 
innovative suggestions towards ensuring enforcement of these regional 
instruments. 
1.7.2 Inspiring literature on the African Charter system 
This section explains what is known on this subject area. It will form the basis of 
the additional finding of this thesis to the body of existing knowledge of the African 
                                       
129 Preamble of the African Charter, paragraphs 4 and 5. In a similar vein, article 37 of Vienna Declaration 
emphasised the importance of a regional approach in the promotion and protection of universal human rights 
standards. 
130 Frans Viljoen, ‘Africa’s Contribution to the Development of International Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law’ (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal, 18. 
131 Paragraph 8 of the African Charter, and 5 of Vienna Declaration.  
132 Makau Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprints: An Evaluation of the Language of 
Duties’ (n 23 above).  
133 Ibid.  
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human rights system. Consequently, this section identifies and reviews what has 
been said previously regarding the African human rights system, its enforcement 
and challenges. Without a doubt, there is a wealth of scholarly writing in the area 
of the African human rights system.134 For instance, this wealth of scholarly 
literature has attracted considerable attention from different academic fields of 
study135 and can be found as primary and secondary sources.136 Thus, this task 
would include examining relevant academic literature on the African Charter 
system.  
Consequent upon the advent of the African Charter, it received accolades 
as the first significant attempt by African governments at giving Africans 
indigenous instruments for human rights protection.137 However, Umozuruike,138 
Eze,139 and Bello,140 in their assessment of the newly adopted African Charter, 
opined that governments were unwilling to give up their privileges of human rights 
violations. According to them, this fear was exemplified in the five years it took 
for the Charter to come into force in 1986 and the period it took to establish the 
African Commission.141 They faulted this document for several reasons, namely; 
the use of claw-back clauses, the absence of a regional court, and the absence of 
a derogation clause.142 In the main, their opinions were mixed with both outright 
enthusiasm and rejection of the African Charter provisions. For example, 
                                       
134 Instances of scholarly writings on the African human rights system can be seen in the following; Osita Eze, 
Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems (n 13 above); EI-Obaid Ahmed EI-Obaid and Kwadwo 
Appiagyei-Atua, ‘Human Rights in Africa; A New Perspective on Linking the Past to the Future’ (n 23 above); 
Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 23 above); Ziyad Motola, ‘Human 
Rights in Africa: A Cultural, Ideological, and Legal Examination’ (n 23 above). 
135 For example, scholars from the following fields of study have contributed to the available materials on human 
rights in Africa namely; international law, sociology, political science and even international relations. 
136 See generally, the bibliography, table of cases, articles, Reports and media reports of this study. 
137 Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 23 above); Osita Eze, Human Rights 
in Africa: Some Selected Problems (n 23 above); Emmanuel Bello, ‘Human Rights and African Developments’ 
(1985) Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 287. 
138 Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 23 above).  
139 Osita Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems (n 13 above). 
140 Emmanuel Bello, ‘Human Rights, African Developments’ (n 137 above) 287. 
141 The African Commission was initiated on 2nd November 1987, but its Headquarters was established in 1989 at 
Banjul, Gambia.  
142 Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 23 above); Osita Eze, Human rights 
in Africa: Some Selected Problems (n 13 above); Emmanuel Bello, ‘Human Rights, African Developments’ (n 
137 above). 
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Gittleman143 described the Charter as a political document with some vague 
provisions and flexibility for the Commission from the aspect of interpretation. 
However, this observation does not fall short of the contemporary situation 
regarding the African Charter because it has not been amended since its adoption.  
Having thus underscored their initial concerns about the African Charter, 
more scholars further examined the content, structure and functions of the African 
Charter and highlighted some prospects and challenges of human rights protection 
under this system. For instance, D’Sa,144 and Rembe145 agree that although the 
adoption of the African Charter restored the tarnished image of Africa in human 
rights issues and introduced an innovative context by the inclusion of the three 
categories of human rights, its organs of protection exhibit procedural and 
structural defects. Having examined the African Charter, Rembe, for example, 
concluded that the regional commitment to upholding human rights was merely 
rhetorical rather than demonstrative. This conclusion was supported mainly by the 
absence of a regional court.146 On the other hand, while extolling the importance 
of African Charter rights, Odinkalu,147 for instance, concentrated more on the 
implementation of socio-economic rights. His study criticised the OAU for not 
considering the economic situation of member states and other factors in its 
theoretical desire to guarantee socio-economic rights.148 However, socio-economic 
rights are today recognised as non-justiciable rights in many African countries’ 
                                       
143 Richard Gittleman, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis’ (1982) 22 Val. 
Journal of International Law, 667; Richard Gittleman, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Prospects and Procedure’ in Hurst Hannum (eds), Guide to International Human Rights Practice (Macmillan, 
1984) 153-161. 
144 Rose D’Sa, ‘African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Problems and Prospects for Regional Action’ 
(1983) 10 Australian Year Book of International Law, 101; Rose D’Sa, ‘Human and Peoples Rights: Distinctive 
Features of the African Charter’ (1985) 29 Journal of African Law, 72.  
145 Nasila Rembe, The System of Protection of Human Rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: Problems and Prospects (National Institute Southern African Studies, 1991) 1-61. 
146 Ibid, 1-61.  
147 Chidi Odinkalu, ‘Analysis of Paralysis or Paralysis of Analysis? Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly, 237. 
148 Ibid. See also, Christopher Mbazira, ‘Enforcing the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Twenty Years of Redundancy, Progression and Significant Strides’ 
(2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal, 333. Mbazira found that the African Charter reflects a desire to 
produce a distinctly human rights instrument for the enjoyment of international human rights especially for not 
making the socio-economic rights subject to the available state party resources.  
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constitutions in defiance of the African Charter.149 What this practical attitude has 
shown is support for Odinkalu’s argument of failing to consider state party peculiar 
circumstances before adopting a mandatory approach of implementation and 
enforcement.   
From the preceding, it is essential to note that the demand for reform of 
the African Charter began within a few years of its existence. This demand was 
heightened following various shortcomings discovered in the African Charter. For 
instance, Heyns,150 Mbondenyi,151 and Udombana152 emphasised the need for the 
establishment of a regional court to aid in providing effective enforcement of 
African Charter rights. Furthermore, Nmehielle, in his analysis, admitted that 
although the Commission has both a promotional and protective mandate under 
article 30 of the African Charter, its protective powers are limited when compared 
to a court.153 Thus, the Commission, being the sole enforcement mechanism prior 
to the establishment of the African Court, was the first to attract scholarly 
criticisms and scrutiny.  
Mutua posited that incredibly slow progress was recorded in the activities 
of the African Commission in carrying out article 30 mandate. He further concluded 
that the Commission has been overtly incompetent due to the disregard of 
member states in not complying with its decisions, the absence of a follow-up 
mechanism in the African Charter, and the language of the Commission in its 
                                       
149 Tulia Ackson, ‘Justiciability of Socio-economic Rights in Tanzania’ (n 95 above); Oguagu Ikpeze, ‘Non-
Justiciability of Chapter II of the Nigerian Constitution as an Impediment to Economic Rights and Development’ 
(n 95 above); Christain-Jr Nkongolo, ‘The Justiciability of Socio-economic Rights under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Appraisal and Perspective Three Decades After its Adoption’ (n 95 above); Taiwo 
Olaiya, ‘Interrogating the Non-Justiciability of Constitutional Directive Principles and Public Policy Failure in 
Nigeria’ (n 95 above); Ajepe Shehu, ‘The Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in Africa: The Nigerian 
Experience’ (n 95 above).  
150 Christof Heyns, ‘The African Human Rights System: In need of Reform’ (n 23 above). 
151 Morris Mbondenyi, ‘Improving the Substance and Content of Civil and Political Rights under the African 
Human Rights System’ (2008) 17 (2) Lesotho Law Journal, 1. 
152 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘An African Human Rights Court and an African Union Court: A Needful Duality or 
a Needless Duplication?’ (2003) 28 Brook Journal of International Law, 830. 
153 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Institutions (n 23 above) pg 
393. 
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decisions and adjudication processes.154 This submission does not wholly reflect 
contemporary position. Although delay in the African Commission process is still 
apparent, the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission 2010155 enshrine a 
follow-up procedure for the African Commission in cases where a state party fails 
to voluntarily comply with decisions.156  
In further clamour for reforms, other scholars carried out an analysis of the 
structure and effectiveness of the Commission, sometimes in comparison with the 
role of a supposed regional court. This is done because implementation of the 
Charter norms was regarded as the most pressing problem at the grassroots.157 
Agreeing that implementation is a significant challenge facing the African Charter, 
Nmehielle opined that the African Charter drafters and the OAU purposely created 
a weak regional human rights mechanism to evade accountability and 
enforcement.158 However, regarding the role of the African Commission in the 
enforcement of the African Charter, it has been submitted that many of its earliest 
decisions highlighted the incapacity to give binding decisions against state parties 
by making declaratory judgments.159 At present, while the African Commission has 
evolved past making declaratory judgments, the issues of composition, structure 
and state party compliance with findings remain constant.160  
                                       
154 Makau Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?’ (1999) 21 (2) Human Rights 
Quarterly, 342. See also, George Mugwanya, Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the 
African Regional Human Rights System (n 1 above) pg 36.  
155 Rule 112 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission 2010. 
156 Extensive discussion of this follow-up procedure is conducted in chapter 4 and 5.  
157 George Mugwanya, ‘Realising International Human Rights Norms through Regional Human Rights 
Mechanisms: Reinvigorating the African System’ (2000) 10 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, 
35. 
158 See, for example, Vincent Nmehielle, ‘Towards an African Court of Human rights: Structuring and the Court’ 
(2000) 6 Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law, 96. 
159 Jennifer Anazor, ‘Enforcement of Human Rights in Africa: A Case Study on the African Commission on 
Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights’ (2018), available at > file:///H:/SSRN-id3407770.pdf< accessed 23 October 
2019; Obinna Okere, ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American System’ (1984) 2 Human Rights Quarterly, 
141; George Mugwanya, ‘Realising International Human Rights Norms through Regional Human Rights 
Mechanisms: Reinvigorating the African System’ (n 157 above).  
160 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa: Assessing the Role of the African 
Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (n 71 above). 
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Despite the broad mandate of the African Commission, the quest for a 
regional court remained a top priority. For instance, Mutua,161 Ndombana,162 and 
Baderin163 all admitted that a Court would fill the void left by the Commission and 
enhance African Charter enforcement. Accordingly, Viljoen asserted that a 
regional court would generate more exposure and create a better human rights 
identity for the African region.164 At present, the fundamental reform clamoured 
for by these scholars being the establishment of a regional human rights court 
was met in 1998 when the Court Protocol was adopted. However, the 
establishment of the African Court has not downplayed the role of the African 
Commission because the African Commission enjoys unhindered direct individual 
and NGOs access when compared to the African Court. This observation is made 
in light of the number of state parties that have made a declaration under article 
34 (6) of the Court Protocol.165 Ironically, inadequate access to the African Court 
shifts the bulk of the discussion on human rights protection within the continent 
back to the Commission. Viljoen, in his analysis of the African Court, compared it 
with other regional human rights systems and concluded that direct access was 
vital but not enough to guarantee enhanced and effective enforcement.166  
Accepting that the establishment of the African Court epitomises 
advancement in the area of human rights protection, Daly and Wiebusch167 
concluded that the Court is susceptible to some patterns of resistance in how it 
operates, monitors and enforces its judgements, and access. Their analysis went 
further to state the key actors who hamper the African Court development as the 
                                       
161 Makau Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?’ (n 154 above). 
162 Nsonguru Udombana, ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than Never’ (n 
78 above). 
163 Mashood Baderin, ‘Recent Development in the African Regional Human Rights System’ (2005) 5 Human 
Rights Law Review, 117.  
164 Frans Viljoen, ‘A Human Rights Court for Africa and Africans’ (2004) 30 Brook Journal of International Law, 
1. 
165 At present, only 9 countries have made declaration under article 34 (6) of the Court Protocol and the are- Benin, 
Tanzania, Mali, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Tunisia, Gambia, and Cote d’Ivoire. 
166 Frans Viljoen, ‘Understanding and Overcoming Challenges in Accessing the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ (2018) 67 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 63.  
167 Tom Daly and Micha Wiebusch, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Court: Mapping Resistance 
against the young Court’ (n 100 above). 
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national government, national courts, and the NGOs.168 For instance, it was 
stressed that some state parties impede the African Court’s progress by their wilful 
refusal to ratify the Court Protocol and make the declaration under Article 34 
(6).169 Daly and Wiebusch opined that the national courts play the most significant 
role beyond national governments by making decisions that absolve state party 
obligation under international treaties or ignore the judgements of international 
courts.170 Despite this observation, there is little evidence of the use of regional 
jurisprudence at the national courts and no established regional mandate on a 
national court to implement or recognise the African Court’s decision.  
From the foregoing, it is demonstrated that most scholars agree on one 
thing- a need for reform of the African human rights system. What is not 
commonly highlighted is the method of reform. However, rather than calling for 
an amendment or adopting a new Charter to meet the set standard recognised in 
various UN instruments, the AU and African Charter state parties should focus on 
the innovative implementation of the existing rights and freedoms.171 Agreeing 
that poor implementation is a significant setback to the African Charter enjoyment, 
Kioko agrees that although the normative provisions of the Charter are mostly 
inadequate, the AU regional politics remain another obstacle to adequate 
implementation within the region.172 To this end, this thesis would provide insights 
to improve African Charter enforcement.  
                                       
168 Ibid.  
169 Ibid.  
170 Ibid.  
171 Chairman Okoloise, ‘Circumventing Obstacles to the Implementation of Recommendations by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2018) 18 African Human Rights Law Journal, 27; Chidi Odinkalu, 
'The Role of Case and Complaints Procedures in the Reform of the African Regional Human Rights System', 
(2001) 1 (2) African Human Rights Journal, 226.  
172 Ben Kioko, ‘The Right of Intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From Non-interference to 
Non-intervention’ (n 18 above). See also, Moussa Samb, ‘Fundamental Issues and Practical Challenges of Human 
Rights in the Context of the African Union’ (2009) 15 (5) Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law, 
1. 
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1.8 Research methodology 
Given the anticipated contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge, 
it is important that the methods used for data collection and analysis be explicit.173 
Chynoweth asserts that no purpose would be served by inputting a methodology 
section within a doctrinal research publication because the process is one of 
analysis rather than data collection.174 While this assertion may be true for 
published research journals, it may not apply wholly to a PhD thesis. This is 
because if the process considered in the analysis of the data or the assumption 
that inform the analysis is not known, it is difficult to evaluate this thesis and 
synthesise it with other related studies. Thus, clarity around the process is vital.  
1.8.1 Overview of methodology and methods  
Having a clear idea of the research methodology and methods of this thesis makes 
the literature analysis more straightforward because it precisely targets literature 
related to this thesis and it critiques the whole approach to similar studies. The 
literature analysis seeks to understand what is available in the research area. 
Research methodology refers to the practical structure within which the research 
is conducted and this includes understanding, explaining, describing, analysing 
and criticising data to arrive at meaningful information that answers specific 
questions.175 On the other hand, research methods refer to the systematic and 
orderly approach taken towards the collection and analysis of data so that 
information can be obtained from such data.176 Moreover, research methods can 
be either qualitative or quantitative depending on research focus and the type of 
data relevant to the research. Simply put, whereas a research methodology is a 
justification for using a particular research method, a research method is simply 
a research tool that is used in performing research.177 However, for the purpose 
                                       
173 Jan Jonker and Bartjan Pennick, The Essence of Research Methodology: A Concise Guide for Master and PhD 
Students in Management Science (Springer-Verlag, 2010). 
174 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research in the Built Environment: A Methodological Framework’ (International 
Conference on Building Education and Research (BEAR), Building Resilience, 11-15 February 2008) 37.  
175 Jan Jonker and Bartjan Pennick, The Essence of Research Methodology: A Concise Guide for Master and PhD 
Students in Management Science (n 173 above) 17. 
176 Nicholas William, Research Methods: The Basics (Routledge, 2011) 1. 
177 Ranji Kothari, Research Methodology and Techniques (2nd edn, New Age Publishers, 2004) 26. 
35 
 
 
of this research, this thesis will be conducted using a legal method in order to 
achieve the research aim and advance on existing literature in this subject area.  
1.8.2 Legal research methods 
Legal research is essentially conducted in the following forms- doctrinal legal 
research method and non-doctrinal legal research method.178 
1.8.2.1 Non-doctrinal legal research  
Non-doctrinal legal research is commonly referred to as interdisciplinary or socio-
legal research and commences when the epistemological nature of legal research 
changes from an internal enquiry into the meaning of law, to external enquiry and 
into the nature of law.179 It generally refers to external factors while seeking 
answers that are consistent with the existing body of rules.180 This legal research 
helps in the understanding of how law works in practice and it is used to 
understand, examine and evaluate the impact of legal rules on people and society. 
Simply put, non-doctrinal helps in understanding how other disiplines influence 
law and legal institutions.181 Consequently, non-doctrinal legal research does not 
investigate the law but researches about the law and how it affects or relates with 
the society and other institutions.182 Nonetheless, research questions structured 
in such manner would have some element of doctrinal research which allows the 
investigation of the law.183  
1.8.2.2 Doctrinal legal research  
Doctrinal legal research provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a 
particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas 
                                       
178 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2012). 
179 Ibid, 6.  
180 Geoffrey Wilson, Comparative Legal Scholarship’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research 
Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2012) 164.  
181 Susan McVie, ‘Challenges in Socio-Legal Emperical Research’, available at > 
https://www.create.ac.uk/methods/methodological-challenges/socio-legal-empirical-research/?print=pdf< 
accessed 21 September 2019.  
182 For instance, non-doctrinal legal research evaluates the effectiveness of a legislation or treaty in achieving a 
particular social goal.  
183 This is because a researcher would first determine the existing law, which can only be done doctrinally. 
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of difficulty and perhaps predicts future development.184 Doctrinal research 
focuses on legal principles generated by the courts and the legislature. Thus, it is 
usually a two-part process because it involves first locating the source of law and 
then interpreting and analysing the text.185 Of course, before analysing the law, a 
researcher is expected to locate it, and this may require some analysis of historical 
and current questions relating to the law. This prepares the researcher to review 
and make arguments based on the norms and standards.  
 Doctrinal legal research is concerned with the analysis of legal doctrines 
and examines how legal doctrines have been developed and applied. It is 
characterised by the study of a body of cases and is often conducted theoretically 
through a historical perspective.186 However, both case law and statute requires 
the contribuition of other disiplines to achive a clear understanding and application 
of the law. Put simply, doctrinal legal research analyses black letter law strictly 
and reviews research in law.187 Doctrinal research seeks to collect and analyse a 
body of case law and statutes, is qualitative in nature and does not necessarily 
involve statistical analysis of data.188 In this vein, this thesis applies a qualitative 
research methodology189 that consists of a library-based text analysis method in 
identifying, locating and analysing relevant information. The qualitative 
characteristics connote that this research is not a field or laboratory research that 
will involve any primary collection procedure such as telephone survey, mass 
observation or a small group study of behaviour. Hence, qualitative research 
simply entails non-numerical research.190  
                                       
184 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing what we do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 
17 Deakin Law Review, 83. 
185 Ibid.  
186 Geoffrey Wilson, Comparative Legal Scholarship’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research 
Methods for Law (n 180 above) 164. 
187 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (n 178 above) 4. 
188 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research in the Built Environment: A Methodological Framework’ (n 174 above) 1.  
189 According to Paul Chynoweth, doctrinal research is concerned with the formulation of legal doctrines through 
analysis and application of legal rules to any given situation under consideration. This research method clarifies 
ambiguity within the rules, is characterised by the study of legal texts, and for this reason, is described as ‘black 
letter law’. Further, doctrinal research is concerned with the discovery and development of the legal doctrines. 
For further analysis, see, Paul Chynoweth, ibid, 29.  
190 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (n 178 above) 201. 
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This research methodology allows the analysis of relevant primary and 
secondary materials.191 Analysis of primary and secondary materials has the 
advantage of not having to generate data, which in this research is beneficial since 
access to conducting a continental-based interview with all relevant stakeholders 
is difficult. On the other hand, the qualitative method adopted for data collection 
instead of conducting interviews is preferred because all relevant data is found in 
the diverse literature on the internet. In this regard, a review of documents that 
seem relevant to the research is advisable, and it is immaterial if such a document 
is private or public. It is a truism that documents have the potential to inform and 
structure decisions; besides, they constitute readings of events.192 Apart from this, 
the approach allows the researcher to email and request documents from relevant 
bodies and individuals without having to travel to such locations.193  
Indeed, this research will rely on primary and secondary data such as case 
law, AU documents, African Commission Resolutions, state parties’ constitutions, 
academic journals and articles, the opinion of jurists, and relevant regional and 
international human rights instruments. The reason for this is to ensure that the 
study focuses on the relevant statements of the law and other related materials 
that discuss, explain, interpret, and analyse what the law is and how the law has 
been enforced or otherwise. This focus leads to an analysis of African Charter case 
law jurisprudence to underscore the direction provided in these decisions and the 
successes or otherwise of the African Charter institutions in realising effective 
enforcement.  
It is worthy of mention that this methodology makes it possible to gather 
the information highlighted in the appendix.194 For instance, the information 
                                       
191 Kristina Simion, ‘Practical Guide: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches to Rule of Law Research’ (2016) 
International Network to Promote the Rule of law, available at 
>https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2817565< accessed 26 July 2018.  
192 Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010) 10. 
193 Further, this approach best fits this research as against other approaches such as participatory observation, 
interviews, and use of questionnaires because of some of the reasons highlighted in the limitation of the study.  
194 It is essential to mention that the content of the tables in appendix are correct as of the date of thesis submission, 
01 July 2019.  
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illustrated in the compliance table under the appendix was collected applying a 
qualitative method such as analysis of the media, email to both the African 
Commission and the African Court secretariats, email to relevant NGOs’, analysis 
of the Activity reports and concluding observations and recommendations, 
scholarly text and articles, and international human rights organisations. 
Furthermore, this thesis does not involve a comparative dimension between the 
African Charter and other international human rights instruments. The 
comparative trend is not necessary because the analysis of the African Charter 
and the case laws would reveal the enforcement challenges confronting effective 
realisation of African Charter civil and political rights. Whereas there is no basis 
for comparison, best practices and strengths of related human rights instruments 
will be highlighted and analysed.195 
1.9 Overview of chapters  
The examination of the issues in this thesis is structured into seven chapters. This 
introductory chapter outlines the aim, objectives, relevance and background of 
the thesis. It further provides a brief account of the problems facing the 
enforcement of the African Charter’s civil and political rights. Also, the research 
questions, methodology, and analysis of the thesis’s inspiring literature of 
reference are outlined.  
It is against the chapter one background that this study sets out in chapter 
2 to analyse the theoretical basis, background context and nature of human rights 
and in particular, civil and political rights. This chapter examines the UN efforts in 
safeguarding civil and political rights up to the evolution into the regional 
protection of human rights. By setting the scene for underlining the relevance of 
                                       
195 Suffice to add that a thematic analysis will be applied as the suitable research approach for the thesis. Thematic 
analysis is a widely used qualitative data analysis method used in identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns 
(themes) within data, and it minimally organises and describes your data set in (wealthy) details. However, having 
examined the research aim, questions and objectives illustrate that the thesis is qualitative in nature, which makes 
a thematic analysis useful for its conduct. See, Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in 
Psychology’ (2006) 3(2) Qualitative Research in Psychology, 77.  
39 
 
 
regional human rights systems, this chapter lays the foundation for the 
examination of the African Charter civil and political rights protection.  
The African Charter normative features, civil and political rights provisions 
and case law jurisprudence are discussed in chapter 3. The African Charter is 
discussed in detail to determine the extent to which it meets the UN standards in 
the UDHR and the ICCPR. In addition, the case law jurisprudence permits an 
analysis of the interpretations of the African Charter civil and political rights 
provisions and the extent to which such interpretation has influenced the 
realisation of civil and political rights. In all, this chapter lays a foundation for 
subsequent recommendations for African Charter norms. 
Chapter 4 analyses the political and institutional framework for the 
protection of African Charter civil and political rights. The principal analysis in this 
chapter includes the structure and mandate of the African Court and the African 
Commission and the role of the African Union in human rights protection.  
Chapter 5 examines state party obligations under the African Charter by 
analysing their constitutional and other measures for the protection of civil and 
political rights. Using a few selected countries as case study, this chapter examines 
whether state parties to the African Charter have met their obligations to 
guarantee civil and political rights protection and enforcement.  
In chapter 6, this thesis assesses the African Charter civil and political 
rights, with a view to impart future reform to regional protection, particularly in 
the context of realising effective enforcement. This chapter analyses potential 
shortcomings of relevant African Charter institutions, the African Charter norms, 
as well as state party obligations in realising effective enforcement of civil and 
political rights.  
Finally, chapter 7 concludes this thesis and outlines the recommendations 
aimed at realising the effective enforcement of civil and political rights provisions 
of the African Charter. This chapter suggests grey areas for reforms to the regional 
human rights system and concludes that if the suggested recommendations are 
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applied, the African Charter civil and political rights would be effectively realised 
within the continent.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE BACKGROUND, CONTEXT AND NATURE OF CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: IN PURSUIT OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS PROTECTION 
2.0. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to examine both the philosophical and normative foundations 
underlying the protection of civil and political rights. It examines the historical 
development, context and nature of relevant international human rights 
instruments and analyses them as a contemporary approach towards realising civil 
and political rights. The discussion in this chapter reflects on the underpinnings of 
the enforcement of civil and political rights under the African Charter Human and 
Peoples Rights (African Charter) in two ways. Firstly, it demonstrates the link 
between contemporary human rights expressed after World War II and the earlier 
guaranteed generations of individual rights following the French and American 
revolutions. Secondly, it acts as a template for the evaluation of the normative 
provisions and limitations of the African Charter. Therefore, through the analysis 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other regional human rights instruments, 
this chapter fits into a more extensive research geared towards improved 
understanding of the origin, development and pursuit of international human 
rights concept with particular reference to civil and political rights.  
2.1 The meaning of civil and political rights  
This section will explore the meaning of civil and political rights. It will demonstrate 
that there is no definition of civil and political rights in international human rights 
treaties; rather, it will emphasise the nature and scope of civil and political rights 
as useful guidance for the understanding of civil and political rights.  
A definition of the key term of this thesis is crucial because it exposes the 
context on which its analysis would be made. In this thesis, civil and political rights 
exclusively imply one of the generations, categories or classifications of human 
rights. The origin of civil rights is traced to the practices of governments or 
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institutions viewed as being oppressive and led to the request for the legal 
protection of individuals and groups from forms of oppression that have gained 
widespread acceptance across the world.1 Political rights, on the other hand, 
guarantee the liberty to contribute to the process of governing the affairs of 
society through political participation of all eligible citizens. Political rights involve 
the ability to interact with one’s government and include the right of free speech, 
the right to vote and be voted for and to criticise the government.2 
According to Keith, civil and political rights have the potential to check the 
powers of the government in respect of actions affecting the individual, and they 
confer upon the people an entitlement to participate in government and contribute 
to the determination of laws.3 They protect an individual or group of individuals 
from infringement of their civil and political liberty by the government, 
government institutions and influential individuals.4 Fundamental rights in this 
category include prohibition of discrimination based on race, religion, ethnicity, 
and gender; the right to life; the right to a fair trial; freedom from torture or cruel, 
inhuman treatment or punishment; the right to property; the right to liberty; the 
right to asylum; the right to personal security; the right to freedom of thought, 
religion, and conscience; and many others.5  
                                       
1 David Kairys, ‘Civil Rights’ (2015) International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences, 686; 
Leland Ware, ‘Civil Rights and the 1960s: A Decade of Unparalleled Progress’ (2013) 72 (4) Maryland Law 
Review, 1087; Cass Sunstein, ‘What the Civil Rights Movement Was and Wasn’t’ (1995) University of Illinois 
Law Review, 191. 
2 Dinal Shelton, ‘Challenges to the Future of Civil and Political Rights’ (1998) 55 Washington and Lee Law 
Review, 669; Gregory Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) 17 (4) Yale Journal 
of International Law, 539. 
3 Linda Keith, ‘The United Nations International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights: Does it make a 
Difference on Human Behaviour?’ (1999) 36 Journal of Peace Research, 95. See also, Egon Schwelb, ‘Civil and 
Political Rights: The International Measures for Implementation’ (1968) 62 (4) American Journal of International 
Law, 827. 
4 Zoran Milovanovich, ‘Civil and Political Rights’ available at > 
http://www.lincoln.edu/criminaljustice/hr/Civilandpolitical.htm< accessed 25 March 2019.  
5 The ICCPR contains a more comprehensive list of rights than all other existing international human rights 
instruments. The provisions of the ICCPR will form the basis to evaluate the African Charter civil and political 
rights provisions in the next chapter.  
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In addition, civil and political rights guarantee freedom from government 
interference and are conceived as negative rights.6 However, not all rights that 
make up civil and political rights are attributed as negative rights; for example, 
the right to participate in free and fair elections and the right to fair trials can be 
categorised as positive rights because they require some duties by the state.7 
However, recognition of individual civil and political rights, as inherent to the 
human family, predates the contemporary human rights protection under the UN 
and regional arrangements.8  
2.2 Philosophical foundation of human rights 
The philosophical foundation of human rights provides useful guidance on the 
understanding and application of the human rights concept while examining its 
development. Therefore, in order to ascertain contemporary human rights 
discourse, this section examines relevant philosophical theories relating to the 
origin of human rights and civil and political rights protection.  The theories are 
naturalism and positivist theories of law.9 However, the details of these theories 
will be analysed only to the extent that the defined scope of this thesis permits.  
According to Shestack, understanding the philosophical foundation of 
human rights is necessary for the universal recognition of human rights 
                                       
6 Berta Hernandez-Truyol, ‘Civil and Political Rights- An Introduction’ (1997) University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review, 223. According to Hernandez-Truyol, a negative right permits government inaction and 
often associated with civil and political rights while positive rights is subjected to an action of another or the 
government- permits action for the right to be enjoyed.  
7 Ibid. For instance, where the government fail to call for elections, the right to vote and be voted for will not be 
exercised or realised.   
8 Some of the contemporary civil and political rights were first contained in the 1689 English Bill of Rights, 1791 
Bill of Rights of the United States and 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man.   
9 Indeed, there are other theories of law such as the Marxist theory. However, this study will not analyse Marxist 
theory, given the understanding that its theoretical approach is rooted in the causal role of things such as relations 
and forces of production. According to Karl Marx (a German philosopher), there is nothing natural or inalienable 
about human rights especially in a capitalist monopolised society. To him, human rights is a middle-class illusion 
while concepts such as law and freedom are determined by the material conditions and social circumstances of a 
people. In addition, the Marxist theory does not support a universal system of human rights because it does not 
recognise international norms and thus, it is associated with more human rights violations. See generally, Darrel 
Moellendorf, ‘Marxism and the Law’ in Darrell Moellendorf and Chris Roederer (eds), Jurisprudence (Juta, 2006) 
138; Jerome Shestack, ‘The Philosophic Foundation of Human Rights’ (1998) 20 (2) Human Rights Quarterly, 
201.  
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principles.10 This section, therefore, is relevant to this thesis because philosophy 
plays an instrumental role in the understanding and clarity of truth to avoid an 
obscure understanding of universal recognition of human rights development.11 
Generally, the discussion in this section is linked to the African Charter because it 
demonstrates the historical development of human rights from its perception as 
the essential characteristics of the human person through the codification process 
which government are obliged to respect and recognise. 
2.2.1. Natural law/right theory 
At the outset, early philosophers developed the theory of natural law (rights) in 
their search for the philosophical foundations and meaning of the law.12 Natural 
law theory is a legal theory that recognises law and morality as deeply connected; 
thus this theory believes that human laws are defined by morality, and not by an 
authority figure.13 Thomas Aquinas, one of the philosophers of the medieval 
period, professed natural right as part of God’s law that allows for certain inherent 
rights of individuals.14 For instance, God’s commandments to the children of Israel 
that protected certain inherent rights of the individual, such as the right to life and 
property.15 It is clear from the proponents of natural law theory that human rights 
were originally understood as natural rights inherent to being human and this was 
determined by philosophers’ perception of nature and the characteristics of the 
human being.16 In particular, rights and freedoms believed to be natural by being 
                                       
10 Jerome Shestack, ‘The Philosophic Foundation of Human Rights’ (n 9 above). 
11 Ibid.  
12 Some of these early philosophers include Aristotle, Sophocle, Plato, St. Augustine, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes 
and St. Thomas Aquinas. Darrel Moellendorf, ‘Marxism and the Law’ in Darrell Moellendorf and Chris Roederer 
(eds), Jurisprudence (n 9 above), pg. 25-61.  
13 Mark Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 4-5. 
14 Wessel Roux, ‘Natural Law Theories’ in Darrell Moellendorf and Chris Roederer (eds), Jurisprudence (Juta, 
2006) 25.  
15 See, Exodus 20: 1-17; Deuteronomy 5: 4-21. Admittedly, these rights come under the contemporary civil and 
political rights category.  
16 Wessel Roux, ‘Natural Law Theories’ in Darrell Moellendorf and Chris Roederer (eds), Jurisprudence (n 14 
above) 25. 
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human were identified, considering the condition of human beings in a stateless 
society.17  
Indeed, following the rise of modern secular and rationalistic philosophies 
of natural law, religion was detached from natural law. The significance of this 
evolution is that the natural law theory led to the natural rights theory, which is 
closely associated with contemporary human rights discourse.18 For instance, 
Grotius, while defining natural law as a ‘dictate of right reason’ asserted that to 
live together in peace and harmony is a natural characteristic of human beings.19 
Grotius agrees that the state of nature guarantees absolute freedom and equality 
because whatever conforms to the nature of men and women were deemed right 
and just and whatever disturbs the social and peaceful harmony were unjust and 
wrong.20 Consequently, the natural rights theory led by John Locke imagined the 
existence of human beings in the state of nature, enjoying their freedom and 
actions without being subject to the will or authority of another.21 For example, it 
is agreed that this state of nature suffered certain limitations due to the absence 
of regulation by a superior power over the rise of the conflicting interests of 
individuals; thus, propelling individuals to enter into a social contract to set up a 
political authority to protect their natural rights by forming civil society.22  
The natural law/right theory demonstrates the evolution of rights from a 
stateless society to political authority. Locke proceeded to note that under the 
natural law theory, human beings, not governments came first in the order of 
things. Accordingly, Locke argued that in setting up civil society and political 
authority, the failure of this authority to secure rights is a failure that justifies the 
                                       
17 Centre for Human Rights, From Human Wrongs to Human Rights (Centre for Human Rights, Pretoria, 1995) 
50. 
18 Josiah Cobbah, ‘African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective’ (1987) 9 (3) Human 
Rights Quarterly, 309.  
19 See generally, Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, (1625) edited by Richard Tuck (Liberty Fund, 
Indianapolis, 2005 Edition), available at > http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/grotius-the-rights-of-war-and-peace-
2005-ed-vol-1-book-i< accessed 10 October 2018.  
20 Ibid. 
21  John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn, Clarendon Law Series, 2011) 18.  
22 Wessel Roux, ‘Natural Law Theories’ in Darrell Moellendorf and Chris Roederer (eds), Jurisprudence (n 14 
above) 25. 
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removal of the government.23 Indeed, the government has the power to protect 
the natural rights of human beings because human beings, not governments, 
came first in the order of things.24 Significantly, this theory formed the basis of 
the principle that law should act as measures to limit the powers of government 
while at the same time protecting the inherent rights such as the right to life, 
liberty and property.25  
Meanwhile, natural rights philosophy was a significant influence in late 
eighteenth century revolutions against absolutism and the birth of individual rights 
in Europe and America.26 In Smith’s opinion, the idea of natural rights is visible in 
contemporary statutory protection of human rights and some historic bills of rights 
such as the English Bill of Rights (1689), the 1776 United States’ Declaration of 
Independence, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), 
and the 1791 Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution.27 Furthermore, the 
Magna Carta (1215)28 promoted measures targeted at curbing the monarch’s 
excessive authoritarian executive and absolute power prior to the late eighteenth 
century revolutions.29 According to Vincent, the demand for good governance on 
the principle of equality, justice, and fairness formed the basis for which the Magna 
Carta was promulgated.30 On the other hand, the Magna Carta was a practical 
solution to the political crisis at that time, and it established the principle that 
everybody, including the king, was made subject to the law.31 The Magna Carta 
                                       
23 Osita Eze, Human Rights in Africa (Nigeria Law Publication Limited, 1998) 85. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Philip Alston, Promoting Human Rights through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspective (Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 13. 
26 Ziyad Motola, ‘Human Rights in Africa: A Cultural, Ideological and Legal Examination’ (1989) Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review, 374. Suffice to add that notable early philosophical sources of natural 
rights theory include Hugo Grotius (1548-1617), John Locke (1932-1704) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).   
27 Rhona Smith, International Human Rights (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2012) 6; the French Declaration 
begins by stating that ‘men are born free and remain free and equal in rights’ and this has continued to remain the 
cornerstone of the French Constitution.  
28 Magna Carta, meaning, the Great Charter was issued by King John of England (1199-1216) as a practical 
solution he faced during a political crisis in 1215 and established the principle that everyone, including the king, 
is subject to the law.  
29 Shami Chakrabarti, ‘Magna Charta and Human Rights’ (2015), available at > https://www.bl.uk/magna-
carta/articles/magna-carta-and-human-rights< accessed on 18 March 2019.  
30 Nicholas Vincent, Magna Carta: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2012) 95; Nicholas 
Vincent, Magna Carta: The Foundation of freedom 1215-2015 (Third Millennium Publishers, 2014) 36. 
31 Lucinda Maer and Oonagh Gay, ‘The Bill of Rights 1689’ (2009) House of Common Library, SN/PC/0293. 
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was repealed not long after it was enacted; however, some of its principles formed 
the bedrock and inspiration for the United States Bill of Rights 1791, UDHR 1948, 
as well as the European Convention of Human Rights 1950.32  
The essence of the 18th-century declarations, as well as the Magna Carta, 
is to protect the rights of individuals. An instance is the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man 1789, which attributed ignorance, neglect, and contempt of the 
inalienable, natural and sacred rights of men as causes of public calamities. This 
legal document recognised state sovereignty and political association and 
participation for the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of men, 
among other rights.33 In particular, the 1689 English Bill of Rights identified 
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, freedom from being fined without 
trial,34 and free elections as inalienable rights.35 This position implies that the 
Western and American political systems had, before contemporary human rights 
discourse under the UN, produced normative and institutional arrangements for 
the protection of the individuals’ natural rights from infringement by the 
government.36  
The position of natural law/rights theory failed to highlight the rights that 
should be considered as inalienable natural rights. While this theory falls outside 
the concept of contemporary human rights approach, Swanson observed that 
under Locke’s view of natural rights, all that was needed by human beings in the 
state of nature for them to be self-dependent were life, property, and liberty.37 In 
particular, Shestack noted that the natural rights theory was criticised and termed 
                                       
32 Claire Breay and Julian Harrison, ‘Magna Carta: An Introduction’ (2014) available at 
>https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-an-introduction< accessed 12 October 2017.  
33 See generally, preamble and Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Declaration of the Rights of Man 1789, available at > 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp< accessed 11 October 2017. Other rights recognised by the 
Rights of Man 1789 are equality (article 1), political association and participation (article 6), personal liberty 
(article 4), fair hearing attributes of presumption of innocence and no punishment without a law (article 7, 8, and 
9) freedom of religion (article 10) freedom to hold ideas and opinion (article 11), and right to property (article 
17).  
34 Article 10 of the 1689 Bill of Rights. 
35 Article 8 of the 1689 Bill of Rights. 
36 Julia Swanson, ‘The Emergence of New Rights in the African Charter’ (1991) 12 New York Law School Journal 
of International and Comparative Law, 307.  
37 Ibid.   
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a ‘fallacy’ by theorists such as Jeremy Bentham because of its potential for 
flexibility arising from the absence of what forms part of natural legal rights and 
other difficulties.38 The implication is that what amounts to natural law/rights may 
vary from one proponent to another, depending on the understanding of the 
theorist on the concept of nature.39 Besides, natural law theory was criticised on 
the argument that it opposes legal reform while insisting on the status quo.40 What 
is implied is that natural law/right does not support reforms and new recognition 
of rights apart from rights qualified as natural rights.  
Furthermore, natural rights theory was criticised by some philosophers who 
supported an idea of rights that are definite and practicably enforceable.41 The 
proponents of this idea believe that rights will be better enjoyed when instruments 
outline what these rights are, as well as the limits of their enjoyment.42 This is 
because there is a need for governments to put in place limits on the enjoyment 
of rights and on the power of their agents because some mistreatment is genuinely 
intolerable, irrespective of possible excuses.43  
2.2.2. Positive rights (law) theory   
The positive rights/law theory is another theory relevant to the foundation of 
contemporary human rights. The legal positivism theory is mostly founded on the 
rejection of metaphysics and experimentation by Auguste Comte, who argued that 
science ought to concern itself with experimental facts from which general rules 
or laws of nature can be abstracted through induction.44 This theory emphasises 
that law is socially constructed and was founded on human beings having control 
                                       
38 Jerome Shestack, ‘The Philosophic Foundation of Human Rights’ (n 9 above) 201. 
39 Ibid.  
40 See, for instance, David Johnson, Steve Pete, and Max Du Plessis, Jurisprudence: A South African Perspective 
(Butterworths, 2001) 64. 
41 A crucial proponent of this idea of rights include Auguste Comte, John Austin (1797-1859) and Jeremy 
Bentham.  
42 Some of the proponents include Hans Kelsen, Herbert Hart and Joseph Raz. 
43 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton University Press, 2001) 06; Jerome 
Shestack, ‘The Philosophic Foundation of Human Rights’ (n 9 above) 201. 
44 See, Irma Kroeze, ‘Legal Positivism’ in Darrell Moellendorf and Chris Roederer (eds), Jurisprudence (Juta, 
2006) 63.  
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over nature and not otherwise.45 Law, according to positivism, is a matter of what 
has been posited.46 The arguments put forward by legal positivism advocates is 
that law is synonymous with positive laws, that is, laws made by a law-making 
institution and not based on divine or natural commandments or rights.47  
Legal positivism theory does not oppose the idea that morality influences 
the law; rather, it opposes the idea that morality determines the validity of a law.48 
This theory has over time undergone several changes due to the diverse 
understanding of preposition by different proponents of the same school of 
thought.49 For instance, the classical positivist proponent rejects any definition of 
law other than that emanating from the existing legal system, given its position 
that all authority belongs to the state. Classical positivism believes that rights/laws 
only emanate from legal enactments with sanctions therein attached and are 
never based on the understanding of the natural entitlement of human beings.50 
This means that classical positivism does not support ‘law as it ought to be’ but 
‘law as it is’ and without regard to its goodness or badness.51  
It has, therefore, been opined in line with the preceding argument that 
natural law/rights theory lacks the capacity to determine what law/right is. Kroeze 
has argued that not only does it equal a mistake to look at natural law/right in a 
bid to establish what law/right is, natural law should also not be used to establish 
what law/right ought to be.52 Other advocates of positive law theory have 
adamantly insisted on the separation of law and morals, which forms part of the 
                                       
45 Ibid.  
46 Kenneth Himma, ‘Legal Positivism’, available at > https://www.iep.utm.edu/legalpos/< accessed 01 January 
2019.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Irma Kroeze, ‘Legal Positivism’ in Darrell Moellendorf and Chris Roederer (eds), Jurisprudence (n 44 above) 
63.  
49 Ibid, 63.  
50 Jerome Shestack, ‘The Philosophic Foundation of Human Rights’ (n 9 above) 201.  
51 John Austin, ‘The Province of Jurisprudence Determined’ (1894) as cited in Irma Kroeze, ‘Legal Positivism’ 
in Darrell Moellendorf and Chris Roederer (eds), Jurisprudence (n 44 above) 63. Therefore, it is agreed that 
natural law cannot deduce what law is because they suggest what law ought to be and not what law is.  
52 Irma Kroeze, ‘Legal Positivism’ in Darrell Moellendorf and Chris Roederer (eds), Jurisprudence (n 44 above) 
63.  
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bedrock of natural law/right theory.53 For instance, Jeremy Bentham dismissed 
the natural law theory as ‘nonsense on stilts’ because he opined that anything that 
cannot be verified empirically does not exist.54 However, the positive right/law 
theory is also not without criticism.  
The positive right/law theory was criticised for its stance in undermining the 
international idea of human rights following its emphasis on the supremacy of 
national laws and sovereignty.55 Shestack discredited this theory because legal 
positivism regards international law as rules of positive morality imposed by 
opinion.56 This criticism is based on his understanding that every society needs to 
apply some basic rules with an intersection between the natural and positive law 
theories. For him, the idea of the supremacy of national law and sovereignty will 
pose a challenge to the effective enforcement of international human rights law.57 
This is because the theory suggests that all laws must be obeyed irrespective of 
their impact on society and people or its extent of moral validity. The implication 
is that every law must be obeyed because it is law regardless of how immoral such 
law may be.58  
The above discussion on the philosophical foundations of rights/law, which 
focused on natural and positivist theory partly explains the dichotomy of the 
historical and philosophical history of human rights. This discussion, however, is 
not to suggest that only the European or American can lay claim to the origin of 
human rights practices because of 18th-century revolutions and Magna Carta. 
Indeed, such arrogation can be successfully sustained if the codification of 
international human rights is unduly relied upon. Nonetheless, it has been 
observed that numerous societies had cultural practices that could be interpreted 
                                       
53 Take, for instance, Adrienne Blerk, Jurisprudence: An Introduction (Lexis Nexus, 2011) 29. 
54 Jeremy Benthan, ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ in Jeremy Waldron Nonsense Upon Stilts: Benthan, Burke and Marx 
on the Rights of Man (Routledge, 1987) 53. 
55 Jerome Shestack, ‘The Philosophic Foundation of Human Rights’ (n 9 above) 201. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid. On this note, Shestack cited the apartheid practice in South Africa and the anti-Semitic edits of the Nazis 
which convincedly were bad norms but were obeyed as positive law.  
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as having human rights characteristics.59 For example, the socialist and 
communalistic attribute of pre-colonial African societies ensured that individual 
rights and privileges were respected and regarded as the rights and privileges of 
the society and community.60 This is because African societies did not emphasise 
individual rights in the same way and manner that European societies did.   
2.3 Foundation and context of contemporary international human 
rights: The international pursuit of effectiveness in civil and political 
rights protection  
This section will examine human rights discourse from the 20th century. The 
underlying foundation for this section is article 60 of the African Charter provision 
which permits the African Commission to draw inspiration from UDHR and other 
other international law provisions. This section demonstrates that contemporary 
human rights arrangement adopts a right codification concept in line with positive 
law/rights theory while also protecting rights which are deemed intrinsic to every 
human being, which appears to be a relic of the natural law theory.  Indeed, the 
discussion of the foundation and context of contemporary international human 
rights is closely related to the preceding section because the normative 
foundations of contemporary human rights are rooted in the French and American 
revolutions, and then found expression internationally after World War II and later 
found their way to Africa following decolonisation. This discussion is relevant to 
this study because the African Charter’s system can be traced to general 
international human rights law; although with a slight difference in norms.  
 The concept of contemporary international human rights is traced to the 
historical antecedents of World War II61 atrocities and the quest by some Western 
                                       
59 Okey Ejidike, ‘Human Rights in the Cultural Traditions and Social Practice of Igbo of the South –Eastern 
Nigeria’ (1999) (43) Journal of African Law, 71; Nana Busia ‘The Status of Human Rights in Pre-Colonial Africa: 
Implications for Contemporary Practices’ in Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds, David Penna, and Debra Joy Cruz 
Sobrepena (eds), Africa, Human Rights, and the Global System: The Political Economy of Human Rights in a 
Changing World, (Greenwood press, 1994) 226; Osita Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems (n 
23 above) 10. 
60 Makau Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of 
Duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law, 339. 
61 The World War II lasted from 1939 to 1945.  
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countries to forestall a future occurrence.62 It follows that the history of 
contemporary human rights protection begins with the creation of the United 
Nations Organisation (UN) in 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations.63 
Primarily, the UN was established to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental rights, amongst other objectives.64 
From the language of the first four paragraphs of the preamble to the Charter of 
the UN, the international community used the opportunity to emphasise the 
previous destruction and death because of the World Wars and the failure of the 
League of Nations.65 The entire preamble to the UN Charter passionately suggests 
the need for nations and individuals to learn lessons from the past to address 
contemporary and future problems.  
 The UN emergence was a commitment to multilateralism and robust 
intergovernmental organisation.66 A distinctive contribution of the UN is its 
character as a standard norm-setter and its universal membership.67 Without a 
doubt, the reference to human rights in the UN Charter is a golden feature of the 
post World War II order and a substantial contribution of the international 
community to individuals and nations. However, one would have thought that 
                                       
62 Zeid Al-Hassan, ‘The United Nations at 70’ (2015) 6 European Human Rights Law Review, 555; George 
Mugwanya, Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African Regional Human Rights 
System (Transnational Publishers, 2003) 16; paragraph 6 of the preamble to UDHR; Kristina Ash, ‘U.S. 
Reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Credibility Maximization and Global 
Influence’ (2005) 3 (1) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 1; Dejo Ololu, An Integrative Rights-
based Approach to Human Rights Development in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, 2009) 22; Miia Halme-
Tuomisaari and Pamela Slotte, ‘Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights: Introduction’ in Pamela Slotte and Miia 
Halme-Tuomisaari (eds), Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 6;  For a 
more detailed discussion of the UN and promotion of human rights, see, Myres McDougal and Gerhard Bebr, 
‘Human Rights in the United Nations’ (1964) American Journal of International Law, 603; William Wagner, ‘The 
Emergency of International Human Rights Law, Universal Human Rights, The United Nations, and the Telos of 
Human Dignity’ (2005) 3 Ave Maria Law Review, 197; George Edwards, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Human 
Rights Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from the Birth of the United Nations to the 21st Century: Ten 
Attributes of highly successful Human Rights NGOs’ (2010) 18 Michigan State Journal of International Law 167. 
63 The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, United States, and came into 
force on 24 October 1945.  
64 Preamble 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.  
65 The League of Nations was an intergovernmental organisation founded on 10 January 1920 as a result of the 
Paris Peace Conference that ended the First World War. It was created as a forum for resolving international 
disputes following the World War I of 1914-1918.   
66 Thomas Weiss, ‘The United Nations: Before, During and After 1945’ (2015) 91 (6) International Affairs, 1221.  
67 Ibid. The UDHR demonstrates an instance of UN standard setting characteristic. 
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since the Charter of the UN recognises the devastating effects of the World Wars, 
it would have been better to have enlisted a stringent human rights concept at 
the international level. 
 The aftermath of World War II brought about a radical change in 
international law in line with article 1 (3) of the UN Charter.68 Being the provision 
of the ‘purpose and principles’ of the UN, the background of this article gave rise 
to the idea embodied in the 1948 UDHR, which supported a universal approach to 
international order.69 Likewise, a universal human rights approach was further 
suggested in the second paragraph of the preamble to the UN Charter.70 However, 
in demanding a universal approach to the international human rights system, the 
UN Charter did not insist that the UDHR must be binding on all member states 
irrespective of their year of membership. This could be taken to signify an 
international understanding of global diversity in civilisation.  
However, prior to the emergence of the UN Charter and adoption of the 
UDHR, the notion of traditional law in practice gave states primacy over their 
subjects irrespective of any agreed international treaty.71 During the period, 
several human rights violations were overlooked because states were not allowed 
to interfere in the internal conflicts and affairs of others.72 This is because the 
relationship between states and its citizens did not fall under the purview of 
international law neither were human rights recognised in international law as 
individual rights vested against a sovereign nation.73 At present, however, human 
                                       
68 Article 1 (3) states as follows: ‘to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion’.  
69 See Article 28 of UDHR; Zeid Al-Hassan, ‘The United Nations at 70’ (n 62 above) 555; Louise Fawcett, ‘The 
History and Concept of Regionalism’ (2012) 4 (2) European Society of International Law (Conference Paper 
Series) 1.  
70 The provision of this preamble enshrines that ‘We the people of the United Nations determined to reaffirm faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women 
and nations large and small’. 
71 John Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century’ in Maarten Bos 
(eds.) The Present State of International Law and Other Essays (Springer Science Business Media, 1973) 75. 
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72 Rehman Javaid, International Human Rights Law (2nd Edition, Pearson Education, 2010) 3.  
73 Paul Seighart, The International Law of Human Rights (Clarendon Press, 1983) 12. 
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rights discourse reflects an interpretation of the traditional concept of international 
law, which limits the exercise of absolute power by governments.74 Accordingly, 
international human rights have acted as a responsive tool for emerging conflicts, 
fears, values, and social problems.75 This concept of rights did not only bring a 
change in state party obligation under international law, but it also introduced the 
idea of fundamental rights that individuals must enjoy the world over.76  
2.3.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
At the outset, the UN Charter preamble reaffirmed faith in fundamental human 
rights without expressly listing what these rights are. However, human rights 
expression found in the UDHR provides the framework for international recognition 
of rights undefined by the UN Charter.77 The UDHR has been praised as one of the 
UN’s greatest achievements.78 For example, the UDHR has inspired a rich body of 
legally binding human rights instruments and acts as an inspiration in addressing 
injustice, repression, conflicts, and in achieving universal enjoyment of human 
rights.79 In this regard, Annan opined that what the UN through UDHR offered is 
a vision of human rights that is foreign to no one and native to all.80  
 In particular, the UDHR comprises thirty articles traversing various 
categories of rights. For example, articles 1 to 21 contain rights that were later 
                                       
74 Rhona Smith, International Human Rights (n 27 above) 5. This is made possible because a new kind of legal 
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75 Dinah Shelton, ‘Challenges to the Future of Civil and Political Rights’ (n 2 above).  
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77 John Humphrey, ‘The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation’ (1976)17 (3) William and Mary 
Law Review, 527. The UDHR enshrines a new scope of human rights ideology, which has influenced other 
regional and national human rights instruments. Some on the notable instruments influenced by the UDHR include 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. 
78 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The United Nations at 70 years: The Impact upon International Law’(2016) 65 (1) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1. 
79 United Nations, ‘The Foundation of International Human Rights Law’, available at > 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-rights-law/index.html< 
accessed 18 March 2019. Indeed, the UDHR has inspired numerous regional treaties, conventions and 
declarations, national human rights laws and constitutional provisions. 
80 Kofi Annan, ‘Ignorance, not Knowledge, … Makes Enemies of Man’ (speech to the Communication 
Conference at ASPEN Institute 1997), available at > 
https://www.un.org/press/en/1997/19971020.SGSM6366.html< accessed on 18 March 2019. 
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enshrined as civil and political rights under the ICCPR 1966 such as the right to 
life, non-discrimination, equality, fair trial, prohibition of torture, slavery, arbitrary 
arrest and detention, and inhuman treatment, amongst others. In the same vein, 
articles 22 to 27 comprise rights later recognised under the International Covenant 
for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966 such as the right to social 
security, the right to work, equal pay, remuneration, the right to a standard of 
living adequate for health, and the right to education. Unlike the UDHR provisions, 
the 1966 covenants provided more expansive rights and further recognised the 
right to self-determination as civil and political rights as well as social-economic 
rights.  
The UDHR is a non-self-executing document and was not intended to be 
binding on UN member states as part of positive international law.81 Instead, the 
UDHR is a human rights aspirational standard for UN member states, with the 
expectation that member states recognise these rights in their constitutions 
and/or domestic laws.82 Nonetheless, the UN Commission on Human Rights83 was 
generally concerned with the implementation aspects of the UN recognised human 
rights until the middle of the 1950s.84 In 1956, the Economic and Social Council 
acting under article 64 of the UN Charter asked all UN member states to report 
every three years on progress made towards the actualisation of the UDHR.85 
Nonetheless, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
                                       
81 UNGA Ordinary Resolution 934, UN Doc. A/177 (1948). 
82 The UN is the world largest intergovernmental organisation with 193 sovereign states are members. 
83 The Commission on Human Rights was made up of 18 members from various political, cultural and religious 
backgrounds and the Commission met for the first time in 1947. 
84 The period between 1947 and 1954 saw the UN Commission on Human Rights being the primary body drawing 
up human rights duties and provisions of the UN Charter. Other UN established institutions with human rights 
mandate include Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which was established following the ECOSOC 
Resolution 1235 of 1967 and ECOSOC Resolution 1503 of 1970. See also, See, George Mugwanya, Human 
Rights in African: Enhancing Human Rights Through the African Regional Human Rights System (n 62 above) 
17.  
85 John Humphrey, ‘The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation’ (n 77 above) 527. However, this 
system has changed to a biannual report circle on any particular topic. Article 64 of the UN Charter empowers the 
Economic and Social Council to obtain reports from the specialised agencies on the steps taken to give effect to 
the recommendations on matters made by the General Assembly.  
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retained lead responsibility in the UN system for the promotion and protection of 
human rights until its replacement in 2006 by the Human Rights Council.86  
Whilst it is essential to mention that the UDHR was not accompanied with 
an implementation mechanism, suffice to add that the General Assembly at the 
time of UDHR adoption requested the Commission on Human Rights to prioritise 
the drafting of measures of implementation.87 Considering the non-self-executing 
nature of the UDHR, Koh likens it to a mere political instrument with less significant 
legal impact on states.88 This is because the common standard of human rights 
put forward in the UDHR would not make any difference if ignored by state parties. 
On the other hand, the UDHR failed to mention the protection of minorities, and 
its treatment of issues relating to political asylum is unsatisfactory.89 Whether the 
omission of rights in the first official human rights standard can be overlooked 
depends on the relevance of the omitted rights. For instance, the right relating to 
the protection of minorities was typical of World War II violations which witnessed 
atrocities against minorities.  
Considering the state of affairs in many countries prior and after the World 
Wars, and the relevance of human rights to human dignity, one would have 
expected the UDHR to have a decisive, uniform and stringent enforcement 
arrangement. This is because the adopted approach for enforcement of the UDHR 
leaves it mainly at the mercy of member states; thus, leaving the UN with the 
task of using its moral and political authority to canvass for the universal spread 
of human rights standards. Although this moral authority seems to be challenged 
in the contemporary world due to divergent political and economic interests, 
                                       
86 The Human Rights Council replaced the 60-year-old UN Commission on Human Rights and became the key 
independent UN body responsible for human rights. At present, the UDHR is promoted and protected by Human 
Rights Council through its secretariat – Office of the UN High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR). Its 
headquarters is situated in Geneva, Switzerland.  
87 General Assembly Resolution 217 B and E, UN Doc A/177 (1948). Several draft reports were submitted 
especially between 1954 and 1963, which were helpful in the drafting of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and other UN human rights instruments such as the 1969 Racial Discrimination Convention. See generally, 
Ved Nanda, ‘Implementation of Human Rights by the United Nations and Regional Organisations’ (n 76 above) 
307.  
88 Harold Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced? (1999) 74 (3) Indiana Law Journal 1397. Koh 
further argued that the UDHR could be legally binding if recognised as international customary law.  
89 John Humphrey, ‘The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation’ (n 77 above) 527.  
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debate on United Nations Security Council, and use of the veto, the UN has 
progressively strived for its human rights mandate.90 It is thought that such a 
universal boost of human rights is supported by the UDHR preamble, which 
declared the UDHR a common human rights standard for all in ‘recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family’.91 The consequence is that the UDHR has become a universally 
accepted interpretation, and the definition of human rights left undefined by the 
UN Charter.92 Despite massive contemporary recognition accorded to the UDHR 
across the globe in international human rights discourse, the UN did not abandon 
its quest for binding human rights instruments.  
2.3.2 International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights93  
The UN quest to provide a binding human rights system was achieved in 1966 
when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted two significant 
multilateral treaties with the capacity to expose states to international scrutiny.94 
The treaties are the ICCPR95 together with its Optional Protocols, and International 
Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).96 With the adoption 
of the ICESCR and the ICCPR and its Optional Protocols, the UN attained a 
                                       
90 Zdzislaw Kedzia, ‘United Nations Mechanisms to Promote and Protect Human Rights’ in Janusz Symonides 
(eds), Human Rights: International Protection, Monitoring and Enforcement (Routledge, 2003) 34. 
91 Paragraph 1 of the preamble to the UDHR. 
92 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The United Nations at 70 years: The Impact upon International Law’ (n 78 above) 1; John 
Humphrey, ‘The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation’ (n 77 above) 527. Furthermore, at the 
time the UN was founded in 1945 it had 51-member states but as today it has 193-member states out of the 195 
countries in the world- the Holy See and the State of Palestine.  
93 As at 11 February 2019, ICCPR has 172 state parties and 19 no-action states. For more detail visit ‘Status of 
Ratification Interaction Dashboard’, available at > http://indicators.ohchr.org/< accessed 11 February 2019. All 
African states have ratified the ICCPR except South Sudan. It is imperative to mention that unlike the UDHR, the 
ICCPR applies only to the state parties that ratify it. See, John Humphrey, ‘The International Bill of Rights: Scope 
and Implementation’ (n 77 above) 527. 
94 Zdzislaw Kedzia, ‘United Nations Mechanism to Promote and Protect Human Rights’ in Janusz Symonides 
(eds), Human Rights: International Protection, Monitoring and Enforcement (n 90 above) 15. 
95 The ICCPR was adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976. The next section would broadly discuss this category of 
international human rights. 
96 The ICESCR was adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16 December 1966 and 
entered into force January 3, 1976. 
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significant step forward towards providing concrete, enforceable rights.97 These 
three UN instruments, the UDHR, the two covenants and the protocols, became 
known as the ‘international bill of rights’.98 The UN effort in enacting enforceable 
civil and political rights is relevant to this thesis because the ICCPR acts as a UN 
standard in the protection of this category of human rights. Conversely, the ICCPR, 
as well as the UDHR, have a direct influence on the African human rights norm 
setting, interpretation and human rights protection under the African Charter.  
In view of the preceding discussion, it is essential to mention that all African 
states are state parties to the ICCPR except South Sudan.99 Whereas this indicates 
African region acceptance of human rights concept, it also signifies accountability 
to ICCPR mechanisms. For instance, article 2 enshrines that ‘each state party to 
the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within 
its territory …the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of 
any kind…’.100 As a binding instrument, this provision is remarkable given that 
every human being lacks the absolute power to determine into what race, 
nationality or ethnicity, gender or societal class one is born. Accordingly, it has 
been opined that article 2(1) creates an independent state obligation outside the 
outlined substantive rights of the ICCPR.101 
2.3.2.1 Normative framework of the ICCPR 
The ICCPR provides the legal framework to protect and preserve the most basic 
civil and political rights such as the right to life, equality, and the prohibition from 
torture. In simple terms, the ICCPR confers rights on individuals and obligations 
                                       
97 Ved Nanda, ‘Implementation of Human Rights by the United Nations and Regional Organisations’ (n 76 above) 
307.  
98 United Nations, Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments of the United Nations. Vol. 1, Pt 2, 
UN.Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.6 (2002), available at > 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/compilation2en.pdf< accessed 13 February 2019. This section 
would concentrate on the ICCPR because of its core bearing with the thesis, being the UN standards of civil and 
political rights.  
99 For more details visit ‘Status of Ratification Interaction Dashboard’, available at > http://indicators.ohchr.org/< 
accessed 11 February 2019. 
100 Article 2 (1) of ICCPR.  
101 Machiko Kanetake, ‘UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies before Domestic Courts’ (2018) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 201; Torkel Opsahl, ‘International Obligation and National 
Implementation’ (1979) 23 Scandinavian Studies in Law, 149. 
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on state parties.102 Unlike the UDHR, the ICCPR has fifty-three articles, divided 
into a preamble and six parts,103 and recognises ‘all peoples’ right to self-
determination’.104 Part 1 of the ICCPR recognises the right to self-determination 
and the right of the people not to be deprived of its means of subsistence. Part 2 
obliges state parties to give effect to the covenant rights through legislation, 
where necessary, and to provide remedy for violation for the covenant rights. it 
requires state parties to recognise these rights without discrimination of any kind. 
Part 3 lists the rights themselves while Part 4 establishes the Human Rights 
Committee. Part 5 adumbrates on interpretation whereas Part 6 governs 
ratification, entry into force and amendment of the ICCPR. However, the civil and 
political rights catalogued in the ICCPR are substantially the same as those 
contained in the UDHR, although there are significant differences.  
 The specific civil and political rights enumerated in the ICCPR comprise the 
equal rights of men and women,105 the right to life,106 freedom from torture, 
degrading treatment,107 freedom from slavery and the slave trade,108 the right to 
liberty and security,109 the right of detained persons,110 freedom from 
imprisonment for debt,111 freedom of movement and choice of residence,112  
freedom of aliens from arbitrary expulsion,113 the right to fair trial,114 prohibition 
                                       
102 Sarah Joseph, ‘A Rights Analysis of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (1999) 5 Journal of 
International Legal Studies, 57.  
103 At on 11th February 2019, there are 172 state parties to the ICCPR; 116 State Parties to the First Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR; and 86 State Parties to the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. See generally, ‘Status 
of Ratification Interaction Dashboard’, available at > http://indicators.ohchr.org/< accessed 11 February 2019. 
104 Article 1 of the ICCPR. This right is recognised under the ICESCR and Article 20 of the African Charter. 
However, under the ECHR, this right is not recognised. Except the African Charter, no other regional human 
rights treaty recognises peoples’ rights.  
105 Article 3 of the ICCPR. 
106 Article 6 of the ICCPR. 
107 Article 7 of the ICCPR. 
108 Article 8 of the ICCPR. 
109 Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
110 Article 10 of the ICCPR. 
111 Article 11 of the ICCPR. 
112 Article 12 of the ICCPR. 
113 Article 13 of the ICCPR. 
114 Article 14 of the ICCPR. 
60 
 
 
against retroactivity of criminal law,115 the right to be recognised everywhere as 
a person before the law,116 the right to privacy,117 the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion,118 the right of opinion and expression,119 prohibition of 
propaganda for war and incitement to national, racial or religious hatred,120 the 
right to peaceful assembly,121 freedom of association,122 the right to marry and 
found a family,123 the right of a child,124 political rights,125 equality before the 
law,126 the right of a person belonging to minorities,127 and the right to self-
determination.128 However, the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR further 
protects the right to life by abolishing the death penalty.129  
 It is thought that the expanded substantive civil and political rights under 
the ICCPR would be all-inclusive and comprehensive; however, unlike article 17 
UDHR, the ICCPR does not cover the right to property and the right to asylum and 
nationality. Further, while it recognises the right to belong to an organisation, the 
ICCPR fails to recognise the right not to belong to an organisation.130 These 
omissions do not literarily imply that ICCPR rights are not comprehensive, 
especially when compared to the UDHR and other regional treaties. It cannot be 
relied upon to discredit the UN efforts in providing a comprehensive binding civil 
and political rights instrument. Indeed, the substantive rights of the ICCPR are so 
                                       
115 Article 15 of the ICCPR. 
116 Article 16 of the ICCPR. 
117 Article 17 of the ICCPR. Under article 17, the ICCPR protects the right to sexual privacy and freedom from 
surveillance. 
118 Article 18 of the ICCPR. 
119 Article 19 of the ICCPR. 
120 Article 20 of the ICCPR. 
121 Article 21 of the ICCPR. 
122 Article 22 of the ICCPR. 
123 Article 23 of the ICCPR. 
124 Article 24 of the ICCPR. 
125 Article 25 of the ICCPR. 
126 Article 26 of the ICCPR. 
127 Article 27 of the ICCPR. 
128 Article 1 of the ICCPR. 
129 Adopted and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly Resolution 44/128 of 15 December 1989 and entered 
into force 11 July 1991. It commits State Parties to the ICCPR to the abolition of the death penalty.   
130 The right not be compelled to belong to an association is recognised under article 10 (2) of the African Charter.  
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comprehensive that virtually no state party can claim to either be in full 
compliance with its normative provisions or their article 2 obligation.131  
An additional instance of the normative advance in the ICCPR is that it gives 
state parties the right to take measures derogating from their obligations under it 
in time of public emergency.132 Although it is unclear what extent of public 
emergency should allow the derogation under article 4 of ICCPR, it is interesting 
to note that there is no derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (1) and (2), 11, 15, 16 
and 18.133 In particular, the exempted articles are very crucial to the inherent 
dignity of the human person and freedom from fear and want. In contrast with the 
European system, however, the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
Lawless v Ireland134 provided valuable clarification of its similar derogation 
provision under article 15. In this case, the court held that ‘emergency refers to 
an exceptional situation or crisis which affects the whole population and 
constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the state is 
composed’.135 In this case, the ECtHR reaffirmed that article 15 (3) only requires 
a state party to communicate the facts of the situation and notice of derogation 
to the Council of Europe Secretary-General.136  
The derogation requirement is different under the ICCPR. Article 4 (3) 
requires a state party to inform other state parties through the Secretary-General 
of the UN, of the provisions from which it has derogated and the reasons for such 
derogation. Despite this, the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapon 
advisory opinion maintains that the human rights protection offered by the ICCPR 
does not cease in case of armed conflict, except through the provisions of article 
                                       
131 David Kaye, ‘State Execution of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (2013) 3 (9) UC Irvine 
Law Review, 95; Anja Seibert-Fohr, ‘Domestic Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights Pursuant to its article 2 para 2’ (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of the United Nations, 399.  
132 Article 4 of ICCPR. Of course, there is no derogation provision under the UDHR. However, a similar provision 
is seen in article 15 of ECHR. Under the European system, the European Court on Human Rights has the power 
to decide whether the conditions for this right has been fulfilled. See, Lawless v Ireland case, (1961) European 
Court of Human Rights 2, (1961) 1 European Court of Human Rights 15, APP No. 332/57. 
133 Article 4 (2) of ICCPR.  
134 Lawless v Ireland, App No. 332/57 (A/5), (1961).  
135 App No. 332/57 (A/8), (1961). 
136 Ibid.  
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4 of ICCPR.137 However, no country has sought to exercise its power of derogation 
under article 4 about a military operation in time of armed conflict outside its 
territory when such armed operation has UN mandate.138 This is because it is 
difficult and unclear how states carrying out military operations in another country 
can invoke the application of the ICCPR under article 4.139 What, then, is unknown 
is whether member states of a coalition or international body taking part in an 
armed conflict in another country can suspend the ICCPR under article 4 (3) on 
behalf of another state. Rather, the frequent notification under article 4 ICCPR 
concerns the suspension of state party domestic laws during periods of public 
emergencies such as armed conflict.140  Therefore, where a state fails to give other 
state parties proper notification of intention to derogate, any derogation then 
declared is illegal and a forfeiture of the right to derogate.141  
Another important normative feature of ICCPR is its approach to permissible 
limitations on the enjoyment of the Covenant rights. Unlike the UDHR which deals 
with limitations only in article 29 (2),142 the ICCPR limitations are more extensive. 
Six rights are limited by restrictions under the ICCPR and they include the right to 
movement under article 12, equality before the courts and tribunal under article 
14, freedom of thought, conscience and religion under article 18, the right to hold 
opinion under article 19, the right to peaceful assembly under article 21 and 
freedom of association under article 22. The grounds for these limitations are 
similar to UDHR with a slight difference, and include national security,143 rights 
                                       
137 Nuclear Weapon Advisory Opinion by the international Court of Justice, 25 para 34. The International Court 
of Justice in DRC v Uganda maintained this position.  
138 See generally, Ineke Boerefijn, ‘UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary’ (2008) 6 
European Journal of International Law, 714. 
139 Without a doubt, article 4 applies to state parties and not international organizations such as the UN though 
individual states participating in the armed operation may be member states of the ICCPR.  
140 See, Notifications under Article 4 (3) of the Covenant (Derogations), available at > 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND< accessed 20 
February 2019.  As of February 20, 2019, 34 states had submitted notifications under article 4 (3) of the ICCPR.  
141 Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion by the international Court of Justice, para 127, 136 and 140.  
142 Article 29 (2) of UDHR permits limitations solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights of others and of meeting a just requirement of morality, public order and general welfare in a democratic 
society.  
143 Articles 12, 14, 19, 21, 22 of ICCPR. 
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and freedom of others,144 public safety,145 public health,146 public order,147 and 
public morals necessary in a democratic society.148 Consequently, the ICCPR 
limitations present greater possibilities of abuse and difficulty in interpretation.149 
For example, the use of ‘public order’ in article 12 (3) has no precise legal meaning 
in common law jurisdiction, which means the absence of disorder.150 One would 
agree that an attempt to allow states to interpret their understanding of public 
order will lead to uncertainty and endanger the efficient implementation of the 
ICCPR.  
2.3.2.2  Structure and procedure for implementation of the ICCPR 
The ICCPR, unlike the UDHR, establishes an implementation and monitoring 
procedure that depends mainly on state party reporting.151 On the other hand, 
unlike the ICESCR,152 the ICCPR goes beyond the reporting system by making 
provision for conciliation of disputes on an optional basis.153 However, the General 
Assembly established a Human Rights Committee (HRC)154 as a self-monitoring 
and enforcement body for the ICCPR. Therefore, this section will determine 
whether the monitoring and enforcement arrangements of the ICCPR are adequate 
to realise effective enforcement of a universal civil and political rights concept. 
2.3.2.2.1 The mandate and functions of the HRC  
The HRC comprises 18 experts elected by the UN member states, who serve in 
their personal capacity.155 Primarily, the HRC is authorised to deal with the 
                                       
144 Articles 12, 18, 21, 22 of ICCPR. 
145 Articles 18, 21, 22 of ICCPR. 
146 Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22 of ICCPR. 
147 Articles 12, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22 of ICCPR. 
148 Articles 12, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22 of ICCPR. 
149 John Humphrey, ‘The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation’ (n 77 above) 527.  
150 Ibid.  
151 Article 40 of ICCPR. Article 40 requires state parties to submit reports through the UN Secretary-General of 
the UN on the measure they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognised in the ICCPR and the progress 
made in the enjoyment of those rights.  
152 The ICESCR depends exclusively on reporting for its implementation. See article 16 of ICESCR. 
153 Article 44 of ICCPR.  
154 Article 28 of ICCPR. 
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individual complaint,156 act on state parties’ reports, deal with interstate 
complaints under article 41, and finally, submit annual reports to the General 
Assembly under article 45. The HRC’s mandate to act on state parties’ reports 
requires it to transmit comments to both state parties and the Economic and Social 
Council.157 Likewise, the HRC has to produce General Comments and Concluding 
Observations after acting on state reports. What this demonstrates is a broad 
responsibility for the implementation body, despite the socio-cultural and political 
diversity and difference of ICCPR state parties. It is therefore argued that the 
mandate of the HRC is very demanding when compared to its composition and the 
number of state parties.  
At the outset, the ICCPR itself did not empower the HRC to deal with 
individual complaints. Such competence was established following the enactment 
of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which enables the HRC to receive and 
consider complaints from individuals.158 Consequently, state parties that ratify the 
Optional Protocol agree to allow individuals to file complaints against them at the 
HRC.159 It follows that the right of individuals to file complaints at the HRC is not 
automatically binding on state parties to the ICCPR. As a prerequisite, however, 
the state party to this Protocol must make a declaration that it recognises the 
competence of the HRC to receive and consider such complaints.160 Likewise, the 
HRC’s jurisdiction extends to the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on the 
abolition of the death penalty with regard to states that have ratified the 
                                       
156 Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession 
by General assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance 
with article 9. Available at > https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/opccpr1.aspx< accessed 14 
February 2019. 
157 Article 40 (4) of ICCPR. 
158 The Optional Protocol establishes an individual complaints procedure for bringing alleged violation of the 
ICCPR before the Human Rights Committee. At present, whereas Benin is a state party to this Protocol, Nigeria 
and Tanzania have taken no action on this Protocol.  
159 While to date, 116 state parties have signed up to this Protocol, this individual complaint procedure has resulted 
in numerous filings giving rise to a vast development of case law jurisprudence. For instance, the HRC has 1745 
finalised cases as at July 2017 from its 116 sessions of communications; see also, Report of the Human Rights 
Committee to the General Assembly, Supplement No. 40 (A/72/40) for 117th, 118th and 119th session, 2017.  
160 Article 1 of the Optional Protocol.  
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Protocol.161 As a result, the abolition of the death penalty in some African countries 
such as Benin, South Africa, Angola, Burundi, Gabon and Cote d’Ivoire have their 
foundation in this Second Optional Protocol.  
The above notwithstanding, the provisions of the ICCPR, its Protocols and 
the jurisdiction of the HRC cannot be enforced against a non-state party and a 
state party that has not made a declaration under article 41.162 This is because 
the option of an inter-state complaints system under article 41 requires a 
voluntary declaration by a state recognising the competence of the HRC to receive 
and consider complaints from another member state alleging that it is not fulfilling 
its obligation under the ICCPR.163 This optional measure for state versus state 
complaint can only be instituted when both countries involved have already made 
the declaration under article 41. However, it is essential to mention that a similar 
inter-state complaint procedure is adopted in some international treaties.164 The 
concern, therefore, is the effect of such an approach to the enhancement of 
international human rights law, and particularly, civil and political rights 
implementation.165 It is therefore argued that the success of inter-state complaint 
system depends on the human rights commitment of the member states. This is 
against the backdrop that state parties’ inability to freely use interstate complaint 
procedure against non-compliant member states may affect international progress 
on the enforcement of the ICCPR. Therefore, one significant probable effect is the 
                                       
161 The Second Optional Protocol aims at the abolition of the death penalty and was adopted and proclaimed by 
the General Assembly resolution 44/123 of 15 December 1989.  
162 As at October 2017, 50 state parties had made the declaration provided for under article 41 (1) of the ICCPR.  
163 Only 50 state parties have filed a declaration under article 41. See, Report of the Human Rights Committee to 
the General Assembly, Supplement No. 40 (A/72/40) for 117th, 118th and 119th session, 2017. 
164 For example, see article 21 of Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
and Punishment; article 32 of Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and, 
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lack of opportunity for state parties to put pressure on themselves or act as a 
watchdog for the HRC.  
2.3.2.2.2 The reporting procedure of ICCPR 
The reporting system is the primary mechanism for monitoring implementation of 
the ICCPR in member states. Under article 40, state parties to the ICCPR 
undertake to submit periodic reports to the Secretary-General of the UN, who will 
transmit them to the HRC. Unlike the ICESCR where the Economic and Social 
Council is expected to report to the General Assembly with ‘recommendations of 
a general nature’,166 the HRC transmits its reports and General Comments as it 
may consider appropriate to the state parties after studying their reports.167 
However, while the HRC may transmit these General Comments to the Economic 
and Social Council, it is expected to include a summary of its activities in its annual 
report submitted to the General Assembly.168 One could, however, question 
whether the HRC General Comments and Concluding Observations have the force 
of law in concerned states.  
 It is clear from the analysis of the HRC that Concluding Observations have 
more influence on the state parties, unlike General Comments.169 In particular, 
the HRC adopts a Concluding Observation after considering state reports which 
are monitored by a Special Rapporteur for Follow Up on Concluding Observation 
to ensure state party implementation. On the other hand, the HRC General 
Comments on ICCPR provisions act as guidance to be taken into account when 
making State Reports under article 40. However, the content and sincerity of these 
reports have been questioned. In this vein, Olowu,170 Donnelly,171 and 
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Robertson,172 have argued that since state parties through their officials compile 
these reports, such state reports may lack an objective account of state 
commitment to the covenant. These scholars are concerned whether state reports 
will reflect the actual position of state measures in respecting and ensuring the 
enjoyment of ICCPR rights because states may not want to indict themselves by 
stating the reality.  
In the light of the preceding concern, the HRC introduced in 2009 a 
simplified reporting procedure which focuses on a state party replying to a list of 
issues from the HRC.173 As a result, this approach allows the HRC to seek input 
from civil society organisations and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) in 
operation in the concerned state party before listing the issues to be addressed in 
its focused state report. This methodology is practical and will ensure objectivity 
in state reports because state parties are expected to respond accurately to the 
HRC listed issues. This is because this method is target driven and result-oriented 
with potential to extract an actual human rights position from state parties. 
However, what is unclear is whether this approach will tackle state parties’ late 
filing of reports to the HRC under the article 40 provision. 
It is observed that delay in submitting state reports contributes to HRC’s 
inability to monitor state parties’ implementation of ICCPR provisions.174 Although 
non-submission of reports is a violation of article 40 (1) of ICCPR, many Asian 
states have been reluctant to submit their state reports to the HRC.175 
Consequently, the HRC has, over time, adopted several measures to encourage 
state parties’ compliance with article 40 (1) and such includes the admonition of 
states, recognition of serious defaulter States, and notice to States warning them 
                                       
172 Arthur Robertson, ‘The Implementation System: International Measures’ in Louis Henkin (eds), The 
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about the HRC’s intent to consider state party measures adopted to give effect to 
the provisions even in the absence of a submitted state report.176 One would have 
thought that since the examination of state reports is the primary means of 
monitoring ICCPR implementation, it would have been better to have clarified this 
scope from the outset rather than leaving the issues to be resolved after many 
years of poor compliance by state parties.   
2.3.2.3  Underlying domestic implementation of the ICCPR 
It is clear from the provisions of the ICCPR that enforcement depends on the 
effectiveness of the HRC and state legislative and enforcement institutions.177 For 
instance, under article 2 (1) ICCPR, state parties undertake ‘to respect and ensure 
for all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognised in the present Covenant’. Furthermore, article 2 (2) of the ICCPR 
provides:  
‘where not already provided for by existing legislative and other measures, 
each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary 
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provision 
of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the present covenant’.  
On the other hand, article 2 (3) of the ICCPR states that each state party to the 
present Covenant undertakes:  
(a) ‘to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy…..’.  
(b) ‘to ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his 
rights thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided 
for by the legal system of the state, and to develop the possibilities 
of judicial remedy’. 
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What is clear from the above provisions is that enjoyment of the ICCPR largely 
depends on the legislative and implementation measures taken by state parties. 
It follows that while domestic enforcement plays a primary role in ICCPR 
implementation, international enforcement acts as a control system and a 
secondary means of enforcement.178 As a result, both national and international 
institutions have a crucial role to play in ensuring civil and political rights 
enforcement to every individual across the globe.  
 Firstly, article 2 (1) ICCPR establishes an obligation of result on state parties 
to ensure the implementation of civil and political rights in an effective manner.179 
Such obligation of result envisages article 2 (2) mandate to adopt legislative and 
other measures to give effect to the ICCPR. What is implied from the wording of 
this provision is that the ICCPR provides leeway for state parties to use another 
medium because it did not make legislative adoption the only method of 
implementation. Indeed, Nowak in his analysis observed that part of the article 2 
(2) wording, speaking of ‘the necessary steps in accordance with the constitutional 
processes’ can give state parties leeway in the implementation of the covenant.180 
It follows that different constitutional processes of state parties will determine the 
manner of ICCPR implementation, thereby eliminating the idea of a harmonised 
implementation medium which ignores the vast difference between diverse legal 
systems. 
 It is the prerogative of state parties to the ICCPR to choose its style of 
legislative implementation as long as it gives effect to the ICCPR.181 On this note, 
Opsahl asserts that state parties have a double duty of implementation. According 
to him, state parties have a responsibility ‘to respect and to ensure individuals 
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enjoy these rights without distinction of any kind, and to take necessary steps to 
provide legislative or other measures to give effect to the ICCPR’.182 Whilst this 
observation appears to be correct, one can argue that the wording of article 2 
suggests immediate state parties’ compliance with ICCPR obligations, unlike the 
ICESCR. For instance, while article 2(1) of ICESCR requires State Parties to 
ICESCR ‘to take steps, individually or through international assistance and 
cooperation…. with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the 
rights’, whereas article 2(3) further demands ‘developing countries, with due 
regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent 
they would guarantee the economic rights’.183 The difference in phrases ‘to take 
steps’ when compared to ‘undertake to respect and ensure’ used in both covenants 
suggests that while the ICCPR creates an immediate and unconditional obligation, 
the ICESCR implies a progressive implementation.184 As a result, one can argue 
that the ICESCR normative approach may have contributed to the idea of adopting 
some socio-economic rights as fundamental objectives and directive principles of 
state policy in many African state constitutions, thus non-justiciable rights.185  
 The mandatory obligation of state parties in the implementation of the 
ICCPR is further emphasised in article 2 (3) ICCPR. This provision instructs state 
parties to provide an effective remedy and fair hearing or determination by a 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authority, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the state party legal system. Furthermore, 
state parties are mandated to ensure that competent authorities enforce such 
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remedies when granted.186 This implies that state institutions have the power to 
choose which remedies or punishment to award. For instance, whereas arbitrary 
killing187 and kidnapping188 constitute both human rights violations189 and crimes 
punishable under the Nigeria Criminal Code Act, female genital mutilation 
constitutes inhuman and degrading with prison term under Benin Act No. 2003-
03.190 What is implied is that acts that breach civil and political rights may attract 
different remedies depending on the punishment and protection under the national 
legislation of concerned state parties.   
 It is particularly evident that ICCPR provisions are protected under national 
and international laws.191 However, the individual complaint system provided by 
the Optional Protocol requires domestic remedies to be exhausted before an 
individual may submit a communication to the HRC.192 This is because domestic 
mechanisms play a prominent role which makes them useful even in its 
international implementation procedure.193 Take, for instance, article 2 (3) (c) 
which mandates state parties to ensure competent authorities enforce remedies 
when granted. It follows that the non-recognition of national institutions in the 
implementation of ICCPR would make the treaty meaningless because of the non-
binding structure of the HRC.  
2.3.2.4 Overriding limitations to the implementation of the ICCPR 
A significant issue for contemporary international human rights law is to guarantee 
both the protection and the enjoyment of these rights by ensuring that human 
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rights do not end as a mere promise. Consequently, implementation has remained 
the weakest component of the international human rights system due to 
institutional weaknesses and voluntary state party compliance method.194 
Therefore, to ascertain the challenges to ICCPR enforcement, this section 
examines the potential limitations of the ICCPR provisions as a foundation for 
studying the prospects for reforms.  
2.3.2.4.1 Reservations, Understandings and Declarations clause  
The Reservations, Understandings and the Declarations clause (RUDs) is a portion 
of a treaty that does not apply to the ‘reserving’ party. RUDs allow a state to 
become a member state to an international treaty in a qualified and contingent 
manner, exempting itself from complying with certain obligations under the 
treaty.195 RUDs limit the domestic effects of treaties and confine provisions of 
international treaties to meanings ascribed to them by state party practice.196 This 
practice is often seen in the United States of America’s (USA) ratification of 
international human rights convention such as the ICCPR.197 However, it is clear 
that the ICCPR permits reservations apart from those relating to reporting.198 In 
particular, this practice has been contentious and was objected to by some state 
parties when the United States sought it in the implementation of the ICCPR.199 
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According to the United States, the ICCPR is not self-executing, thereby it cannot 
by itself create rights enforceable in the United States.200 In contrast, opposing 
countries relied on the argument that RUDs contradict the provisions and 
objectives of the ICCPR and are in violation of articles 4 and 50 provisions. What 
is clear, however, is that although the ICCPR permits RUDs, invoking it can be 
argued to limit state party obligations under the ICCPR while also violating state 
party commitment not to invoke domestic law to justify non-compliance.201  
It is clear from the foregoing that the option for a reservation to the ICCPR 
has a direct effect on the enjoyment of civil and political rights. For instance, the 
USA reservation relating to the right to sentence persons under the age of 18 to 
death contravenes the article 4 (2) provision on non-derogation from the 
implementation of the right to life.202 It is important to note that such an approach 
has the potential to create uncertainties if copied by other state parties, and in 
particular, will undermine the efficiency of the HRC. The analysis put forward 
concerning RUDs shows that they will deprive individuals of the international 
protection provided under the ICCPR because it limits state party obligations under 
the ICCPR, thereby denying individuals a cause of action under domestic law. 
2.3.2.4.2 Lack of judicial or quasi-judicial enforcement institution  
The ICCPR, just like the UDHR, fails to create an effective enforcement system 
given the absence of either a judicial institution for the determination of disputes. 
According to Mutua, the absence of a binding enforcement mechanism is a 
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significant weakness that impacts on state party implementation of ICCPR.203 From 
a less cynical perspective, the lack of a judicial enforcement mechanism for ICCPR 
leaves its enjoyment at the mercy of the state parties’ judicial system. In such 
circumstances, ratification of the ICCPR is not enough to guarantee international 
implementation. Therefore, where a state party fails to internalise the ICCPR, the 
entire reports, comments, and observations of the HRC may be of no effect or 
ignored, and individuals will have no domestic redress available to exhaust before 
the HRC assumes jurisdiction.204  
 The absence of a judicial institution for ICCPR enforcement makes the 
ICCPR somewhat a persuasive instrument.205 Despite establishing the HRC to 
oversee the implementation of the ICCPR, article 45 requires an annual HRC report 
to be submitted to the UNGA as evidence of its implementation activities.206 While 
the article 45 requirement may give rise to effective enforcement or persuasion 
through the UNGA, it still cannot translate to a judicial enforcement system, which 
internationally enjoys the binding force of law. Indeed, such a situation has the 
potential of weakening international implementation measures because it leaves 
a considerable implementation responsibility on state party mechanisms. 
Accordingly, Mutua, in his analysis of the HRC, maintains that this ICCPR 
implementation body has remained mostly ineffective because state parties have 
consistently ignored their ICCPR obligations.207 This has sometimes led to the 
conclusion that the HRC is weak, timid and ineffectual to deliver international 
community promises on human rights protection.208 On the other hand, it has 
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been observed that neither states nor international bodies, which depend on the 
voluntary approach of implementation, can adequately protect human rights.209   
2.3.2.4.3 Lack of sanctions for non-compliance 
Another significant limitation of the ICCPR is the lack of penalties or sanctions 
against non-complying state parties. The non-recognition of the use of sanctions 
against erring state parties to the ICCPR exposes its persuasive or voluntary 
implementation status. The most notable impact of this absence is that full 
individual enjoyment of the ICCPR cannot be guaranteed at the state level because 
a state party can ratify international treaties to comply with international 
obligations even when necessary institutions for effective implementation are 
lacking. For instance, some state parties to the ICCPR have witnessed large-scale 
violations of the Covenant rights and freedoms without officially applying for a 
derogation under article 4.210  
 However, it is argued that state parties and perhaps people understand that 
rules will be readily obeyed if backed with penalties for non-compliance even when 
they felt no moral obligation to follow such rules.211 What is expected in the 
absence of sanction is a situation where the interest of government conflicts with 
state obligations under international treaties. The impact that may be created by 
such lack of sanctions will be more distressing given the ICCPR approach to the 
interstate complaint system and the absence of peer pressure from other state 
parties.212 One would have thought that since the violation of civil and political 
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rights affects the intrinsic nature of human beings and the widespread violations 
in many states, it would have been better to have its implementation backed with 
sanctions.  
2.3.2.4.4 Regionalism  
Regionalism occurs where a group of independent states form a subgroup within 
the UN.213 Regionalism, as a group strategy, is an approach adopted by countries 
to pursue common agendas, protect individual members or further national 
policies of different states.214 As an aspect of international human rights law, 
regionalism is a useful concept to understand voting amongst the groups of 
countries that share seats in the HRC.215 According to Abebe, such subgroups 
within the UN are necessary because human rights are often twisted towards 
Western practices leaving non-Western states with the option of using subgroups 
to represent their standpoint.216  
 It is clear from the outset that the UN’s human rights system was not open 
to the idea of regional implementation until the rise of regional bodies and their 
participation in regional peace, security, and political affairs.217 In other words, 
the European human rights system having not undermined the universal scope of 
the UDHR, led to the UN General Assembly Resolution 32/127 encouraging states 
to consider the establishment of regional human rights machinery.218 With more 
involvement and pressure coming from such subgroups, the UN subsequently 
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recognised regionalism though within the institutional and legal hierarchy that 
promote the internationalisation of human rights.219 At present, both UN and 
regional human rights systems are complementary in ensuring that the UN 
universal human rights ambition is actualised.220 This arrangement scuttles the 
early notion that the UN remains the sole player in securing human rights. 
Concerning compliance with international treaties, regional mechanisms are more 
attractive to states because they deal more with cultural sensitivities221 and are 
homogenous insofar as their countries have similar political and cultural 
histories.222 It follows that countries within a region are more aware of the 
challenges in the region and maybe in a better position to make recommendations 
and promote cooperation.223 
As time progressed, regionalism started having a negative influence by 
dividing and undermining UN human rights work. In particular, this manifests in 
situations where state parties adopt or decline recommendations because of the 
recommending country. For example, Kenya, during a Universal Periodic Review, 
accepted recommendations from Angola and Rwanda to continue its efforts 
towards the abolition of the death penalty while rejecting a similar 
recommendation from France and Poland.224 Several African states have shown 
that they are more inclined to accept recommendations from fellow African nations 
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than from non-African countries.225 Therefore, regionalism breeds solidarity, which 
negatively impacts on the implementation of ICCPR.  
Regionalism is used by state parties to shield allied states. Regional alliance 
can be traced to the local politics, culture, and history of the particular region, 
which may cause member states to shield some allies from critical and potential 
threat and review.226 For instance, South Africa’s positive remarks on human rights 
situations in some African countries where human rights violations were rife.227 As 
a result, regionalism can negatively influence and undermine UN international 
human rights/law goals. Another relevant factor is that regionalism offers a 
protective mechanism with authority broader than a sovereign state which 
functions at an intermediate level for effective international human rights 
enforcement.228 From the above analysis, it is submitted that regionalism can 
achieve both negative and positive outcomes. However, what is essential is how 
state parties utilise it to achieve international goals, such as effective human rights 
enforcement.  
2.3.2.4.5 Cultural relativism 
States that advocate cultural relativism in international human rights 
implementation argue that human rights depend on the context and culture in 
which they are applied.229 Cultural relativism is supported due to different cultural, 
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social, ideological, economic and religious backgrounds.230 Likewise, some cultural 
relativism advocates base their arguments on the need to respect strong, diverse 
cultural values amongst various countries and societies. An example is seen in a 
statement made by the Nigerian delegate on behalf of the African Group at the 
HRC, who reiterated that same-sex relations stand against African values and will 
not be accepted or integrated as domestic human rights.231 The position of some 
of these African countries has shown that it is legally, socially, culturally and 
practically impossible to consider all individual rights acknowledged by Western 
countries as human rights. For instance, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) rights in many Western countries have continued to face stiff opposition in 
many African countries due to cultural, religious and societal values.232 Some 
states like Kenya, Zimbabwe and Nigeria have refused to accept the existence of 
gay rights; thereby considering it an attempt by Western countries to prescribe 
new rights.233 To some cultural relativism advocates, human rights is a weapon of 
cultural hegemony.234  
 Many countries, especially from the African continent, have exhibited these 
cultural relativism aspects in some human rights issues.235 According to Etone, 
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African states have received the highest number of recommendations on sexual 
orientation at the HRC; yet, there seems to be an increase in the number of African 
countries criminalising same-sex marriages and related practices.236 In other 
words, these countries refuse to accept recommendations on the strength of 
entrenched socio, cultural and religious sentiments. Indeed, the impact of state 
party refusal to recognise recommendations is that no legislative effort would be 
made to recognise the infringed right. However, the argument put forward against 
cultural relativism is that it has the potential to leave human rights under the 
control of leaders who use culture as a shield for abuse.237 The analysis above 
demonstrates that cultural relativism remains an essential factor in the 
engagement of states, particularly African countries, in any international human 
rights discourse.238  
2.4 Regional protection of civil and political rights  
Soon after the adoption of the nonbinding UDHR, human rights evolution moved 
in the direction of regional arrangements. Regional human rights systems are 
independent sub-regimes nested within the international framework for human 
rights protection and promotion.239 Following the enactment of the ECHR in 1950 
and other subsequent regional instruments,240 regional human rights systems 
continued to help in localising international human rights norms and standards 
while reflecting the particular human rights concerns of the region.241 The 
discussion in this section will be limited mainly to the ECHR and the American 
Convention on Human Rights because both regional instruments pre-date the 
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African Charter.242 Therefore, this section will assess whether these regional 
systems have any significant influence in the normative and institutional 
arrangements of the African Charter, thereby positioning as a yardstick to 
measure the extent of protection afforded by the African Charter.  
2.4.1 The European Convention on Human Rights  
The ECHR, as the first regional human rights instrument, emerged shortly after 
the adoption of the UDHR, from a war-ravaged Europe. Following the atrocities of 
World War II, countries in the European continent created an intergovernmental 
organisation, the Council of Europe on May 5 1949, to protect human rights 
amongst other objectives.243 In fulfilment of its primary task, governments of this 
organisation at Rome on 4 November 1950 signed the ECHR, and it entered into 
force on 3 September 1953.244 The ECHR is arguably the most effective regional 
system for human rights protection available today.245 This argument is based on 
the level of compliance it gets from state parties.246 
2.4.1.1 Analysis of normative protection  
The ECHR creates a regional system for the collective judicial enforcement of 
rights drawn from the UDHR on every individual within their jurisdiction. It is clear 
from the language of the ECHR preamble that the ECHR provides a system for the 
protection of universal rights.247 The rights guaranteed in the ECHR include the 
right to life; prohibition of torture; prohibition of slavery and forced labour; the 
right to liberty and security; the right to a fair trial; no punishment without law; 
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the right to respect for private and family life; freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; freedom of expression; freedom of assembly and association; the right 
to marry and the prohibition of discrimination. While these rights are similar to 
the UDHR, its enforcement is different.  
 Human rights protection under the ECHR has been progressive. The 
protection of the ECHR extends to its Protocols. These Protocols protect rights not 
covered in the ECHR. For example, the right to property, the right to education, 
and the right to free election are covered by the Protocol to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1952. Similarly, 
Protocol No. 4 of 1963 protects prohibition of imprisonment for debt; freedom of 
movement; prohibition of the expulsion of nationals, and prohibition of collective 
expulsion of aliens, while Protocol No. 6 of 1983 abolishes the death penalty.248 
Protocol No. 7 of 1984 provides procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of 
aliens; compensation for wrongful conviction; the right not to be tried or punished 
twice; the right of appeal in criminal matters; and, the right to equality between 
spouses. Likewise, while Protocol No. 12 of 2000 protects the general prohibition 
of discrimination, Protocol No. 13 of 2002 protection covers the abolition of the 
death penalty; prohibition of derogations; and prohibition of reservations. As a 
result of the preceding progression, the ECHR has been able to cover the majority 
of human rights omitted at the time of enactment.  
  However, some rights under the European system may be limited 
according to the laws of a contracting state. What this implies is that not all rights 
under the ECHR are absolute. For instance, while state parties may limit the right 
to respect for private and family life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
freedom of expression; and, freedom of assembly and association, the reason for 
limitation must be necessary in a democratic society, for the protection of the 
rights and freedom of others, or in the interest of national security or public 
safety.249 Therefore, in the absence of any or all of these grounds for limitation, 
                                       
248 What is interesting about this Protocol is that it prohibits derogation and reservations. Therefore, this right is 
an absolute right. 
249 See articles 8 (2), 9 (2), 10 (2) and 11 (2) of ECHR.   
83 
 
 
the state would be seen as violating the ECHR. On the other hand, state parties 
can derogate in time of public emergency or war threatening the life of the 
nation.250 Although this is similar to the ICCPR, some rights are absolute and 
cannot be derogated from even in time of public emergency.251 As a result, state 
parties are expected to uphold them irrespective of what emergencies the state 
may be undergoing.  
 The ECHR provides for both individual and inter-state complaint procedures. 
Although the original thinking was that the inter-state complaint procedure would 
act as the guardian of the public order of Europe, the individual complaint 
procedures have been mostly responsible for the vast case law jurisprudence of 
the ECHR.252 Suffice it to add that article 34 emphasises the power of the ECtHR 
to receive individual application from a victim, who may not be a national of the 
state involved.253 This idea of protection may be traced to article 1 provision which 
obliges contracting state parties to ECHR to secure these rights and freedoms to 
everyone within its jurisdiction. However, individual complaints before the ECtHR 
need to meet the admissibility requirement enshrined in article 35. This provision 
permits the court to reject applications where complainants fail to meet one or all 
of the enshrined criteria. For example, the most common ground of challenge to 
the court jurisdiction is the failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The legal 
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies is a fundamental element of the 
international complaint procedure which ensures that state parties to an 
international treaty are not denied the first opportunity to provide redress before 
being dragged before an international body.254 What is implied here is that regional 
courts assume subsidiary or complementary roles in the protection of human 
rights.  
                                       
250 Article 15 of ECHR. 
251 Article 15 prohibits derogation on the right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of forced labour and 
slavery.  
252 Kevin Boyle, ‘The European Experience: The European Convention on Human Rights’ (n 246 above). 
253 See, Soering v United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88 (1989). In this case, the Court held that extradition 
of a German national from Britain to the United States where he would face a death penalty violates the United 
Kingdom’s obligation of prohibition against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment under the ECHR.  
254 Kevin Boyle, ‘The European Experience: The European Convention on Human Rights’ (n 246 above). 
84 
 
 
 Generally, the ECHR establishes state party obligations toward individuals. 
It acts as mandatory domestic standards for state parties and alludes, through its 
subsidiarity principle, that state parties have a duty to ensure that human rights 
are respected at the national level.255 Given the idea that human rights can only 
be enjoyed when state parties meet their duties under an international treaty, the 
ECHR establishes a system different from the UN approach in the collective 
protection of human rights through petitions by both states and individuals.256  
2.4.1.2 Enforcement mechanism of the ECHR  
From its origin, the ECHR established a Commission of Human Rights and a Court. 
While the Commission of Human Rights, a quasi-judicial body with the mandate 
to examine the admissibility of applications was abolished by Protocol No. 11 of 
1998, this reform made way for the former part-time Court to become a full-time 
Court. In particular, the composition of the abolished Commission comprises the 
same number of state parties, and the Commissioners acted in their individual 
capacities and independently of their various governments. The Commission gave 
opinions on complaints, but the final decision on violation of the ECHR rested with 
the Court.257 This evolution in the European human rights system entails that all 
complaints arising from the violation of the ECHR are adjudicated exclusively by 
the ECtHR.  
On the other hand, the ECtHR applies and protects the rights set out in the 
ECHR and its Protocols.258 It protects ECHR rights and freedoms through its judicial 
procedures, and states are bound to implement its judgments.259 As with the 
abolished Commission, the ECtHR consists of a number of judges equal to that of 
the contracting parties,260 elected by the state party Parliamentary Assembly by a 
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majority of votes cast from a list of three candidates nominated by the state.261 
The ECtHR is organised into five administrative sections sitting and resolving cases 
simultaneously. At present, the Court works in four different judicial formations; 
namely, the single judge, committee, chamber, and grand chamber.262 Such 
administrative pattern ensures speedy adjudication of cases, even though there 
are several backlogs of pending cases before the ECtHR. Furthermore, the ECtHR 
has jurisdiction to decide applications submitted by individuals, NGOs and state 
parties concerning the violation of ECHR and its Protocols.263 The consequence of 
the ECtHR jurisdiction is that cases and complaints may overburden it. 
Concerning jurisdiction, the ECtHR has undisputed power to decide whether 
cases submitted to it meet the admissibility criteria under article 35 ECHR. To 
carry out this mandate, a single judge, committee or chamber share jurisdiction 
to decide cases relating to individual application concerning the exhaustion of local 
remedies, six-month application deadline after the exhaustion of local remedies, 
if a case is against a state party to the ECHR, and if the applicant has shown that 
he/she suffered a significant disadvantage. From the text of article 35, which is 
similar to article 56 of the African Charter, a claim would be declared inadmissible 
by the single judge, committee or chamber if it fails to meet one or all of these 
criteria.264 However, where any of the ECtHR judicial formations found a violation 
of ECHR, it has the power to award just satisfaction or fair compensation in the 
form of financial compensation, to individual applicants or victims of ECHR 
violation.265 It follows that the award of just satisfaction or fair compensation to 
victims of ECHR violations may come with a state party obligation to review its 
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national laws. Indeed, as the world’s first human rights court, the ECtHR has 
influenced the domestic laws of many member states through decisions and case 
laws that create fundamental standards for domestic legislation.266 Enforcement 
has been one of the positive impacts of the European human rights system. 
However, in order to enhance enforcement, state parties voluntarily undertake to 
abide by the decision of the ECtHR, which the ECtHR transmits to the Committee 
of Ministers for the supervision of its execution.267  
2.4.2  American Convention on Human Rights  
The American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention), also known 
as the ‘Pact of San Jose’ was adopted by the Organisation of American States on 
22 November 1969 and came into force on 18 July 1978.268 Its evolution is linked 
with the political, legal and normative developments in the region.269 The purpose 
of the American Convention is to ‘consolidate in this hemisphere, within the 
framework of domestic institutions, a system of personal liberty and social justice 
based on the respect for the essentials of man’.270 The state parties to this 
Convention accept the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the basic human 
rights enshrined therein and agree to be bound by the outcome of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights.271 Suffice it to add that the civil and political rights form the bulk of the 
protected rights under the American Convention just like the European 
Convention. Regardless, article 26 of the American Convention merely commits 
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states to the progressive realisation of social-economic rights, which are not 
explicitly listed in this Convention.272  
2.4.2.1 Overview of normative protection under the American Convention  
The rights contained in the American Convention consist primarily of civil and 
political rights.273 It is clear that some rights enshrined in the American Convention 
are unique and a departure from the UDHR and the ECHR. For instance, while 
article 4 protects the right to life from the moment of conception, the right to 
humane treatment and the right to a name are omitted in ECHR and UDHR. In 
addition, unlike the ECHR, the American Convention distinctly expanded some fair 
hearing rights, thereby protecting more international human rights principles. 
Such expanded rights include the freedom from ex post facto laws, the right to 
compensation, the right of reply, and the right to judicial protection.  
 However, not all rights protected in this American Convention are absolute. 
Similar to the ECHR, some rights can be limited by the rights of others, by the 
security of all, and by the just demands of general welfare in a democratic 
society.274 In another similar pattern to the ECHR, state parties are permitted 
during the time of war, public danger or other emergencies to suspend certain 
rights. Despite these similarities, article 27 (2) forbids suspension of the following 
rights- the right to judicial personality, the right to life, the right to humane 
treatment, freedom from slavery, freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom of 
conscience and religion, the right to family, the right to a name, the right of a 
child, the right to nationality, and the right to participate in government. 
Interestingly, whilst this list outnumbers the rights protected from derogation in 
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article 15 (2) ECHR and article 4 of ICCPR, it would indeed make a difference in 
the number of rights that individuals must enjoy at all times.  
 Considering the normative protection of human rights, the American 
Convention contains some normative features that are lacking in the ECHR. For 
instance, states are permitted to submit reservations under article 75. Allowing 
state parties to enter reservation implies that state parties can opt out of specific 
provisions of the American Convention at the point of ratification. Such an 
approach and tactic may have a devastating effect on civil and political rights 
enforcement in the American region, even with its expanded norms and approach 
to derogation. Indeed, it gives state parties a right to choose what right to protect 
domestically.275 On the other hand, the American Convention is the first regional 
instrument to enshrine a relationship between duties and rights.276 Although this 
was later applied in the African Charter, individual duties created under the 
American Convention include ‘responsibility to his family, his community, and 
mankind’.277  
2.4.2.2 Analysis of the American Convention enforcement institutions 
To address the hemisphere human rights problems, the Organisation of American 
States established the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-
American Commission) and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (Inter-
American Court) as monitoring and compliance bodies for the American 
Convention. Such dual monitoring and compliance institutions demonstrate 
another similarity between the American system and the ECHR system.278 The 
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Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court play complementary 
but distinct roles.  
The Inter-American Commission consists of seven members with 
competence in the field of human rights elected by the Organisation of American 
States General Assembly.279 The number of its members is different from the 
precedent set in the ECHR, which allows a composition that equals the member 
states. Despite its composition, the Inter-American Commission has a broad 
mandate. Even in the face of its broad mandate, the sitting pattern of the 
American Commission, like the American Court, is part-time. For instance, while 
the American Commission observes two regular sessions per year, they may sit in 
special session when necessary, and the American Court convenes four times per 
year.280 In particular, both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-
American Court are supported by a full-time secretariat.281 Without a doubt, 
having a full-time secretariat helps organise and support the Court and the 
Commission to carry out their mandate. 
The primary function of the Inter-American Commission is ‘to promote 
respect for and defence of human rights amongst other functions and powers listed 
in article 41. The Inter-American Commission assists the Inter-American Court in 
identifying and handling complaints by considering the admissibility requirement 
for the Inter-American Court’s contentious cases. The Inter-American Commission 
carries out its promotional responsibilities by monitoring situations in member 
states, publishing reports, proposing amendments and additional Protocols to the 
American Convention. The Inter-American Commission receives and processes 
complaints on specific abuses and can seek to reach a friendly settlement between 
the parties under article 45 of the Convention. However, for the Inter-American 
Commission to consider petitions from individuals and NGOs in the above 
circumstances, such individuals or NGOs are required to have exhausted local 
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remedies and other admissibility requirements under article 46, before 
approaching the Commission.282  
 The Inter-American Commission is a quasi-judicial body, and its decisions 
are not binding. Based on this, the Inter-American Commission can only declare 
that a violation has taken place and make recommendations for correction.283 
Further, the Inter-American Commission can refer a case to the Inter-American 
Court for a binding decision if the affected state has accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction.284 However, the Inter-American Commission has a duty to appear in 
all cases before the Court.285 
 The American Convention created the Inter-American Court to adjudicate 
the obligations enshrined in the Convention.286 The composition of the Inter-
American Court is similar to the Inter-American Commission, which comprises 
seven members proposed by member states and voted on by the General 
Assembly, including those states that have not recognised the jurisdiction of the 
court.287 While the Inter-American Court has both contentious and advisory 
powers,288 its contentious power permits it to order provisional measures, where 
it is necessary to prevent irreparable loss.289 Despite this, the jurisdiction of the 
Court relates to the interpretation and application of the American Convention, 
other human rights treaties of the Organisation of American States, or 
international human rights treaties ratified by the particular state, which may aid 
the interpretation of the Convention.290 For instance, the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court applies only to state parties which recognise its jurisdiction. 
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Notwithstanding, a state that has not done this may grant the Court a temporary 
jurisdiction to consider a particular case.291  
 The American Convention and the Charter of the Organisation of American 
States are superficial on how the judgments of the Inter-American Court can be 
enforced. Unlike the European system that imposes on the Committee of Ministers 
the duty to ensure and monitor state party compliance of the ECtHR decisions, the 
American Convention lacks such provision. Instead, article 41 (g) requests both 
the Inter-American Court and Commission to submit reports to the General 
Assembly of the Organisation of American States. In particular, the General 
Assembly of the Organisation of American States performs enforcement oversight 
for both the Inter-American Court and Commission.292 For instance, it has 
discretionary power to sanction state parties that fail to comply with the decisions 
of both the Inter-American Court and Commission.293  
2.5  Conclusion 
The philosophical foundation of human rights has shown that human rights 
protection has always been part of humanity. Although the codification of rights 
started with the early revolutions, the 20th-century events laid the foundation for 
contemporary international codification for human rights and its development as 
a branch of law. It is agreed that the international and regional arrangements for 
human rights protection are laudable. In particular, the regional arrangements 
have taken a more progressive leap towards realising effective protection through 
their adoption of judicial means of enforcement. What is remaining is for these 
regional and UN institutions to ensure state parties’ adherence to treaty 
obligations. This is because the strength of each regional system lies in the varying 
commitment from member states, the concerned intergovernmental body and 
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monitoring enforcement institutions. However, it is not out of place to consider 
reforms to the UN human rights system, especially the ICCPR, given the identified 
contextual shortcomings in the area of enforcement. Based on these gaps which 
somewhat leave enforcement partly at the mercy of state parties, a more 
innovative measure such as ensuring enforcement using the UN Security Council 
or collaboration with the International Court of Justice or International Criminal 
Court may be considered. In brief, the UN and its member states should employ 
more use of pressure, the name and shame approach, and Security Council 
resolutions to improve its enforcement of the ICCPR.294 Finally, the analysis of this 
chapter provides the needed foundation for assessment of the African Charter 
normative and enforcement institutions as well as the domestic enforcement of 
civil and political rights. 
                                       
294 The ICCPR may be amended under article 51 with the consent of two-thirds of its state parties. 
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CHAPTER THREE: NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS PROTECTION UNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER 
3.0 Introduction.  
The previous chapter has laid the foundation for regional human rights 
arrangement through the analysis of the evolution of human rights; in particular, 
the progressive approach in guaranteeing effective enforcement of civil and 
political rights. This chapter analyses the protection of civil and political rights 
under the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). 
It examines the extent of normative protection enshrined in the African Charter 
while assessing the similarities and differences with relevant international 
instruments. In particular, this chapter examines the key normative features of 
the African Charter and analyses their impact on realising effective enforcement 
of civil and political rights. Furthermore, it analyses the interpretation accorded to 
civil and political rights by African Charter enforcement institutions1 as well as the 
direction provided in these case laws. The intention is to facilitate a better 
understanding of whether the interpretation accorded these rights have corrected 
the challenge posed by the underlying provisions or oversights of the African 
Charter norms.   
3.1 Historical overview and emergence of the African Charter 
This section will examine the emergence and development of the African Charter. 
It suggests that the journey towards the realisation of the African Charter was 
marred by resistance as well as negotiations, thus leaving several questions 
relating to the normative and institutional protection of human rights unanswered 
by the African Charter.  
The journey towards the enactment of an African Charter started in 1961.2 
At the outset, the ‘African Conference on the Rule of Law’ 1961 organised by the 
                                       
1 The enforcement institutions of the African Charter are the African Court and the African Commission. These 
institutions will be broadly analysed in the next chapter.  
2 The first conference for an African human rights treaty was the African Conference for the Rule of Law 1961 
organised by the International Commission of Jurists in Lagos, Nigeria.  
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International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and held in Lagos, Nigeria, emphasised 
the African need to give effect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) by possibly adopting an African Convention of Human Rights with a human 
rights court.3 Although the recommendations of this conference did not have any 
immediate result in Africa, it set the scene for further discussions for the 
establishment of a regional human rights system. For instance, the quest for a 
regional human rights system following the 1961 Lagos Conference led to a series 
of Conferences and Seminars such as the Cairo Seminar of 1969;4 the Lusaka, 
Zambia Seminar of 1970 on the Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights; the Libreville Gabon Seminar of 1971 on the Participation of Women in 
Economic Life; the Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania Seminar of 1973 on the study of New 
Ways and Means for Promoting Human Rights with Special Attention to the 
Problems and Needs of Africa; and, the Dakar, Senegal Seminar of 1978 on Human 
Rights and Economic Development in Francophone Africa. One would have thought 
that since many newly independent African countries have recognised the UDHR 
through their membership of the UN, more priority would have been given to the 
immediate creation of an indigenous regional human rights system just like the 
European system, rather than relying on the UDHR which many newly independent 
African countries did not participate in making. This submission is true given that 
the colonialists mostly did not implement UDHR provisions during 
colonisation/apartheid. 
The output from the above conferences and seminars resulted in one 
recommendation or other that partly formed the basis of the African Charter in 
1981. For instance, at the 1978 Dakar Seminar, a draft resolution prepared by 
Keba M’baye, a delegate from President Senghor of Senegal, proposed the 
establishment of an African Human Rights Commission.5 In addition, at the 1979 
                                       
3 Lone Lindholt, Questioning the universality of Human Rights: The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique: Law, Social Change and Development (Aldershot, England, 1997) 
73; Laurence Lombard, ‘African Conference on the Rule of Law Held at Lagos, Nigeria, in January’ (1961) 46 
(6) American Bar Association Journal, 563. 
4 This conference pressed for the establishment of an African Commission. 
5 Gino Naldi, The Organisation of African Unity: An Analysis of its Role (Mansell Publishing, 1989) 110.  
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Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Monrovia organised by the OAU 
Secretariat, the OAU agreed to the establishment of a Pan-African Commission on 
Human Rights. In 1979, a UN Seminar on the Establishment of Regional 
Commission on Human Rights in Monrovia resulted in the setting up of a Working 
Group to draft proposals for the establishment of the African Commission on 
Human Rights. Afterwards, the 1979 Ministerial Conference in Dakar had these 
draft proposals reviewed.6 Considering the strides made through these drafts, a 
selected group of jurists produced the first draft of the African Charter in 1979 
while the second and final draft was prepared in Banjul, The Gambia, in June 1980 
and January 1981. Consequent upon the preparation of the January 1981 draft, 
the 18th Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) on 26th of June 1981 
in Nairobi Kenya adopted the African Charter. Thereupon, Africa joined its 
European and American counterparts in establishing a regional human rights 
system for the promotion and protection of basic universal rights.7  
The African Charter has been applauded for its positive contribution to 
international human rights discourse.8 In contrast to other regional human rights 
instruments, the drafters of the African Charter adopted a unique normative 
approach. Whereas it can be argued that some of its normative approaches were 
due to the historical past of the continent, it is also submitted that the reality in 
many African states at the time of drafting may have been considered. For 
instance, by protecting various categories of human rights, the drafters of the 
African Charter may have considered the totalitarian nature of governance in 
many countries and the consequences of not including various human rights 
                                       
6 Fatash Ouguergous, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human 
Rights Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002) 32.  
7 Oji Umozurike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1983) 77 American Journal of 
International Law 902; Rose D’Sa ‘African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Problems and Prospects for 
Regional Action’ (1983) 10 Australian YearBook of International Law, 101. The universal objective of human 
rights is embedded in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 1948 and 
subsequently re-enacted so as to have binding force in UN backed International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) 1976 and International Covenant of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (ICSECR) 1976.  
8 Josiah Cobbah, ‘African Values and the African Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective’ (1987) 9 Human 
Rights Quarterly 309; Frans Viljoen, ‘Africa’s Contribution to the Development of International Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law’ (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal, 18; Evelyn Ankumah, ‘The African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights: Practice and Procedure (Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) 11. 
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categories. While this is an enormous advantage and innovation in international 
human rights law development, the absence of a derogation clause in the African 
Charter can potentially be invoked to enhance enforcement in conflict and 
peacetime.  
 Indeed, the significance of the African Charter adoption offers OAU member 
states an indigenous human rights measure for the promotion and protection of 
individuals and groups rights.9 However, OAU adoption of the African Charter does 
not imply the automatic coming into force and operation in member states. In this 
instance, article 63 (3) the African Charter requires a simple majority ratification 
by member states of the OAU before the African Charter could come into force. It 
follows that African leaders at this time in history who were mostly totalitarian 
could choose not to ratify the newly adopted human rights instrument. However, 
in 1986, five years after the adoption, the simple majority requirement was met, 
and the African Charter eventually came into force. The five years cannot be wholly 
criticised when compared to the ten years it took the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Social, Economic 
and Cultural Rights (ICSECR), and the nine years it took the American Convention 
to come into force. However, uncertainties marred the slow pace of African Charter 
ratification, and this ignited great fear and doubt among human rights crusaders.10  
 However, this is not to say that human rights were unknown to African 
countries before the adoption and coming into force of the African Charter. Suffice 
it to mention that some new independent African countries were signatories to 
international human rights instruments such as the UDHR,11 ICCPR,12 and 
                                       
9 The African Charter came alongside the African Commission, which was inaugurated in 1987 in The Gambia. 
10 Rachel Murray, ‘Serious or Massive Violations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A 
Comparison with the Inter-American and European Mechanisms’ (1999) 17 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights, 109; Lone Lindholt, Questioning the Universality of Human Rights: The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights in Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique: Law, Social Change and Development (n 3 above) 80. 
11 Two African countries were part of the adoption of the UDHR: Egypt and Ethiopia, while South Africa 
abstained on the day of adoption. The majority of African states were still under colonisation at this time of 
adoption in 1948. However, several African countries joined the UN upon independence as follows: Libya 1955; 
Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia 1956; Ghana 1957; Guinea 1958; Cameroun, CAR, Chad, Congo, DRC, Dahomey, 
Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta 1960.    
12 Of 169 and 165 States that have ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR respectively, all African States except 
South Sudan and Western Sahara have ratified the ICCPR and, all African States except Botswana, South Sudan, 
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ICESCR.13 By being signatories to some of the highlighted human rights 
instruments, concerned African countries already had human rights obligations 
despite the poor human rights respect by some African leaders.14 That 
notwithstanding, the emergence of the African Charter, to date, appears not to 
have largely eliminated widespread human rights violations in many African 
countries despite the wide ratification it enjoys.15 Suffice to note that all African 
Union (AU, former OAU) member states except Morocco have ratified and 
deposited the African Charter.16 It is clear that upon ratification of the Charter, 
state parties automatically come under the jurisdiction of the Commission. This is 
because the Commission is a creation of the Charter and does not require separate 
ratification.  
                                       
Western Sahara, and Mozambique have ratified the ICESCR. For instance, the following countries ratified the 
ICCPR in the 1970s and 1980s- Cameroun 1984; CAR 1981; Congo 1983; DRC 1976; Egypt 1982; Gabon 1983; 
Gambia 1978; Togo 1984; Guinea 1978; Kenya 1972; Libya 1970; Madagascar 1971 Mali 1974; Mauritius 1973; 
Morocco 1979; Niger 1986; Rwanda 1975; Senegal 1978; Sudan 1986; Tunisia 1969; Tanzania 1976, and Zambia 
1984. 
13 Up to 1986, the following African countries ratified the ICESCR: Cameroun 1984; CAR 1981; Congo 1983; 
DRC 1976; Egypt 1982; Gabon 1983; Gambia 1978; Guinea 1978; Kenya 1972; Libya 1970; Madagascar 
1971Mali 1974; Mauritius 1973; Morocco 1979; Niger 1986; Rwanda 1975; Senegal 1978; Sudan 1986; Tunisia 
1969; Tanzania 1976, and Zambia 1984.  
14 Some of these leaders include Idi Amin of Uganda, Jean-Bedel Bokassa of CAR, and Marcias Nguema of 
Equatorial Guinea.  
15 Morris Mbondenyi, International Human Rights and their Enforcement in Africa (Law Africa Publishing, 
2011); Fatash Ouguergous, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Rights Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (n 6 above) 32; Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 7 above); Oji Umozuruike, ‘The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the 
OAU Charter’ (1979) 311 African Affairs 197; Rachel Murray, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 1987-2000: An Overview of its Prospects and Problems’ (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal, 1; 
Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Institutions (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2001). Further, see the following links for contemporary widespread human rights violation in Africa- 
Human Rights Watch, 2017 World Report: Events of 2016, available at > 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf<  > accessed on 18 March 2019; 
European parliament Policy Briefing, ‘Human rights protection mechanisms in Africa: Strong potential, weak 
capacity’ (2013), available at > 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491487/EXPO-
DROI_SP(2013)491487_EN.pdf< accessed on 19 March 2019.  
16 South Sudan deposited its document of ratification on 19th May 2016 in line with Article 65 of the African 
Charter. At the time of writing, all African States except Morocco have ratified the African Charter. South Sudan 
joined the AU in 2011 and deposited its document of ratification on 19th May 2016 in line with article 65 of the 
African Charter. Morocco re-joined in January 2017; 33 years after withdrawing from the regional body due to 
the regional body’s recognition of Western Sahara. However, Morocco has commenced the process of ratifying 
the African Charter.  
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By its very scope as the primary monitoring and enforcement institution, 
the Commission undertakes promotional, protection and interpretative functions, 
which it has used to develop its rich jurisprudence and case law principles.17 It 
should be borne in mind that the Commission has used its mandate to clarify some 
discrepancies in the African Charter norms. For example, the Commission has 
considered several complaints of extra-judicial killings,18 unlawful detention, 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment by government security agencies,19 
restriction of movement and membership of associations,20 and deprivation of 
property.21 The African Commission case laws have also closed some normative 
gaps in the interpretation and understanding of the African Charter. 
 The African Charter norms and institutions, like their counterparts, appear 
not to be perfect. This position demonstrates why its emergence did not 
immediately resolve several human rights violations in African countries.22 
Although many African states were locked in dictatorial rule amidst prevalent 
internal armed conflicts at the time of adoption of the Charter, the contemporary 
situation in many African countries shows extensive human rights violations by 
state authorities.23 However, the premise deduced from the widespread human 
rights violations in the continent during the 1980s became more prominent given 
                                       
17 Such celebrated cases include, Communication 155/96 - Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) 
and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria; Communication 218/98 - Civil Liberties 
Organisation, Legal Defence Centre, Legal Defence and Assistance Project v Nigeria; Communication 148/96 
Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria.  
18 Killing of unarmed students during the ‘Ali must go’ 1978 demonstration in Ibadan Nigeria by security forces; 
killing of over 100 demonstrators over the 1993 presidential election annulment by the Nigerian military 
government. See, Sylvester Odion-Akhaine, ‘The Student Movement in Nigeria: Antinomies and Transformation’ 
(2009) 36 (12) Review of African Political Economy, 427. 
19 See African Commission Communication 279/09 against Sudan wherein it ruled that Sudan through its security 
agencies was responsible for torture and other inhuman treatment against the complainants.  
20 Communication 225/98- Huri-Law (on behalf of Civil Liberties Organisation) v Nigeria.  
21 Communication 155/96 - Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Centre for Economic and 
Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria. 
22 Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 7 above); Further instances of 
countries where internal conflicts erupted include the Nigeria civil war of 1967-1970; Algerian Ethio-Somali War 
of 1977-1978; and South Africa’s apartheid regime.  
23 Some of Africa’s despotic leaders who violated these rights include Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo (1967-2005), 
Hasting Banda of Malawi (1963-1994), Siad Barre of Somalia (1969-1991), Obiang Mbasogo of Equatorial 
Guinea (1979-Date), Hissene Habre of Chad (1982-1990), Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan (1989 –2019), and Muammar 
Gaddafi of Libya (1969-2011).  
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the absence of a judicial arm of enforcement in the regional human rights 
system.24 Based on these observations and in contrast with the European and 
American human rights systems, the African human rights system has been 
adjudged the least developed, least efficient, most distinctive and the most 
controversial regional human rights instrument.25 Today, this argument cannot be 
entirely correct given the evolution recorded in the system and the number of 
complaints that have been successfully adjudicated by the African Court, the 
African Commission and other regional human rights institutions such as the 
Committee on the Rights of Women and Committee of Expert on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child.  
3.2 Significant features of the African Charter: Underlying basis for 
interpretation  
This section examines the unique normative features in the African Charter and 
their impact in enhancing civil and political rights enforcement in Africa. It argues 
that the drafters of the African Charter produced a treaty for human rights 
protection which deviated from the normative styles in existing human rights 
instruments, thus raising several concerns relating to African Charter 
interpretation. However, it is interesting to note that the normative structure and 
content of a legal framework are useful in distinguishing the standard of the norm. 
A norm is synonymous with a legal principle upon which legal rules should be 
based- a set of standards of behaviour or judgment assumed to be just standards 
                                       
24 Christof Heyns, ‘The African Human Rights System: In Need of Reform’ (2001) 2 African Human Rights 
Journal, 155; Fatsah Onguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda 
for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (n 6 above) 791; Hastings Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Human and 
Peoples' Rights: What Point Is Africa Trying to Make?’ In R. Cohen Hyden, and W. Nagen, (eds), Human Rights 
and Governance in Africa, (University Press of Florida, 1993) 76; Jean Boukongou, ‘The Appeal of the African 
System for Protecting Human Rights’ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal, 269; Oji Umozuruike, ‘The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 7 above); Edward Kannyo, Human Rights in Africa: Problems 
and Prospects (1980) A report prepared for the International League for Human Rights (Human rights working 
paper) 15; Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Can a Leopard can its spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights’ 
(2002) 17 Australian University Law Review, 1177; Makau Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights System: A 
Critical Evaluation’ (2000) available at > http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mutua.pdf< accessed on 18 March 
2019; Makau Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language 
of Duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of Int. Law, 339.   
25 Henry Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and 
Morals (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2008) 1063. 
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of behaviour for society or humanity in its entirety.26 Thus, some unique normative 
style of the African Charter includes the absence of a derogation clause, the 
inclusion of three categories of human rights, individual duties and an introduction 
of ‘peoples’ rights’.27 
3.2.1 Inclusion of various human rights categories 
This section examines whether the inclusion of different human rights categories 
in the African Charter is effective in guaranteeing enforcement by state parties to 
the African Charter, thereby alleviating the challenge of drafting and ratifying 
numerous treaties. It will be demonstrated that although the African Charter 
approach is different from other regional instruments and saves the region the 
burden of multiple ratifications of treaties, it has not satisfactorily influenced the 
recognition and justiciability of specific categories of rights in some countries.   
The African Charter norms comprise different categories of human rights. 
Unlike the ICCPR and the ECHR, the African Charter rights and freedoms comprise 
civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and group and 
peoples’ rights. Whether this normative approach is unconventional or not, the 
inclusion of these categories of human rights has the potential to influence 
effective domestic implementation. It saves AU member states the burden of 
ratifying different human rights instruments for these categories of rights. 
Besides, there is no guarantee that AU member states will willingly ratify too many 
human rights instruments for three main reasons. Firstly, the uncertainty that 
state parties’ may not ratify numerous treaties has been exemplified following the 
poor ratification of some regional human rights instruments such as the Protocol 
to the African Charter on the Rights of Women,28 Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights,29  and, Protocol to the African Charter 
                                       
26 Daci Jordan, ‘Legal Principles, Legal Values and Legal Norms: Are they the same or different?’ (2010) 
Academicus International Scientific Journal, 109.  
27 Fatsah Onguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human 
Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (n 6 above) 57.  
28 Adopted 11 July 2003 at Maputo Mozambique and have been ratified by 41-member states as at June 2019.  
29 Adopted in Egypt 01 July 2008 and as at June 2019, has been ratified by only 7 countries but needs 15 
ratifications to come into force.  
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on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.30 
Secondly, the potential that minority group and tribes may rely upon group rights 
to seek independence or self-determination, thereby distorting the already 
recognised state boundaries. Thirdly, the financial burden that comes with 
domestic implementation of socio-economic rights may deter state parties from 
ratifying a distinct instrument on socio-economic rights protection.  
 The recognition of diverse human rights categories enshrined in the African 
Charter is reflected in the Charter preamble. For instance, paragraph 7 to the 
African Charter preamble enshrines that the satisfaction of the economic, social 
and cultural rights is a guarantee of the enjoyment of civil and political rights.31 It 
suggests that no particular category of right is more important or should be 
prioritised by state parties. Considering the normative recognition of these rights, 
the African Charter norms can be argued as complying with the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action idea of human rights protection.32 Thus, this illustrates 
the reason for the African Commission’s ruling in SERAC v Nigeria. In this case, 
the Commission ruled that collective rights, individual rights, environmental 
rights, and economic and social rights are essential elements of the African Charter 
and must be made efficient through implementation.33 Arguably, this approach 
guarantees the enjoyment of rights, which ordinarily would be hindered by 
poverty, and the scarce finances of AU member states.34  
 Under the African Charter, civil and political rights protection comprises 
freedom from discrimination, equality before the law, the right to life, prohibition 
of torture, the right to liberty, the right to fair trial, freedom of conscience and 
religion, the right to receive information, the right to free association, the right to 
assemble freely, freedom of movement, the right to participate in government, 
                                       
30 Ratified by 30 AU states since its adoption in 1998.  
31 Preamble, paragraph 7. This paragraph equally emphasised the right to development.  
32 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Part 1, para 5; Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 7 above).  
33 Communication 155/96. This communication also opened new ground in environmental and human rights 
activism in Africa given that the case was one that challenged environmental degradation.  
34 Oji Umozuruike, ‘The Present State of Human Rights in Africa’ (1986) 1 Calabar Law Journal, 62. 
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and the right to property.35 These rights are direct and essential rights of 
individuals, and they confer on individuals the opportunity to participate in the 
political scheme of the government.36 At the same time, the African Commission 
jurisprudence on individual and NGO complaints indicates a widespread violation 
of these rights.37 Examples of prevalent civil and political rights violation in the 
region include arbitrary arrest, detention and unfair or no trial, use of military 
courts for civilian opponents, forceful disappearance, inhuman and cruel 
treatment, restriction on freedom of expression, association and assembly by 
government forces, banned opposition demonstrations, closure of media houses, 
and, forceful dismissal of peaceful protesters.38 However, it is noteworthy to 
mention that this category of rights is mainly recognised as fundamental rights in 
many African Charter state parties’ constitutions.  
Similar to the above array of rights, economic, social and cultural rights 
protected under the African Charter include the right to work, the right to physical 
and mental health, and the right to education.39 The African Charter omitted some 
individual socio-economic rights guaranteed under the ICSECR such as the right 
to social security,40 trade union rights,41 the right to an adequate and improved 
standard of living,42 and the right to reasonable limitation of working hours and 
remuneration for public holidays.43 However, the African Commission has 
remedied some of these omissions in the 1989 Guidelines for National Periodic 
                                       
35 Articles 2-14 of the African Charter. 
36 See Article 13 of the African Charter; article 23 of American Convention on Human Rights; Article 21 of 
UDHR.  
37 A right-to-right analysis of civil and political rights category will be conducted in the next section.  
38 Amnesty International, ‘Cameroon 2016/2017’ available at > 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/< accessed on 18 March 2019; Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Burundi Human Rights Crisis 2015-2017’ available at > 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/burundi_compendium_2016_web_version_4.pdf< 
accessed on 18 March 2019; Human Rights Watch, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Events of 2016’ available at 
> https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/democratic-republic-congo< accessed on 18 June 
2019;  Human Rights Watch, ‘Ethiopia: Year of Brutality and Restrictions’ available at > 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/ethiopia-year-brutality-restrictions< accessed on 18 March 2019.  
39 Article 15-17 of the African Charter.  
40 Article 9 (b) ICSECR. 
41 Article 8 ICSECR. 
42 Article 11 ICSECR. 
43 Article 7 (d) ICSECR. 
103 
 
 
Reports which requires states to provide information on social security rights, 
trade union rights and the right to limitation of working hours and remuneration 
for public holidays.44 On the other hand, group rights comprise, among other 
things, the right to self-determination, the right to freely dispose of wealth and 
natural resources, the right to economic, social, and cultural development, the 
right to national and international peace and security, and the right to satisfactory 
environment.45 Unlike civil and political rights, many socio-economic rights and 
group rights are recognised as Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of 
State Policy. Thus, they are not enforceable rights in many African countries.46  
3.2.2 Claw-back clauses 
Another significant feature in the African Charter is the use of claw-back clauses. 
The term ‘claw-back clause’ was first used by Rosalyn Higgins to refer to a 
limitation clause that permits a non-observation of an obligation for public 
reason.47 Such clauses are qualifications or limitations to the full enjoyment of 
human rights.48 Under the African Charter, some relevant claw-back clauses are 
introduced through the use of phrases such as ‘within the law’, ‘subject to law and 
order’, ‘laid down by the law’ and ‘provided that the individual abides by the law’.49 
This section will illustrate that it is not clear whether claw-back clauses have 
enhanced civil and political rights enforcement, thereby reducing the challenge of 
state party ousting of regional human rights protection. It will be demonstrated 
that although the African Charter institutions have given an impressive 
                                       
44 Guidelines for National Periodic Reports 1989’, available at > 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/guidelines_national_periodic_reports/achpr_guide_periodic_reporting_1
989_eng.pdf< accessed on 18 March 2019. 
45 Article 20-24 of the African Charter. 
46 More discussion and understanding of fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy will be 
done in details in chapter five.  
47 See generally, Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Derogations under Human Rights Treaties’ (1977) 48 British Yearbook of 
International Law, 281.  The author further distinguished a claw-back clause from a derogation clause to the extent 
that a derogation clause allows a suspension or breach of obligation only in circumstances of war or public 
emergency.  
48 Sandhiya Singh, ‘The Impact of Clawback Clauses on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2009) 18 (4) African 
Security Studies, 95; Makau Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights System: A Critical Evaluation’ (n 24 above).  
49 See the provisions of Article 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 of the African Charter. 
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interpretation of claw-back clauses, there is more need for reforms to reduce these 
clauses from the African Charter norms.  
 The inclusion of claw-back clauses in the African Charter has attracted 
several criticisms. Mutua,50 Anthony51 , and Buergenthal52 argue that claw-back 
clauses put the African Charter rights under the discretion of domestic jurisdiction, 
while Murray opines that they could promote despotism.53 State parties have 
severally relied upon these clauses to avoid implementation of the African 
Charter.54 In such instances, state parties’ interpretation of these clauses gives 
credence to the provisions of national law.55 However, the controversy generated 
by claw-back clauses in the African Charter has attracted an interpretation by the 
African Commission. In Civil Liberties Organisation (in respect of the Nigerian Bar 
Association) v Nigeria,56 wherein the complainant challenged the ouster clause in 
the Legal Practitioners’ Decree promulgated by the Nigerian Military Government 
which prevents the observation of articles 6, 7, and 10 of the African Charter, the 
African Commission ruled that the term ‘law’ in these clauses should, in fact, be 
understood as a reference to international law. This decision interprets a claw-
back clause to mean referral to other international human rights instruments. This 
decision did not change the pattern of African Charter state parties to rely on claw-
back clauses to oust the African Charter rights and freedoms. 
                                       
50 Makau Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective: The Need for Urgent 
Reformulation’ (1993) 5 Legal Affairs, 7. 
51 Arthur Anthony, ‘Beyond the Paper Tiger: The Challenge of a Human Rights Court in Africa’ (1997) 32 Texas 
International Law Journal, 518.  
52 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘et al’, International Human Rights in a Nutshell (4th edn, West publishing Company, 
2009) 234. 
53 Rachel Murray, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1987-2000: An Overview of its Prospects 
and Problems’ (n 15 above) 1.   
54 Dojo Olowu, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, its Regional System and the Role of Civil 
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 The decision in the aforementioned communication did not change state 
party attitude on claw-back clauses. For instance, in Constitutional Rights Project 
(in respect of Akamu and Others) v Nigeria,57 Nigeria again relied on claw-back 
clauses to give powers to special tribunals and military courts while ousting the 
jurisdiction of ordinary courts and denying appellate courts the right to entertain 
appeals.58 In this case, the African Commission gave a similar ruling as above by 
emphasising that state parties cannot oust the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. 
Despite these rulings on claw-back clauses, state parties will still rely on claw-
back clauses to achieve local circumstance factors to demonstrate a specific 
domain of sovereign competence over its affairs.59 It illustrates the reason some 
state parties’ limit rights such as freedom of the press, the right to association 
and assembly through domestic legislation. 
 Indeed, the African Commission has set limits to state party legislation that 
renders the African Charter rights inoperative. The significance of such limits to 
state party reliance on claw-back clauses makes it legally difficult for state parties 
to oust the Charter rights through domestic laws. For example, in Media Rights 
Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, the African Commission ruled that 
a claw-back clause makes recourse to violating domestic law remedies non-
existent and ineffective.60 In this case, the Commission set a limit that claw-back 
clauses should not serve the purpose of a general restriction of African Charter 
rights. However, a claw-back clause will be allowed if the limitation meets the 
legitimate interest and are necessary in a democratic society.61 On the other hand, 
the Court has not developed much jurisprudence in this aspect.  
                                       
57 Communication 60/91. See also, Communication 87/93- Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Lekwot 
and Others) v Nigeria.  
58 Ibid. 
59 Amos Anabulele, ‘Incompatibility of National Law with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Does the African Court on Human Rights have the final say?’ (2016) 16 African Human Rights Law Journal, 1.  
60 Communication 105/93-124/94-130/94-152/96.  
61 Scanlen and Holderness v Zimbabwe, Communication 297/05. 
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3.2.3 Individual and state duties 
From the viewpoint of the African Charter, the enjoyment of rights and freedoms 
also implies the performance of corresponding duties on the part of everyone.62 
Under the African Charter, the duties imposed on individuals are towards the 
family, his/her fellow beings, society, state, other legally recognised communities 
and the international community, to strengthen African cultural values, preserve 
national security, and to promote African unity.63 State duties, on the other hand, 
are towards ensuring the respect of the rights and freedoms of the African Charter, 
the independence of the courts and institutions for the promotion and protection 
of African Charter rights.64 This section will argue that while state duties have a 
potential to enhance the effective realisation of civil and political rights, it is not 
clear whether individual duties make any meaningful contribution to effective 
enforcement of the African Charter rights. This is against the backdrop that some 
individual duties are somewhat unclear in terms of implementation.  
 The African Charter was drafted after the ECHR and the UN covenants 
became operative, while none of these instruments made explicit reference to 
individual duties, the American Convention recognised it in article 32 titled 
‘relations between duties and rights’. This article recognises individual duties only 
to one’s family, community and mankind.65 However, unlike these human rights 
instruments, the African Charter contains a chapter on duties and creates a direct 
legal obligation between parties, which makes it more regionally oriented.66 
According to Mutua, the African Charter state duties are based on inspiration from 
the regional history of colonisation and respect for post-colonisation institutions 
for human rights protection.67 For instance, state parties have a mandatory 
obligation at all times to allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate 
                                       
62 African Charter Preamble, paragraph 7.  
63 Article 27-29 of the African Charter.  
64 Article 21 (5), 22 (2), 25 and 26 of the African Charter.  
65 Article 32 of American Convention; See also Article 29 UDHR.  
66 Ralph Beddard, ‘Duties of Individuals under International Human Rights Instruments’ (1999) 3 (4) International 
Journal of Human Rights, 30.  
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institutions such as the courts. Hence, the decision in Amnesty International, 
Comite Looseli Bachelard, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Association of 
Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v Sudan68 where the 
Commission held that the state duty to guarantee the independence of the court 
remains sacrosanct. In this case, Decree 2 of 1989, which ousted the ordinary 
courts in Sudan was declared a violation of Sudan’s duty to guarantee the 
independence of the judiciary under articles 7 and 26. In this case, the 
Commission further held that the Sudan government had bound itself under article 
1 to respect the Charter rights and freedoms. From this decision, one can agree 
that state duties are essential in the realisation of effective civil and political rights 
enforcement. 
 On the other hand, while the provision for individual duties requires the 
rights and freedom of each individual to be exercised with due regard to the rights 
of others,69 it places a duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without 
discrimination.70 Therefore, the civil and political rights of an individual may be 
restricted in the interests of the rights of others and the need to respect some 
moral and social order adopted by the state and duty to the community. Arguably, 
this duty raises the question as to whether individuals enjoy unfettered rights 
under the African Charter. This question is raised because the scope of the 
individual duty to fellow human beings, the community and the need to respect 
moral and social order seem unclear and open-ended. However, it is clear that for 
the individual to enjoy the African Charter civil and political rights, he must abide 
by the duties therein recognised. For example, for an individual to enjoy an 
unfettered right to expression under the African Charter, he has a responsibility 
not to breach another’s intellectual property rights or be defamatory or seditious.  
                                       
68 Communication 48/90-52/91-89/93; See also, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Institute for Human 
Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v Zimbabwe (Communication 294/04).  
69 Article 27 (2) of the African Charter. 
70 Article 28 of the African Charter.  
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3.2.4 Absence of derogation clause 
This section examines whether the absence of a derogation clause in the Africa 
Charter is an effective method to ensure effective enforcement of African Charter 
rights and freedoms by state parties. It will be demonstrated in this section that 
although the African Charter is alone in this method when compared with other 
regional instruments, the drafters of the Charter may not have been completely 
wrong because of the numerous human rights violations in many African countries 
at the time of drafting.  
A derogation clause is a limitation on a state’s power during an emergency 
where human rights are in a precarious situation.71 It allows a temporary 
suspension of human rights instruments during state emergencies, such as war 
and armed conflict.72 In other words, a derogation clause confers the right on state 
parties to temporarily abandon some human rights obligations and resort to 
adequate measures necessary for the duration of the emergency.73 A core 
objective of a derogation clause is to limit the enforcement of human rights 
temporarily within a state for a period of time necessary to allow for the return of 
normalcy.74 On the other hand, the recognition of derogation in international 
human rights instruments guarantees a ‘rational response to domestic political 
uncertainty’ given that it confers on states time to confront a crisis.75  
From the preceding analysis of the instruments that contain derogation 
clauses, three circumstances under which derogation can be allowed are76 (a) in 
the event of exceptional public danger that threatens the existence of the state,77 
                                       
71 Melkamu Tolera, ‘Absence of a Derogation Clause under the African Charter and the Position of the African 
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72 Abdi Ali, ‘Derogation from Constitutional Rights and its Implication under the African Charter on Human and 
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(b) during a war or other public danger threatening the life of the nation,78 and 
(c) during a war or any other crisis situation that threatens the independence or 
security of a state.79 It is clear that the life of the nation can be threatened from 
within or outside the country in which circumstances the state’s duty to protect 
communities and institutions arises.80 However, one would have thought that a 
derogation might negatively influence state party obligation to respect human 
rights. This is because a state can use such an opportunity to abuse the rights of 
the perceived opponents or the people for many unjustifiable reasons.  
However, unlike the ICCPR, ECHR and the American Convention, the African 
Charter is silent on a derogation clause.81 Derogation clauses under these 
instruments enjoy different status. For instance, while the ICCPR adopts a similar 
approach to the ECHR by explicitly prohibiting derogation from certain articles 
such as the right to life,82 prohibition of torture,83 prohibition of slavery and forced 
labour,84 and no punishment without law,85 the ICCPR goes further to prohibit 
derogation on imprisonment on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual 
obligation,86 right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law,87 and the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.88 It follows that non-
derogable rights in these instruments must remain justiciable and sacrosanct even 
when a lawful state of emergency has been declared. What is not known is whether 
the African Charter drafters envisaged the need for countries not to opt out of 
                                       
78 Article 15 of ECHR.  
79 Article 27 of American Convention.  
80 Amrei Muller, ‘Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9 Human 
Rights Law Review, 557.  
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their Charter obligation or that derogation is irrelevant because of the inclusion of 
claw-back clauses.  
It cannot be ascertained whether the African Charter drafters took into 
consideration the fact that the Charter was drafted at a time when many African 
countries were locked into military regimes or other forms of totalitarian 
government. Conversely, it is clear that the drafters of the African Charter did not 
envisage derogation even in emergencies, unusual circumstances,89 or civil wars.90 
This has been demonstrated by the African Commission when it ruled that the 
impact of the absence of a derogation is that every state party must at all times 
respect the Charter rights and freedoms.91 At present, however, the absence of a 
derogation clause in the African Charter is not replicated in the human rights 
provisions of many African countries constitutions. In contrast, most African 
constitutions contain a derogation clause which is frequently ignited to declare a 
state of emergency,92 thereby limiting or suspending the constitutional rights, as 
well as the enjoyment of other human rights legislation. Arguably, the contrasted 
fact that African constitutions contain derogation clauses makes the interpretation 
of the absence of a derogation clause less likely to be enforced by the African 
states.93 
3.2.5 Peoples’ rights  
The protection of ‘peoples’ rights in the African Charter is another unique feature 
that distinguishes it from the other regional instruments earlier discussed. Peoples’ 
rights protected in the African Charter include equality of all peoples’ rights,94 
                                       
89 See in Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project V Nigeria. 
90 See Commission Nationale des Driots de l’Homme et des Liberties V Chad, - Communication 70/92. 
91 Ibid.  
92 For instance, see, section 45 (2) of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria; article 44 of the 1995 Constitution of 
Uganda; article 24 (3) of the 1990 Constitution of Namibia; Article 93 (4) of the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia; 
Article 52 of the 1992 Constitution of Angola; Article 137 of the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda; and, Article 31 
of the 1984 Constitution of Guinea-Bissau.   
93 It is noteworthy that many African states are signatories to the ICCPR and can argue their constitutional 
recognition of derogation through the interpretations of claw-back clauses, which recognises international laws 
and article 61 of the African Charter.  
94 Article 19 of African Charter. 
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peoples’ right to existence and self-determination,95 peoples’ right to sovereignty 
over group wealth and natural resources,96 peoples’ right to development,97 
peoples’ right to national and international peace and security,98 and peoples’ right 
to general satisfactory environment favourable to development.99 It is clear from 
the above list of rights that the peoples’ rights category is a different and unique 
category of human rights; the African Charter fails to define this concept. 
However, while the idea of peoples’ rights opens a new development of 
international human rights jurisprudence, the absence of a definition potentially 
breeds uncertainty and speculation in understanding this concept of rights.100 This 
section will demonstrate the relationship between peoples’ rights and civil and 
political rights, thereby arguing that the realisation of some peoples’ rights will 
enhance effective enforcement of civil and political rights.  
 The concept of peoples’ rights, as a distinct category of rights, is critical to 
the enjoyment of civil and political rights. For example, article 19 provides that 
‘all peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the 
same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another’. Likewise, 
article 20 protects peoples’ right to existence and the unquestionable and 
inalienable right to self-determination and freely determine their political status. 
From these provisions, peoples’ rights are directly significant to the enjoyment 
and protection of some civil and political rights. This is because while the peoples’ 
rights look at group or collective protection of the right to equality, the right to 
choose a government and prohibition of discrimination, the rights under article 2, 
3 and 13 are accessed on an individual basis. For instance, in Malawi African 
Association, Amnesty International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union Interafricaine des Droits 
IHomme and RADDHO, Collectif des Veuves et Ayants-droit, Association 
Mauritanienne des Droits de IHomme v Mauritania, the Commission noted that 
                                       
95 Article 20 of African Charter. 
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peoples’ right to national and international peace and security under article 23 
could be used to protect villages of black Mauritanians against attacks, 
discrimination and enjoyment of property.101 In the light of the above 
communication, the peoples’ right has been employed to remove the obstacle of 
having many complaints before the Commission and other restraints that may 
have restricted victims from seeking justice at the African Commission.   
3.3 African Charter civil and political rights norms and case law 
jurisprudence 
The rights protected under the African Charter, like the other regional human 
rights instruments, contain provisions safeguarding civil and political rights. The 
civil and political rights protected under the African Charter are the protection 
from discrimination on grounds such as race, gender, ethnicity, age, religion and 
national origin; the right to equality before the law; the right to life; prohibition of 
torture and inhuman treatment; the right to liberty; the right to fair trial; freedom 
of conscience and religion; the right to receive information; the right to freedom 
of association; the right to freedom of movement; the right to participate freely 
in government and the right to property.102 Therefore, to ascertain the extent of 
normative protection to this category of rights by the African Charter, this section 
examines the provisions relating to civil and political rights and how relevant 
African Charter institutions have interpreted them.  
Effective enforcement of any right depends on the normative protection, 
interpretation from the relevant institution and appropriate implementation. 
Considering that the civil and political rights form part of the three categories of 
rights contained in the African Charter, this section will demonstrate that other 
international human rights instruments indeed influenced the African Charter 
provisions, given some similarity in language and right coverage. Yet, at present, 
like at the time of drafting the African Charter, many African states make headlines 
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for extensive human rights abuses in wartime,103 political conflicts,104 coups 
d’état,105 flawed elections,106 and religious intolerance.107 For example, the 
2016/2017 Amnesty International Annual Report attributes causes of Africa’s 
unfortunate human rights situation to authoritarianism and political repression; 
lack of judicial independence and freedom of the press; discrimination, inequality 
and marginalisation; civil and political conflicts; and, armed conflicts in several 
African states.108 From the preceding observation, the violation of civil and political 
rights has remained rife in some African countries. Therefore, it will be 
demonstrated in this section that the normative protection in the African Charter 
does not appear to be satisfactory and somewhat inadequate when compared to 
the ICCPR and some regional instruments. However, one can rightly argue that 
the African Commission and the African Court have reasonably interpreted the 
scope of these rights; thereby, providing case precedents that close some 
normative gaps in the African Charter.  
3.3.1 Prohibition of discrimination 
The prohibition of discrimination is amongst the commonly protected human 
right.109 Several international human rights instruments,110 as well as national 
                                       
103 The ongoing-armed conflict in Somalia and South Sudan wherein the following rights are violated: right to 
life, right to dignity of human person, liberty and to the security of his person, freedom of expression, information, 
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104 In Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Mali, Congo, and Ethiopia where political crisis has led to the killings of 
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106 Uganda general election 2016, Gabon general election 2016, Sudanese general election 2015, and Equatorial 
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accessed 22 June 2017.  Consequently, poverty, unemployment, insecurity, illegal migration, and inequality has 
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109 David Kairys, ‘Civil Rights’ (2015) International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences, 686. 
See, article 2 of the African Charter.  
110 For instance, article 2 UDHR, article 2 African Charter, article 2 ICCPR, article 1 (1) Inter-American 
Convention, article 14 ECHR and Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 
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constitutions,111 prohibit discrimination on several grounds.112 For instance, article 
2 UDHR, likewise article 2 of ICCPR prohibit discrimination on the following ten 
grounds: race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth, or other status. Thus, the African Charter adopted 
the same grounds as ICCPR with the exclusion of ‘property’. Under the African 
Charter, ‘fortune’ is used to replace ‘property’. However, while the Inter-American 
Convention has an addition of ‘economic status’, the ECHR recognises ‘association 
with a national minority’ in addition to its prohibited grounds of discrimination.  
 Article 2 of the African Charter protects individual rights and entitlement to 
the enjoyment of the African Charter rights and freedoms without distinction of 
any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status. The 
grounds enumerated in this article seem not to be exhaustive given that the term 
‘other status’ could open up more grounds not explicitly mentioned such as 
disability, economic status, age or sexual orientation. The context of article 2 
forbids unjustified exclusion. For instance, article 2 has been violated on the 
ground of disability,113 national or social origin,114 birth or other status,115 
                                       
111 Section 17 (2) of Gambian 1997 Constitution; section 42 of 1999 Constitution of Nigeria; Article 29 of the 
1989 Constitution of Algeria; article 9 (3) of 1996 Constitution of South Africa; Article 10 (2) of 1990 Constitution 
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Kenya; and, Article 7 of 2001 Constitution of Senegal, and many others.  
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113 See the case of Purohit and Moore v Gambia, wherein the African Commission held that the Lunatics Detention 
Act [LDA] violates the rights of disabled persons affected in the Act.  
114 Communication 211/98 - Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia. In this case, the African Commission ruled 
that article 34 and 35 of Zambia Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1996 provision that anyone who wants to 
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nationality,116 gender,117 race and ethnicity,118 political opinion and inclination,119 
amongst others.120 However, the prohibition of discrimination is not a free-
standing right because it must be attached to another substantive right for it to 
be enjoyed.  
The Commission has drawn a connection between non-discrimination and 
other guaranteed rights such as the right to life, dignity, property, movement, 
association, information, expression and the extent to which domestic laws comply 
with the Africa Charter.121 For instance, in Legal Resources Foundation v 
Zambia,122 the complainant alleged that the respondent constitution is 
discriminatory and violates the rights of 35 percent of the entire population on the 
grounds of their place of birth, social origin, and other status. The Commission, in 
this case, held that the constitutional provision restricting citizenship for political 
offices to Zambian citizens born to Zambia parents after independence in 1964 is 
particularly a vexing matter and discriminatory.123 The facts in this case alleged 
that the Zambian government enacted into law through the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act of 1996 which provides in article 34 ‘that anyone who wants to 
contest the office of President has to prove that both parents are/were Zambians 
by birth or descent’, and Article 35 that ‘nobody who has served two five-year 
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121 See also, Communication 211/98 - Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia.  
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123 Ibid, para 71-72.  
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terms as President shall be eligible for re-election to that office’. However, the 
Commission observed that there are ‘Zambian citizens born in Zambia but whose 
parents were not born in what has become known as the Republic of Zambia 
following independence in 1964’124 and ruled that Zambia should take necessary 
steps to bring its laws and constitution into conformity with the African Charter.125  
 The wording of article 2 of the African Charter implies that there must be 
no discrimination on any of the listed grounds when applying the other protections 
in the Charter. It requires that individuals and groups can secure all other rights 
without discrimination. Hence, all civil and political rights, as well as other rights 
protected under the African Charter, enjoy legal protection against the grounds of 
discrimination listed therein. However, the right to non-discrimination is non-
derogable and must be respected to allow the enjoyment of all other rights 
protected under the African Charter.126 It protects individuals against 
discrimination irrespective of whether the state is the direct violator or where 
states fail to discharge their duties to protect individuals from abuse by non-state 
parties.127 For example, in Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS 
v Egypt,128 the African Commission ruled that violence targeted against women is 
a form of discrimination which compromises and affects the enjoyment of the 
Charter rights. In this case, the victims complained that they were sexually and 
physically assaulted during a demonstration concerning a referendum aimed at 
amending Article 76 of the Egyptian Constitution on May 25, 2005, because of 
their gender while their opposite-sex counterparts did not experience the same 
humiliation and assault.  
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The complainants, in the foregoing case, further alleged that they were 
attacked by supporters of President Mubarak and his party in the presence of Riot 
Police Officers, State Security Intelligence Officers, and high-ranking officers of 
the Ministry of Interior who did not intervene to save them. Hence, the 
Commission stated that ‘it is clear that the assault which occurred on 25 May 2005 
was gender-based violence, perpetrated by both state and non-state actors under 
the control of state actors. The violations were designed to silence women who 
were participating in the ….’129 While agreeing that the alleged violations escalated 
because of the state authority’s failure to take action against the perpetrators 
during and after the acts of assault, the Commission further ruled that Egypt 
should ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa.130  
Discrimination, according to the International Labour Organisation means 
‘any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, 
religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect 
of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in the employment 
or occupation’.131 Accordingly, any of the following terms can be used to describe 
and establish discrimination- ‘distinction,’ ‘exclusion,’ ‘restriction,’ and 
‘preference’.132 For instance, the African Commission in Purohit and Moore v 
Gambia described discrimination to include any exclusion or preference in the 
enjoyment of rights contained in the African Charter.133 The African Commission 
in this case established that state parties should give equal attention to people 
with mental health disability by helping them achieve their full potential and rights. 
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130 However, Egypt has not ratified the Women’s Protocol in line with this ruling. See, Status of Implementation 
of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 60 th 
Meeting -Commission on the Status of Women, 18 March 2016, available at > 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/special-rapporteur-on-rights-of-women-in-africa-presentation-for-csw-
implementation.pdf< accessed 1 July 2017. 
131 Convention No. 111, Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, 1958, 
available at >http://www.supremecourt.ge/files/upload-file/pdf/act75.pdf< accessed 29 June 2017. 
132 Li Weiwei, ‘Equality and non-discrimination under International Human Rights Law’ (2004) Research Notes, 
The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, available at > 
http://www.mittendrinundaussenvor.de/fileadmin/bilder/0304.pdf< accessed 05 July 2017.  
133 Communication 241/2001, para 61.  
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It further ruled that the Lunatic Detention Act (LDA) of 1917 which subjects 
persons designated as ‘lunatics’ to ‘automatic and indefinite institutionalisation’ 
amongst other deprivations be repealed and replaced with new legislation that is 
compatible with the African Charter and international standards for the protection 
of mentally ill and disabled persons. In this case, the complainant alleged that 
certain provisions of the LDA such as lack of provision for legal aid, no remedy to 
compensation if rights are violated, denial of the right to vote, denial of consent 
to treatment or subsequent review of treatment on persons designated as 
‘lunatics’ violate article 2 of the Charter.134  
Discrimination arises under international law if ‘equal cases are treated 
differently; a difference in treatment that lacks objective and reasonable 
justification; and/or if there is no proportionality between the aims sought and the 
means employed’.135 In Purohit and Moore v Gambia, the African Commission 
agrees that article 2 protects against all forms of discrimination and lays down a 
principle essential in eradicating all guise of discrimination within the continent.136 
However, discrimination has remained prevalent in the everyday life of individuals 
at home, society and the workplace. Some manifestation of discrimination in the 
African region is seen in the expulsion of non-nationals, selective employment 
based on gender or nationality, xenophobic attacks against non-nationals,137 
persecution and killing of people with albinism,138 gender-based traditional 
practices,139 and, the social outcast system.140 Despite this situation, the 
                                       
134 Ibid, para4-8.  
135 Icelandic Human Rights Centre, ‘The Right to Equality and Non-discrimination’ available at > 
http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-and-
fora/substantive-human-rights/the-right-to-equality-and-non-discrimination< accessed 29 June 2017.  
136 Communication 241/2001.  
137 In May 2008, a series of attacks left 62 people dead in South Africa; another series of attacks in 2015 prompted 
repatriation of citizens by foreign governments such as Angola and South Africa.  
138 See ‘History of attacks against Persons with Albinism’ available at > 
http://www.underthesamesun.com/sites/default/files/History%20of%20Attacks%20against%20PWA.pdf< 
accessed 1 July 2017. 
139 Such practices include female genital mutilation, boy preference over girls and its implication for education, 
social and health consequences, work opportunities; early marriage; cultural support for violence against women; 
see generally, Fact Sheet No.23, ‘Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children’ 
available at > http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet23en.pdf< accessed 1 July 2017.  
140 Sexual and racial harassment, bullying, and discrimination by reason of age and disability. See generally, Darcy 
Toit, ‘The Evolution of the Concept of Unfair Discrimination in South African Labour Law (2006) 27 Industrial 
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Commission agrees that prohibition of discrimination is the spirit in which the 
African Charter is laid down because it ensures equality amongst individuals.141  
Any differential treatment based on grounds prohibited by article 2 on the 
enjoyment of any of the African Charter rights and freedom violates the Charter. 
For instance, while highlighting a UN General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of 18th 
December 1992,142 the Commission ruled that killings, torture, and incarceration 
of people because of the colour of their skin violates the non-discriminatory 
provision.143 Similarly, in Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de 
l'Homme v Zambia,144 the Commission also held that the expulsion of 517 West 
Africans from Zambia on February 26 and 27, 1992, by the government based on 
their nationality is a violation of article 2 provision.145 However, the Commission 
failed to elaborate in these cases whether any other situation such as security or 
economy, can justify the expulsion of non-nationals from one country. In another 
case before the Commission, the arrest and detention of Burundian refugees by 
the Rwandan government on the basis of their ethnic origin as members of the 
Tutsi ethnic group was held to be discriminatory.146 
                                       
Law Journal, 1311; Darcy Toit, ‘Protection against Unfair Discrimination in the Workplace: Are the Courts 
getting it Right?’ (2007) available at >  http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/LDD/2007/20.pdf< accessed 1 July 
2017.  
141 Communication 54/91-61/91-96/93-98/93-164/97_196/97-210/98 - Malawi Africa Association, Amnesty 
International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union interafricaine des droits de l'Homme and RADDHO, Collectif des veuves et 
ayantsDroit, Association mauritanienne des droits de l'Homme / Mauritania.  
142 See Article 1 of Declaration of the Rights of People Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic 
Minorities.  
143 Association mauritanienne des droits de l'Homme v Mauritania, Communication 54/91-61/91-96/93-98/93-
164/97_196/97-210/98, para 130-132. 
144 Communication 71/92.  
145 The Commission agreed that given the manner in which the victims were deported, all from West Africa, 
constituted a flagrant violation of Article 2 as same appears to target the nationals of West African countries.  
146 Opinion in Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture and Association Internationale des Juristes Democrates, 
Commission Internationale des Juristes, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme (OMCT, AIJD, CIJ, UIDH) 
v Rwanda, Communication 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93. 
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3.3.2  Right to equality before the law 
Equality provisions appear in numerous international human rights instruments 
and documents of many countries.147 While article 3 of the African Charter and 
article 7 of UDHR contain identical language by explicitly guaranteeing equality 
before the law and equal protection of the law, the wording of article 14 ECHR is 
almost identical to the ICESCR which requires the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the convention without discrimination of any kind. The right 
to equality has a close nexus with the prohibition of discrimination and both rights 
constitute a basic and general principle of the protection of human rights.148  
The essence of this right is for the law not to be applied discriminatorily.149 
Article 3 of the African Charter suggests that the law is the same for everybody 
and must treat everyone fairly and equally. In this regard, the distinctions listed 
in article 2 of the African Charter must not be applied to favour one individual over 
another. For example, in Actions Pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH) 
v Republic of Cote d’Ivoire,150 the African Court noted that equality and non-
discrimination are a fundamental principle of international human rights law and 
that everyone, without distinction, should enjoy all the rights guaranteed in the 
Charter.151 In this case, the complainant alleged that the composition of the 
Ivorian Electoral Board in Law No. 2014-335 of June 18, 2014, favours the 
government as well as reflects an imbalance that would affect the independence 
and impartiality of the board. In its ruling, the African Court found that such 
imbalance places the government in an advantageous position over other 
candidates, especially independent candidates, and violates the right to equal 
protection of the law.152  
                                       
147 See, article 7 of UDHR, articles 3 and 14 of ICCPR, article 2 of ICESCR, article 3 of the African Charter, and 
article 24 of American Convention on Human Rights. However, this right is the first individual civil and political 
right under the African Charter.  
148 See United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 18 in ‘United Nations Compilation of 
General Comments’, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol 1) p. 195.  
149 App. No. 001/2014, Actions Pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH) v Republic of Cote d’Ivoire. 
150 App. No. 001/2014, judgement delivered 18 November 2016.  
151 App. No. 001/2014, para 142.  
152 App. No. 001/2014, para 149-151. 
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Article 3 bans the discrimination and unfair treatment of individuals, and at 
the same time, it helps form the rule of law. The protection provided by article 3 
of the African Charter combats specific forms of discrimination on any grounds 
whatsoever. In this regard, the complainant alleging the violation of article 3 must 
prove how the treatment complained about is different to that meted out to others 
in the same position.153 In Rev. Christopher R. Mtikila v Tanzania, the applicant 
alleged that while the constitutional prohibition of independent candidature affects 
all Tanzanians, its effects are still discriminatory and against the right to equal 
protection by the law because it offers differential treatment to all Tanzanians who 
want to seek election to the Presidency, Parliamentary and local government 
positions outside sponsored political parties.154 The African Court, therefore, ruled 
that this provision is a restriction on the right to participate in the government of 
one’s country and a violation of Article 3 (2) of the African Charter.  
The right to equality before the law is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of 
some other rights, and its interpretation has further added to the ban on 
discrimination and unfair treatment.155 In Mr Mamboleo M. Itundamilamba v 
Democratic Republic of Congo,156 the African Commission stated that the right to 
equality ensures that parties in a dispute are accorded similar and equal 
opportunities from the formulation to the implementation of the law.157 Thus, the 
right to equality encompasses the right to equal opportunity for parties to a case 
from access to the court, to the preparation and defence of the case.158 A similar 
decision was reached in Burkinabe Movement for Human and Peoples’ Rights v. 
Burkina Faso,159 where the Commission held that the respondent state violated 
Article 3 because it failed to provide sufficient justification for undue prolongation 
                                       
153 See the case of Alex Thomas v. United Republic of Tanzania (App. No. 005/2013), Judgment on Merits (20 
November 2015), para 139-140.  
154 App. 009/2011 (judgment delivered 14 June 2013), para 117-119. 
155 Communication 302/05- In Mr Mamboleo M. Itundamilamba v. Democratic Republic of Congo, para 97; see 
also, Article 26 ICCPR; Article 1 of UDHR. 
156 Communication 302/05. 
157 Ibid, para 99.  
158 Communication 286 /2004 –Dino Noca v Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
159 Communication 304/97. 
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of a case spanning 15 years with no verdict when other cases on the same subject 
matter had been concluded.160  
In Burkinabe Movement for Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Burkina Faso 
case, the complainants were among the magistrates suspended, dismissed and 
retired between 1983 and 1987 by the ‘Conseil National de la Révolution’ regime. 
At the end of this regime, an amnesty was introduced by the Burkinabé state to 
rehabilitate these workers. Following this amnesty programme, many workers 
were restored to their position, while many others who were unaffected by the 
measure demanded to be compensated in kind just as the complainants. However, 
more than 15 years after the complainants had filed this request at the Supreme 
Court of Burkina Faso, the court has failed to give any verdict on the case. On this 
note, the Commission admitted that it is clear that the failure to proceed with the 
complainants’ case by the Supreme Court constitutes a denial of justice and a 
violation of the equality of all citizens before the law.161   
The right to equality prohibits discrimination by persons or authorities 
acting under the law or in the discharge of the functions or business of a state 
office.162 It is not enough for states to have legislation condemning discrimination; 
they have to take positive steps to provide redress. Hence, where a person in 
authority uses his/her offices to take decisions that discriminate and cause an 
imbalance in the treatment of persons, such acts amount to a violation of this 
right.163 It is based on this that the Commission in Antonie Bissangou v Congo164 
ruled that the respondent state violated article 3 due to its failure to implement 
the ruling of the court of the first instance even after the Minister of Justice had 
instructed the Minister of the Economy, Finance and the Budget to enforce the 
ruling. In this case, the complainant alleged that leaving the discretion of what 
                                       
160 Ibid, para 38. 
161 Ibid, para 40. See also, Communication 286 /2004 –Dino Noca v Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
162 See, article 12 (4) of Tanzania Constitution and Article 29 of Algerian Constitution.  
163 Communication 253/02, Antonie Bissangou v Congo. 
164 Ibid. 
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ruling to enforce or not, to the Minister of the Economy, Finance and the Budget, 
violates his right to equality before the law and equal protection by the law.165  
3.3.3  Right to life 
The right to life is a basic right for every individual. This means that nobody should 
have his/her life terminated by another, including the government.166 By 
implication, governments are obliged to make laws that safeguard the life of 
individuals within their territory. Consequently, this right is duly emphasised in 
numerous international human rights instruments167 as well as AU member states’ 
constitutions.168 For instance, article 2 ECHR protects this right and puts a specific 
obligation on the state, such as preventing public authorities from taking lives and 
requiring them to take steps to protect lives. On the African continent, article 4 of 
the African Charter provides in clear terms that ‘human beings are inviolable. 
Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his 
person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right’. This provision prohibits 
any form of arbitrary deprivation of life because it is the foundation upon which 
other rights are exercised.169  
By way of contrast, the right to life in the European system is absolute.170 
The European system does not allow derogation of this right by state parties, not 
even as a punishment for the worst crime.171 However, this right will not be 
breached if death occurs when a public authority uses necessary force to stop 
unlawful violence, make a lawful arrest, stop a riot or uprising, and prevent 
                                       
165 Ibid, para 69-71. 
166 Another shortcoming to this provision is that the African Charter is silent on whether suicide may fall under 
the violation of the right to life. Although this is also absent in other regional treaties, the increasing number of 
suicides in many African states, or instance, Nigeria, may require the scope of the right to life to be expanded. 
This may require the need to investigate the causes and circumstances surrounding the incident in order to hold 
persons or institutions accountable.  
167 Article 2 of ECHR; Article 4 of American Convention on Human rights; Article 3 of UDHR; and, Article 6 of 
ICCPR. 
168 Article 11 of 1996 Constitution of South African; Article 14 of 1977 Constitution of Tanzania; section 33 of 
1999 Constitution of Nigeria; Article 13 of 1992 Constitution of Togo; Article 7 of 2001 Constitution of Senegal; 
Article 16 of the 1994 Constitution of Malawi; Article 16 of 2005 Constitution of DRC; Article 24 of 2005 Burundi 
Constitution; Article 20 of 2011 Constitution of Morocco; and, Article 13 of 2012 Constitution of Somali.  
169 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practices and Institutions (n 15 above) 85. 
170 See Article 15 of ECHR, and, Protocol 13 to the ECHR- (abolition of death penalty).  
171 Protocol 13 to the ECHR.  
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escaping from lawful detainment.172 On the other hand, while the African Charter 
agrees that the right to life is inviolable, it is silent on what may constitute an 
arbitrary deprivation of this right leading to a good number of AU state 
constitutions listing exceptions to the absolute enjoyment of the right to life.173 
For instance, section 33 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides as follows:  
‘(1) Every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived 
intentionally of his life, save in execution of the sentence of a court in 
respect of a criminal offence of which he has been found guilty in Nigeria. 
(2) A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in 
contravention of this section, if he dies as a result of the use, to such extent 
and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is 
reasonably necessary - (a) for the defence of any person from unlawful 
violence or for the defence of property: (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest 
or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; or (c) for the 
purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny’.174 
Notwithstanding the approach in various AU member states constitutions, 
the African Commission re-emphasised in Forum of Conscience v Sierra Leone that 
the right to life is a human rights bedrock from which other rights proceed.175 This 
means that state parties would be accountable for violation of article 4 where state 
agents execute persons after summary and arbitrary trials, or where death occurs 
due to denial of food, medical attention, sand burning and torture.176 Furthermore, 
any inappropriate and unnecessary use of lethal force by law enforcement officers 
leading to a loss of life is tantamount to arbitrary, excessive, wrongful and 
                                       
172 Article 2 ECHR. 
173 Right to life is absolute in Rwanda- Article 10 of the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda, Chad- Article 17 of 1996 
Constitution of Chad, South Africa- Article 37 of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, and other states. 
174 See generally, Article 13 of 1992 Constitution of Ghana; Article 18 of the 1997 Constitution of Gambia; Article 
14 and 15 of the 1994 Constitution of Ethiopia. 
175 Communication 223/98 - Forum of Conscience v Sierra Leone, para 19.  
176 Communication 48/90-50/91-52/91-89/93- Amnesty International, Comité Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers' 
Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v Sudan, para 
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unlawful killing.177 Other acts that violate the right to life include the death penalty, 
extra-judicial, summary and arbitrary killings whether during a violent suppression 
of peaceful demonstrations, in lawful detention because of bad conditions and ill-
treatment, or participation in an illegal political rally.178 
The Commission’s interpretations have sustained the meaning of the right 
to life within the ambit of international human rights law framework. For example, 
in Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Union 
Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah v DRC, the 
Commission held that the extra-judicial execution of unarmed protesters violates 
article 4 provision of the African Charter.179 Similarly, in Organisation Mondiale 
Contre la Torture and Association Internationale des Juristes Democrates, 
Commission Internationale des Juristes, Union Interafricaine des Droits de 
l'Homme v Rwanda, the Commission held that the extra-judicial killings of 
Rwandan villagers by the Rwandan Armed Forces is a violation of the right to life 
guaranteed by the Charter.180 In this case, it emphasised that any killing other 
than that ordered by law through a competent judicial body is a violation of the 
right to life. 
The issue relating to the death penalty has attracted significant attention 
from the African Commission. Unlike Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR which abolishes 
the death penalty, the African Charter and its protocol lack such protection. In 
Interights ‘et al’. (on behalf of Mariette Sonjaleen Bosch) v Botswana,181 the 
Commission agreed that the death penalty could be imposed only after full 
consideration of circumstances relating to the offence and offender within the 
sphere of domestic law.182 Nevertheless, the Commission further urged Botswana 
to take all measures in line with the article 1 obligation to refrain from exercising 
                                       
177 Communication 295/04- Noah Kazingachire, John Chitsenga, Elias Chemvura and Batanai Hadzisi 
(represented by Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, para 123.  
178 Communication 266/03- Kevin Mgwanga Gunme, ‘et al’. v Cameroon, para 100-112.  
179 Communication 25/89-47/90-56/91-100/93 para 43. 
180 Communication 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93.  
181 Communication 240/01.  
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the death penalty183 in line with the African Commission Resolution Urging States 
to Envisage a Moratorium on the Death Penalty184 and UN 2nd Optional Protocol 
to the ICCPR aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty.185 In this case, the 
complainant alleged that the imposition of a death sentence had violated her right 
to life and that her execution method, which is by hanging, is a cruel method and 
would further expose her to inhuman treatment and punishment, unnecessary 
suffering, degradation, and humiliation. However, the Commission was silent on 
whether the method of execution violates the prohibition of inhuman and 
degrading treatment.  
The Commission has remained consistent in its call for the abolition of the 
death penalty in the region. According to the Commission, the death penalty 
violates other human rights such as the right to dignity and freedom from torture, 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.186 At present, many 
African countries retain the death penalty as a punishment for crimes. For 
instance, as of September 2016, out of the seventeen African countries that permit 
the death sentence, five countries carried out an execution in 2015.187 On the 
other hand, forty-one persons sentenced to death were granted State Pardon in 
Nigeria in 2015, while no public execution has been recorded in Nigeria since 
2011.188 What is unknown is whether Nigeria is doing this in line with the 
moratorium on the death penalty.  
                                       
183 Communication 240/01, para 52.  
184 Adopted at the 26th Ordinary Session of the African Commission held from 1st to 15th November 1999, Kigali, 
Rwanda, available at > http://www.achpr.org/sessions/26th/resolutions/42/< ,accessed 08 July 2017.  
185 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 44/128 of 15 December 1989.  
186 New Guidance on the Right to Life from the African Commission, ‘General Comment No. 3 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, available at >http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/centre-news-a-events-
2015/1564.html< accessed 06 July 2017.  
187 The Telegraph, ‘Mapped: The 58 countries that still have the death penalty’ (1 September, 2016), available at 
> http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/maps-and-graphics/countries-that-still-have-the-death-penalty/< , accessed 
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188 Amnesty International, ‘Death Penalty 2015: Facts and Figures’, (April 6, 2016), available at > 
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Specifically, while article 6 (2) ICCPR somewhat acknowledges the death 
penalty, the UN Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR abolishes the death 
penalty.189 In contrast, the Resolution Urging States to Envisage a Moratorium on 
Death Penalty provides as follows:  
‘1. urges all States parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights that still maintain the death penalty to comply fully with their 
obligations under the treaty and to ensure that persons accused of crimes 
for which the death penalty is a competent sentence are afforded all the 
guarantees in the African Charter;  
2. Calls upon all States parties that still maintain the death penalty to (a) 
limit the imposition of the death penalty only to the most serious crimes; 
(b) consider establishing a moratorium on executions of the death 
penalty; (c) reflect on the possibility of abolishing the death penalty’.190  
This means that the African Commission permits the adoption of the death penalty 
by states for offences they consider most serious crimes without an explanation 
of what constitutes serious crimes. Again, the African Commission Resolution is 
not for the immediate and complete abolition of the death penalty, but for state 
parties to first limit their imposition, and secondly, to consider its abolition through 
legislative measures. Surprisingly, the Commission failed to use the opportunity 
in this Resolution to either completely abolish the death penalty or forbid the death 
sentence on certain classes of persons based on age and other circumstance such 
as pregnancy.191  
 Several other situations within the African continent contradict the African 
Charter expression that ‘human beings are inviolable’. For instance, the African 
                                       
189 Article 1 of Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Liberia, 
however, reintroduced the death penalty for offence of armed robbery, terrorism, and hijacking in 2008. As at 
June 2018, only 15 African States are parties to the UN Protocol on the death penalty. They are Cape Verde Island 
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190 Resolution Urging States to Envisage a Moratorium on Death Penalty.  
191 However, article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa prohibits the use of the death penalty on pregnant or nursing women.  
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Charter lacks clarity relating to when one becomes a human being to enjoy the 
right to life. The approach is different under the American Convention, which 
explicitly guarantees the right to life from the moment of conception.192 
Significantly, the 2010 Kenyan Constitution is similar to the American Convention 
on this issue. Article 26 of this constitution provides as follows:  
‘(1) every person has the right to life. (2) the life of a person begins at 
conception. (3) a person shall not be deprived of life intentionally, except 
to the extent authorised by this Constitution or other written law. (4) 
abortion is not permitted unless, in the opinion of a trained health 
professional, there is a need for emergency treatment or the life or health 
of the mother is in danger, or if permitted by any other written law’.193 
 The Commission agrees that the right to life is clearly under pressure in 
Africa.194 Such pressure is manifest through violation of means of the livelihood, 
state party negligence or use of excessive force resulting to death by state agents. 
In Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Centre for Economic 
and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, the Commission ruled that the right to life 
implies the right to food, health and other social, economic rights necessary for a 
dignified life.195 In this case, the complainants alleged that the respondent state 
polluted and degraded the environment of the Ogoni people of Nigeria to a level 
humanly unacceptable, which made living a near-impossible task for the 
community. In its recommendation, the Commission observed that collective 
rights, environmental rights, and economic and social rights are essential 
elements of the right to life.196 
                                       
192 Article 4 of American Convention on Human Rights.  
193 This is similar to the position of Article 4 (1) of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
194 New Guidance on the Right to Life from the African Commission, ‘General Comment No. 3 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, adopted at the 57th Ordinary Session held from 4 to 18 November 2015 
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The decision in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria is a departure from the 
Commission’s recommendation in communications where death is a direct 
consequence of state party action. The Commission has over time found state 
parties in violation of article 4 where their organs and persons carrying out legal 
duties are directly the cause of death or due to state negligence, to ensure the 
protection of the African Charter rights. In Commission nationale des droits de 
l'Homme et des libertés v Chad,197 the facts presented by the complainant show 
that unknown gunmen and soldiers killed some journalists and other civilians. In 
defence, the respondent state claimed that its agents did not perpetuate this act 
and that it lacked control of the actions of its agents and other nonstate actors, 
given that the country was at war. Despite this claim, however, the African 
Commission ruled that the African Charter does not allow derogation from state 
parties, even during emergencies and further ordered that the respondent state, 
having failed to establish security and stability in the country, and by the 
government participation in the war, was in violation of Article 4.198  
Accordingly, killings during an armed conflict that do not conform to 
international humanitarian law and ‘enforced disappearance’ violate the right to 
life.199 The standard to which international law expects states to operate is the 
same across the board; life must only be taken in the circumstances permitted by 
the law. The reality is that the Commission has sometimes requested that 
investigations into extra-judicial killings are set up by states and an entirely 
independent body of individuals must carry such out with the state providing the 
necessary resources.200 In Amnesty International, Comite Loosli Bachel and 
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Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal 
Conference of East Africa v Sudan, the Commission held that findings from such 
investigations must be made public and prosecutions must, after that, be initiated 
in accordance with the information discovered.201 What this recommendation 
entails is the need for an independent judiciary that can guarantee redress for 
victims and the political will of the government to ensure investigation and 
suppression of acts likely to cause extra-judicial killings.  
 To understand the position of the Commission on the violation of the right 
to life, it ruled in Krishna Achuthan (on behalf of Aleke Banda), Amnesty 
International (on behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa) v Malawi,202 that the death of 
Mr Chirwa in prison custody due to inadequate health care and food, as well as 
the shooting and killing of peaceful protesters by the police, violated article 4.203 
Similarly, in International PEN, Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties 
Organisation and Interights (on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jnr.) v Nigeria, the 
African Commission in this case reinstated that the state has a duty and obligation 
not to purposely let a person die while in custody due to denial of other rights 
such as healthcare.204 In these cases, the Commission emphasised the duty of 
state parties to investigate the cause of death and use its organs to provide 
redress to victims.  
 However, the Commission has over time been criticised for unsatisfactory 
responses to state party violations of the right to life and for its inability to find 
the violation of article 4 in some seemingly unjustified circumstances.205 Take, for 
instance, in International Commission of Jurist v Rwanda,206 which was later 
merged with several other communications,207 the complainant alleged that the 
                                       
201 Ibid.   
202 Communication 64/92-68/92-78/92_8AR. 
203 The Commission also stated that Malawi was in violation of the right to fair hearing, liberty and freedom from 
torture. 
204 Communication 137/94-139/94-154/96-161/97, para 103. 
205 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practices and Institutions (n 13 above) 87. 
206 Communication 49/91. 
207 Communication 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93 - Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture and Association 
Internationale des jurists Democrates Commission, Commission Intenationale des jurists, Union Interafricaine 
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respondent state arrested and detained thousands of people on the grounds of 
ethnicity and destroyed their villages, and as well, massacred many of them. The 
Commission, in this case, failed to use the evidence provided by the complainant, 
instead requested permission from the Rwandan government to conduct an on-
site investigation, which was done four years after despite the Rwandan 
government’s quick response to the request. In particular, the alleged violations 
in this communication were later engulfed in the Rwandan genocide of 1994.  
3.3.4 Prohibition of torture and cruel treatment 
Torture and inhuman and degrading treatment violate human dignity. The 
international community has developed a standard to protect against torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment containing a minimum guarantee to be 
provided by every system under articles 4 and 5 UDHR. While article 5 UDHR and 
article 3 ECHR share similar language, article 5 of the African Charter prohibits, in 
addition to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, all forms of 
exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery and the slave trade. 
Article 5 of the African Charter guarantees three rights: the right to the respect of 
the human dignity; the recognition of legal status; and, the prohibition of all forms 
of the exploitative and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, 
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment. What this article 
has done is mostly to combine the protection under articles 3 and 4 ECHR and 4 
and 5 UDHR in one.208 However, unlike the ECHR and UDHR, the African Charter 
is silent on forced labour and servitude.  
Many African states have had experience of bad leadership, war, armed 
conflict and military rule, many of which were known for the exploitation and 
degradation of human beings. For instance, the Commission in Sudan Human 
Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan 
held that torture constitutes the intentional and systematic infliction of physical or 
                                       
208 See also, articles 5 and 6 of the Inter-American Convention. Article 6 of the Inter-American Convention 
protects the right to respect of physical, mental and moral integrity. 
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psychological pain and suffering to punish, intimidate or gather information.209 
Torture means any act by which severe pain, suffering, whether physical or 
emotional, is intentionally inflicted, and includes beating, solitary confinement of 
prisoners, extremely poor feeding of prisoners, chaining and locking up in 
overpopulated cells lacking hygiene, burning and burying under desert sand, 
electrocution of genital organs, water-boarding, pepper spray, and confinement in 
very cold underground cells.210  
Firstly, article 5 recognises the right to respect the dignity inherent in a 
human being. Human dignity is inherent in a human being, forms the basis of the 
human rights concept, and has been part of international human rights law since 
the adoption of the UDHR.211 Dignity enables the human family to engage in the 
activities that embody what we wish to become despite the nature of our origins 
and incident lifestyle.212 Further, dignity had played a crucial role in enabling 
differing human rights views to put aside the perceived ideological differences and 
focus on specific practices that should be prohibited.213 However, in an analysis of 
the term ‘human dignity’ as used by the U.S. Supreme Court and state courts 
around the globe, Rao agreed that courts have different concepts of dignity which 
they base on how they balance individual rights with the demands of social policy 
and community values.214 Governments and religious bodies in debates for or 
against their position on controversial issues such as forced labour, under-age 
marriage, torture, abuse of domestic staff and gay rights, have used human 
                                       
209 Communication 279/03-296/05 Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan, para 145.  
210 Communication 54/91-61/91-96/93-98/93-164/97_196/97-210/98 - Malawi Africa Association, Amnesty 
International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union interafricaine des droits de l'Homme and RADDHO, Collectif des veuves et 
ayantsDroit, Association mauritanienne des droits de l'Homme v Mauritania, para 115-117. 
211 Article 1 of UDHR; Roberto Andorno, ‘Human Dignity and Human Rights’ (2013) Handbook of Global 
Bioethics 45. Consequently, the preambles to both the ICCPR and ICESER acknowledge that human rights are 
derived from the dignity of the human person.  
212 Edwin Cameron, ‘Dignity and Disgrace- Moral Citizenship and Constitutional Protection’ In Hugh Corder, 
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2016) 100. 
213 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European 
Journal of International Law, 655. 
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dignity.215 What is clear in article 5, however, is the protection of human dignity 
against all forms of exploitation and degradation of man. Therefore, can article 5 
which prohibits forms of inhuman and degrading treatment be said to be 
exhaustive?  
Ankumanh stressed that the contemporary exploitation and degradation of 
human beings are sometimes rooted in traditional and religious practices and 
manifest in the form of early marriage, betrothal of girls, illegal sale and traffic in 
human beings, forced marriage, child labour, forced labour, pledging of young 
girls for debt, and use of domestic servants for extremely low pay.216 As one would 
expect, public authorities must not inflict the sort of treatment listed in article 5 
on anyone, and they must protect individuals against such treatment from other 
individuals. Nonetheless, there seems to be an alarming increase in contemporary 
exploitation and degradation by individuals in some African countries. For 
instance, the abuse of domestic servants in many countries.217  
On the meaning of torture, the Commission in Gabriel Shumba v Republic 
of Zimbabwe held that torture includes acts capable of causing serious physical or 
psychological suffering, which humiliates any individual to the extent of being 
forced to act against one’s will or conscience.218 In this case, the following acts 
were construed to constitute torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment; namely, forceful drinking of one’s own blood or urine, spray of a 
chemical substance on the body, being urinated upon by security officials, 
beatings, electrocution, and denial of food and water. Indeed, these acts caused 
physical injuries, mental and psychological trauma to the victim.219 Hence, the 
                                       
215 Ariel Zylberman, ‘Human Dignity’ (2016) 11(4) Philosophy Compass 201. 
216 Evelyn Ankumanh, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and Procedure (n 8 
above) 119.  
217 Emeka Okafor, ‘The use of Adolescents as Domestic Servants in Ibadan, Nigeria’ (2009) 24 (2) Journal of 
Adolescent Research, 169. 
218 Communication288/2004 - Gabriel Shumba v Republic of Zimbabwe; Communication 236/2000 - Curtis 
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understanding of what may constitute torture and degrading treatment can be 
endless. 
Likewise, the Commission in Malawi Africa Association, Amnesty 
International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union interafricaine des droits de l'Homme and 
RADDHO, Collectif des veuves et ayants Droit, Association mauritanienne des 
droits de l'Homme v Mauritania held that a situation where detainees were left to 
die a slow death at the hands of government officials constituted cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment and punishment.220 Similar pronouncement was also 
made in Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Sierra 
Leonean refugees in Guinea) v Guinea, where Sierra Leonean refugees were 
harassed, deported, property looted, physical bodily injuries and mutilation such 
as cutting off their ears, arms, and legs, and arbitrary arrests and assassinations 
following President Conté’s speech on 9th September 2000 which incited soldiers 
and civilians. The African Commission, in this case, ruled that the punishment and 
treatment meted out were in extreme violation of Article 5 and other articles of 
the Charter.221 
However, there is an evolving international law effort to curb the acts of 
torture, cruel and inhuman treatment and punishment. At the UN level, the 
international community has enacted the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984222 and Optional 
Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 2006.223 For instance, article 1 of this Convention 
                                       
220 Ibid, para 118.  
221 Communication 249/02 - Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Sierra Leonean 
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against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
provides as follows: 
‘for the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating 
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination 
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.’  
It appears that the approach adopted in the reasonings of the African Commission 
decisions aligns with the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Similar to this UN Convention, the 
African Commission adopted ‘Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and 
Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 
Africa (Robben Island Guideline)’.224 This Guideline is implemented through an 
independent body called the Committee for the Prevention of Torture in Africa.225  
 The Robben Island Guideline is not binding on states; it is a mere 
declaration. However, the Robben Island Guideline requires states to prohibit, 
prevent and respond to the needs of torture victims, requires states to criminalise 
torture, establish complaints and investigate procedures, and take steps to 
                                       
224 Adopted during the 32nd Ordinary Session held at The Gambia between 17th and 23rd October 2002. For more 
information on the context of the ‘Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, 
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guarantee that the conditions of detention comply with international standards. At 
present, many state laws still contain a penalty which constitutes inhuman and 
degrading treatment and punishment. For instance, section 18 of Southern Nigeria 
Criminal Code and section 68 (1) (f) of Northern Nigeria Penal Code permit 
flogging as a punishment for offences despite the constitutional prohibition of 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.226 Furthermore, the Commission 
observed in Curtis Francis Doebbler v Sudan227 that Sudan’s laws contain several 
forms of corporal punishment that violate the prohibition of torture and degrading 
treatment such as stoning, amputation and whipping. Based on this, the 
Commission stated that these forms of punishment are cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading and further requested Sudan to amend its laws in line with this 
observation.228 On the other hand, there is a noticeable jurisprudence from the 
African Court concerning article 5. However, many of the cases relating to this 
article are declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of local remedies.229  
3.3.5 Right to personal liberty and security of the person  
The right to personal liberty and security of the person protects individuals from 
having their freedom arbitrarily taken away. It focuses on individual freedom from 
unreasonable imprisonment or detention. This right can be qualified under two 
headings: the right to be free, and the right against arbitrary arrest and detention. 
From the declaration of rights during the 18th century French Revolution to 
contemporary regional human rights instruments, the right to liberty is protected. 
For instance, article 3 UDHR provides that ‘everyone has the right to life, liberty 
                                       
226 Section 34 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
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and security of person’ while article 9 UDHR provides that ‘no one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’. On the other hand, article 9 
ICCPR provides that ‘everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as 
established by law’.  
 Unlike the UDHR, the ECHR protects the right to liberty and security of 
person but with a list of instances when this right can be deprived such as lawful 
arrest and detention or detention of a minor by legal order.230 However, article 6 
of the African Charter, in protecting this right provides that ‘everyone shall have 
the right to liberty and the security of person. No one may be deprived of his 
freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In 
particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained’. Like other international 
human rights instruments, article 6 guarantees individual physical liberty by 
prohibiting state arbitrary arrest and detention. It suggests that while the 
individual is conferred with the right to be free, the state is obliged to use its 
apparatus to guarantee the safety and security of individuals.  
The right to personal liberty and security is not absolute and can be 
legitimately deprived in appropriate circumstances by the government.231 There 
are circumstances in which a government can detain a person as long as it acts 
within the law, and this includes when a person is found guilty of a crime and sent 
to prison; acting in compliance with a court order; and, upon reasonable suspicion 
of committing a crime or absconding after committing a crime.232 Therefore, not 
every action that restricts the physical freedom of an individual would constitute 
a violation of the right to liberty.233 Hence, in Monim Elgak, Osman Hummeida and 
                                       
230 Article 5 ECHR. 
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Amir Suliman (represented by FIDH and OMCT) v Sudan, the Commission found 
that constraint of physical liberty would amount to a violation of Article 6 where it 
falls outside the strict confines of the law.234  
The African Commission has severally upheld the position of the law that 
arbitrary arrest and detention is a violation of the right to liberty.235 For instance, 
in Krischna Achutan (on behalf of Aleke Banda), Amnesty International (on behalf 
of Orton and Vera Chirwa v Malawi, the Commission ruled that the arbitrary arrest 
of Mr Banda and others without recourse to redress from national courts is a 
violation of Article 6 of the African Charter and the constitution of Malawi.236 The 
Commission described arbitrariness to include elements of injustice, lack of due 
process of law, inappropriateness and lack of predictability.237 In Article 19 v The 
State of Eritrea, the Commission further made it clear that an arrest or detention 
may be legal according to domestic law but can be rendered illegal due to an 
unjust and inappropriate procedure and nature.238  
The right to personal liberty and security of person includes some 
procedural safeguards for individuals which state authorities must follow. For 
instance, a person must be informed of the reason for detention, brought before 
a competent court within a reasonable time, may be granted bail or challenge the 
lawfulness of such detention.239 Therefore, where an arrest and detention lack a 
legal basis or fails to meet the legal conditions, it would constitute a violation of 
article 6.240 However, state authorities have the responsibility to provide detention 
                                       
234 Ibid, para 103.  
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centres that safeguard the inherent dignity of human beings in accordance with 
the provisions of the Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition 
and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
in Africa. This resolution prohibits the use of unauthorised places of detention and 
use of incommunicado detention.241  
Similarly, the length of detention may constitute a violation of the right to 
liberty. For instance, the Commission found a violation of article 6 where a person 
has been in detention without trial for three years under a Police Detention Order 
and a Presidential Detention Order.242 Likewise, the Commission took a similar 
approach when it held that arrest and detention for seven years without trial is a 
gross violation of the right to liberty irrespective of any justifiable circumstances 
that may be presented by a state party.243 Nonetheless, the Commission has failed 
to stipulate a timeframe for which arbitrary detention without trial may constitute 
a violation of article 6.  
Based on the ongoing analysis, it seems that there is a nexus between the 
enjoyment of the right to liberty and the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and 
detention on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.  
3.3.6  Right to a fair trial  
The right to a fair trial is recognised by several international human rights 
instruments such as the UDHR, ICCPR and ECHR. For instance, while articles 7,244 
8245 and 11246 UDHR enshrine some fair trial rights, article 10, as the key provision 
provides ‘everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him’. However, article 14 ICCPR 
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provided exhaustive and well-defined protection of the right to a fair trial. This 
article provides for the following; the presumption of innocence,247 minimum fair 
trial rights in criminal proceedings,248 protection of juveniles,249 the right to 
appeal,250 and prohibition of double jeopardy/conviction.251 Thus, the right to a 
fair hearing can be summarised as an umbrella right which encompasses all other 
rights that focus on ensuring that a criminal or civil trial is not conducted in an 
unfair manner against the citizen.  
 On the regional level, the right to a fair trial is explicitly proclaimed in 
various treaties as well as in state constitutions.252 Similar to ICCPR language in 
article 14, article 6 of ECHR is equally exhaustive and covers individual entitlement 
in the determination of civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge while 
article 7 protects individuals from retrospective criminal legislation. Likewise, 
article 7 of the African Charter provides for the right to have one’s cause heard. 
Aligning with ICCPR and ECHR, the African Charter listed other related rights for 
the protection of an individual to include- the right to appeal; the right to defence; 
the right to be informed in a language one understands of the charges; the right 
to a defence counsel; presumption of innocence; trial by an impartial court; trial 
within reasonable time; personal criminal liability; and protection from 
retrospective criminal liability.253 Other fair trial rights enshrined in the African 
Charter are contained in articles 3254 and 26.255 In all, the right to fair trial remains 
the legitimate means to filter the innocent from the guilty and to ensure 
accountability through punishment, and redress to victims.  
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The right to a fair trial is one of the most extensive rights as well as one of 
the most litigated right under the African Charter given the available case law 
jurisprudence of the African Court and the African Commission.256 Despite 
variations in the placement of fair trial rights, its aim remains to ensure proper 
administration of justice to every individual except in the circumstances specified 
by such instrument. In spite of this aim, the court, state authorities, and persons 
in official capacity might impede a fair trial in any event where one or all of these 
rights are violated. 
The first fair trial right protected under article 7 is the right to an appeal to 
competent national bodies. Even though the Charter failed to define the term 
‘appeal’, Black’s law dictionary defines it as: 
‘the complaint to a superior court of an injustice done or error committed 
by an inferior one, whose judgment or decision the court above is called 
upon to correct or reverse. The removal of a cause from a court of inferior 
to one of superior jurisdiction, for the purpose of obtaining a review and 
retrial’.257 
From this definition of appeal, there is no gainsaying that the right to appeal is a 
necessary individual right for the sake of justice, fairness and equity. The 
enjoyment of this right goes beyond the establishment of national courts.  
Article 7 (1) (a) requires state laws to allow appeals to competent organs. 
For instance, in Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lekwot and six 
others) v Nigeria, the complainants stated that section 8 (1) of Civil Disturbances 
(Special Tribunal) Act No. 2 of 1987 of Nigeria prohibits the courts from reviewing 
its decisions and operation.258 Hence, an appeal was not allowed from tribunal to 
any other national judicial body. However, the Commission ruled that this Act 
violated article 7 (1) of the African Charter and urged Nigeria to take steps to 
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remedy the situation. Similarly, the Commission in Constitutional Rights Project 
(in respect of Wahab Akamu, G. Adega and others) v Nigeria held that domestic 
law foreclosing appeal against a judicial sentence especially in criminal cases 
bearing the death penalty is a violation of article 7(1) (a).259 This case concerned 
pronouncement of the death sentence under the Robbery and Firearms (Special 
provision) Decree No. 5 of 1984 of Nigeria under which section 11 (4) prohibited 
an appeal from this special tribunal.260 It means that military and special tribunals 
where the death penalty is enforced do not enjoy exceptions to a right to appeal.261 
The right to appeal is closely related to the right to legal redress. This 
position is maintained because an appeal provides an avenue to undo a perceived 
injustice or error with a view that a superior court makes a new pronouncement 
against or in favour of the lower court.262 This line of reasoning was maintained in 
Interights, ASADHO and Madam O. Disu v Democratic Republic of Congo.263 In this 
case, some individuals were denied the opportunity to seek redress for illegal 
detention, and to appeal against the court decision without reason or 
compensation. However, the right to appeal may be declined when a party misses 
the time limit for bringing a case or in other circumstances as may be prescribed 
by domestic law.  
Determination of judicial claims, whether an appeal or at first instance, 
must take place in competent and impartial courts or tribunal. A ‘competent 
national court’ involves the expertise of the judge and the inherent justice of the 
laws under which they operate.264 Hence, article 7 (1) (d) and 26 would be violated 
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where courts are denied qualified personnel to ensure impartiality is 
guaranteed.265 Nevertheless, the Commission in Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal 
Defence Centre and Assistance Project v Nigeria, held that military tribunals, being 
establishments of law are assumed to be equitable, impartial and independent in 
its administration of justice, and should not be negated because they are presided 
over by military officers.266  
In addition to the availability of competent courts, where a domestic law 
denies a person the opportunity of being heard or represented during or after 
detention, such violates article 7(1) (a) and (c).267 It is a principle of international 
law that an accused/detained person is entitled to a legal representative and an 
opportunity to challenge the matter of their detention or decision from its outcome 
before competent national organs.268 As a result, the Commission in Civil Liberties 
Organisation, Legal Defence Centre and Assistance Project v Nigeria further 
emphasised that the provisions of article 7 are not derogable because they provide 
minimum protections to every individual.269  
Furthermore, persons accused of committing an offence or in detention are 
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a competent, impartial and 
independent court or tribunal.270 One of the ultimate goals of the presumption of 
innocence is to avoid passing judgment on an accused person before a competent 
court or tribunal gives its ruling or judgment.271 In Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara v 
Cameroon, the Commission ruled that a situation where government authorities 
made statements affirming embezzlement by officials arrested and under trial 
during its ‘Operation Sparrow Hawk’ violates their right to the presumption of 
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innocence.272 According to the Commission, such practice, if encouraged or 
allowed, is capable of influencing the final decision of the trial court.273  
Substantively, violation of the presumption of innocence would occur where 
state officers publicly declare the accused persons guilty of the offence for which 
they are facing prosecution in a court.274 Should this be the case, however, the 
intended goal of the protection is to promote carefulness in people, particularly 
persons in authority, not to say anything capable of giving the impression that 
they wished to influence the outcome of an ongoing trial before a court.275  
Presumption of innocence also involves the right of an accused person to 
examine and be examined by witnesses while defending himself.276 The accused 
person may exercise this right by himself or through a legal counsel of choice.277 
This right creates a duty for state parties, in particular, in criminal proceedings. 
Therefore, state law would violate article 7 (1) (c) of the African Charter if it gives 
a tribunal/court the power to veto the accused person’s choice of counsel or 
decline certain persons from appearing as representatives of the accused 
persons.278 For instance, in Krishna Achuthan (on behalf of Aleke Banda), Amnesty 
International (on behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa v Malawi, the Commission ruled 
that a criminal trial without a legal representative is a violation of the individual’s 
right to a fair hearing under article 7 (1) (c).279 Thus, denying an accused person 
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access to his counsel while in detention violates the right to judicial assistance and 
defence.280  
The Charter was not explicit in guaranteeing free legal aid or legal 
assistance. However, the Commission has held that legal representation and 
lawyer’s access to appropriate information must continue from the time of the 
arrest until the determination of the charge against an accused person.281 
Likewise, for criminal cases bearing the death penalty, the right to defence would 
be violated if an accused person’s representative withdraws from a trial for reasons 
such as constant harassment and assault from government security agents or 
officials.282  
Nonetheless, free legal aid or assistance is a right in criminal cases where 
an accused cannot afford the financial means to engage a lawyer under the 
European system.283 Similarly, it is an inalienable right of an accused person under 
the American system to be assisted by a state lawyer where an accused fails to 
engage a lawyer on time or where he does not want to defend himself 
personally.284 However, the non-recognition of legal aid in the African Charter is 
unjustifiable, especially given the international attention this right has attracted 
in other regional instruments and the economic situation in many African 
countries. Still, at the international level, Part B, Principles 1 and 2 of the United 
Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice 
Systems285 recognise legal aid as an essential element of a criminal justice system 
and a responsibility of states. However, the right to legal aid has gradually become 
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an integral part of many African Charter state parties’ constitution. For example, 
Article 35 (2) (c) of the South African constitution states:   
‘everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right 
to have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the state 
and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to 
be informed of this right promptly’.286 
Besides the African Charter, African states have by such constitutional inclusion, 
shown their commitment to protecting this aspect of the right to a fair hearing 
because the right to legal aid is an entitlement of an accused person that need not 
be requested.287 According to the African Court in Alex Thomas v Tanzania, 
indigent persons facing criminal trial are particularly entitled to the right to free 
legal assistance.288  
In addition to the failure to recognise the right to legal aid, two notable gaps 
in the African Charter are the absence of the right of an accused to be informed 
in a language he/she understands of the charges against him/her or reason of 
arrest, and non-recognition of the right to an interpreter. In contrast with the 
European system where the right to an interpreter is an absolute right given their 
diversity in language,289 one would have expected that this right should have been 
part of the African Charter given Africa’s numerous indigenous and ethnic 
languages spread across its English, French, Arabic, Spanish or Portuguese 
colonial past. At present, while the right to an interpreter has been recognised in 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in 
Africa,290 the right to be informed in a language one understands is presently 
captured in the African Commission’s Resolution on the Right to Recourse 
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Procedure and Fair Trial.291 However, both the Guidelines and Resolution are not 
binding on state parties like the provisions of the African Charter. In Malawi Africa 
Association, Amnesty International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union interafricaine des droits 
de l'Homme and RADDHO, Collectif des veuves et ayantsDroit, Association 
mauritanienne des droits de l'Homme v Mauritania, the Commission held that 
Article 7 was violated for using the Arabic language in a trial where 3 out of the 
21 accused persons spoke and understood Arabic fluently and without an 
interpreter.292  
Although the African Charter recognises the right to be tried within a 
reasonable time by an impartial court and tribunal under article 7 (1) (d), 
prolonged and undue delay in the commencement of trial or trial proceedings is a 
violation of Article 7 (1) (d).293 In Wilfred Onyango Nganyi and nine others v 
Tanzania, the African Court observed that slow justice brings about loss of 
confidence in the judicial institutions and in the peaceful settlement of disputes 
which thus is a denial of justice to the accused persons.294 In the instant case, the 
Court rejected the respondent state’s argument that the complexity and 
seriousness of the case caused the prolongation from 2006 to 2013. Unfortunately, 
however, the Court did not provide what amounts to a reasonable time. Similarly, 
while in Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, the Commission ruled that Nigeria 
violated the provisions of the right to fair trial by detaining protesters for three 
years without trial,295 it also ruled in Comité culturel pour la démocratie au Bénin 
v Benin that arrest and detention of persons for several months without trial 
violates  article 7 (1) (d).296 In these cases, no attempt has been made to 
rationalise what amounts to a reasonable time.  
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What, from the above cases, constitutes a reasonable time? In answering 
this question, the African Commission has held that a reasonable time depends on 
the circumstances of each case and cannot be expressed in a blanket time limit 
standard that can be applied generally across the board.297 For instance, the facts 
in Article 19 v Eritrea, concerning detention incommunicado of over 18 journalists 
and political opponents without trial in Eritrea from September 2001 was held by 
the Commission as a violation of article 7 (1) (d) because state parties are not 
permitted to derogate from its obligation under the African Charter even in time 
of war. According to the Commission, neither the existence of a war in Eritrea nor 
a backlog of cases awaiting trial justifies the excessive delay experienced in 
violation of article 7 (1) (d).298  
3.3.7 Freedom of conscience and religion 
Article 8 of the African Charter guarantees two individual rights; namely, the right 
to freedom of conscience and the right to free practice of religion. Under the 
European system, this right is protected in article 9 ECHR and includes the right 
to change your religion or beliefs at any time and the right to put one’s thoughts 
and beliefs into action. From these terms, this right could include the right to 
participate in religious activities, wear religious clothing and to freely talk and 
declare one’s belief. Unlike the African Charter, article 18 ICCPR broadly protects 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Despite this, the African Charter 
omitted the right to change one’s religion, either alone or in community with 
others and the right to practice one’s religion in public or private.299 In spite of 
this omission, it is argued that the freedom to change one’s religion or belief is 
still recognised in Africa as it is akin to the freedom to adopt, retain and practice 
religion in any circumstance as chosen by the individual.300 However, there is a 
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need to expressly cover these omissions because of the increasing intolerance to 
religious activities by governments and individuals across many African states.  
 Religion or belief is a powerful tool for the promotion of moral values within 
a political society.301 Religion or belief have been cited as the basis for the rejection 
of certain entitlements connected with human rights. For example, the 1998 
Lambeth Conference of Anglican Bishops from Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe forbids and expressly rejects homosexual practices and rights as highly 
incompatible with the belief of the church and the people of Africa.302 The position 
is similar to the practice in many African countries where homosexuality and 
same-sex marriages are opposed or criminalised on the basis of cultural values.  
 Freedom of conscience and religion guarantee a person’s rights to profess 
and practice one’s religion without fear in both public and private places.303 The 
right to freedom of conscience and religion involves the freedom to manifest 
religion or belief in worship, practice, observance, teaching, religious education, 
language, ceremonies, diet, customs, and dress.304 This right also protects 
philosophical beliefs such as atheism alongside other beliefs as long as they do 
not offend public safety, order, health or morals, or for the protection of others.305 
That notwithstanding, the manifestation of this right can be limited.  
Indeed, freedom of conscience and religion can be restricted subject to law 
and order.306 For example, under the ECHR, such limitation would take place ‘in 
the interest of public safety, protection of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedom of others.307 The African Charter does not 
explicitly list restrictions in article 8; instead, it acknowledges that no one may, 
subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of 
these freedoms. That notwithstanding, the Commission held in Free Legal 
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Assistance Group, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des 
Droits de l'Homme, Les Temoins de Jehovah v Zaire that the respondent state 
violated article 8 for allowing prosecution by government agencies on the ground 
of belief without evidence that such practice or belief in any way threatened law 
and order.308 The Commission, in this case, ruled that harassment of members of 
a religious group known as ‘Jehovah Witnesses’ by government agencies 
constitutes a violation of the right to religion because article 8 allows individuals 
or groups to worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, to 
establish and maintain places for these purposes, and to celebrate ceremonies in 
accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief.309  
However, beliefs must be consistent with the basic standards of human 
dignity, concern essential aspects of human life or behaviour, be sincerely held 
and be worthy of respect in a democratic society.310 Freedom of religion will not 
be deemed violated where a display of religious practice conflicts with legal 
provisions of the law.311 For instance, in Garreth Anver Prince v South Africa, the 
complainant alleged a violation of his right to religion by the respondent state 
through a prohibition of cannabis which he needs for sacramental use for his 
Rastafari religious belief. His prayer is that the use of cannabis should be 
exempted for Rastafari. The African Commission held that the use of cannabis 
conflicts with the law of South Africa and attracts a penalty recognised by the law 
which serves a rational and legitimate purpose for all; and thus, cannot constitute 
a violation of the right to conscience and religion.312  
Religion must not be exercised in a manner that violates the equal right to 
protection under the African Charter even when it is a state law. At present, the 
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constitutions of Egypt,313 Libya,314 Morocco,315 Tunisia,316 Somalia,317 and 
Algeria318 recognise Islam as their state religion, whereas Zambia319 has declared 
itself a Christian nation. In some countries, other religious beliefs and practices 
are not accommodated or outlawed, and this practice indeed poses some 
challenges to the enjoyment of this right by members of the outlawed religions. 
Hence, state parties to the African Charter are in violation of the Charter rights 
and freedom when they fail to protect individuals from the harmful effects that 
imposition of religion or beliefs might cause. For instance, the Commission in 
Amnesty International, Comite Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v. 
Sudan,320 held that Sudan violated article 8 of the African Charter and further ruled 
that Islamic Sharia religious law could not be imposed as national law in a secular 
state that comprises diverse religious practices.321 The complainants, in this case, 
stated that non-Muslims were persecuted to persuade their conversion to Islam, 
prohibited from preaching or building their churches, and were prohibited from 
using the national press for their religious activities. Furthermore, they averred 
that non-Muslims faced constant harassment and oppression including the 
expulsion of Christian missionaries, and were subjected to arbitrary arrest, 
expulsion and denial of access to work, education and food aid on account of their 
religious belief.  
Therefore, state laws that expressly prohibit individuals from actions that 
manifest one’s convictions, religion or belief violate the freedom of religion and 
belief. In this regard, where state law is explicit on the restriction of religion or 
belief that is not contrary to collective security, morality, rights of others and 
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common interest, such an act may be deemed a violation of the African Charter.322 
However, although there is no controversy about having a state religion, it has 
been established that it is fundamentally unjust for religious laws to apply in cases 
against non-adherents of such religion.323 In Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare 
Council) v Kenya, the Commission held that a limitation to the right to practice 
religion should be based on exceptionally good reasons, necessitated by significant 
public security interests or other justification and proportionate to the specific 
need for which this right is denied.324  
3.3.8 Right to receive information and freedom of expression 
Article 9 guarantees two branches of related rights: the right to receive 
information and, the right to express and disseminate opinion. This right protects 
the right to hold an opinion and to express it freely without government 
interference. The expression of this right involves expressing one’s views, whether 
through public protest or demonstrations or published works such as books or 
even through the internet and social media. Equally important, it protects one’s 
right to access or receive information as may be expressed by other people.  
 Freedom of expression and information is a recognised international human 
right as enshrined in several instruments.325 However, article 9 of the African 
Charter is not as expansive, exhaustive or adequate as the ICCPR and the ECHR. 
For example, the African Charter seems not to cover the right to hold opinions, 
thoughts, states’ rights on broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises,326 
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conditions for limitation,327 and the medium of expression of this right.328 What is 
clear is that the protection guaranteed under the African Charter may as well cover 
more than the mere right to receive information and to express and disseminate 
opinion. For example, this right can be seen as the foundation for the various 
freedom of information law in twenty-three African countries.329   
Access to information is described as the cornerstone of good governance, 
and it gives individuals the right to information on the environment, political 
opinion and participation, corruption and human rights from government and its 
organs.330 The freedom to receive information and to express opinion distinguishes 
open from closed societies, and it is a right vital to the existence of a free press 
or the media.331 In this regard, freedom of expression as a fundamental right has 
great significance to the functioning of a democratic and constitutional process.332  
Where national law is inconsistent with the Charter protection of this right, 
such inconsistency would constitute a violation. According to the African 
Commission, international human rights standards must always prevail over 
contradictory national law.333 To put it differently, the phrase ‘within the law’ 
evidenced in article 9 (2) of the African Charter would be referenced to 
international norms.334 For example, the Court ruled in Lohe Issa Konate v Burkina 
Faso that restrictions from the national laws of Burkina Faso on the freedom of 
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expression violate the dictates of article 9.335 Importantly, state party restriction 
to the enjoyment of this right can come under article 27 of the Charter, which 
consists of respect for the rights of others, collective security, morality, and 
common interest. Therefore, restriction of freedom of expression should be based 
on legitimate public interest proportionate to and necessary to achieve the desired 
benefit.336  
Restrictive national laws, policies and directives to the enjoyment of the 
right to expression is a violation of the African Charter. In Scanlen and Holderness 
v Zimbabwe, the African Commission noted that sections 79 and 80 of the Access 
to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 2003 of Zimbabwe imposes restrictive 
accreditation conditions which is an excessive burden on journalists; thereby,  
further restricting their effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of 
expression.337 Notwithstanding the effects of national laws, the Commission has 
identified freedom of expression as a cornerstone of democracy.338 According to 
the Commission, there is a relationship between freedom of expression and 
democracy. For instance, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
in Africa provides as follows: ‘no one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with 
his or her freedom of expression, and any restrictions on freedom of expression 
shall be provided by law, serve a legitimate interest and be necessary and in a 
democratic society’.339 Therefore, in Kenneth Good v Botswana, the Commission 
observed that though the expression of opinion on state affairs is always sensitive 
to political leaders, any restriction thereto must serve a legitimate interest and be 
necessary in a democratic society.340  
As is evident from the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
in Africa, it would amount to a violation of this right if an individual was forced to 
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flee from a country because of his political views and opinions of a government.341 
Furthermore, the Commission in Interights, Institute for Human Rights and 
Development in Africa, and Association mauritanienne des droits de l'Homme v 
Mauritania342 evaluated articles 11 and 18 of the Mauritanian Constitution and 
articles 4, 25 and 26 of the Decree 91-024 of the 25 July 1991 of Mauritania, and 
noted that if national laws can entirely avoid the right to expression, it would make 
its protection inoperable. The Commission, thus, ruled that Mauritanian laws 
violated the right to expression and further stated that international human rights 
law will always take precedence over national laws except where such laws 
conform to article 27 of the African Charter.343  
Furthermore, the right to receive information and freedom of expression in 
the African region is an essential right for the individual formation of opinion.344 
The relevance of this right has been demonstrated in the case law jurisprudence 
of the African Charter,345 the establishment of a Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Expression and Access to Information,346 and the African Commission 
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa.347 This right extends 
to the protection of journalists in the continent. For example, in Abdoulaye 
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for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v Zimbabwe; 
Communication 242/01 - Interights, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, and Association 
mauritanienne des droits de l'Homme v Mauritania; Communication 232/99 - John D. Ouko v Kenya.  
346 Established by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with the adoption of Resolution 71 at 
the 36th Ordinary Session held in Dakar, Senegal from 23rd November to 7th December 2004. 
347 Adopted by the African Commission at its 32nd Ordinary Session, in Banjul, The Gambia, from 17th to 23rd 
October 2002: ACHPR /Res.62 (XXXII) 02.  
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Nikiema, Ernest Zongo, Blaise Ilboudo and Burkinabe Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Movement v Burkina Faso, the African Court find a violation of article 9 following 
the respondent state’s inability to protect the assassinated investigative journalist 
despite numerous reports about threats to life and attempts to abduct him due to 
the nature of his work. The African Court, in this case, concluded that the right of 
a journalist, which should be safeguarded by the respondent state, is specifically 
the right to life and the right to freedom of expression.348  
Similarly, the Commission in Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties 
Organisations and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, observed that freedom of 
expression is vital to every individual’s personal development and political 
consciousness as well as participation in the public affairs of one’s country.349 In 
this case, the Commission considered whether the respondent state law 
requirement for registration of newspapers and their prohibition thereof violated 
article 9. It noted that though excessive high registration fees will constitute a 
violation, the fact that the government bans a specific publication is inconsistent 
with the law and a violation of freedom of expression.350  
3.3.9 Right to freedom of association  
The right to freedom of association protects one’s right to join political parties, 
trade unions and voluntary groups. This right envisages some components which 
include the freedom of individuals to come together for the protection of their 
group interest, which may be political, social or religious, professional, sports, 
cultural or otherwise.351 The language of UDHR in protecting this right is simple 
and straightforward, unlike the expansive and broad language enshrined in the 
ICCPR. Article 20 UDHR provides- ‘everyone has the right to a peaceful assembly 
and association. No one may be compelled to belong to an association’. It is clear 
from this provision that article 20 UDHR covers both the right to assembly and 
association as well as the right not to join/assemble. However, while this language 
                                       
348 App. No. 013/2011, para 180. 
349Communication 105/93-128/94-130/94-152/96, para 54.  
350 See, Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisations and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, para 71. 
351 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practices and Institutions (n 15 above) 110. 
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style is evident in ECHR, the African Charter and ICCPR adopted a different 
language approach.  
 Unlike the UDHR, the African Charter and the ICCPR separates the right to 
freedom of association and assembly. Article 10 of the African Charter provides: 
‘every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides 
by the law. Subject to the obligation of solidarity provided for in article 29 no one 
may be compelled to join an association’.352 Equally important, freedom of 
association is recognised under Article 8 of the ICESCR to cover the field of labour 
and trade unions. Generally, this right allows people to associate with other people 
and is relevant when people are forming, joining or exiting a union, political party 
or for protest.  
 As evident in ECHR and UDHR, this right is merged with the right to freedom 
of assembly due to their interrelatedness and nature. This is because the nature 
of both rights allows individuals to come together for a lawful purpose and to 
express their thoughts. While this language style is not known to article 10 of the 
African Charter, the Charter, like all other human rights instruments outlaws 
forced membership of any association but is subject to article 29 of the Charter.353 
This ideology was affirmed in Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights 
Centre v Tanzania when the African Court noted that the right to freedom of 
association implies freedom to associate and freedom not to associate. The Court 
further ruled that freedom of association will be negated if a person is forced to 
associate with others; therefore, the law prohibiting individual candidature under 
the Electoral Act of Tanzania by requiring individuals to belong and be sponsored 
by a political party in the general elections violates the freedom of expression.354  
The right to free association is both an individual and a collective right. It 
allows people to either individually or jointly further their interest through legal 
                                       
352 See also, Article 16 of American Convention; Article 11 of ECHR; and Article 22 of ICCPR. 
353 Article 29 of the Charter provides for individual duties such as participation in defence of one’s country. 
354 App. No. 009/2011, para 113-114.  
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means such as a Non-Governmental Organisation or political party.355 In this 
regard, restriction to the enjoyment of this right must meet the African Charter 
requirement. For instance, In Monim Elgak, Osman Hummeida and Amir Suliman 
(represented by FIDH and OMCT) v Sudan, the Commission stated that restriction 
of this right must meet article 27 conditions.356 However, individuals do not have 
the absolute right to membership of an association, and as well, associations 
retain the right to create guidelines for its membership and retain the right to 
admit or discontinue an individual’s membership.357  
The right to freedom of association under the African Charter can be 
restricted just as in all the other regional human right instruments.358 As it is 
evident, the grounds for a restriction must meet the article 27 requirement.359 
Article 29 (4) imposes a duty on the individual, which seems to be an exception 
against the forceful membership protection. For instance, it would not be deemed 
a violation of the African Charter rights if an individual is forced into a body for 
the preservation and strengthening of social and national solidarity when 
threatened.360 This entails that an individual may be conscripted into the military 
or other institutions under certain circumstances.  
However, the arbitrary arrest of an individual because of his/her political 
belief or membership of a political party is a violation of the freedom of 
association.361 Presently, some African countries have laws that restrict citizens’ 
right to association. For instance, in Amnesty International, Comité Loosli 
Bachelard, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the 
Episcopal Conference of East Africa v Sudan, the Commission ruled that section 7 
of the Process and Transitional Powers Act, Decree No. 2 of 1989 of Sudan which 
prohibits any assembly for a political purpose in a public or private place, without 
                                       
355 Communication 379/09 – Monim Elgak, Osman Hummeida and Amir Suliman (represented by FIDH and 
OMCT) v Sudan, para 118.  
356 Ibid.  
357 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practices and Institutions (n 15 above) 110.  
358 Article 16 (2) of American Convention; Article 11 (2) of ECHR; and, Article 10 (1) of African Charter.  
359 Monim Elgak, Osman Hummeida and Amir Suliman (represented by FIDH and OMCT) v Sudan. 
360 Article 29 (4) of the African Charter read together with Article 10 (2).  
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special permission, is a violation of the African Charter. It further held that this 
law is disproportionate to the measures it intended to maintain being, public order, 
security, and safety, and thus, a violation of the freedom of association.362 
Similarly, the African Commission in Lawyers of Human Rights v Swaziland held 
that the Proclamation of 1973 which abolishes and prohibits the existence, and 
the formation of political parties or organisations of a similar nature in Swaziland 
is a violation of the freedom of association and the right to assemble freely and 
peacefully.363  
In spite of these rulings, the Commission has adopted a Resolution on the 
Right to Freedom of Association in Africa, and this has acted as a reference point 
in many of its case-law jurisprudence. This Resolution provides an update on some 
of the gaps in the African Charter protection of the right to association. However, 
it is not binding on African Charter state parties.  
3.3.10 Right to freedom of assembly 
The freedom of assembly involves the individual right to come together and 
collectively pursue, express, promote, and defend shared ideas.364 This right 
permits the freedom to assemble peacefully in public places and is often used in 
the context of the right to protest. This right protects one’s right to protest 
peacefully with others and must be enjoyed freely and without coercion.365 
However, the right to assemble freely complements the right to freedom of 
association. Assembly is an ‘intentional and temporary gathering in a private or 
public space for a specific purpose’ and allows individuals to indulge in 
                                       
362 Communication 48/90-50/91-52/91-89/93 - Amnesty International, Comité Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers' 
Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v Sudan. Para. 
82. See also, Communication 212/98 - Amnesty International v Zambia, para 56 and Communication 225/98 -
Huri - Laws v Nigeria. The Commission held differently in these cases that where state interference in freedom 
of association is not proportionate to whatever measures sought to be maintained, such act would be considered 
arbitrary and in violation of this right.  
363 Communication 251/02, para 60; see also Communication 242/01 - Interights, Institute for Human Rights and 
Development in Africa, and Association mauritanienne des droits de l'Homme v Mauritania.  
364 Jeremey McBride, Freedom of Association: The Essentials of Human Rights (Hodder Arnolf, London, 2005) 
18-20. 
365 Article 5 of African Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Association as Pertaining to Civil Society and 
Guidelines on Peaceful Assembly.  
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demonstrations, inside meetings, strikes, processions, rallies or sit-ins.366 Unlike 
some other rights, the right to assemble freely with others is an individual and a 
group right but can only be expressed collectively. Some forms of assembly are 
essential characteristics of democratic government and a medium to express 
satisfaction or otherwise of view, policies or system of governance within society. 
A peaceful assembly encompasses a temporary gathering without riot, use of arms 
or chaos. In an event where an individual or small group of bad actors are 
involved, such person or groups should be removed rather than break up the 
assembly.367  
 The right to freedom of assembly is fused with the right to freedom of 
association under the ECHR and UDHR. The African Charter enshrines this as an 
independent right, just as ICCPR. Article 11 of the African Charter provides that 
‘every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise 
of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law, in 
particular, those enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, 
ethics and rights and freedoms of others’. The African Charter language is similar 
to article 21 ICCPR to the extent that the ICCPR included more grounds for 
restriction such as public order and morals.  
The right to freedom of assembly prevents government imposition of lawful 
restrictions by state parties or the use of excessive force by state organs against 
the citizens. For instance, the complainants in Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al v 
Cameroon alleged that the respondent state used excessive force to suppress 
peaceful demonstrators and further arrested and detained several of them for 
participating in what the respondent tagged unlawful political rallies. In its ruling, 
the Commission concluded that the respondent state must guarantee the right to 
assemble which is violated in the instant case.368 This right prohibits the use of 
excessive force by state organs in suppressing demonstration, riot or to break up 
                                       
366 Human Rights Council (A/HRC/20/27), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, at its twentieth session on 21st May, 2012, para 24.  
367 African Commission, ‘Freedom of Association, as Pertaining to Civil Society, and Freedom of Assembly in 
Africa: A Consideration of Selected Cases and Recommendations’ (2014) III.C.2, 26. 
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an assembly except when there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury.369 
Similarly, where a person has been prevented from participating in a meeting with 
other people to discuss human rights issues or is punished by state authorities for 
participating in such meetings, the Commission has found a violation of Article 
11.370  
As noted in article 11, this right can be restricted under certain 
conditions;371 a fact enshrined in other international human rights instruments. 
However, any form of blanket prohibition or interference in relation to time, 
location, or speech content by the state towards the enjoyment of this right is 
prohibited.372 The position is that any interference or restriction must be in 
compliance with the law and must be proportionate, and imposed as a measure 
of last resort.373 Hence, detaining individuals for holding unauthorised meetings in 
the absence of justification by the respondent state in the interest of national 
security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others, is a violation 
of the right to freedom of assembly.374  
The African Commission has adopted a Guidelines on Freedom of 
Association as Pertaining to Civil Society and Guidelines on Peaceful Assembly to 
assist states in the implementation and adoption of legal frameworks on this 
right.375 This Guideline enshrines that freedom of assembly is not a privilege and 
                                       
369 African Commission, ‘Freedom of Association, as Pertaining to Civil Society, and Freedom of Assembly in 
Africa: A Consideration of Selected Cases and Recommendations’ (2014) III.C.2, 26.  
370 Communication 228/99 - Law Offices of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan, para 56-57.  
371 The following conditions are recognised under article 27 of the African Charter, national interest, national 
security, the safety, and rights and freedoms of others.  
372 African Commission, ‘Freedom of Association, as Pertaining to Civil Society, and Freedom of Assembly in 
Africa: A Consideration of Selected Cases and Recommendations’ (2014) III.C.2, 25. See also, Report of the 
Study Group on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, available at > 
http://www.achpr.org/files/special-mechanisms/human-rights-
defenders/report_of_the_study_group_on_freedom_of_association__assembly_in_africa.pdf< accessed 29 
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373 See United Nations Human Rights Council (A/HRC/20/27), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, para 39.  
374 Communication 54/91-61/91-96/93-98/93-164/97_196/97-210/98 - Malawi Africa Association, Amnesty 
International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union interafricaine des droits de l'Homme and RADDHO, Collectif des veuves et 
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thus does not need a state licence or permission for its enjoyment.376 Nonetheless, 
the Amnesty Annual Report on Africa 2016/2017 has alleged that the following 
countries witnessed widespread repression, violence and arbitrary crackdown on 
protests and gatherings; Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Togo and Zimbabwe.377 
3.3.11 Right to freedom of movement and residence 
The right to freedom of movement and residence includes the right to move and 
reside freely within a country for those lawfully within the country and the right to 
enter and leave any country of which you are a citizen.378 This right allows 
individuals to visit, reside and work in other countries. In a human rights treaty 
such as the UDHR, this right is protected under article 13 whereas, under the 
ICCPR, it is protected under articles 12 and 13. For instance, article 13 UDHR 
provides that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence 
within the borders of each country. Everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country’. This right is enshrined in various 
regional human rights instruments as well as AU member states’ constitutions.379 
At the African regional level, article 12 of the African Charter covers the following 
rights; namely, the individual right to freedom of movement and residence within 
a state; the individual right to leave and return to any country; the individual right 
to asylum in any country; and, restriction on the expulsion of non-nationals from 
a country. It is clear that the broad protection under the African Charter is 
exercisable if the person abides by the law.380 To this end, legislation for the 
                                       
376 Article 10 of the Guideline. See also the ruling by the Nigeria Court of Appeal in Inspector-General of Police 
v All Nigeria Peoples Party and others, (Nigeria Court of Appeal, 2007). 
377 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2016/2017: The State of the World’s Human Rights, 
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protection of national security, law, and order, public health or morality can 
restrict the enjoyment of this right.381 
The right to freedom of movement applies to nationals, non-nationals, and 
even aliens who are resident of any state party.382 Regardless, an alien’s right to 
enter, reside or remain in another country is determinant on the laws of the 
receiving country as well as international conventions. But in contrast with the 
American Convention and the ICCPR,383 the African charter failed to outlaw the 
expulsion of citizens from their state of origin. This omission can be said to be 
strange given that many African leaders have over time expelled their citizens for 
holding contrary views which invariably renders such individuals stateless. For 
example, the African Commission in both John D Ouko v Kenya384 and Sudan 
Human Rights Organization and Center on Housing Rights and Evictions v Sudan385 
ruled that respondent states violated article 12 in circumstances where 
complainants fled their respective countries of nationality because of harassment, 
persecution, and threats by government agents. This line of reasoning was again 
followed in Monim Elgak, Osman Hummeida and Amir Suliman (represented by 
FIDH and OMCT) v Sudan where the complainant alleged that they were forced to 
flee their country of nationality due to constant harassment, intimidation, as well 
as the fear of inhuman and degrading treatment, should they return to Sudan. In 
this case, the Commission ruled that because the anticipated fear based on 
previous experience prevented them from residing in Sudan, the respondent 
violates article 12 (1) of the Charter.386  
Unlike the Inter-American Convention and the UDHR, the African Charter 
explicitly prohibits mass expulsion of non-nationals from a country.387 The 
American Convention provides protection against deportation where the right to 
                                       
381 Article 12 (2) of the African Charter.  
382 Article 12 (3) and (4) of the African Charter. 
383 Article 22 of American Convention; Article 12 (4) of ICCPR.  
384 Communication 232/99.  
385 Communication 279/05 – 296/05. 
386 Communication 379/09, para 123 and 126. 
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life or personal freedom of an alien is in danger of being violated on the grounds 
of race, nationality, religion, political opinion and social status.388 This provision 
implies that some rights enshrined in the Convention must be guaranteed by the 
demanding state before deportation or expulsion can be allowed. This approach 
creates a human rights duty on the demanding state and a legal assurance that 
the deportee would not have his rights infringed on any of the discriminatory 
grounds. On its part, article 12 of the African Charter lacks such guarantee and 
protection concerning the movement of non-nationals.  
Despite the express international human rights protection on the right to 
leave any country including his own, and to return to his country, Article 12 (2) 
emphasises the need for regulations from both domestic laws and international 
conventions.389 For instance, in Monim Elgak, Osman Hummeida and Amir Suliman 
(represented by FIDH and OMCT) v Sudan, the Commission made it clear that Mr 
Monim Elgak and Mr Amir Osman have the right to return to their country except 
if the respondent state shows that their return will pose a danger to national 
security, law and order or public health or morality.390 However, suggesting that 
article 27 exception can justify state party refusal for someone to return to his/her 
country invariably has the potential to make such a person a refugee in another 
country or even stateless, without nationality.  
However, the decision as to who is permitted to remain in a country is a 
function of the competent authorities of that country and should be reached after 
careful and just legal procedures, and with due regard to the international norms 
and standards.391 Indeed, measures short of the standards and norms provided in 
the African Charter is unacceptable and a violation of Article 12 (4).392 Given these 
principles, the expulsion of a non-national because of the expression of political 
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opinion has been found to violate article 12 of the African Charter.393 This is 
because expression by any individual, whether a national or non-national of the 
state, is not a ground for which this right can be restricted. On the other hand, 
the Commission in Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Institute for Human 
Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v 
Zimbabwe, held that deportation could only be legal and in accordance with the 
law when due process of law for the protection of rights have been accorded to 
the victims of deportation.394 It further held that inhuman treatment and 
degrading treatment of deportees during the process of deportation amounts to 
non-compliance with international law and standards and a violation of Article 
12.395  
Generally, under articles 12 (4) and (5) the expulsion of non-nationals must 
not be based on national, racial, ethnic or religious grounds. In Institute for Human 
Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) 
v Guinea, the Commission defined mass expulsion as that which targets national, 
racial, ethnic or religious groups as a whole.396 Despite this protection under the 
African Charter, however, African states still expel non-nationals based on 
ethnicity, race, and religion.397  
3.3.12 Right to participate freely in the government of one’s country  
The right to participate freely in the government is shaped by the objective to get 
individuals involved in decision-making which affects their interest. Its foundation 
is based on the idea that everyone enjoys the opportunity to participate in creating 
a society which in turn fulfils one's interest.398 Indeed, this right is protected in 
various instruments. For instance, while article 21 UDHR and article 25 ICCPR 
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394 Communication 294/04 - Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Institute for Human Rights and 
Development in Africa (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v Zimbabwe, para 116.  
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adopted the similar language as well as protection of three branches of this 
right,399 the HRC General Comment No. 25 emphasised that state parties have a 
duty to anyone entitled to vote or be elected are able to exercise this right. On 
the other hand, article 23 American Convention, article 3 First Protocol to ECHR 
and article 13 of the African Charter contain similar protection of this right. For 
instance, while article 13 of the African Charter provides that every citizen shall 
have the right to participate freely in the government of his country either directly 
or through chosen representatives and the right to equal access to the public 
service of the country, every individual shall have equal right of access to public 
property and services, article 20 states that ‘they shall freely determine their 
political status…’. Furthermore, the language of the American Convention can be 
said to be more explicit than the African Charter in the protection of this right.400  
The above analysis resonates with the fact that government exclusion has 
been witnessed in many African states at some point in their history through one 
or more of the following; namely, military coups, one-party autocracies, 
dictatorships and monarchies. At present, a few African states are engulfed in 
various political crises or have experienced one form of pre and post-election 
crisis. For instance, while Kenya and Nigeria had in the past experienced pre and 
post-election violence which led to the loss of lives and property, intimidation, and 
abduction of political opponents, Uganda, Algeria and Cameroon have had their 
President in office for more than two decades.  
 This right forms the foundation for a representative democratic process and 
ensures that public affairs and property are genuinely public. This right suggests 
that the electorates own the power which they repose in their representatives in 
various elective positions which guarantee their involvement in the decision-
                                       
399 The rights protected include (a) the right to take part in the government of one’s country; (b) right to equal 
access to public service; (c) the right to vote and be elected in a genuine periodic election which will be by 
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making process on policies that affect them. At present, however, there is a 
general move towards democracy across the globe, and this twist has increased 
international support and observation of elections in various UN member states.  
 However, it is noteworthy that article 13 (1) and (2) of the African Charter 
explicitly refers that only citizens can enjoy the right to freely participate in 
government and access to the public service of a country. This implies that 
domestic laws may put some limits on the way elections are held, age, capacity, 
or decide the electoral system for citizens to enjoy this right to vote and be voted 
for, and the right of access to public services of a country. For example, section 
65 of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria stipulates that a person shall be qualified 
for election as a member of (a) the Senate, if he is a citizen of Nigeria and has 
attained the age of 35 years; and (b) the House of Representatives, if he is a 
citizen of Nigeria and has attained the age of 30 years. Likewise, article 25 ICCPR 
suggest that citizens will, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 
and without unreasonable restrictions, enjoy the right provided in article 25. 
However, the ICCPR language suggests that this right is absolute and should never 
be unreasonably restricted.  
 As noted in article 13 of the African Charter and other regional instruments, 
the enjoyment of this right must be in accordance with the provision of the law; 
thus, not absolute. However, such limiting national laws must not be 
discriminatory or contradict any provisions of the African Charter and more 
especially, article 2.401 For instance, in Purohit and Moore v Gambia the African 
Commission concluded that the rights specified under article 13 (1) are for every 
citizen and any denial thereto can only be justified by reason of legal incapacity 
or non-citizenship but not mental incapacity.402 Likewise, the African Court in 
Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend 
Christopher R. Mtikila v United Republic of Tanzania agreed that the Eleventh 
Constitutional Amendment passed by the Tanzanian National Assembly on 2 
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December 1994 and assented to by the President of the United Republic of 
Tanzania on 17 January 1995, which bars 32 candidates from contesting 
Presidential, Parliamentary as well as Local Government elections as independent 
candidates violates the right to participate in public or government affairs in one’s 
country.403  
Nevertheless, virtually all international human rights instruments seem to 
agree that elections are the most acceptable means to guarantee the protection 
of the right to participation in government.404 In this regard, it can be argued that 
any change of government that lacks free participation of people in process and 
outcome is a violation of this right.405 Despite the recognition of this right in the 
African Charter, many African states are lagging in guaranteeing genuine periodic 
elections. For instance, the Court has found a violation of Article 13 in Actions Pour 
la Protection des Droits de L’homme (APDH) v Republic of Cote d’Ivoire because 
the respondent state violated its commitment to establish an independent and 
impartial electoral body.406 Similarly, in Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, the 
Commission has found a violation of article 13 (1) right because the respondent 
state annulled the results of a general election without reasonable grounds. In this 
case, the Commission stated that the inevitable consequence of the right to 
participate in government is that the results of the free expression of the will of 
the voters are respected.407  
3.3.13 Right to property  
The right to property guarantees an individual’s right to own property or 
possessions such as patents, houses, land, shares, leases, pensions, money and 
objects. The right to property, as a traditional fundamental right in democratic 
                                       
403 App. Nos. 009 and 011/2011. Similar decisions have been reached in Communication 251/02 - Lawyers of 
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and liberal societies, is guaranteed in international human rights instruments as 
well as national constitutions.408 For instance, while article 17 UDHR stipulates that 
‘everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property’, the ICCPR did not recognise 
this right.409  
The regional instruments recognise the right to property to varying degrees. 
A right to property is not explicitly stipulated in the ECHR but recognised in 
Protocol 1, article 1 to ECHR as an entitlement to natural and legal persons and 
no one shall be deprived of this right except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international 
law. This article further gives states the right to enforce such laws to control the 
use of property in accordance with a general interest or to secure the payment of 
taxes. On the African continent, article 14 of the African Charter protects the right 
to property by stipulating ‘the right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only 
be infringed upon in the interest of public need or the general interest of the 
community and accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws’. While article 
21 (1) of the African Charter recognises the right of all peoples to dispose of their 
wealth and natural resources freely, article 21 (2) states that ‘in case of spoliation 
the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property 
as well as to adequate compensation’. However, article 21 of the American 
Convention is more explicit and is unique by including the right to just 
compensation and prohibition of usury and other exploitation.  
 Although the object of this right consists of property already owned or to 
be owned by a person through lawful means, all the regional instruments are 
explicit that this right may be legally curtailed. Such restriction must comply with 
                                       
408 Communications 71/92 - Rencontre africaine pour la défense des droits de l'Homme v Zambia; Communication 
292/2004 - Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Republic of Angola; and, Communication 
159/1996 - Union interafricaine des droits de l’Homme, Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de 
l’Homme and Others v Angola.  
409 The absence of this right in ICCPR is due to controversy about the definition and scope of the right such as 
who is to enjoy property right (natural person or corporation) and types of property to be protected. See generally, 
Curtis Doebbler, Introduction to International Human Rights Law (CD Publishing, 2006) 3-7.  
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reasons stipulated in these instruments or by the general principles of 
international law. Under this circumstance, forced eviction and state destruction 
of property would amount to a violation of article 14. For example, the African 
Commission in Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan found a violation of article 14 where a complainant 
alleged forced evictions and destruction of houses and property by military forces 
and armed groups in the Darfur region of Sudan.410  
To enjoy this right, therefore, it is immaterial whether the victim holds a 
legal title to the property or not. What is relevant is evidence to show that such a 
victim has been deprived of the use of their property under conditions which are 
not permitted by article 14.411 In Malawi African Association and Others v 
Mauritania, the African Commission considered land property for individual 
enjoyment under the Charter412 and further agreed that the individual’s right to 
property includes the right to have access to one’s property, the right not to have 
this property invaded and encroached upon, and the right to undisturbed 
possession, use and control of that property by the owner.413  
From the preceding, removal of people from their homes and encroachment 
thereto is a violation of the right to property if the respondent state fails to prove 
the exceptions to the enjoyment of this right. This was the decision in Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya where the Africa Commission ruled that the 
government’s encroachment and takeover of the native land of the Endorois 
                                       
410 Communication 279/03-296/05, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan, para 193 and 194. 
411 Ibid, para 205.  
412 Communication 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97, 196/97 and 210/98, para 128. 
413 Communication 155/96 - Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and 
Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, para. 62; Communication 225/98 - Huri - Laws v Nigeria, para. 52-54; 
Communication 373/09 - INTERIGHTS, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, and Association 
Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme vs. Mauritania, para 44. 
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people is not proportionate to any public need and not in accordance with national 
and international law.414  
This takes us to the question of who can be the owner of a property. Though 
the explanation is not included in the African Charter, the case law jurisprudence 
shows that this right can be enjoyed individually and collectively.415 For example, 
it was found in Dino Noca v Democratic Republic of Congo that Congo violated 
Noca’s right to property when it used its national law to deprive him of his property 
because he is not a citizen of DRC. In this case, Noca, an Italian national, alleged 
that his property was stolen under the pretext of the execution of presidential 
measures referred to as economic measures based on the Congolese law of 2 July 
1974 concerning the abandoned or undeveloped property and other assets 
acquired by the state under the law.416 It was further noted in this case that the 
right to ownership of property imposes a duty on states to protect the holders 
through legislation and the provision of remedies.417 In a similar communication, 
the Commission found a violation of the right to property where confiscation and 
looting of the property of black Mauritanians and the expropriation or destruction 
of their land and houses were allegedly carried out by state agents and majority 
non-black Mauritanians.418 
However, a property can be owned by a non-juristic body. Although this 
position is not explicitly enshrined in the African Charter, the Commission in 
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v 
Zimbabwe ruled that state confiscation of the Complainants’ equipment because 
of a new media law - Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) 
enacted in 2002 by the Respondent State, deprived them of a source of income 
                                       
414 Communication 276/03 - Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on 
behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya, para 238. 
415 Communication no 97/93 - John K. Modise v Botswana, par. 94.  
416 Communication 286 /2004 – Dino Noca vs Democratic Republic of the Congo, para 158. 
417 Ibid, para 162. 
418 Communication 54/91-61/91-96/93-98/93-164/97-196/97-210/98 - Malawi Africa Association, Amnesty 
International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union interafricaine des droits de l'Homme and RADDHO, Collectif des veuves et 
ayants-Droit, Association mauritanienne des droits de l'Homme v Mauritania, para 128. 
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and livelihood and thus was a violation of their right to property guaranteed under 
Article 14.419  
3.4 The complementing African Commission resolutions, principles and 
guidelines accompanying the African Charter  
The previous section demonstrates that normative provisions of the African 
Charter relating to civil and political rights are literally not as expanded as the 
ICCPR. To cover these normative gaps, African Charter rights are often 
complemented by resolutions, principles and guidelines adopted by the African 
Commission. Therefore, this section examines whether these resolutions, 
principles and guidelines have influenced the realisation of civil and political rights 
in the region and whether they enjoy the binding force of law on member states. 
Arguably, the complementing resolutions, principles and guidelines accompanying 
the African Charter provide useful guidance on the efforts made by the African 
Commission in closing the African Charter normative gaps given that the African 
Commission often refer to them in its case law and interpretation of the African 
Charter provisions. On the other hand, it is worthy of mention that these 
complementing resolutions, principles and guidelines are developed in accordance 
with article 45 (1) (b) which empowers the African Commission to formulate and 
lay down principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human 
and peoples’ rights and fundamental freedoms.  
3.4.1 African Commission Declaration of Principles on Freedom of 
Expression in Africa 
At the regional level, the right to freedom of expression is enshrined in article 9 
of the African Charter. Conversely, the right to freedom of expression under article 
9 of the African Charter is not as expansive, exhaustive and adequate as the ICCPR 
and ECHR provisions. The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in 
Africa was drafted to accompany and complement the African Charter protection 
of this right. For instance, it shows dissatisfaction by the African Commission in 
                                       
419 Communication 284/03, para 179. 
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the normative provision of the African Charter relating to the right to freedom of 
expression. Arguably, the right to freedom of expression was not understood at 
the time of the African Charter enactment because many African states were 
undemocratic and would not want a free press or any means for transparency and 
accountability. If indeed freedom to the right to expression provision under article 
9 were seen as adequate, then there would have been no need for a 
complementing declaration to elaborate on the means of dissemination and other 
principles of this right.  
 Indeed, the significance of this declaration is varied. First, it re-emphasised 
the relevance of free press and the right to freedom of expression to a nation and 
the enjoyment of other human rights. Furthermore, it recognises vast activities 
that underline the objectives of this declaration such as diversity, interference with 
freedom of expression, freedom of information, private broadcasting, public 
broadcasting, regulatory bodies for broadcasting and telecommunications, 
promoting professionalism, attacks on media practitioners, protection of sources 
and other journalistic material amongst others. This shows that this declaration 
offers an enhanced legal document on the enjoyment of the right to freedom of 
expression. However, this declaration did not explicitly state if its provisions are 
legally binding on state parties; instead, it urges state parties to make efforts to 
give practical effect to its principles. Therefore, the conclusion that may be drawn 
from this declaration is that although it provides a comprehensive guarantee of 
the enjoyment of freedom of expression, it is not legally binding on state parties 
despite the African Commission citation of it in the interpretation of the right to 
freedom of expression.  
3.4.2 African Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Association and 
Assembly in Africa  
The Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa provide 
authoritative guidance to state parties to ensure that domestic law, policy and 
practice conform to regional and international standards. The guidelines, adopted 
in 2017, provide a monitoring and accountability tool to NGOs and guidance to 
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state parties on legislative protection and the practical implementation of the right 
to freedom of association and assembly. As a guideline, it is not binding on state 
parties; however, the African Commission urges state parties to refer to it in 
enacting, amending or reviewing domestic laws, national policies and practices 
that relate to the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association and assembly. 
From the preceding, it is submitted that the relevance of these guidelines is to 
guide states in the amendment or enactment of policies and legislation relating to 
the freedom of association and assembly.  
 Unlike the other resolutions of the African Commission, this guideline 
responds to restrictive national laws by providing state parties with an 
authoritative understanding of how to give effect to the right to freedom of 
association and assembly under the African Charter and other international human 
rights instruments. Therefore, while it is clear that this guideline is an expression 
of the African Commission concern on state party restriction of article 10 and 11 
of the African Charter, it further acknowledged some of the principles of these 
rights which were omitted in the African Charter such as the right to form and join 
trade unions. In addition, this guideline put forward a definition of association and 
assembly and further provided ten fundamental principles that guide the 
interpretation of the right to association and assembly. The impact of this 
definition would clarify state parties’ relationship with groups and unions to ensure 
the enforcement of the right to freedom of association and assembly.  
One crucial factor about this guideline is that it is exhaustive and 
comprehensive in areas concerning formation, administration, purpose and 
activities, oversight, financing, limitation, notification, reporting, sanctions and 
remedies of article 10 and 11 of the African Charter. For example, it prohibits 
some practical realities in state parties such as state imposition of criminal 
sanctions in the context of law governing assemblies. This is because the position 
put forward in this guideline would indeed make a difference where a state party 
considers realising the effective enforcement of the right to freedom of association 
and assembly. However, it is submitted that the enjoyment of the right to freedom 
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of association and assembly is unpleasant in many African countries. This is 
because many African governments are uncomfortable when criticised or 
challenged, thereby resulting in the use of inappropriate force to suppress 
opponents, protests and union activities.420 
3.4.3 African Commission Resolution Urging States to Envisage a 
Moratorium on Death Penalty  
At the outset, the right to life covered in article 4 of the African Charter does not 
abolish the death penalty. In addition, the normative provision of article 4 is brief 
in scope as well as marred with uncertainty as to its absoluteness. Consequently, 
many state parties have national legislation that bears the death penalty as a 
punishment for certain serious offences. Considering this position in many African 
countries as well as the position in ECHR and the Second Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR, the African Commission has remained consistent in its call for the abolition 
of the death penalty. Emphatically, while Benin and fourteen other African 
countries have abolished the death penalty,421 five African countries applied the 
death penalty in 2018.422  
It is clear from the provision of article 4 that the drafters of the African 
Charter did not envisage the right to life to be absolute. Indeed, this position was 
reaffirmed in the resolution urging states to envisage a moratorium on the death 
penalty because it explicitly did not abolish or condemn the death penalty in state 
parties. If the position of this resolution were firm in abolishing the death penalty, 
the Commission and the Court would interpret their complaints involving the legal 
sentence to death as a violation of the African Charter rather than making a 
                                       
420 Between January and June 2019 alone, the government of Nigeria, Sudan and Benin have supressed many 
peaceful demonstrations; thus, leading to the death, detention and torture of many peaceful protesters. 
421 The countries include Cape Verde Island, Djibouti, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Madagascar, Angola, Gabon, Togo, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, and Liberia. However, 
Liberia reintroduced the death penalty for offences of armed robbery, terrorism, and hijacking in 2008.   
422 The five countries are Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Botswana. See, africanews, ‘Five African 
countries applied death penalty in 2018- Amnesty Report’ available at > 
https://www.africanews.com/2019/04/11/five-african-countries-applied-death-penalty-in-2018-amnesty-
report//< accessed 27 May 2019.  
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request for states to consider a moratorium on the death penalty.423 Indeed, the 
resolution urging states to envisage a moratorium on the death penalty is a 
request by the African Commission on states that still maintain the death penalty 
to either ensure that accused persons in a trial to which the death penalty is a 
punishment are fairly tried or establish a moratorium on executions with a view 
to abolishing the death penalty. Therefore, it is neither explicitly mandating state 
parties to abolish the death penalty nor enjoying the binding force of law on African 
Charter state parties.  
 Since this resolution requests that state parties to the African Charter ratify 
the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death 
penalty; the African Commission has assumed a weak position to abolish the death 
penalty legally. This is because the African Court could rely on the Second Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR to make binding orders against violating state parties. In 
conclusion, the hope of the African Commission that state parties ratify and 
enforce the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR seems the only available legally 
binding mechanism in the region. Therefore, the conclusion that may be drawn 
from the resolution urging states to envisage a moratorium on the death penalty 
is that it did not sufficiently clarify Africa’s position on issues of the death penalty.  
3.4.4 African Commission Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair 
Trial 
The African Commission resolution on the right to recourse and a fair trial provide 
more comprehensive guidance on the right to a fair trial. Contrasted with the 
provision of the African Charter, this resolution covered some of the African 
Charter omitted principles of a fair trial such as the right to an interpreter and the 
right to be informed at the time of arrest in a language which one understands of 
the reason for the arrest. Although the protection of the right to a fair trial under 
article 7 is not exhaustive and well defined like article 14 ICCPR, this recognition 
                                       
423 For instance, see the following African Court decisions- App No 001/2015-Armand Guehi v Tanzania; App. 
No. 007/2015- Ally Rajabu v Tanzania; App. No. 017/2016 Deogratius Nicolaus Jeshi v Tanzania; App. No. 
018/2016- Cosma Faustine v Tanzania. In all these cases, Tanzania responded to the African Court that it would 
not implement its order not to execute the applicants because its domestic laws recognise the death penalty.  
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of omitted rights in this resolution shows that the African Commission understands 
the need for comprehensive fair trial principles to effective enforcement of civil 
and political rights. 
 The consequences of human right omissions in the African Charter is that 
individuals cannot rely on the African Charter alone in proceedings that involve 
the violations of omitted rights. In other words, the Commission must refer to 
other international human rights instruments where the subject matter of the 
violation relates to omitted principles of fair hearing. Interestingly, however, the 
resolution on the right to recourse and a fair trial proceeded to list fair trial 
principles whether covered by article 7 of the African Charter or not. In particular, 
it provided for the right to appeal, the right to be tried within a reasonable time, 
the presumption of innocence, the right to adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of a defence and to communicate in confidence with counsel of choice, 
equality before the courts and the right to have the cause heard. In addition, the 
above resolution urges state parties to create awareness of the accessibility of the 
recourse procedure and to provide the needy with legal aid. Indeed, this resolution 
demonstrates that this right is a cornerstone to the enjoyment of several other 
rights; thereby, it should be clarified and elaborated. This resolution provides 
better guidance on the protection of the right to a fair trial under article 7 of the 
African Charter.  
3.4.5 African Commission Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the 
Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Robben Island Guidelines) in Africa 
The Robben Island Guidelines provided better guidance on the normative 
protection of the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in human beings and 
the prohibition of exploitation and degradation of man. The overall goal of this 
Guideline in relation to article 5 of the African Charter shows that the African 
Commission can play a role in combating torture in Africa and provide a framework 
that national actors can refer to in realising effective enforcement of the 
prohibition of torture. In addition, the Robben Island Guidelines take a different 
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approach from the above-discussed resolutions and guidelines by establishing a 
follow-up committee to promote the implementation of the Guidelines and help 
the African Commission deal effectively with the question of torture and inhuman 
treatment.424  
A crucial position in the Robben Island Guidelines that makes it 
comprehensible is that its implementation requires a progressive and methodical 
approach.425 The Robben Island Guidelines agree that torture is a prevalent 
phenomenon despite the progress made at the international level by establishing 
institutions such as the International Criminal Court and legal frameworks such as 
the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. One would have thought that the Robben 
Guidelines enjoy the binding force of law given that its self-executing nature and 
the flagrant reality of torture in many African states. However, the prohibition of 
torture has been assumed to be part of international customary law applicable to 
UN member states, and it is contemporarily linked to the absolute respect for 
human dignity.426 Equally important, the Commission continues to interpret article 
5 of the African Charter as an absolute prohibited right. For instance, in Thomas 
Kwoyelo v Uganda, the African Commission asserted that an absolute prohibition 
of torture applies at all times and in any place whatsoever.427  
In the same way, the African Commission in interpreting the article 5 
provision has over time reiterated the position in the Robben Island Guidelines. 
For instance, the African Commission in Gabriel Shumba v Zimbabwe further 
reiterated that the Guidelines deal with three broad issues: namely prohibition of 
torture, prevention of torture, and responding to the needs of victims of torture.428 
Emphatically, the African Commission seized the opportunity in this case to 
                                       
424 The Committee for the Prevention of Torture in Africa implements the Robben Island Guidelines.  
425 Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero and Patrick Lessene, Robben Island Guidelines for the Prohibition and Prevention 
of Torture in Africa: Practical Guide for Implementation (2008) available at > http://www.achpr.org/files/special-
mechanisms/cpta/rig_practical_use_book.pdf< accessed 27 May 2019.    
426 Ibid, pg 7. 
427 Communication 431/12, para 201. 
428 Communication 288/04, para 146.  
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reference one of the goals of the Robben Island Guidelines which is recommending 
state parties’ ratification of all regional and international instruments prohibiting 
torture.429 It follows that the context of the Robben Island Guidelines meets the 
worldview on the prohibition of torture and this makes it a useful tool to both 
regional and national efforts in preventing and prohibiting torture as well as 
providing legal support for victims of torture. However, until the useful input in 
the Robben Island Guidelines is incorporated into the African Charter, they are not 
binding on state parties.   
3.5 Conclusion 
The African Charter has been attributed as an extraordinary and powerful 
instrument of liberalisation, and an unprecedented event in the history of Africa.430 
As suggested in the introduction, the African Charter offers a number of key 
insights. It indicates that the African Charter norms are wanting in depth and 
consistency with existing human rights instruments. In its practice, the African 
Charter institutions have fluctuated between a rigid interpretation of the norms 
and judicial activism that may be necessary to cover the normative shortcomings 
in the African Charter. The main argument here is not that the African Charter has 
not contributed tremendously to the regional human rights discourse despite its 
normative shortcomings. To this end, it has been shown that reforms to the African 
Charter norms can foundationally rely on the interpretation afforded by the 
regional institutions. This is because the direction of the interpretations of the 
Charter provisions and the complementing documents accompanying the African 
Charter is correcting some of the normative shortcomings of the Charter. Given 
such circumstances, there is a need for state parties to allow amendment of the 
African Charter to attune some of its provisions to meet international human rights 
standards. When this is agreed, any amendment to the African Charter may 
consider enshrining certain civil and political rights as non-derogable rights as 
evident in the ICCPR, ECHR and the American Convention. 
                                       
429 Ibid, para 147.  
430 Keba Mbaye and Birame Ndiaye, ‘The Organisation of African Unity’ in Karel Visak and Philip Alston (eds), 
The International Dimension of Human Rights (2nd edn, Greenwood Press, 1982) 583. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF AFRICAN CHARTER CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS  
4.0. Introduction  
The previous chapter examined the normative framework of the African Charter 
and demonstrated that the African Charter civil and political rights norms are not 
entirely adequate when contrasted with the ICCPR and other regional human 
rights treaties. Even with the inadequacies of the normative provisions, the 
previous chapter has shown that African Charter norms have enjoyed substantial 
interpretation at the African Court and African Commission. Therefore, this chapter 
seeks to highlight and analyse the relevant political and institutional frameworks 
involved in the enforcement of the African Charter norms. In particular, the 
political and institutional frameworks involved in the protection of the African 
Charter are principally the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU, now, Africa Union), 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) and 
the African Court on Humana Peoples’ Rights (African Court). These organs play 
crucial roles in realising the effective enforcement of civil and political rights 
according to the provisions and dictates of the African Charter and the Court 
Protocol. This is done in order to examine whether these frameworks are legally 
strengthened to enforce civil and political rights adequately.  
4.1 Human rights protection in Africa: The emergence and role of the 
OAU 
It is, of course, imperative to consider the history and transformation of this 
regional organisation in order to demonstrate whether human rights fall amongst 
its goals and principles and whether such goals, if they exist, are implemented 
and respected. To ascertain whether regional human rights goals and principles 
are implemented and respected, this section further examines the relevant AU 
organs involved in human rights protection and enforcement. In particular, this 
section discusses the emergence, role and position of the OAU (now, AU) in African 
Charter protection. 
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Most African states emerged out of the struggle for control of political and 
economic self-determination from European colonialism,1 which began after the 
implementation of the 1941 Atlantic Conference and Charter.2 Following this 
implementation, a few independent African countries emerged between 1945 and 
1960, perhaps motivating others to adopt the right to self-determination as a 
foundational argument for their liberation.3 One would have thought that the 
human rights foundation that underpinned liberation from European colonisation 
would have influenced emerging states to adhere to other human rights tenets in 
the UDHR.  
Human rights protection in colonised Africa colonies was mostly non-
existent.4 Adequate human rights protection was non-existent in African colonies 
because their colonial countries were interested in political and economic control, 
which conflicts with human rights tenets.5 This is because it would be 
                                       
1 The 1884 Berlin Conference initiated the international guideline for the acquisition of African territories even 
after established European empires, notably: Britain, France and Portugal had already claimed vast areas for 
themselves. This Conference initiated the scramble and provided guidelines that ensured European nations 
avoided warring among themselves because of Africa. Notable European nations that colonised Africa in the 19th 
century are Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain. British colonies included Nigeria, 
Ghana, Togo, Tanzania, Camoroons (part of Cameroon), Swaziland, Uganda, Kenya, amongst others. France 
colonised Gabon, Congo, Comoros, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Niger, and Ivory Coast amongst others. The Spanish 
had Equatorial Guinea and Western Sahara, among others. Portugal had control over Guinea Bissau, Angola, 
Mozambique, Cape Varde, Sao Tome and Principe, and some others. Italy exercised control over Libya, Italian 
Somaliland and Italian Eritrea (part of Somalia and Eritrea). Belgium got Rwanda and Burundi after Germany. 
However, Germany lost its colonies after the First World War to Britain, France and Belgium which included 
colonies such as German Kamerun (now Cameroon and part of Nigeria), German East Africa (now Rwanda, 
Burundi and most of Tanzania), German South West Africa (now Namibia), and German Togoland (now Togo 
and eastern part of Ghana).  
2  The Atlantic Conference and Charter resulted from USA and Britain’s post-war world discussion on 12 February 
1941 between British Prime Minister Churchill and USA President Roosevelt, which included provisions for the 
autonomy of imperial colonies. Thereafter, pressure from USA and African elites after World War 2 on imperialist 
nations and in particular, Britain, to abide by this Charter resulted in the independence of individual African States. 
For example: Nigeria got her independence on October 1, 1960; Ghana, March 6, 1957; Morocco, April 7, 1956; 
Tunisia, March 20, 1956; Mali, June 20 1960; Burkina Faso, August 5 1960; Swaziland, September 6 1968; 
Angola, November 11 1975; Eritrea, May 24 1993. For general information of dates of independence, see African 
Union Member States Profile, available at > https://au.int/memberstates<  accessed 18 March 2019.  
3 Makau Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights System: A Critical Evaluation’ (2000) available at > 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mutua.pdf< accessed on 18 March 2019.  
4 John Oloka-Onyango, ‘Human Rights and Sustainable Development in Contemporary Africa: A New Dawn, or 
Retreating Horizons?’ (2000) 6 Buffalo Human Rights Review, 4. 
5 Ibid.  
182 
 
 
conventionally difficult for colonial countries to assert such economic and political 
control and at the same time, respect human rights values.  
However, the emergence of independent African countries transferred 
leadership responsibilities to indigenous Africans; thereby, placing the region on 
a new era and path. The responsibilities include human rights protection in their 
respective countries, creating a regional organisation, and eradicating colonisation 
and apartheid. However, while these leaders seriously pursued other goals, such 
as creating a regional organisation and eradicating colonialism and apartheid, 
African leaders failed to make human rights a priority in the region. For example, 
soon after the independence of many countries in the 1960s, the newly 
independent countries proceeded with discussions to form a regional body. 
Although it is agreed that a regional organisation was essential, one would have 
expected human rights to be part of its main objectives and purpose to give 
succour and dignity to the battered peoples’ of Africa having moved from slavery 
to colonisation.  
Nevertheless, the formation of the regional organisation was as a result of 
regional events and conferences aimed at liberating colonised African countries.6 
For example, at the 1958 All African People Conference held in Accra, Ghana, 
initiated by President Kwame Nkrumah and attended by all independent African 
states: Libya, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, United Republic of Egypt 
and Ghana, African leaders strongly condemned various forms of racial and 
discriminatory laws and practices going on in many colonised African states. In 
particular, the agenda of this conference was centred on anti-colonialism, anti-
imperialism, anti-racialism, African unity, and non-alignment.7 African countries 
resolved that the idea of colonisation in the African region is unacceptable and 
urged the liberated countries to rally support for the decolonisation of the 
                                       
6 Rachel Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From OAU to AU (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 2. These 
conferences also condemned human rights violations within the continent. 
7 Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 
1787 (Routledge, London, 2003) 143; see generally, All African Conference 1958’, available at > 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/all-african-people-conference-held-accra-ghana< accessed 03 January 
2019.  
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remaining African colonies. However, this conference also made little reference to 
human rights respect apart from an emphasis of the right to self-determination.   
The preceding position was reiterated in another conference of nine 
independent states held in Monrovia to discuss the Algerian provisional 
government situation in 1959.8 The success of this conference gave rise to more 
discussions in the 1960s which reinvigorated pursuit of a non-violent revolution 
for the independence of colonised African states and the creation of the OAU as a 
talking shop for Africa.9 By 1961, the 1961 Pan-African Conference held again in 
Monrovia recommended the establishment of an Organisation of African and 
Malagasy States10, which later resulted in the adoption of the OAU in 1963.11 The 
emergence of OAU gave African countries a common front to articulate regional 
issues and collaborate with international communities. Above all, it provided a 
regional platform to discuss and agree on the regional human rights system.   
 The emergence of the OAU presented an opportunity for Africa to guarantee 
human rights protection. However, the only mention of human rights in the OAU 
Charter relates to respect of UDHR as one of OAU’s purposes.12 Whether the 
mention of UDHR was enough to guarantee human rights protection in new African 
countries depended on how the OAU pursues its objectives and purposes. 
However, Young-Anawaty13 and Mangu14 argued that the OAU showed less 
concern for human rights protection. This is because OAU’s core human rights 
                                       
8 The nine independent states that participated are Libya, Sudan, Liberia, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Ghana, 
Morocco and United Arab Republic.  
9 Rachel Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From OAU to AU, (n 6 above) 2.  
10 Taslim Elias, ’The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity’ (1965) 59 American Journal of International 
Law, 243. 
11 Charter of the OAU, adopted 25 May 1963, 47 UNTS 39; 2 ILM (1963) 766. Twenty-two of twenty-seven 
independent African states attended the 1961 conference. It is imperative to note that many African states regained 
their independence in the 1960s while several others did not get their independence until the 1970s and even up 
to the 1990s. For instance, South Africa-1994, Zimbabwe-1980, Guinea Bissau-1974, Eritrea-1993, and Angola-
1975. 
12 Article II (1) (e) of OAU Charter. 
13 Amy Young-Anawaty, ‘Human Rights and the ACP-EEC Lomé II Convention’, (1980) 13 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Policy 63. 
14 Andre Mangu, The road to Constitutionalism and Democracy in Post-Colonial Africa: The case of Democratic 
Republic of Congo (PHD Thesis, Department of Constitutional and Public International Law, University of South 
Africa, June 2002) 262.  
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focus merely emphasised the principle of the self-determination of colonised 
African countries and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.15 The lesson 
that may be gleaned from the above is that while the OAU vigorously pursued the 
ultimate goal to liberate colonised African states, it failed to show much 
commitment to ensuring UDHR protection in liberated member states.  
The OAU overlooked human rights abuses in liberated member states on its 
strong reliance on the principle of non-interference and sovereignty.16 Although 
the principle of non-interference is a recognised international principle that forbids 
countries from interfering in the internal affairs of another country,17 this concept 
has the potential to reduce acts of aggression by stronger state(s). However, strict 
reliance on this principle would help state parties evade accountability for human 
rights violations and intervention from external bodies. One would agree that such 
strict reliance on the principle of non-interference exacerbated OAU’s stance in 
internal activities of liberated states, thereby giving member states human rights 
obligations a back seat.  
Human rights enjoyed low esteem in some newly independent African 
countries before the adoption of the African Charter. Linked to this is the fact that 
human rights atrocities became worse in countries with authoritarian governments 
                                       
15 Aisha Abdullahi, Statement at the 5th High Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in 
Africa: Trends, Challenges and Prospects, ‘Reflecting, Celebrating and Advancing Human and Peoples’ Rights 
in Africa with a Special Focus on the Rights of Women’ Arusha, Tanzania 23-26 November 2016, available at 
>https://www.au.int/web/en/speeches/statement-he-dr-aisha-l-abdullahi-commissioner-political-affairs-african-
union-commission-1< accessed 26 June 2017.  
16 Article III (3) of OAU Charter. See also, Jeremy Sarkin. ‘The Role of the United Nations, The African Union 
and Africa's Sub-regional Organizations in dealing with Africa's Human Rights Problems: Connecting 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) Journal of African Law 53(1), 1; Henry 
Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International human rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals (3rd 
edn, Oxford University Press, 2008) 1064; Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’(1983) 77 American Journal of International Law, 902; Oji Umozuruike, ‘The Domestic Jurisdiction 
Clause in the OAU Charter’ (1979) 311 African Affairs, 197.  
17 See, article III (3) of OAU Charter. This principle was also reaffirmed in the UN Friendly Relations Declaration 
1970 as follows: ‘no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatsoever, in the internal affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all forms of 
interference or attempted threats against the personality of a state or its political, economic and cultural elements, 
are in violation of international law’. See, Friendly Relations Declaration (UN General Assembly, 1970), available 
at > https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement< accessed 13 August 2016. 
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and internally armed crises.18 For instance, military regimes and coups, internal 
wars and other conflicts became manifest across the continent. Furthermore, 
human rights provisions were absent in some OAU member states constitutions.19 
These practical consequences of OAU’s position indicated why its voice was not 
heard amidst cases of abuse perpetrated by African leaders.20  
 However, the submission that the OAU needed to ensure more human rights 
protection in the region is twofold: on the one hand, many African countries soon 
after independence joined the United Nations (UN) and became signatories to 
some UN human rights instruments such as the UDHR and the ICCPR. This 
implication of becoming state parties to these instruments means that they are 
obliged to ensure the respect of the rights therein enshrined. Secondly, there was 
international and local pressure for African leaders to respect human rights. In 
this sense, the OAU organised myriad conferences which eventually led to the 
emergence and adoption of the African Charter and other human rights related 
instruments.21 For example, the OAU played a dominant role in convincing the UN 
to set up a Liberation Committee against colonialism and apartheid, which was 
used to support internal struggles for independence in South Africa, Angola, 
Namibia, Mozambique, and Guinea.22 Other human rights related instruments 
adopted under the auspices of the OAU include the 1969 Convention on the 
                                       
18 For instance, the 1967-1970 civil war in Nigeria and the numerous military and civilian dictators that governed 
several African states such as Uganda, Chad, Sudan and Mali, from the 1960s. 
19 For instance, 1961 Constitution of Tanzania did not contain any human rights provisions.   
20 Haroub Othman, ‘Africa and the Protection of Rights’ (1995) 6 (1) African Law Review, 51. See Articles 2 and 
3 of OAU Charter. For instance, article 2 (e) of the OAU Charter states that the purpose of the OAU is to ‘promote 
international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights’.  
21 Tiyanjana Maluwa, ‘International law making in the Organisation of Africa Unity: An Overview’ (2000) 12 
African Journal of International Comparative Law, 201. Human rights related treaties and conventions enacted by 
the OAU include OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 1969; African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990; and, the Court Protocol 1998.  
22 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Institutions (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2001)70. 
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Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,23 the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969,24 
and the Grand Bay Declaration of 1999. For instance, one could, however, argue 
that the 1969 Refugee Convention was essential given the several internal political 
conflicts, wars, dictatorial leadership and military coups in many African countries, 
thereby leading to an increase in the number of people seeking refuge and asylum 
from the 1960s. Despite these efforts, human rights protection and enforcement 
under the OAU was inadequate. Therefore, the next opportunity for Africa to clarify 
the scope of its human rights, thereby dealing with the concerns raised against 
the OAU presented itself when African governments embarked on a journey to 
transform the OAU to AU.25 
4.1.2  The transformation of the OAU to AU  
The transformation of the OAU to AU26 presented another opportunity for Africa to 
expand its regional human rights scope. The transformation became possible 
following the African leaders’ official launch of the AU in July 2002 after their 
decision in September 1999 to replace the OAU with a new body in order to realise 
Africa’s potential.27 The emergence of the AU also demonstrates an attempt to 
reposition Africa’s desire to boost international human rights law principles in the 
region.28 A key reason for this is that the OAU Charter did not adequately recognise 
human rights as its principles and objectives. This may have contributed to the 
poor human rights situation in many OAU member states. However, it should be 
noted at the outset that the AU Constitutive Act incorporates a vast number of 
                                       
23 This was done to address the increasing refugee crisis within the region from countries at war and dictatorship 
such as Algerian war 1954-1962; Nigeria civil was 1967-1070; violence in Congo, Rwanda and Burundi; refugees 
from Portuguese-administered Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau; and, Ewe refugees from Ghana, amongst 
many others. See also, Rachel Murray and Amanda Lylyod, ‘Institutions with Responsibility for Human Rights 
Protection under the African Union’ (2004) 48 (2) Journal of African Law, 167.  
24 This Manifesto renewed African leaders’ faith in the equality of all men, human dignity and non-discrimination.  
25 Kindiki Kithure, ‘The Normative and Institutional Framework of the African Union relating to the Protection 
of Human Rights and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: A Critical Appraisal’ (2003) 3 African 
Human Rights Law Journal, 99.  
26 The AU was founded on 26 May 2001. It currently has 55-member States. South Sudan joined the African 
Union in 2011 while Morocco re-joined in January 2017 after 33 years withdrawal from the regional body due to 
the regional body’s recognition of Western Sahara.  
27 African Union, About the African Union, available at > https://au.int/en/overview< accessed 12 April 2019.  
28 Vincent Nmehielle, ‘Development of the African Human Rights System in the Last Decade’ (2004) 11 (3) 
Human Rights Brief, 6. 
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human rights provisions as part of its objectives and principles.29 For example, 
while article 3 (h) recognises the promotion and protection of human rights in 
accordance with the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments, 
article 4 (m) recognises the respect for democratic principles, human rights, the 
rule of law and good governance as part of the cardinal principles of the AU. 
More specific Constitutive Act provisions with human rights connotation 
include the promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic 
development,30 respect for the sanctity of life, condemnation and rejection of 
impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities,31 
promotion of gender equality;32 and, condemnation and rejection of an 
unconstitutional change of governments.33 Furthermore, while article 30 provides 
that any governments that come into power through an unconstitutional means 
shall be suspended from the Union, article 23 further imposes sanctions on 
member states that fail to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union.34 
The implication is that human rights have assumed a more prominent position in 
the operation, purpose and principles of the regional organisation.  
From the foregoing, it is evident that the AU has assumed more in its role 
of ensuring the adequate protection of human rights in the continent. For instance, 
the Constitutive Act empowers the AU to intervene in the internal matters of 
member states in respect of grave circumstances such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.35 In this sense, the AU has over time intervened in 
                                       
29 Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. See, Tiyanjana Maluwa, ‘The Constitutive Act 
of the African Union and Institute Building in Post-Colonial Africa’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 157. 
30 Article 4 (n) of the Constitutive Act. 
31 Article 4 (o) of the Constitutive Act. 
32 Article 4 (I) of the Constitutive Act. 
33 Article 4 (p) of the Constitutive Act.  
34 It is worthy to note that the AU on 25th March 2013 suspended the Central African Republic (CAR) from all 
AU activities. The Central African Republic was readmitted into the AU three years after in 2016, after it 
completed its transitional process and restored its constitution. Sudan was suspended in June 2019 when the 
military failed to hand over power to a civilian government after ousting President Al-Bashir.  
35 Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. See also, Carolyn Martorena, ‘The New African Union: Will it 
Promote Enforcement of the Decisions of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2008/2009) George 
Washington International Law Review, 583.  
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member states’ internal conflicts on the strength of article 4 (h) of the Constitutive 
Act.36 Indeed, such remarkable strides have helped de-escalate internal crises as 
well as reduce potential gross human rights violations. Therefore, it can be argued 
that this position was assumed in order to improve the human rights situations in 
member states.  
However, the transformation of OAU to AU has not entirely erased 
insincerity and lack of political will in condemning gross human rights abuses in 
many states.37 AU member states continue to commit widespread human rights 
abuses with little or no interference from the AU. For example, the recent 
suppression and killing of over one hundred protesters in Sudan following the call 
for a change of government between May and June 2019. Given situations like 
this, Nsongurua had earlier argued that AU human rights commitment is not 
meaningfully different from the OAU.38 Likewise, it is submitted that this argument 
cannot be entirely correct because the AU has made many strides towards 
repositioning human rights in the continent such as strengthening its sanction 
regime in 201839 and the enactment of the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights 2008.40 Without a doubt, the AU has more work 
                                       
36 Some of the states where the AU has interfered are Sudan 2006; CAR 2016; South Sudan 2018; Cote d’Ivoire 
2003, and Somalia 2018. In 2012, the AU suspended Mali following a military coup that ousted President Toure. 
Other countries that have at some point faced suspension include Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, and Madagascar. 
37 See, for instance, the human rights violations committed by several African leaders in recent times. Countries 
where leaders have recently committed widespread abuse without much interference from the AU include South 
Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Benin after the 2019 election. See also, The Guardian, ‘Burundi President threatens 
to fights African Peace keepers’ available at >https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/30/burundi-
president-pierre-nkurunziza-threatens-fight-african-union-peacekeepers< accessed 18 March 2019. For example, 
the threat by President Nkurunziza of Burundi to use state military against AU Peacekeepers amidst serious 
allegation of human rights abuses. 
38 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Can a Leopard change its spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights (2002) 
17 Australian University Law Review, 1177.   
39 African Union, African Union strengthens its sanctions regime for non-payment of dues, available at > 
https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20181127/african-union-strengthens-its-sanction-regime-non-payment-dues< 
accessed 13 April 2019. What the AU has done is that it has agreed to easily impose sanction on state parties 
whenever they fail to meet the regional obligations under the AU Constitutive Act. Whether this will enhance the 
realisation of human rights enforcement depends on the nature of sanctions to be imposed on member states.  
40 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights merges the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights and 
the African Court of justice and will come into force after 15 member states ratification. So far, only 7 African 
states have ratified the Protocol and they are Mali, Liberia, Libya, Gambia, Congo, Burkina Faso, and Benin.  
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to do in ensuring that African states abide by their African Charter obligations and 
be proactive in reducing human rights violation in its member states.41  
4.1.2  Relevant AU organs to human rights protection  
From the outset, it should be recalled that this section is examining the role of the 
regional organisation in realising effective enforcement of African Charter civil and 
political rights. This is necessary in order to illustrate some of the regional 
challenges in the enforcement of African Charter rights and freedoms and to 
determine whether the transformation of the OAU to AU has resolved the entire 
organisational challenges in human rights enforcement. The AU has several organs 
with responsibilities for its key programme areas.42 The organs include the 
Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council of Ministers, Pan African Parliament, 
Commission, Permanent Representative Committee, Peace and Security Council, 
Economic Social and Security Council, and the Judicial and Human Rights 
Institutions comprising of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and the African Committee of 
Experts on Human and Peoples Rights. Many of these organs seem unrelated to 
human rights protection. However, a few AU organs explicitly bear responsibility 
under the African Charter and its Protocol, and they are the Assembly of the Union 
and the Executive Council of Ministers.  
4.1.2.1  AU Assembly  
The Assembly of the Union (former AHSG) is the supreme organ of the AU and is 
composed of Heads of State and Government. The Assembly of the Union plays a 
crucial role in the enforcement of human and peoples’ rights under the African 
Charter and the Court Protocol. For instance, it is involved in consideration of the 
annual reports of the African Commission,43 the follow-up of African Commission 
                                       
41 Magnus Kilander, ‘Human Rights Developments in the African Union during 2014’ (2015) 15 African Human 
Rights Law Journal, 537.  
42 Key programme areas include conflict resolution, peace and security; agricultural development; democracy, 
law and human rights; education, science and technology; and, gender equality and development.  
43 Article 54 of the African Charter. 
190 
 
 
findings,44 the decision concerning publications of African Commission findings,45 
amendment of the African Charter,46 and may request any other human rights 
related task to be performed by the Commission.47 The Constitutive Act gives the 
AU Assembly more human rights enforcement related functions than the Charter 
of the OAU.48 For example, the Assembly can suspend a member state from the 
AU in instances where a government comes into power through unconstitutional 
means49 or impose sanctions for non-compliance with the decisions and policies of 
the Union.50 This implies that if a member state of the AU fails to comply with 
regional responsibilities or allows a change of legitimate government, as was the 
case under the auspices of the OAU, the AU is bound to intervene and use its 
powers to deal with such a state. Furthermore, one would expect that if these 
provisions are adequately implemented, the AU will not compromise on democratic 
tenets as condoned by the OAU in the 1980s and 1990s when military coups were 
rampant in the continent.  
The role of the AU Assembly indicates that neither the African Commission 
nor the African Court can circumvent the position of the AU Assembly if the African 
Charter rights are to be enjoyed in the region. However, the question here is not 
whether the AU Assembly play a crucial role in realising effective human rights 
enforcement but whether it has applied its position to realise effective enforcement 
of human rights in Africa. In answering this question, one would need to analyse 
human rights situations in the region and how the AU has responded. For instance, 
the AU suspended Sudan in June 2019 following the killings of protesters 
demanding that the military should hand over to a civilian government. Although 
the AU is yet to use its position to influence member states compliance with African 
Court and African Commission decisions or request the amendment of the African 
Charter, its late or little interference to stop human rights abuses in member states 
                                       
44 Article 58 of the African Charter. 
45 Article 59 of the African Charter. 
46 Article 68 of the African Charter,  
47 Article 45 (4) of the African Charter.  
48 Vincent Nmehielle, ‘Development of the African Human Rights System in the Last Decade’ (n 28 above). 
49 Article 30 of the Constitutive Act. 
50 Article 23 of the Constitutive Act. 
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is discouraging. Therefore, with widespread human rights abuses still going on in 
many African countries such as CAR, Mali, Somalia, Benin, Cameroon, Burundi, 
Sudan and South Sudan, to mention a few, the AU Assembly cannot be said to 
have clearly applied its powers.  
4.1.2.2  Council of Ministers  
The Executive Council of the African Union comprises ministers designated by the 
governments of member states.51 Although there is no mention of the Council of 
Ministers in the African Charter, the Court Protocol mandates this body to monitor 
the execution of African Court decisions on behalf of the AU Assembly.52 This 
specific role is a complete departure from the approach in the African Charter but 
similar to the European system of monitoring ECtHR decisions. However, the 
fundamental question posed is whether the Council of Ministers has adequate 
enforcement power since it acts on behalf of the AHSG. To answer this question, 
suffice it to add that though state parties have complied with a few African Court 
judgments, there is no evidence of the involvement of the Council of Ministers in 
persuading compliance.53 Therefore, this role has not yielded the expected results 
in human rights enforcement in the region. 
4.2 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Having examined the role of the OAU in African Charter development and 
enforcement, this section will discuss the African Commission, a creation of the 
OAU for African Charter promotion, protection and interpretation. This section 
explores the arguments concerning the role of the African Commission in realising 
effective enforcement of African Charter civil and political rights. In this light, it is, 
of course, essential to consider the uncertainties concerning the mandate of the 
African Commission as well as the special mechanisms that support the African 
Commission to actualise its mandate. Therefore, this section is relevant and 
                                       
51 Article 10 of the AU Constitutive Act.  
52 Article 29 (2) of the AU Constitutive Act. 
53 Executive Council 34th Ordinary Session, Activity Report of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(February 07-08 2019) available at > http://en.african-
court.org/images/Activity%20Reports/Activity%20report%20January%20-%20December%20%202018.pdf< 
accessed 06 May 2019. 
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connected to human rights discussion in Africa because its mandate and structure 
make it a cornerstone to test the regional enforcement of human rights and state 
party voluntary compliance with decisions.  
The African Commission, a body established by the African Charter consists 
of 11 members chosen from amongst African personalities with high reputation, 
morals, integrity, and impartiality and sound knowledge of human and peoples’ 
rights.54 The members of the African Commission serve in their personal capacity55 
for a term of 6 years.56 The Assembly of African Heads of State and Government 
elect the Commissioners by secret ballot from nominees forwarded by State 
Parties, and the Commission will not include more than one national of the same 
country.57 The business of the Commission is carried out during sessions; 
however, while the Ordinary Session is held twice a year, the African Commission 
may meet, if need be, in Extraordinary Sessions.58 This implies that the 
Commission’s seating arrangement is a part-time method. One would have 
thought that being the sole enforcement institution, a full-time seating pattern 
should have been considered given the widespread human rights abuses in many 
African countries at the time of adopting the African Charter.  
Furthermore, the African Commission is a quasi-judicial institution. This is 
because the Commission only has a partly judicial character and in effect cannot 
pronounce a binding decision on parties. The impact of adopting a single quasi-
judicial institution in the absence of a judicial institution is colossal in the efforts 
to carry out its mandate and in its relationship with state parties. For instance, 
this can be construed to form part of the reasons why state parties do not comply 
with its recommendations. Arguably, if the African Charter had intended to 
establish a Commission with a mandate to issue a binding decision, a court would 
                                       
54 Article 30 and 31 of the African Charter. The African Commission was inaugurated on 2nd November 1987.  
55 Article 31 (2) of the African Charter.  
56 Article 36 of the African Charter. 
57 Article 33 of the African Charter. 
58 The first session of the African Commission took place on 2nd November 1987 in Ethiopia while the first 
extraordinary session took place 13-14 June 1989 in The Gambia. In addition, the Commission had held 63 
Ordinary Sessions and 24 Extraordinary Sessions as at November 2018. See generally, the website of the African 
Commission, available at > http://www.achpr.org/sessions/< accessed 23 May 2017.  
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have been unnecessary. Therefore, in Bekker’s view, Africa’s desire for a single 
quasi-judicial human rights institution was primarily to deflect international and 
local pressure and avoid a system that could hold them accountable.59 Whether 
Bekker’s opinion is correct depends on the relationship between the Commission 
and state parties towards realising effective enforcement of African Charter rights.  
It is clear that recognising the Commission in the African Charter as the 
sole enforcement institution exposed some shortcomings in the African human 
rights system.60 Indeed, it exposed that the African Charter enforcement 
arrangement is not perfect. This is because if the region had intended to have an 
effective enforcement system, a judicial institution would have accompanied the 
Commission. However, having an imperfect enforcement arrangement from the 
outset lays a faulty foundation for voluntary state party compliance with African 
Commission recommendations. Significantly, non-compliance with the 
Commission’s decisions makes it meaningless and fruitless for victims as well as 
a complete disservice by states.61 The implication, therefore, is that it reduces the 
advantages of implementation, such as strengthening the protective mandate of 
institutions and impacting on the lives of victims whose rights have been abused.62 
One could, however, question whether the Commission has the opportunity 
to carry out its functions optimally without interference. According to articles 58 
and 59, some of the Commission’s duties are influenced and determined by the 
                                       
59 Gina Bekker, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2013) 13 (3) Human Rights Law 
Review, 499; Gina Bekker, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; Safeguarding the Interest of 
African States’ (2007) 52 Journal of African Law, 151.  
60 Richard Gittleman ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis’ (1982) 22 Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 667; Jean-Bernard Marie ‘Relations between Peoples’ Rights and Human Rights: 
Semantic and Methodological Distinctions, A Comparison and Appraisal’ (1987) 20 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 585; Jack Donnelly ‘Human Rights and Western Liberalism’ in Abdullahi An-Naim and 
Francis Deng (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Cross Cultural Perspectives (Brooking Institution Press, 1990) 31.  
61 Rachel Murray and Elizabeth Mottershaw, ‘Mechanisms for the Implementations of decisions of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2014) 36 (2) Human Rights Quarterly, 349. 
62 See generally, ‘Statement on the implementation of the decision of the Africa Commission 292/04 IHRDA v 
Angola’ available at > https://www.ihrda.org/2016/04/ihrdas-statement-on-implementation-of-the-african-
commissions-decision-in-communication-29204-ihra-angola-58th-ordinary-session-of-the-commission/< 
accessed on 18 June 2019. 
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AHSG.63 The impact of such interference had at some point reduced the capacity 
of the Commission to effectively realise its enforcement mandate when it was 
making declaratory judgments and delaying in making public its annual reports.64 
One would have thought that since the Commission was the sole enforcement 
institution prior to the adoption of the Court Protocol, reducing further interference 
that impacts on effective enforcement of the African Charter rights would have 
been ideal.  
However, an opportunity to reduce such interference and enhance its 
capacity to enforce the African Charter presented itself when the Commission, 
relying on article 42 (2) of the African Charter, adopted the Rules of Procedure of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 47th Ordinary Session 
in 2010. Although this rule was adopted after the emergence of the African Court, 
it allowed the Commission to take a broad approach in ensuring that African 
Charter rights are effectively realised. The Rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission strengthen enforcement in two significant ways. First, it recognises a 
working relationship between the African Commission and the African Court, which 
allows both institutions to transfer cases amongst themselves. This relationship 
enables the Commission to refer a complaint to the African Court in circumstances 
where a state has not complied or is unwilling to comply with its 
recommendation.65 Although this position reaffirms the quasi-judicial nature of the 
Commission which impacts on the binding nature of its recommendations, it 
provides an opportunity for the Commission to seek a binding decision from the 
Court. Under the Rules, the Commission can also transfer a complaint to the 
African Court if it is convinced that a situation in a member state constitutes a 
                                       
63 Article 58 requires the Commission to draw the attention of the AHSG to any situation where it finds serious 
human rights violation, without suggesting that the Commission can on its own, make recommendations. On the 
other hand, article 59 mandates the Commission to make its findings confidential until it gives approval for them 
to be made public.  
64 Rachel Murray and Elizabeth Mottershaw, ‘Mechanisms for the Implementations of Decisions of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ (n 61 above) 349; Zeray Yihdego. ‘The African Union: Founding Principles, 
Frameworks and Prospects’. (2011) 17 (5) European Law Journal, 568; Manuel Manrique, et al., ‘Human Rights 
Protection Mechanisms in Africa: Strong Potential, Weak Capacity’ (2013, European Parliament Policy Briefing) 
Available at > http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491487/EXPO-
DROI_SP(2013)491487_EN.pdf< accessed 18 March 2019.  
65 Rule 118 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
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severe and massive violation of human rights under article 58 of the African 
Charter.66 This implies that the Commission can circumvent the article 58 purpose 
which requires it to draw the attention of the AHSG. Secondly, it recognises a 
follow-up procedure where state parties are expected to report to the Commission 
on steps taken to comply with the Commission’s decision within 180 days of the 
recommendation. Whether this procedure has enhanced state party compliance 
with African Commission recommendations, it is clear that the Commission used 
the opportunity in its Rules to close another major gap in the African Charter. 
However, state parties have over time declined to comply with the Commission’s 
recommendations.   
4.2.1  The mandate and functions of the African Commission 
Article 45 explicitly mandates the African Commission to promote, protect, and 
interpret the African Charter as well as carry out other functions assigned to it by 
the AHSG. The distinction between the article 45 mandate when compared with 
the European and American regional system, is broad. First, the African 
Commission is today the only regional Commission with a protective mandate even 
with the existence of a regional court. Suffice it to add that before the European 
Commission became obsolete in 1998, one of its principal functions was to assist 
the European Court in considering whether petitions were admissible by the 
ECtHR.67 Likewise, the functions of the American Commission are limited to the 
promotion of rights through awareness, recommendations to governments, 
receiving information on state measures in matters of human rights, and advisory 
services to states.68 However, analysis of the African Commission mandate is 
necessary in order to determine whether the African Commission is capable of 
ensuring civil and political rights enforcement.   
                                       
66 Rule 118 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. 
67 Created by Article 19 of the Convention alongside the Court. It also had an intermediary role shielding the 
Court from frivolous cases. It would refer serious cases to the Court-the only body with powers to issue binding 
legal decisions. See Dana Neacsu, ‘European Human Rights System’ (2015) available at > 
http://library.law.columbia.edu/guides/European_Human_Rights_System< accessed on 18 March 2019. 
68 Article 41 of the American Convention.  
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4.2.1.1 Promotional mandate and activities of the African Commission  
The first mandate of the African Commission is to promote the African Charter 
through its numerous activities. This is because good promotion of human rights 
impacts on human rights protection; thereby, the Commission must take its 
promotional activities seriously. Indeed, promotional activities are a reliable 
means of enhancing the knowledge needed to realise effective enforcement. Such 
activities include undertaking studies and research, organising seminars and 
conferences, disseminating information, formulating principles and making 
recommendations to governments, and, cooperating with other African and 
International Human Rights Institutions.69 The Commission can receive state party 
reports to enable it to examine the steps undertaken to recognise and enforce the 
Charter rights.70 The duty to receive state party reports seems the most important 
promotional activity that assists the realisation of effective enforcement of the 
Charter rights. This is because it allows the Commission to interact with states 
concerning the domestic efforts adopted to ensure that the Charter rights are 
given effect, and examine whether state commitment is adequate to ensure 
implementation, as well as monitor state party compliance with decisions.  
4.2.1.1.1 State reporting system   
It is clear from the preceding that the state reporting system is vital to the African 
Commission mandate to promote and protect the African Charter. Therefore, 
article 62 mandates each state party to submit reports every two years on the 
legislative and other measures taken to give effect to the Charter. Although article 
62 fails to mention which body receives the reports, the Commission has over time 
and in practice accepted this responsibility. Such practice under the African 
Charter is similar to the ICCPR system,71 which requires state parties to submit 
reports on measures taken to give effect to the treaty rights and freedom. 
However, the text of article 62 of the African Charter is brief when compared to 
the lengthy and procedurally text of the ICCPR. For instance, while the ICCPR 
                                       
69 See article 45 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the African Charter.  
70 Article 62 of the African Charter.  
71 Article 40 of ICCPR. 
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requires state parties to ‘report on the measures’ adopted, the African Charter 
requires state parties to ‘report on the legislative and other measures’ taken. 
Therefore, such an obvious difference signposts the African Charter’s emphasis on 
legislative measures in addition to other measures suitable to state parties.  
 The Commission’s function to receive state reports is essential from both 
the enforcement and promotional perspectives. This function allows the 
Commission to access and advice states on African Charter implementation 
efforts.72 Firstly, the reporting system directly helps in advancing human rights 
enforcement through the recommendations the African Commission make to state 
parties.73 Secondly, the reporting system is the backbone of the Commission 
concerning its promotion and protective mandate.74 However, this procedure 
should not be wholly relied upon by the Commission in assessing state party 
commitment to African Charter rights and freedoms. This is because the reporting 
system is based on self-criticism and good faith, which potentially requires a 
strong state political will to evaluate itself.75  
Indeed, some states have not taken their reporting obligations seriously. 
For instance, as at March 2019, only fourteen states are up to date with 
reporting;76 six states have never submitted,77 while eighteen states have more 
than three reports overdue.78 Therefore, irregular or outright non-submission of 
state reports is amongst the significant challenges impeding the African 
                                       
72 Morris Mbondenyi, International Human Rights and their Enforcement in Africa (Law Africa Publishing, 2011) 
303. 
73 For example, the Commission may recommended that states institute a moratorium on the death penalty. See 
African Commission Concluding Observation and Recommendations on the Initial Periodic Report of Botswana, 
May 2010, para 53.  
74 Badawi Elsheikh, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights: Prospects and Problems’ (1989) 7 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 281.  
75 James Crawford, ‘The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A System in Crisis’ in Philip Alston and James 
Crawford (eds) The Future of Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 2. 
76 The fourteen states are Angola, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Eritrea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, and Togo. 
77 Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, South Sudan and Somalia.  
78 44th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, available at > 
http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-reports/44/actrep44_2018_eng.pdf< accessed 05 March 2019.  
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Commission mandate.79 However, the Commission has introduced a country-
specific concluding observation procedure which demands that state reports 
include responses to main areas of concern and the recommendations outlined in 
the Commission’s concluding observation.80 This approach was adopted to ensure 
state parties respond on specific areas of interest to the Commission and to 
encourage more state submission of reports. However, one can argue that it still 
has not changed state attitude to the submission of reports. 
4.2.1.2 Protective mandate of the African Commission  
The African Commission has the mandate to protect human and peoples’ rights 
under the conditions laid down by the Charter.81 Protection means the safety or 
benefit that a government or an organisation affords to citizens or individuals.82 
However, while article 45 (2) of the African Charter fails to illustrate how the 
Commission can exercise this mandate, chapter three of the African Charter 
highlights the procedure of the Commission in dealing with communications or 
complaints. 
To carry out its protective mandate, the Commission receives and considers 
complaints or communications alleging human rights violations and makes 
recommendations after its findings. The communication procedure provides the 
opportunity for victims of human rights abuse to seek redress against their 
violators at the Commission. This procedure, in addition, outlines the criteria to 
be met by a complainant before the Commission can hear a claim. In particular, 
the Commission’s function in determining complaints include ascertaining the 
                                       
79 Both state parties and the Commission do not take the reporting obligations under article 62 seriously. For 
instance, the Commission is yet to adopt the use of sanctions provided under the AU Constitutive Act to encourage 
state party reporting and the few days it uses during ordinary sessions to cover its protective, promotional and 
state reports potentially speaks volumes of the quality of work it does.  
80 See, The Federal Ministry of Justice, Nigeria’s 6th Periodic Country Report: 2015-2016 on the Implementation 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Nigeria, (Abuja, August 2017) available at > 
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/62nd_os/state-reports/6th-2015-
2016/nigeria_state_report_6th_2015_2016_eng.pdf< accessed 05 March 2019.  
81 Article 45 (2) of the African Charter.  
82 Lexicon Online Dictionary definition of ‘protection’, available at > https://www.lectlaw.com/def2/p191.htm< 
accessed 06 March 2019.  
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facts, determining admissibility and jurisdiction,83 notifying the state concerned,84 
making necessary investigations,85 making its findings known to the parties and 
the AHSG,86 and in case of failure to comply with its findings, instituting an action 
in the African Court.87 What must be borne in mind is that the protective mandate 
of the Commission applies to all cases where the breach of the Charter rights is 
alleged against state actors. Specifically, articles 47-54 cover inter-state 
communications while articles 55-60 cover ‘other communications’.  
4.2.1.2.1 Communication from states  
The African Charter inter-state provision is similar to the ECHR88 and many UN 
human rights treaties, including the ICCPR.89 The African Charter recognises two 
procedures for inter-state communication or settlement under articles 47-54 of 
the African Charter. Firstly, the African Charter envisages a situation where state 
parties may want to settle their dispute through a friendly or bilateral negotiation 
before approaching the Commission under article 47. In such circumstances, a 
state party may communicate in writing to the other member state and draw its 
attention to the matter; also, such communication will be addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the OAU and the chairman of the Commission.90 However, 
the Commission in DRC v Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda stated that while the 
procedure under article 47 is not mandatory, the requirement to inform the OAU 
Secretary-General is also not obligatory. Although this gives state parties the 
opportunity to report or request another state to abide by the African Charter 
obligations, especially when such violations are carried out in another/respondent 
state party, it also seem controversial because a state claim may not wholly 
                                       
83 Article 56 of the African Charter.  
84 Article 57 of the African Charter.  
85 Articles 46 and 51 of the African Charter. 
86 Articles 52 and 54 of the African Charter. 
87 Rule 118 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.  
88 Article 33 of the ECHR. 
89 Under the ICCPR unlike the ECHR, the procedure is generally optional and both states must recognise the 
competence of the treaty implementation body to receive such communication.  
90 Article 47 and 48 of the African Charter. See also, Rule 88 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. 
This communication shall be addressed to the Secretary-General of the OAU and the Chairman of the 
Commission.  
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capture the entirety of individual victims whose rights have been violated by acts 
of one’s state or another state.  
State parties to the African Charter have an unfettered legal standing to 
institute an obligatory state versus state communication. For instance, the 
procedure under article 49 allows a state party to refer a case against another 
member state directly to the Commission by addressing a communication to the 
Chairman, Secretary-General of the OAU and the country concerned.91 The 
concept of obligatory state versus state communication is correct given the 
absence of any admissibility requirement which a state party may meet before 
invoking this procedure. Besides, this concept gives state parties the power to 
institute action against another state when there is a violation of any provision of 
the Charter. In addition, this procedure provides a platform for state parties to 
seek justice from another where substantial violations occur, and it is immaterial 
if the citizens of the complainant states are victims of such reported abuse. 
Therefore, this procedure has the potential to enhance human rights protection if 
optimally adopted by state parties on behalf of individuals within the African 
continent. For instance, governments whose citizens are victims of xenophobic 
attacks in other countries or where non-nationals are illegally expelled may 
institute an action and seek redress on behalf of their citizens. It presents a link 
for AU member states to report issues in another country such as the May/June 
2019 cases of abuse in Sudan.  
 One could, however, question whether inter-state communication is 
adequately invoked under the African human rights system. Comparing the 
number of inter-state communications to the human rights abuses going on in 
many African countries, it is correct to agree that this procedure has been poorly 
invoked. For instance, inter-state communication procedure has only appeared in 
three communications at the African Commission.92 Such an insignificant number 
                                       
91 It is noteworthy to mention that the Rules 93-101 of Procedure of the African Commission relating to interstate 
communications do not make a clear distinction between cases brought under article 47 and 48 on the one hand, 
and article 49 on the other hand. 
92 See Communication 227/99, Congo v Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda; communication 422/12 – The Sudan v 
South Sudan; communication 478/14 – Djibouti v Eritrea.  
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of communications in a continent where African governments, through their 
agents, are continually violating human rights, and where non-nationals are widely 
targeted for various human rights violations is discouraging and unimaginable. 
Whether such low usage is because states see the inter-states procedure as a 
hostile and quite drastic response by another state desiring to address human 
rights concerns,93 the story is not the same under the European system. For 
instance, the inter-state communication procedure under the ECHR shares in the 
success story of the Convention because the numerous inter-state cases litigated 
by the European Court has underlined its continued relevance.94  
 From the foregoing, it is suggested that inter-state communication 
potentially affects a large number of individuals because it provides human rights 
protection to the group as well as individuals. For example, the facts in DR Congo 
v Burundi, and Rwanda v Uganda, the first inter-state communication before the 
Commission concerns the mass killings of civilians by soldiers, the deliberate 
spread of HIV/AIDS amongst the local population, rape cases, mass looting of 
civilian property and natural mineral wealth in the region, and forced movement 
into ‘concentration camps’.95 What is clear from this communication is that the 
complainant state party sought collective redress against the human rights 
violations of its citizens. In this case, the Commission found that the occupation 
of part of the complainant territory constitutes a violation of the Charter and 
further urged Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi to vacate DRC territory. This decision 
further implies that the interstate procedure has the potential to protect weaker 
countries and its citizens from the hostile acts of another while also advancing 
human and peoples’ rights enforcement.  
                                       
93 Scott Lekie, ‘The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in International Human Rights Law: Hopeful Prospects or 
Wishful Thinking?’ (1988) 10 Human Rights Quarterly, 249.  
94 Isabella Risini, The Inter-State Application under the European Convention of Human Rights: Between 
Collective Enforcement of Human Rights and International Dispute Settlement (Martinus Nijhoff, 2018) 1. For 
example, between 2006 and 2017, Georgia has instituted three applications against Russia using the inter-state 
procedure at the European Court on Human Rights.  
95 Communication 227/99, DR Congo v Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. 
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4.2.1.2.2 Individual (other) communication  
Apart from inter-state communication, article 55 permits the African Commission 
to receive ‘other communications’. Although the Charter fails to define the term 
‘other communications’, the text of article 55 (1) suggests that communications 
other than state parties’ communication. This article shows that the Charter does 
not aim to restrict access to the Commission to only state parties. In other words, 
it suggests that the Commission can consider complaints from individuals, groups, 
or NGOs subject to the admissibility requirement in article 56 of the Charter. 
Suffice it to add that while the Commission has received well over 400 complaints 
since its inception in 1987, nearly all are from individuals and NGOs.96 This implies 
that the analysis of ‘other communications’ under article 55 and 56 is essential to 
the Commission interpretation and enforcement of civil and political rights.  
It is clear from case law jurisprudence that the Commission is expected to 
consider communications from individuals and NGOs without requiring the 
complainant to be a victim or family member of the victim.97 Although this 
approach indicates that the African Commission is more liberal when compared to 
its American counterpart which only allows NGOs recognised in member states to 
appear before the American Commission,98 there is no guarantee that every 
communication received by the African Commission will be heard because 
communications are considered only if they get simple majority support from 
Commissioners.99 Nevertheless, only NGOs that have acquired observer status 
with the African Commission can submit a communication to the Commission.100 
Since the interpretation of articles 55 and 56 are clear about individuals and NGOs, 
it follows that redress from individual and NGO communications remain one of the 
                                       
96 See the website of the African Commission and African Human Rights Case Law Analysis. 
97 SERAC v Nigeria, Communication 155/96, para 49. 
98 See article 44 of the American Convention.  
99 Article 55 (2) of the African Charter. 
100 Hence, as of March 2019, a total number of NGOs with Observer Status with the African Commission is 518. 
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main achievements of the Commission even with the legal hurdles in meeting 
some of the admissibility requirement under article 56.101  
4.2.1.2.2.1 Admissibility requirement under individual communication procedure 
Admissibility is the bedrock of the Commission’s protective mandate for individuals 
and NGOs complaints, and is enshrined in article 56 of the African Charter.102 
Admissibility sets the machinery of the African Commission in considering ‘other 
communications’ in motion.103 It follows that the requirement under article 56 is 
a mandatory prerequisite for African Commission jurisdiction in communications 
before it.104 In other words, it acts as a screening and filtering mechanism for the 
Commission while also emphasising the principles of sovereignty and regional 
supervision.105 Indeed, admissibility mainly determines enforcement because, 
without it, the African Charter rights cannot be tested and interpreted by regional 
institutions.  
4.2.1.2.2.1.1 Name of the author  
The first admissibility requirement under article 56 (1) is that the name of the 
author must be indicated, even if they request anonymity. The name of the author 
in this circumstance is the name of the complainant and must not be the name of 
the victim.106 In World Organisation against Torture et al. v Zaire, the Commission 
emphasised that the author need not be the victim of the violations complained 
                                       
101 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa: Assessing the Role of the African 
Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1987-2018)’ (2018) 7 International Human Rights Law 
Review, 1.  
102 Rule 106 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. 
103 Once the communication is declared admissible, the parties are notified of the outcome. See, Rule 107 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. However, proceedings commence when the complainant submits 
observations on merit within 60 days and which the Commission transmits to the concerned state for its written 
observations. See, Rule 108 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. 
104 Rule 106 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. See, article 56 (1) – (7) of the African Charter; 
Communication 338/07 – SERAP v Nigeria (2010) ACHPR para 43, and Communication 284/03 - Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights and Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v Zimbabwe (2009), para 81. 
105 Frans Viljoen, ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’ in Malcome Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000 (Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 62. 
106 FIDH, National Human Rights Organisation (ONDH) and Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de 
l’Homme (RADDHO) v Senegal, Communication 304/2005. 
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about nor their family or even person authorised by the victims.107 In this regard, 
any individual or NGO with observer status before the Commission can submit a 
complaint on behalf of victims.108 It follows that access to the Commission would 
be restricted if requirements concerning authorship are not met by a complainant 
irrespective of the manner of abuse suffered by such a victim. By this ruling, the 
Commission removes any iota of strict locus standi requirement.  
The author must also not reside or operate within the continent. The 
underpinning idea is that international NGOs based outside Africa can submit 
communications to the Commission.109 However, the Commission has encouraged 
authors to include their address, although this requirement is not expressly 
inserted under article 56 (1). This approach was highlighted in Tanko Bariga v 
Nigeria, where the Commission averred that even though article 56 (1) did not 
extend authorship to include the address, this has become necessary to ensure 
communication between the Commission and the complainant.110 This is in 
addition to the Commission agreeing that the author’s address is crucial to 
maintaining a degree of specificity concerning the victim.111 Ultimately, the 
inclusion of the address in authorship has the potential to promote effective 
monitoring and follow-up by the Commission. It gives the Commission requisite 
details to follow up on complainants in order to monitor state party compliance in 
line with Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure.  
4.2.1.2.2.1.2 Communication must be compatible with OAU Charter or 
African Charter  
A complaint will be declared incoherent and inadmissible under article 56 (2) if it 
is not compatible with the African Charter or the OAU Charter.112 In other words, 
it suggests that violations outside the purview of the African Charter or the OAU 
                                       
107 World Organisation against Torture et al v Zaire, Communication 25/89. See also, Rachel Murray, ‘Decisions 
by the African Commission on Individual Communications under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 420. 
108 Communication 31/89, Maria Baez v Zaire. 
109 For instance, International PEN v Burkina Faso, communication 22/88. 
110 Communication 57/91 - Tanko Bariga v Nigeria. 
111 Communication 104/94-109/94_126/94 - Centre of the Independence of Judges and Lawyers v Algeria. 
112 Communication 57/91- Tanko Bariga v Nigeria. 
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Charter would not be heard. However, reading article 56 (2) together with article 
60 which requires the Commission to draw inspiration from international human 
rights law, various African instruments including the OAU Charter, UDHR, other 
human rights instruments adopted by the African country before it, one would 
agree that article 56 (2) is limited in scope. This is because of the seeming 
conflicting scope with article 60, which allows the Commission to adopt a broader 
scope in the interpretation of the Charter rights.  
In particular, article 56 (2) is an essential process for sifting out frivolous 
cases, and non-compliance with this provision could be fatal to a 
communication.113 For instance, while article 3 of the OAU Charter affirms member 
state adherence to the respect of the sovereignty and territory integrity of each 
state,114 a strict reliance on article 56 (2) somewhat conflicts with peoples’ right 
to existence and self-determination under article 20 of the African Charter. This 
has been demonstrated in Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire. In this case, the 
Commission upheld the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire, a member 
state of the OAU and African Charter state party in line with the OAU Charter while 
overlooking the right to self-determination under article 20 of the Charter.115 This 
position was reached because the Commission relied on the basis of article 56 (2) 
to rule that it is obligated to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Zaire, a member state of the OAU and a state party to the African Charter. 
4.2.1.2.2.1.3 Communication must not contain insulting or disparaging 
language  
The article 56 (3) provision empowers the Commission to declare a communication 
inadmissible if such communication is written in disparaging or insulting language 
directed against a state. The first observation in this requirement is that the 
                                       
113 See Communication 162/97 – Frederick Korvah v Liberia where the complaint before the African Commission 
was on discipline and corruption in the respondent police force. The Commission ruled out the complaint as 
inadmissible citing that the issues raised did not meet article 56 (2) of the African Charter.  
114 See communication 75/92, Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire. In this case, the Commission held that the 
communication has no merit and the incompatible as provided under article 56 (2) of the African Charter for 
seeking for the right to self-determination of the Katangese people.  
115 Ibid.  
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Charter fails to explain what it would consider ‘disparaging or insulting language’. 
However, the Commission has applied its understanding to determine what may 
amount to disparaging and insulting language in some communications.116 
According to the Commission, the language used must not demonstrate the 
complainant’s intention to disrepute the state and its institutions.117 Therefore, 
words such as ‘regime of torturers’ and ‘government barbarism’ in communication 
against Paul Biya, the President of Cameroon is deemed insulting and disparaging 
even though this communication alleges serious and massive violations of the 
African Charter.118  
 Article 56(3) is framed in language that makes it significantly subjective as 
to what the Commission considers disparaging or insulting language.119 The 
absence of an objective standard of what language is disparaging or insulting 
makes it more difficult for complainants. This is because a communication alleging 
a massive violation of human and peoples’ rights may by its nature contain 
disparaging language against the violating state or any of its institutions.120 This 
broadly explains why no other regional instrument provided for disparaging or 
insulting language compliance as an admissibility requirement. In this regard, 
Africa seems to be setting a dangerous precedent on admissibility conditions.  
                                       
116 Instances where African Commission defined scope of what amounts to insulting or disparaging language are 
seen in Communication 306/05 - Samuel T Muzerengwa and 11 others v Zimbabwe; Communication 268/03 - 
Ilesanmi v Nigeria; and, Communication 65/19 - Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de l’Homme v Cammeroon. In 
Communication 295/04, para 51, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Right v Zimbabwe, the Commission stated that  
‘in determining whether a certain remark is disparaging or insulting and whether it has dampened the integrity of 
the judiciary or any other state institution, the Commission has to satisfy itself whether the said remark or language 
is aimed at unlawfully and intentionally violating the dignity, reputation for integrity of a judicial officer or body 
and whether it is used in a manner calculated to pollute the minds of the public or any reasonable man to cast 
aspersions on and weaken public confidence on the institution. The language must be aimed at undermining the 
integrity and status of the institution and bring it into disrepute’.  
117 Communication 435/12 - Eyob B. Asemie v the Kingdom of Lesotho.  
118 Communication 65/19, Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de l’Homme v Cameroon. 
119 Chidi Odinkalu and Camilla Christensen, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
Development of Non-State Communication Procedures’ (1998) 20 (2) Human Rights Quarterly, 235. 
120 Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights in Africa (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2012) 315.  
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4.2.1.2.2.1.4 Communications are not be based exclusively on news 
disseminated through the media  
Emphatically, the article 56 (4) requirement is a unique feature in international 
human rights discourse. It, however, ensures proper investigation of facts 
ascertained by complainants before coming to the African Commission.121 Though 
this requirement is similar to article 35 (3) (a) of ECHR which allows inadmissibility 
where an application is manifestly ill-founded, it potentially can impact on the role 
of the media in the human rights corpus. For instance, the Commission declared 
Jawara v The Gambia inadmissible because part of it was based on information 
disseminated by the mass media.122 While this requirement is necessary in order 
to reduce communications based on unconfirmed media reports, it is suggested 
that the Commission needs verifiable information from the media given its 
shortage of personnel to cover human rights situations in the entire AU member 
states. To this extent, one would expect the guiding principle to be whether the 
media information is correct and pobtaining ossible confirmation of complaints 
through its special mechanisms.  
4.2.1.2.2.1.5 Exhaustion of local remedies  
One of the most crucial admissibility requirements for ‘other communications’ 
which is very much present in other regional human rights treaties123 is the 
exhaustion of local remedies. This requirement gives a state first-hand opportunity 
to use their domestic laws and institutions to provide redress to victims of human 
rights abuse.124 In addition, it reduces interference from international bodies while 
preventing these international institutions from being overburdened with 
complaints.125 This provision indirectly reassures respondent states of their 
sovereignty and the international law principle of non-interference.  
                                       
121 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practices and Institutions (n 22 above) 217.  
122 Communication 147/95, Jawara v The Gambia. 
123 Article 35 of ECHR and article 46 (1) (a) of the American Convention.  
124 Chidi Odinkalu, ‘The Role of Case and Complaints Procedures in the Reform of African Regional Human 
Rights System’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, 227. 
125 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, Advisory 
Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, available at > 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_11_ing.pdf< accessed 08 March 2019.  
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Ultimately, this provision demands that a complainant show that local 
remedies have been exhausted before approaching international enforcement 
bodies.126 However, a complainant need not prove the exhaustion of local 
remedies if it is evident that this procedure is unduly prolonged, unavailable or 
impossible.127 For instance, in Louis Emegba Mekongo v Cameroon, the 
Commission ruled that a matter pending at a domestic court for about 12 years is 
proof of an extremely prolonged case which may not guarantee justice.128 While 
the Commission jurisprudence has shown that the Commission uses case by case 
circumstances to determine what amounts to unduly prolonged cases, it is 
noteworthy that neither the African Charter nor the African Commission has 
provided a concise definition of the phrase ‘unduly prolonged’. One would, 
therefore, expect that the Commission make an appropriate order to suggest what 
duration may amount to unduly prolonged cases.  
However, the requirement to exhaust local remedies includes, in 
appropriate cases, an indirect duty under article 26 to guarantee the independence 
of the courts and other national institutions for the protection of human and 
peoples’ rights. This is because the independence of available local institutions is 
essential for victims to have confidence while seeking justice and redress. In this 
light, the Commission has ruled that it has jurisdiction when convinced that the 
local remedies or justice are incapable of giving effect to the provisions of the 
Charter.129 In particular, a domestic remedy must be available, efficient and 
sufficient if the complainant is obliged to pursue it.130 Nevertheless, the 
jurisprudence of the Commission has shown that exhaustion of local remedies is 
the most invoked ground by respondent states to challenge admissibility.131  
                                       
126 Rule 93 (2) (i) of African Commission Rules of Procedure provides that complainants must show steps taken 
to exhaust domestic remedies available or prove the impossibility or unavailability of domestic remedies. 
127 Article 56 (5) of the African Charter. 
128 See the case of Louis Emegba Mekongo v Cameroon – Communication 59/91. In this case, the Commission 
accepted jurisdiction 12 years after the final judgment from the national court. 
129 Communication 227/99, Congo v Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, para. 62-63. 
130 Communication 147/95 and 149/96 – Jawara v The Gambia. 
131 Article 56 (5) of the African Charter. See the following cases:  Communication 435/12 – Eyob B. Asemie v the 
Kingdom of Lesotho; Communication 477/14 - Crawford Lindsay von Abo v. the Republic of Zimbabwe; 
Communication 383/10 – Mohammed Abdullah Saleh Al-Asad v. Republic of Djibouti; Communication 322/2006 
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4.2.1.2.2.1.6 Communications are submitted within a reasonable time after 
exhaustion of local remedies  
The African Charter requires an individual or NGO to submit a complainant within 
a reasonable time after the exhaustion of local remedies.132 This requirement is 
similar to both the European and American system except that they specifically 
require a complainant to submit such a case within six months of the date of final 
judgement.133 The question posed by this requirement relates to what amounts to 
a reasonable time under the African Charter.  
Article 56 (6) is not specific about what period may amount to a reasonable 
time. While this position may seem advantageous to complainants who are 
ignorant of the Commission’s procedure, it leaves the Commission with 
discretionary power on the interpretation of what amounts to a reasonable time. 
Indeed, it is capable of encouraging complainants to sleep on their rights and has 
the potential to bring about confusion amongst Commissioners in agreeing on 
what constitutes a reasonable time. Consequently, the Commission has relied on 
a case by case basis for interpreting this requirement.134 For instance, the 
Commission in John Modise v Botswana135 admitted a complaint submitted 15 
years after a final judgment from the domestic court. 
4.2.1.2.2.1.7 Cases already settled by concerned states 
To avoid re-trial of a concluded case and further protect parties from being found 
guilty twice, the Commission will not deal with cases settled in accordance with 
the principles of the UN Charter or the Charter of the OAU or the present 
Charter.136 Although this is a principle of fair hearing, it is not out of place to have 
                                       
- Tsatsu Tsikata v. Republic of Ghana; Communication 368/09 – Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi & Others v Republic of 
Sudan; Communication 335/2006- Dabalorivhuwa Patriotic Front v the Republic of South Africa. 
132 Article 56 (6) of the African Charter.  
133 Article 35 of the ECHR and Article 46 (1) (b) of the American Convention.  
134 Frans Viljoen, ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000 (n 105 above) 91.  
135 Communication 97/93.  
136 Rule 93 (2) (j) of the African Commission Rule of Procedure; Article 56 (7) of the African Charter. See also, 
Frans Viljoen, ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000 (n 134 above) 91.  
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it as a pre-condition and admissibility requirement because it ensures that the 
Commission does not waste its time or sit as an appellate court.  
4.2.1.3 Interpretative mandate of the African Commission 
The interpretative mandate can be invoked at the request of a state party, OAU 
institution or an African organisation recognised by the OAU.137 However, what is 
absent in this article is whether individuals can set the motion for the 
interpretation of the African Charter and whether this provision applies to the 
interstate procedure system. In relation to this provision, understanding the 
interpretative mandate of the Commission may pose a challenge because of its 
ambiguous wording; more especially, given that the consideration of 
communications allows the Commission to interpret the provisions of the African 
Charter and other relevant human rights instruments. Indeed, the Commission 
gives meaning to the literal language and intention of the Charter while at the 
same time handing down recommendations to violating bodies or countries.138 
This implies that whatever interpretation is given to the African Charter provision 
through adjudication of cases whether instituted by individuals, NGOs or state 
parties is how it will be enforced. Therefore, effective enforcement requires 
pragmatic and accurate interpretation of African Charter provisions.  
4.2.2  Remedial authority of the African Commission  
The concept of rights carries with it a duty to redress violations. This is because 
human rights are meaningless if they lack provisions for effective remedies and 
mechanisms for enforcement.139 Remedy refers to ‘the range of measures that 
may be taken in response to an actual or threatened violation of human rights.140 
                                       
137 Article 45 (3) of the African Charter.  
138 Rule 93 (5) of the African Commission Rule of Procedure.   
139 Godfrey Musila, ‘The Right to Effective Remedy under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
(2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal, 442; Frans Viljoen, ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’ in 
Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in 
Practice 1986-2000 (n 134 above) 61-99; Nsongurua Udombana, ‘So Far, So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in 
the Jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2003) 97 American Journal of 
International Law, 1.  
140 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2003) 1. 
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Remedies in the substantive context connote the relief afforded to complainants 
following the outcome of a proceeding such as compensation or declaration.  
 It is clear from the provisions of the African Charter that the concept of 
remedies for human rights victims is lacking. The absence of recognition of 
remedies in the African Charter is an aberration that needs to be corrected 
because it has the potential to reduce the impact of the African Commission 
enforcement in the region. In particular, the requirement under article 58 of the 
Charter which requires the Commission to draw the attention of the AHSG where 
cases of human rights are revealed and after that, make an accurate report, 
accompanied by its findings and recommendations, makes this absence more 
daunting. Suffice it to add at this juncture that the article 58 provision does not 
suggest the power of the AHSG to grant remedies after the Commission has made 
its findings. This is because the African Charter is unclear on what the AHSG must 
do after receiving such information from the Commission. However, while this 
shortcoming in the African Charter cannot be explained, the practice by the 
Commission has come to its rescue to measure up with the practice in the ECHR 
and the American Convention. It is essential to add that this was after several 
years of making declaratory judgments.  
It is important to note that the Commission has evolved through the era of 
declaratory judgment to issuing reparation and compensation. However, in order 
to conform to the dictate of the African Charter, the early years of the Commission 
were marred mainly by declaratory judgments where the Commission stopped at 
merely finding a violation by a state party without making recommendations. 
Although this approach later changed, the Commission has over time made orders 
to violating state parties on compensation or amendment of local laws. For 
instance, the Commission in Malawi African Association v Mauritania141 ruled that 
Mauritania annul its domestic legislation that violates the Charter rights. Similarly, 
in Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria, the Commission ordered Nigeria to release 
                                       
141 Communication 210/98. 
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detained prisoners.142 This implies that the Commission is now under an obligation 
to grant relief to victims as well as request state parties to carry out 
recommendations that obstruct effective enforcement of human rights.  
It is clear from the preceding that the Commission has accepted that the 
right to a remedy is self-evident and need not be explicitly enshrined.143 This is 
because one would expect the Commission to rely on the reference to remedies 
in articles 1, 7, 21 (2) and 26 of the African Charter to bolster its argument. For 
instance, in Jawara v The Gambia, the Commission set out three elements of a 
remedy to include: availability, effectiveness and sufficiency.144 Having due regard 
to these elements, the Commission has over time granted relief to human rights 
victims on its own terms. Accordingly, the Commission has provided remedies to 
victims in the form of reparation, damages, injunction, apology, condemnation, 
declaration, and removal through repeal or enactment of the law.145  
Nonetheless, the Commission approach towards remedies lacks uniformity, 
thereby impacting on the African Commission mandate to effectively enforce the 
African Charter. For instance, in Louis Emegba Mekongo v Cameroon, the 
Commission ordered compensation to the complainants but in accordance with the 
domestic law of Sudan for the rights violated.146 What this recommendation 
implies is that the responsibility to decide the compensation sum lies with the 
violating state. Contrasted with the decision in Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara v 
Cameroon, the African Commission, in this case, ruled that the respondent state 
should release the complainant from detention, and further ordered it to pay the 
sum of four hundred million (400,000,000) CFA francs as compensation for the 
material and non-material damages suffered as a result of the established 
                                       
142 Communication 101/93. 
143 Communication 74/92, Commission Nationale des droits de I’Homme et des libertes v Chad.  
144 Comunication 147/95-149/96, Jawara v The Gambia. 
145 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practices and Institutions (n 25 above) 226.  
146 See Louis Emegba Mekongo v Cameroon wherein the African Commission found that the complainant was 
entitled to compensation but instead of deciding the value to be awarded, it delegated that to be done by the 
violating state respondent. See also, Communication 379/09, Monim Elgak, Osman Hummeida and Amir Suliman 
(represented by FIDH and OMCT) v Sudan. 
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violations.147 The inconsistent manner to which a victim’s financial compensation 
is decided illustrates the effect of this gap in the African Charter.  
4.2.3 African Commission special mechanisms  
This section examines the African Commission special mechanisms for the 
promotion and protection of human rights. It argues that though article 46 of the 
African Charter mandates the African Commission to employ any appropriate 
method of investigation in carrying out its responsibilities, the establishment of 
special rapporteurs and working groups have made tremendous contributions in 
promotional and investigative activities of the African Commission. It is, of course, 
essential to consider the uncertainties and challenges of the special mechanisms 
in order to determine whether their role has contributed to closing the institutional 
and normative gap in the enforcement of the African Charter. 
Special mechanisms investigate human rights violations, undertake 
promotional activities and submit reports on member states situation, which 
sometimes form the basis of African Commission’s resolutions.148 However, this 
crucial role of special mechanisms focusing on human rights issues of specific 
concern to the African Commission is not without challenges. For instance, the 
Commissioners double as Special Rapporteurs, thus leaving several questions 
relating to the efficiency of their roles as Commissioners and Rapporteurs 
unanswered. One would agree that the protective, promotional and interpretative 
role of a Commissioner is tasking. However, any additional role such as this, which 
                                       
147 Communication 416/12.  
148 The African Commission currently has fourteen special mechanisms, that is, seven Working Groups, five 
Special Rapporteurs, two Committees, and one Advisory Committee. Some special mechanisms and their year of 
establishment include Prisons and conditions of detention (1996); Rights of women in Africa (1999); Refugees, 
asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (2004); Freedom of expression and access to information in 
Africa (2004); and, Human rights defenders (2004). Working groups include Committee for the prevention of 
Torture in Africa (2004); Death penalty (2005); Older persons and people with disability in Africa (2007) and, 
Study group on freedom of association in Africa (2011). Each special mechanism is headed by a serving 
Commissioner whose duty is on a part-time basis. Further, each Special Rapporteur has a mandate to present an 
Annual Report to the Commission at each Ordinary Session Special Mechanisms of the African Commission, 
available at > http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/< accessed 13 June 2017. Examples of some special mechanism 
that monitor state enforcement of human rights decisions includes Working Group on Specific Issues Related to 
the work of the African Commission and Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders.  
214 
 
 
also requires observation of human rights situations, country visits and report 
writing, would invariably affect their efficiency.  
Special mechanisms have contributed immensely to the African Commission 
mandate. For instance, the role played by the Committee for the prevention of 
Torture in Africa (previously Robben Island Guidelines Committee) in drafting the 
Robben Island Guidelines cannot be ignored. However, resources have remained 
a key factor underpinning the functions of these special mechanisms.149 To fulfil 
their missions, assessing state parties’ human rights situations involve country 
visits and meetings with relevant parties which needs financial and other resources 
which are insufficient.  
The African Commission special mechanism undertakes missions focusing 
on human rights violations within their mandates. This requires them to carry out 
an on-site mission or fact-finding mission to investigate facts or explore avenues 
for amicable settlement relating to communications. However, state consent is 
required for visits, but it is on many occasions, not given. For instance, out of 
many state visit requests, only six missions were granted and undertaken in 
2018.150 From this above observation, state consent denial to carry out a mission 
poses a challenge to the mandate of the African Commission and should be 
reported in the annual report to the AU Assembly. Consent to special mechanisms 
needs to be freely given as it enhances the mandate of the African Commission 
towards the realisation of the African Charter rights and freedoms.  
4.3 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
This section examines the African Court. The African Court is based in Arusha, 
Tanzania, and largely epitomises the advances made by the regional human rights 
system to enhance human rights protection through a judicial system.151 
                                       
149 Centre for Human Rights, Celebrating the African Charter at 30: A Guide to the African Human Rights System 
(Pretoria University Law Press, 2011) 45. 
150 The countries include Botswana, Guinea Bissau, South Africa, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Lesotho. See, 45th Activity 
Report of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, pg 19.  
151 Existing international courts prior to the emergence of the African Court include the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court. 
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Accordingly, the African Court complements the protective mandate of the African 
Commission.152 Following the inauguration of the first eleven judges on 2nd July 
2006, the Court had its first session from 2nd July to 5th July 2006, in Banjul, The 
Gambia. As will be discussed hereinbelow, the Court has evolved to become an 
essential mechanism in African Charter enforcement, although it seems vulnerable 
when compared to its European and American counterparts.153 Therefore, this 
section will argue that AU member states vaguely established a regional court with 
clauses that limit state party accountability by limiting individual access to the 
court. 
4.3.1 The history and establishment of the African Court  
The creation of an African Court was first suggested at the 1961 International 
Commission of Jurist Conference on the Rule of Law in Lagos, Nigeria, which 
consisted of 194 judges, practising lawyers and teachers of law from 23 African 
nations as well as nine countries of other continents.154 Although this suggestion 
was turned down by the argument that Africa was not mature enough for a 
regional court at this time in its history,155 the African governments further claimed 
that a regional court would interfere with and challenge their sovereignty, and 
would conflict with the preferred African culture of reconciliation with 
adjudication.156 Several years after, this suggestion was also not implanted when 
the region adopted the African Charter with a Commission as its single 
implementing body in 1981.    
                                       
152 Article 5 (1) (a), 6 (1) and (3), 8 and 33 of the Court Protocol.  
153 Tom Daly and Micha Wiebusch, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Mapping Resistance 
against a Young Court’ (2018)14 (2) International Journal of Law in Context, 294. 
154 Charles Rhyne, ‘Law in Africa: A Report on the Lagos Conference’ (1961) 47 (7) American Bar Association 
Journal 685; International Commission of Jurists, African Conference on the Rule of Law, Lagos, Nigeria ... 1961: 
A Report on the Proceedings of the Conference (I.C.J., 1961)  
155 See also, Timothy Yerima, ‘Comparative Evaluation of the Challenges of African Regional Human Rights 
Court’ (2011) 4 (2) Journal of Politics and Law, 120.  
156 Adama Dieng, ‘Introduction to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2005) 15 Interights Bulletin, 
3. 
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The omission of a regional court in the Africa Charter increased the pressure 
on the regional human rights system to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness.157 
During this time, several options suggested include replacing the Commission with 
the Court, strengthening the Commission or complementing it with a court. 
However, while the option of replacing it was not ideal because the Court would 
lack powers to promote the Charter rights, the idea of strengthening it was 
opposed because there were no signs of the Commission being independent of the 
AU.158 Instead, a complementary dual system was most preferable.159 However, 
in 1998, African governments adopted the Court Protocol establishing the African 
Court. While it is submitted that the process of establishing a regional Court was 
slow, its absence provided African states with the backing to circumvent regional 
accountability regarding human rights enforcement from a quasi-judicial African 
Commission.  
The enforcement principle of the African human rights system was criticised 
prior to the emergence of the African Court due to the inability of the Commission 
to impose legally binding decisions and its dependence on its political parent, the 
AU.160 These critiques demanded a more powerful institution to fill the gaps in 
realising effective enforcement of human rights, which later resulted in the 
adoption of the Court Protocol on 9 June 1998.161 Thereafter, the Court eventually 
entered into force on 25 January 2004 after meeting the 15 member states 
                                       
157 Gina Bekker, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the Interests of African States’ 
(n 59 above).  
158 Van Der Mai, ‘The New African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards an Effective Human Rights 
Protection Mechanism for Africa’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law, 118. 
159 Gina Bekker, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the Interests of African States’ 
(n 59 above). 
160 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than Never’ 
(2014) 3 (2) Yale Human Rights and Development Journal, 45; Roger-Claude Liwanga, ‘From Commitment to 
Compliance: Enforceability of Remedial Orders of African Human Rights Bodies’ (2015) 41 (2) Brooklyn Journal 
of International Law, 99; Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Can a Leopard can its Spots? The African Union treaty and 
human rights (n 38 above); Oji Umozuruike, ’The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ (n 16 above) 
902; Carolyn Martorena, ‘The New African Union: Will it Promote Enforcement of the Decisions of the African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 35 above); Edward Kannayo, ‘The OAU and Human Rights’ in Yassin 
El-Ayouty and William Zartman (eds), The OAU after twenty years (Praeger, 1984) 157.  
161 Protocol to the African Charter, available at >http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-establishment/<  
accessed 18 March 2019.  
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ratification requirement.162 The drafting of this Protocol was inspired by the 
established international courts under the European and Inter-American 
Conventions as well as the Statute of the International Court of Justice.163 The 
implication, therefore, is that one would expect the Court to adopt standards 
concerning access, composition and jurisdiction that enhance effective human 
rights enforcement.  
However, the African Court consists of 11 judges elected for six years from 
Member States’ jurists of high moral character and judicial or academic 
competence and experience in human and peoples’ rights.164 Unlike the 
Commission, the Court sits four times a year in two-week Ordinary Sessions and 
may also sit in Extraordinary Sessions. What this implies is that Africa once again 
adopted a part-time sitting arrangement for the Court; thereby, making it the only 
regional Court that sits on a part-time basis.165 Nonetheless, all judges except the 
President of the African Court perform their function on a part-time basis.166 The 
consequence of adopting a part-time sitting arrangement is the potential to affect 
the quality and quantity of the Court’s output. In addition, such preferred sitting 
arrangements when all other existing courts enjoy a full-time sitting arrangement 
is indicative of how the AU member states view the African Court. One can argue 
that this arrangement would not guarantee the needed timeframe to carry out its 
contentious and advisory mandate optimally. For example, of the 203 applications 
received since it commenced operation in 2006, over 100 applications are pending 
                                       
162 Presently, nine AU States allow individuals and NGOs to directly petition the African Court, namely: Burkina 
Faso (1998), Malawi (2008), Mali (2010), Tanzania (2010), Ghana (2011), Cote d’Ivoire (2013), Benin (2016), 
Tunisia (2017) and Gambia (2018). Rwanda had previously deposited a declaration in conformity with Article 34 
(6) in 2013 but subsequently withdrew with effect from March 2017; See African Union List of Countries that 
have ratified the 1998 Protocol as at the end of 2018, available at > http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-
establishment/ratification/<  accessed 18 March 2019. It is noteworthy that as of February 2019, 30 of the 55 AU 
member states have ratified the 1998 Protocol 
163 Explanatory Notes to the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 1, (6-12 September 1995), Cape Town South Africa. 
164 Article 11 and 15 of the 1998 Protocol.  
165 For example, following the amalgamation of the Court and Commission in 1998, the European Court started 
sitting on a full-time basis. 
166 Article 15 of the Court Protocol. The Assembly may change this sitting arrangement as it may deem 
appropriate. See article 15 (4) of the Court Protocol.  
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as of January 2019.167 Another firsthand impact of this sitting arrangement can be 
seen in the three years delay experienced in arriving at the Court’s first judgement 
in Micholet Yogogombaye v Senegal.168 
However, there are a number of reasons why the African Court was 
established. Firstly, the African Court was created with a clear mission of 
complementing and enhancing the protective mandate of the Commission.169 This 
implies that the Court does not remove all protective mandates of the 
Commission; rather, to support its mandate to ensure effective enforcement. 
Secondly, the Court was established to cover the gap in effective enforcement of 
the Charter rights by providing an institution capable of rendering binding 
decisions against state parties. However, for the Court to render binding decisions, 
the Court must first acknowledge it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.  
4.3.2 Mandate and jurisdiction of the African Court  
The Court jurisdiction extends to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning 
the interpretation and application of the African Charter, its protocol and any other 
relevant human rights instruments ratified by the state concerned.170 It follows 
from the Court Protocol that the Court has advisory,171 arbitral172 and 
contentious173 jurisdiction. This implies that the Court would be called upon to 
interpret and adjudicate on complaints that fall within the broad material scope 
aforementioned. For instance, the advisory duties of the Court empower it to give 
opinions at the request of a member state, the OAU and any of its organs, or any 
African organisation recognised by the OAU, on any matter relating to the 
                                       
167 See generally, African Court Index, available at > http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases< accessed 
16 January 2019.  
168 App. No. 1/2008. The Court in this case declined jurisdiction citing Article 34(6) of the 1998 Protocol. That 
notwithstanding, the Court on December 15, 2009, three years after the selection of the first set of judges, gave 
its first judgment. 
169 Article 2 of the 1998 Protocol. African Court has adopted its Rules of Procedure also known as ‘Interim Rules 
of Court’ in June 2010, which replaced the Interim Rules of Procedure 2008. 
170 Article 3 of the 1998 Protocol.  
171 Article 4 of the 1998 Protocol.  
172 Article 9 of the 1998 Protocol. The arbitral jurisdiction of the Court empowers it to amicably settle cases and 
disputes brought before it by parties. 
173 Article 3 (1) of the 1998 Protocol.  
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protection of human rights and relevant human rights instruments.174 Although 
this function is not peculiar to the African system, the difference is that under the 
European system, only the Committee of Ministers can request advisory opinion175 
whereas the American system grants just the Member States and the organs of 
the Organisation of American States the power to ask for an opinion.176 In other 
words, one can argue that such broad jurisdiction is intended to ensure proper 
engagement with the African Court regarding the enforcement and interpretation 
of African rights and freedoms.  
On the other hand, both arbitral and contentious jurisdiction involves 
adjudication of cases and disputes submitted by states, individuals and NGOs. It 
goes beyond giving an opinion at the request of state parties to rendering binding 
decisions on parties involved. For example, the contentious jurisdiction of the 
African Court permits it to interpret and apply the African Charter or other relevant 
human rights instruments. At the outset, the Court illustrated this position in 
Michelot Yogogombaye v Senegal177 when it accepted that though there were 
violations of other international human rights instruments such as the UDHR and 
the ICCPR, it lacked jurisdiction to entertain this case because the respondent 
state had not made a declaration allowing individuals and NGOs to bring claims 
under article 34(6) of the Court Protocol. The thought in this decision may seem 
not to be coercive because it laid the foundation that the Court would never 
entertain cases where respondent states fail to make an article 34(6) declaration. 
However, the Court contentious jurisdiction has resulted in the fifty-two finalised 
applications.178 Furthermore, the contentious jurisdiction of the Court creates a 
dual function similar to other regional human rights instruments.179 Such dual 
                                       
174 Out of the 13 advisory opinions submitted to the Court since its operation in 2006, 12 have been finalised with 
one pending as at April 2019. 
175 Article 47 (1) of ECHR.  
176 Article 64 (1) of the American Convention.  
177 App. No. 001/2008.  
178 This information is as at June 1, 2019. An example of a finalised case is App. 004/2013. In this application, 
the Court found a violation of article 19 of the ICCPR and article 9 of the African Charter in Konate v Burkina 
Faso. The complaint in this case was instituted following a publication and prosecuting for defamation, public 
insult and contempt of court. See also, Anudo Ochieng Anudo v Tanzania, App. 012/2015, where the Court found 
a violation of article 15 of the UDHR and article 14 of the ICCPR. 
179 Article 32 of ECHR and article 62 of Inter-American Convention.  
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function requires the African Court to ascertain the extent to which the African 
Charter provision has been applied by state parties’ and how state parties interpret 
these rights.180  
4.3.3 Access to the African Court 
The Court Protocol took a different approach from the African Charter on the issue 
of access. However, access is crucial to human rights protection as well as the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Unlimited access to the Court is granted to the African 
Commission, state parties, and intergovernmental organisations.181 In addition, 
the Court Protocol provides that to have access to the Court, a country must have 
ratified the Court Protocol.182 This prerequisite requirement relating to access 
portrays a restriction to the protection of the Court because of the poor ratification 
history of human rights treaties in Africa. In other words, a state may intentionally 
avoid the jurisdiction of the Court by choosing not to ratify the Court Protocol, 
especially in the absence of regional or international pressure to ratify such a 
treaty. However, individuals and NGOs with observer status have direct access to 
the Court only when their states have accepted the declaration under article 34 
(6). This implies that individual and NGO access is not automatic even after their 
country have ratified the Court Protocol. Notwithstanding, individuals and NGOs 
may indirectly approach the Court by instituting complaints before the Commission 
hoping the Commission will refer the matter to the Court in any case of non-
compliance of the Commission’s findings by the state party.183  
 Africa’s position on access to the Court is a true reflection of African leaders’ 
reluctance to have an accountable and effective regional judicial system.184 For 
                                       
180 For instance, after considering the admissibility requirement regarding exhaustion of local remedies, the Court 
in Norbert Zongo and others v Burkina Faso (App. 013/2011) ruled that the respondent state failed to take 
appropriate action to ensure that the rights of the applicants are respected.  
181 Article 5 of the Court Protocol and Rule 33 of the Rules of African Court. 
182 As of February 2019, only 30 African states have ratified the Court Protocol. 
183 Article 6 of the Court Protocol, Rule 118 and 120 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission. 
Notably, the Court has transferred 4 cases to the Commission. 
184 Ibrahim Ali Badawi El-Sheikh, ‘Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Introductory Note’ (1997) 9 African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law, 943.  
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instance, the issue of allowing NGOs and individuals access to the Court stirred 
controversy at the drafting stage of the Court Protocol.185 The draft submitted by 
African Experts to the Government Experts in the Cape Town Meeting provided 
that the Court may, on exceptional grounds, allow individuals, NGOs or groups of 
individuals to bring cases before it.186 While this draft did not recognise separate 
acceptance by state parties regarding access by NGOs and individuals, the 
subsequent Nouakchott Meeting draft makes individual and NGOs access 
optional.187 The Nouakchott Meeting proposed that NGOs and individuals can bring 
cases regarding urgent, serious systematic or massive violations of human 
rights.188 This proposal was later elaborated in substance in article 5 and article 
34 (6) of the final draft of the Court Protocol, which allows both automatic and 
optional access to the Court. However, one would have thought that since the 
Commission automatically applies to every state party of the African Charter, a 
similar approach should have been followed concerning the African Court.      
The provision of article 34 (6) of the Court Protocol impacts on uniformed 
access and jurisdiction for individuals whose countries have ratified the Court 
Protocol. In particular, this provision reduces the extent to which individuals and 
NGOs can seek justice from the Court. While it is submitted that the purpose of 
article 34 (6) cannot optimally advance the complementary mandate of the Court, 
it presents an opportunity for state parties to avoid accountability. Indeed, with 
only nine states declaring to allow individuals and NGOs access to the African 
Court,189 article 34 (6) compromises free and absolute access to the Court thereby 
                                       
185 Ibid.  
186 Article 5 of the Draft Protocol submitted by the OAU General-Secretariat to Governmental Legal Experts, 6-
12 September 1995, Cape Town, South Africa. See generally, Report of Government Expert Meeting on the 
Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
187 Article 6 (5) of Nouakchott Draft. 
188 Article 6 (1) of Nouakchott Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT. (III) Rev. 
1. 
189 The countries are Burkina Faso (1998), Malawi (2008), Mali (2010), Tanzania (2010), Ghana (2011), Cote 
d’Ivoire (2013), Benin (2016), Tunisia (2017), and The Gambia (2018). Rwanda had previously deposited a 
declaration in conformity with Article 34 (6) in 2013 but subsequently withdrew with effect from March 2017.  
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having an impact on victims of human rights abuses.190 The logic of the foregoing 
is that cases instituted against non-compliant countries such as Nigeria,191 
Senegal,192 Algeria,193 South Africa,194 and Tunisia,195 will be declared inadmissible 
by the Court.  
One could, however, question the purport of retaining this clause in the 
Court Protocol given that the majority of decided and pending cases before the 
African Court as well as the Commission, are instituted by individuals and NGOs. 
The numerous cases submitted by individuals and NGOs have provided the 
opportunity to make appropriate orders in line with articles 9 and 27 of the Court 
Protocol. Indeed, individual cases have resulted in some landmark decisions where 
the Court has ordered states to amend their domestic laws and constitutions to 
reflect the true intent and content of the African Charter.196 For instance, in 
Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend 
Christopher R. Mtikila v United Republic of Tanzania, the complainants alleged that 
the Eight Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 which requires candidates to 
elective positions to be sponsored by a political party conflicted with the 
constitution of Tanzania and were therefore null and void for barring independent 
candidates from contesting. The Court, however, found a violation of the right to 
non-discrimination, equal right before the law, freedom of association, and right 
to participate freely in government. The Court, therefore, ordered the respondent 
state to take constitutional, legislative and other measures necessary to remedy 
violated the articles of the African Charter and ordered the applicant to file for 
reparations.197 Nevertheless, individuals and NGOs have remained the highest 
                                       
190 Timothy Yerima, ‘Comparative Evaluation of the Challenges of African Regional Human Rights Courts’ (n 
155 above) 120; Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better later 
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191 App. 8/2011, Ekollo v Cameroon and Nigeria.  
192 Michelot Yogogombaye v Senegal, App. 001/2008. 
193 App. 2/2011, Soufianne Ababou v Algeria.  
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under article 34 (6) of the Court Protocol.  
196 See the judgments in the following cases: Lohe Issa Konate v Burkina Faso (2015); Rev. Christopher R. Mtikila 
v Tanzania (2013); Action pour la protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH) v Cote d’Ivoire (2014).  
197 App. Nos. 009 and 011/2011, and judgment on merit delivered 14 June 2013.  
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beneficiaries of the Court in terms of access while the Court continues to assert 
its mandate through its decisions similar to State Supreme Courts.198 This is 
because final decisions of the Court impact on domestic laws of member states. 
Access to the African Court is central to realising effective human rights. In 
particular, it ensures remedies are accorded to victims while the laws are 
interpreted to form part of case laws. As captured by the Nigeria Supreme Court 
in Attorney General of Kaduna State v Hassan, ‘he who cannot reach the court 
cannot talk of justice from the courts’.199 However, because access to the court is 
vital if we must talk about justice, the approach adopted in the Court Protocol has 
attracted criticisms.200 However, the African Court is not the only regional court 
that bars individuals’ direct access.201 For instance, the American system permits 
only state parties and the Inter-American Commission to submit cases directly to 
the Inter-American Court.202 Conversely, article 34 of the ECHR allows the 
individual access to the ECtHR if they meet the requirement under article 35 (3) 
ECHR.203  
4.3.4 Admissibility and the relationship between the African Court and 
the African Commission   
Where an individual or NGO institute a claim at the African Court under article 5 
(3) of the Court Protocol, the Court must first rule on its admissibility based on 
                                       
198 This submission is based on the involvement of individuals in the cases before the African Court, which shows 
that of the 34 cases that have been decided by the Court at its 44th Ordinary Session March 6-24, 2017, 29 of them 
are connected with individuals.  
199 (1985) Nigerian Weekly Law Report, Part 8, 483. 
200 Frans Viljoen, ‘Understanding and Overcoming Challenges in Accessing the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ (2018) 67 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 63; Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Eyeing the 
Promised Land: The Wearisome Quest for an Effective Regional Human Rights Enforcement Mechanism in 
Africa’ (2014) 1 Transnational Human Rights Review, 179.  
201 Article 44 of the American Convention requires individuals to institute complaints through the Inter-American 
Commission.  
202 Article 61 of the American Convention on Huma Rights. 
203 This article provides that the admissibility criteria for individual application to include incompatibility with 
the provisions of the ECHR, if the application is anonymous, substantially the same with a matter that has been 
submitted to another procedure for investigation, or where the applicant has not suffered a significant 
disadvantage. See also, Andrew Williams, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU and the UK: 
Confronting a Heresy’ (2013) 24 (4) European Journal of International Law, 1157; Francesco Seatzu, ‘The 
Experience of the European Court of Human Rights with the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine’ (2015) 31 (81) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 5.   
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article 56 of the African Charter. The admissibility criteria are so important to 
individual cases at the Court because they determine the Court’s jurisdiction. They 
also determine what steps the Court may take concerning cases before it. For 
instance, the Court may assume jurisdiction and go ahead to consider the case or 
transfer it to the Commission.204 However, while the approach adopted in the Court 
Protocol is commendable for granting the Court power to transfer cases to the 
Commission where it lacks jurisdiction to the Commission, the number of cases 
declared inadmissible without such referral indicate the Court’s insignificant use 
of the article 6 provision to enhance human rights enforcement.   
Indeed, the relationship between the African Charter institutions set out in 
the Court Protocol, and the Rules of Procedure of the Commission205 includes the 
power of the Commission to transfer cases of massive human rights violations and 
non-compliance of its orders to the Court. In particular, these provisions have the 
potential to enhance the working relationship between the two institutions, at least 
on paper.206 At present, however, the Court has transferred four cases to the 
Commission while the Commission has demonstrated this relationship by 
transferring three cases to the Court, including African Commission v Libya207 and 
African Commission v Kenya.208 It is submitted that this number is insignificant 
given the number of cases declared inadmissible on the ground of article 34 (6) 
declaration. This insignificant number of cases illustrate the perceived reluctance 
to transfer cases to the Commission.  
However, it is not particularly evident whether strict reliance on the 
admissibility criteria has enhanced the realisation of effective enforcement of civil 
and political rights. But in the case of Diakite Couple v Mali,209 the Court dismissed 
the case for failure to exhaust domestic remedies as requested under article 56 
                                       
204 Article 6 of the Court Protocol. 
205 Articles 2 and 6 of the Court Protocol, Rule 29 of Rules of Procedure of the Court and Part IV of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Commission 2010.  
206 See also, Part lV, Rule and Procedures of the African Commission 2010. 
207 App. 002/2013. 
208 App. 006/2012. 
209 App. 009/2016. 
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(5) of the African Charter. Similarly, although the Court accepted jurisdiction in 
Jean-Claude Roger Gombert v Cote d'Ivoire, it went ahead to uphold the 
inadmissibility objection raised by the respondent state that the dispute has been 
settled within the meaning of article 56 (7) of the African Charter.210  
4.3.5 Remedies authority under the Court Protocol and enforceability of 
African Court decisions  
Where the Court finds a violation of the African Charter and proceeds to make a 
decision on its finding, it has the power to grant remedies in line with article 27 of 
the Court Protocol. Instances of such remedies include compensation or 
reparation. In addition, the Court can order provisional measures where a violation 
is found or in circumstances where necessary to avoid irreparable harm to 
persons.211 For instance, the Court applied provisional measures in African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Libya.212 In this case, the 
Commission alleged that not only has the respondent state refused to comply with 
its decision but that the victim, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, is faced with the imminent 
threat of the death penalty, following a long period of arbitrary detention without 
access to a lawyer. This case further demonstrates the positive impact of the 
relationship between the two institutions and the need for the Commission to 
swiftly invoke its unlimited access to the Court against non-complying state 
parties. In its ruling, the Court held that Libya violated the African Charter, and 
ordered it to terminate the illegal criminal proceeding against the victim before 
the domestic court and allow the victim access to a lawyer immediately without 
delay’.213 The essence of this order is to preserve or stop a state from further 
committing human rights violations while the Court goes ahead to adjudicate on 
the application before it.  
                                       
210 App. 038/2016, Jean-Claude Roger Gombert v Cote d’Ivorie. 
211 The provision of provisional measures is similar to article 63 (2) of the Inter-American Human Rights 
Convention which empowers the Court to order this remedy in cases of extreme gravity and urgency in order to 
avoid irreparable harm to persons.  
212 App. No. 002/2013.  
213 Ibid, para 97. It is noteworthy to mention that Libya did not comply with this decision.  
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In particular, it is noteworthy that the remedial authority of the African 
Court is similar to the ECtHR and the American Court.214 However, under the 
European system, the decision of the Court becomes final in accordance with 
article 44 (2), one of which is three months after the date of judgment without 
any request to the Grand Chamber. On the other hand, the position under the 
African Court is that the decision of the Court shall be final, binding on state 
parties, and not subject to any appeal.215 While this position guarantees the 
availability of binding and final remedies for victims, it also reinvigorates voluntary 
compliance with decisions under article 30 despite mandating the Executive 
Council of Ministers to assist the Assembly by monitoring the execution of the 
Court’s judgment on its behalf.216  
The concept of involving an AU organ to monitor execution is not alien when 
compared with article 58 of the African Charter. On the other hand, while a similar 
text is evident in the ECHR217 and Inter-American human rights,218 the African 
Charter provision did not go further on what the Court could do if the Executive 
Council of Ministers fails to carry out its duty. While this needs to be addressed, it 
can be argued that such a gap may have contributed to poor compliance with 
decisions by state parties.219 Nevertheless, the recognition of the Council of 
Ministers in the Court Protocol is a progressive step in the improvement of the 
African regional human rights system.220 What is therefore lacking is for the AU to 
ensure that the Executive Council of Ministers carries out its duty or alternatively, 
creates a new body that may focus on monitoring compliance with African Court 
decisions. 
                                       
214 Article 63 of the Inter-American Human Rights Convention and article 41 of the ECHR. 
215 Articles 28 (1) and (2), 29 and 30 of the Court Protocol; Rules 59 and 61 of the Rules of Court. However, such 
decision may be reviewed by the Court in the light of new evidences- article 28 (3) of the Court Protocol.   
216 Articles 29 (2) and 30 of the Court Protocol; Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. 
217 Article 46 (1) of ECHR. 
218 Article 68 (1) of the Inter-American Human Rights Convention. 
219 Activity Report of the African Court, available at > http://en.african-
court.org/images/Activity%20Reports/AfCHPR_Activity_Report_2016_E.pdf< accessed 15 March 2019.  
220 However, as of March 2019, no mission has been undertaken by the Council of Ministers to ascertain reasons 
for non-compliance with Court decisions. 
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However, the Court is mandated to submit a report to the Assembly 
specifying the cases in which a state has not complied with the Court’s 
judgment.221 Whether this provision is intended to notify the Assembly to act 
against non-complying state parties, Nsongurua opined that this provision acts as 
a robust shaming mechanism to strengthen the authority of the African Court.222 
One could, however, question whether the name and shame characteristic has 
enhanced the effective realisation of civil and political rights in Africa. This question 
is put forward because there is neither any record of the AU Assembly acting on 
the annual reports of the Court to demand state party compliance nor evidence of 
the use of sanctions against non-complying state parties to the Court decisions. 
In this light, one would suggest the use of sanctions against non-complying state 
parties or other measures such as negotiations, where necessary, to ensure state 
party compliance. Therefore, it is submitted that the AU Assembly has failed to 
invoke the information under article 31 to compel effective compliance despite 
having the power to impose sanctions or take other measures of a political or 
economic nature against AU member states.223    
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter confirms that Africa’s political and institutional framework for 
realising effective human rights protection is far from being complete. Firstly, it 
suggests that this journey is still in progress. In its practice, for instance, the 
African Union, African Commission and Court have moved between weakness and 
rigidity, perhaps explaining some of the growth recorded in the aspects of African 
human rights enforcement. Indeed, while the African Commission and African 
Court have developed meaningful jurisprudence in the course of carrying out their 
mandates, they are incapacitated due to reasons such as lack of capacity to ensure 
that state parties comply with their decisions and hindered access to the African 
Court. At present, the African Union is equally unprepared to deploy its organs 
                                       
221 Article 31 of the Court Protocol.  
222 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better later than never’ (n 
160 above).  
223 Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act empowers the AU Assembly to impose sanctions where necessary. 
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and disciplinary powers to advance effective enforcement of African Charter rights 
and freedoms. Secondly, one thing to reiterate here is that the protection of 
African Charter rights is not the sole obligation of the African Court and African 
Commission. The African Commission may cooperate with other African and 
international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human 
and peoples’ rights.224 In other words, other AU institutions, as well as 
international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council, may put pressure 
or demand enforcement of findings of the Court or Commission. Until then, the 
use of sanctions against non-complying AU member states remains a good option 
for the AU. At the same time, the AU must learn to positively use the name and 
shame approach as a tool to realise more state party compliance with African 
Charter obligations because African countries have shown some discomfort when 
publicly identified as human rights abusers.225  
Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated that mere ratification of 
human rights treaties does not end human rights violations. While much more can 
be and should be done to advance enforcement on the continent, the regional 
institutions can draw a meaningful lesson from their counterparts’ successes to 
improve its shortcomings. However, different strategies need to be embarked on 
and considered, especially where the strategies of the African Court and 
Commission have been unsuccessful in advancing enforcement of the African 
Charter or where the Executive Council of Ministers and the ASHG have shown 
lack of dedication. In this regard, a human rights department within the AU should 
be considered and established.   
Altogether, the fact that the African Charter continues to receive criticism 
means that it is not successful in addressing human rights matters in the region. 
It is agreed that the emergence of the African Court has so far not sufficiently 
addressed the structural weaknesses of the African human rights system. 
                                       
224 Article 45 (c) of the African Charter. 
225 This accounts for the reason why many totalitarian African governments supress free dissemination of 
information through the media. See also, Kofi Quashigah, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: 
Towards a more effective Reporting Mechanism’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Journal, 261.  
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Nevertheless, the finding in this chapter is not merely asking for stronger 
realignment with the totality of Western human rights models; indeed, it is now 
more than ever before that Africa needs to borrow heavily from its civilisation to 
help chart a stronger and more durable human rights heritage.
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CHAPTER FIVE: STATE PARTY OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AFRICAN 
CHARTER: USING NIGERIA, TANZANIA, AND BENIN TO HIGHLIGHT 
DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS  
5.0. Introduction  
Having demonstrated that the African Charter norms are not entirely 
comprehensive, and having shown that the political and institutional 
framework for African Charter enforcement is problematic, this chapter will 
investigate state party obligations under the Charter. In particular, using 
Nigeria, the United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania), and the Republic of 
Benin (Benin) as illustrations, it will analyse how these countries have 
incorporated the African Charter and the influence, if any, the African 
Charter may have on domestic protection of civil and political rights. Thus, 
this chapter will contribute to knowledge by examining the constitutional 
protection of civil and political rights, particularly how some state parties 
respond to the African Charter discourse with a view to suggesting how 
effective enforcement of civil and political rights can be realised.  
This chapter is undertaken because responding to an array of civil 
and political rights violations requires multi-faceted efforts at international, 
regional and domestic levels. For this reason, the approach adopted in the 
African Charter and its Court Protocol is such that contracting state parties 
are assigned certain obligations to enhance the enforcement of African 
Charter rights and freedoms. For instance, article 1 of the African Charter 
mandates state parties to take legislative and other measures to give effect 
to human and peoples’ rights enshrined therein. Accordingly, state parties 
to the African Charter are obliged to ensure the enjoyment of rights for the 
following reasons. First, state parties have a mandate to protect these rights 
through legislative or other measures. And secondly, state parties are 
obliged under the Charter to provide redress through domestic means such 
as the national courts. The above reasons are anticipated because state 
parties bear enormous responsibility for ensuring that the Charter rights 
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are respected within their jurisdiction, given that violations and firsthand 
enforcement are carried out at state levels. Indeed, human rights 
enforcement will be a remote and unattainable goal if the actual situation 
in states does not reflect the ideals of international human rights treaties.  
5.1 Rationale and justification for the choice of countries 
It is imperative to explain the rationale for the choice of countries in order 
to delineate the scope of this chapter. This is because the AU comprises 
fifty-five member states with diverse legal systems, of which fifty-four have 
signed, deposited and ratified the African Charter.1 This number makes it 
practically impossible for this thesis to examine all fifty-four African Charter 
state parties. However, states are chosen on the rationale of the similarity 
and dissimilarity approach whereby selected states represent/reflect 
situations in other states. Thus, three countries would be examined having 
due consideration to the following justifications: legal system, engagement 
of the African Charter and regional institutions, and the scope of domestic 
protection and enforcement.  
                                       
1 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights ratification table, available at 
>https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-sl-
african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_2.pdf< accessed 23 September 2019.  
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2 At present, the main legal systems found in Africa are common law, civil law, customary law, religious 
law such as Islamic law or Sharia law, and mixed law.   
3 In practice, the law of Nigeria consists of three distinct legal systems, Sharia law, the customary law 
and the common law. For example, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria recognises various courts across 
these three legal systems to ensure enforcement institutions are provided for the religious and cultural 
societies. To put it differently, Nigeria is a multi-religious and cultural country. See Chapter VII of 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria. 
Country  Engagement with 
the African 
Charter and 
regional 
institutions  
Legal 
system2 
Scope of domestic 
protection  
Nigeria  
African Charter ratification 
- 22/06/1983 
African Court Protocol 
ratification - 20/05/2004 
Article 34(6) of the Court 
Protocol Declaration – Not 
applicable.  
Thirty-six finalised 
communications 
at the African 
Commission and 
one finalised case 
at the African 
Court. 
Mixed law3 1999 Constitution 
of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 
Tanzania  
African Charter ratification 
- 18/02/1984 
African Court Protocol 
ratification - 07/02/2006 
Article 34(6) of the Court 
Protocol Declaration – 
09/03/2010. 
Nine 
communications 
at the African 
Commission. 
Twenty-seven 
finalised cases and 
103 pending cases 
at the African 
Court.  
Common law 1977 Constitution 
of the United 
Republic of 
Tanzania  
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5.1.1 Legal system 
Long before colonisation, the administration of justice in many African 
settlements was mainly based on customary law and values.4 However, 
everything changed when the colonialists came to Africa. The European 
influence over the traditional African practices, values and rights were made 
possible through the guise and promise of improving and bettering the lives 
of Africans.5 Hence, at the time of independence, the European political, 
social and economic structures dominated entirely and replaced the 
majority of the “traditional African structures and values”.6 While this 
position is correct according to Nmehielle, it is noteworthy to mention that 
the European system did not completely erase the “traditional African value 
system”.7 At present, the main legal systems found in Africa are common 
                                       
4 Makau Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the 
Language of Duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of Int. Law, 339. 
5 Kofi Busia, Africa in search of Democracy (Routledge and Kegan Paul PLC, 1969) 48. 
6 Makau Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the 
Language of Duties’ (n 4 above).  
7 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practices and Institutions (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 27. At present, customary law system forms part of the recognised legal 
systems in many African states such as Nigeria.  
Benin  
African Charter ratification 
- 20/01/1986 
African Court Protocol 
ratification - 22/08/2004 
Article 34(6) of the Court 
Protocol Declaration – 
08/02/2016.  
Six 
communications 
at the African 
Commission. One 
finalised case and 
four pending cases 
before the African 
Court.      
Civil law 1990 Constitution 
of the Republic of 
Benin 
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law,8 civil law,9 customary law,10 religious law such as Islamic law or Sharia 
law,11 and mixed law.12 The legal system in many African countries reflect 
the systems of law and dispute resolution of the colonising country.13 
Flowing from the foregoing, Tanzania is a common law country, Benin is a 
civil law country while Nigeria ordinarily should be a common law country, 
but in reality, Nigeria is a mixed law country.14 The different legal systems 
demonstrate that some African countries did not wholly accept the legal 
system of their colonising country after independence; indeed, some 
aspects of the traditional values were retained alongside the European 
system. Therefore, the choice of Tanzania, Benin and Nigeria offers an 
opportunity to assess African Charter civil and political rights enforcement 
from the perspective of different legal systems.  
5.1.2 Scope of domestic protection of civil and political rights  
Most African states regained their independence from the late 1950s. 
Independence from European colonialism changed the human rights 
perspective of these African countries because many newly independent 
African countries were under pressure to accept the UDHR through their 
                                       
8 Common law is derived from English common law doctrine and passed on to British colonies following 
colonisation. See, Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Evolution of Common Law’ (2007) 115 
Journal of Political Economy, 43.  
9 The civil law is derived from Roman law and is found in many in continental European countries, 
including France and its former colonies.   
10 Customary law systems are found in Africa and is rooted in the customs and values of a community. 
See, Neil Duxbury, ‘Custom as Law in English Law’ (2017) 76 (2) Cambridge Law Journal, 337.  
11 This is based on religious belief or text and governs all aspects of public and private life. An example 
is Sharia law.  
12 Mixed law refers to a combination of any of the other legal systems in one jurisdiction or country. See, 
William Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified)’ (2000) 60 
(3) Louisiana Law Review, 677. 
13 Sandra Joireman, ‘Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial 
Legacy’ (2001) 39 (4) Journal of Modern African Studies, 2. For instance, Nigeria was colonised by 
Britain, Benin was created in 1960 when the colony of French Dahomey gained independence from 
France, and Tanzania was a former colony of Germany until 1919, when, under the League of Nations, 
it became a British colony.  
14 In practice, the law of Nigeria consists of three distinct legal systems, Sharia law, the customary law 
and the common law. For example, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria recognises various courts across 
these three legal systems to ensure enforcement institutions are provided for the religious and cultural 
societies. To put it differently, Nigeria is a multi-religious and cultural country. See Chapter VII of 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria.  
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membership of the UN.15 Consequently, state constitutions were drafted as 
the supreme law of countries, and some of them enshrined human rights 
provisions. However, soon after the independence of many countries, the 
African elites in a bid to consolidate power dismantled liberal constitutions, 
retreated to ethnic loyalties and resorted to totalitarian leadership.16 
Although this trend lasted for decades in many African countries, some that 
later returned to constitutional democracy include Nigeria,17 Benin18 and 
Tanzania.19 Returning to constitutional democracy presents an opportunity 
to examine the legislative and other measures adopted for the enforcement 
of civil and political rights at national levels. This is because totalitarian 
governments either fail to respect human rights adequately or suspend 
state constitutions containing human rights.20 
However, it is imperative to mention that the extent of constitutional 
protection of civil and political rights varies from one country to another. 
For instance, Tanzania and Nigeria have some similarities concerning the 
constitutional enforcement of fundamental or basic human rights as 
opposed to socio-economic rights which are recognised as Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, thus, non-justiciable 
rights.21 It follows that these human rights categories do not enjoy equal 
domestic enforcement at national levels, thereby violating the African 
Charter objective. On the other hand, the 1990 Constitution of Benin 
adopted a different approach. First, this constitution affirms the rights and 
                                       
15 Osita Eze, Human rights in Africa: Some selected problems (Macmillan Nigeria Publishers, 1984) 23. 
16 John Harbeson, ‘Democracy, Autocracy and the Sub-Saharan African States’ in John Harbeson and 
Donald Rothchild (eds) Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order (4th edition, Westview Press, 
2008) 87. 
17 Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999 after several years of military rule and its 1999 Constitution 
has been amended severally but no significant amendment has been made to its human rights provisions 
and judicial institutions. 
18 Benin has a 1990 Constitution.  
19 Tanzania 1977 Constitution contains human rights provisions and judicial institutions.  
20 For example, General Sani Abacha suspended the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria using Decree No. 12 
of 1994 and Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 to oust the jurisdiction of 
ordinary courts in Nigeria.  
21 Part II of 1977 Constitution of Tanzania, and Chapter II of 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.  
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duties proclaimed in the African Charter as an integral part of the 1990 
Constitution.22 Secondly, this constitution does not contain provisions on 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, which 
makes its progressive coverage of human rights protection relevant. 
Therefore, the inclusion of Benin provides a different approach from many 
African countries concerning the constitutional protection of human rights 
and the domestic institutions for enforcement.  
5.1.3 Engagement with the African Charter and its Court Protocol  
Another significant reason for the choice of countries is their level of 
engagement with the African Charter institutions. The engagement depends 
on whether they have ratified the African Charter and its Protocol, and if 
they have made a declaration under article 34 (6) of the Court Protocol. For 
instance, while the three countries have ratified the African Charter and the 
Court Protocol, Tanzania and Benin have deposited the declaration under 
article 34 (6) of the Court protocol accepting the competence of individuals 
and NGOs to access the court. On the other hand, Nigeria is yet to make 
changes under article 34 (6). It is therefore submitted that the level of 
accountability differs especially in relation to the African Court jurisdiction 
of individual and NGOs cases. For instance, while Nigeria has the highest 
number of finalised cases at the African Commission,23 Tanzania has the 
highest number of both finalised and pending cases at the African Court,24 
whereas Benin, has the least appearances at both the African Court and 
                                       
22 Article 7 of 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
23 Nigeria, as of the 1st day of May 2019 has 36 finalised communications at the African Commission 
and only one finalised case at the African Court. See, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
‘Contentious Matters’, available at > http://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-
21#statistical-summary< accessed 11 October 2019; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, ‘Communications’, available at > https://www.achpr.org/communications< accessed 11 October 
2019.  
24 Tanzania, as of the 1st day of May 2019 has 27 finalised cases and 103 out of 146 pending cases before 
the African Court. In addition, Tanzania has 9 finalised communications at the African Commission. 
See, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Contentious Matters’, available at > 
http://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21#statistical-summary< accessed 11 
October 2019; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Communications’, available at > 
https://www.achpr.org/communications< accessed 11 October 2019. 
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Commission.25 Therefore, state party engagement would demonstrate the 
underpinning domestic normative and institutional challenges or otherwise, 
in the enforcement of civil and political rights as well as the level of 
compliance with African Charter obligations.  
5.2 State party obligations under the African Charter and the Court 
Protocol 
Having examined the rationale and justification for the choice of selected 
states in the previous section, this section will demonstrate that success of 
a regional human rights treaty is a reflection of the commitment of its 
contracting state parties. Before examining state parties’ obligations under 
the African Charter, it is imperative to mention that state party obligations 
vary from one instrument to another, and these directly impact on national 
human rights enforcement. For instance, while both the American 
Convention and ECHR allow for state party reservation,26 the African 
Charter adopts an approach that requires mandatory state party 
enforcement of the rights and freedom therein enshrined. This implies that 
a state party may, when signing the ECHR or when depositing its national 
instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular 
provision that is not in conformity with the provisions of a law in force in its 
territory.  
Articles 1 and 26 of the African Charter advance the suggestion that 
state parties’ obligations under the Charter play a significant role in its 
success.27 Obligations undertaken under international instruments upon 
becoming a state party carry with it an underlying commitment that must 
be respected by state parties. For instance, the actual and evident prospect 
                                       
25 As at the 1st day of May 2019, Benin has one decided case (Sabastine Ajavon v Benin, App. No. 
013/2017) and only four pending cases at the African Court. In addition, Benin has 6 communications at 
the African Commission of which three were ruled inadmissible, two had their files closed, and one was 
decided on merit.  
26 Article 75 of the American Convention and article 57 of ECHR. 
27 Ultimately, article 1 requires the adoption of legislative or other measures of protection, while article 
26 instructs the establishment of independent courts and other national institutions for the protection of 
Charter rights and freedoms.  
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of article 1 is that the enjoyment of the Charter rights and freedoms largely 
depend on the level of recognition given, and measures that are taken to 
give effect to them by state parties. It suggests that state parties have the 
primary responsibility for implementation. Thus, litigation at domestic 
courts and quasi-judicial bodies is a reliable method of realising rights 
recognised by state parties in any event where there is an alleged violation 
or risk of violation.28 Not surprisingly, the Commission found a breach of 
article 26 in Tsatsu Tsikata v Ghana because the respondent state failed to 
guarantee the independence of courts through tactics such as the 
appointment of judicial officers.29 According to the Commission, such acts 
would undermine both the independence of the courts and public confidence 
in them.30 Therefore, the obligations reviewed in this section highlight the 
relationship between the African Charter and state parties as well as 
emphasising the significance of state parties in the enforcement of the 
African Charter.  
5.2.1 Obligation to provide legislative or other measures of 
protection 
When the member states of the AU ratify the African Charter, they 
voluntarily agree to be bound by the regional concepts and ideas of human 
rights enforcement.31 This undertaking in African human rights discourse 
demands a change of attitude by state parties. Clearly, it comes with 
various obligations. It mandates state parties to recognise the rights, duties 
and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and adopt legislative or other 
measures to give effect to them.32 Furthermore, it mandates state parties 
to guarantee the protection of the Charter rights to every individual without 
                                       
28 For African Charter right to be enforced at domestic level, state party implementation must be backed 
by independent court and other appropriate national institutions.  
29 Communication 332/2006, para. 163.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Communication 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93 - Amnesty International v Sudan, para 40-42.  
32 Article 1 of the African Charter. Article 1 enshrines that ‘member states of the Organisation of African 
Unity parties to the present Charter will recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter 
and will undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them’.  
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distinction of any kind.33 However, the extent to which this reality can be 
achieved varies from state to state.34 For example, the language ‘other 
measures’ as evident in article 1 seems broad. In other words, it gives a 
leeway for state parties to adopt approaches that suit them as long as they 
give effect to the Charter rights, duties and freedoms. What is implied by is 
that African countries may choose any means, not particularly legislative 
measures, as long as they give effect to African Charter rights and 
freedoms. 
Contrary to the normative protection in other regional treaties, the 
African Charter protects a range of rights such as civil and political rights, 
socio-economic and cultural rights, and collective rights. At the international 
level, both civil and political rights and socio-economic and cultural rights 
enjoy international law recognition following re-enactments by the UN in 
ICCPR and ICSECR.35 However, article 1 of the African Charter declares a 
fundamental obligation that state parties recognise the rights and duties in 
the Charter as well as committing to respect them and undertake measures 
to give effect to them.36 Therefore, violation of any provision of the African 
Charter is a violation of article 1.37 This implies that the numerous 
communications and cases alleging violations of various African Charter 
rights demonstrate the failures in domestic protection.  
 From the outset, article 1 demonstrates the state party mandate to 
provide domestic protection of human rights through legislative or other 
measures. However, it is clear that while some African states have laudable 
                                       
33 Article 2 of the African Charter stipulates that ‘every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of 
the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind 
such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and 
social origin, fortune, birth or other status’.   
34 It is not out of place to assert that states face challenges that may affect their obligation and enforcement 
of civil and political rights and these challenges may include legal and political systems, armed conflict 
and unrest, weak domestic institutions, poor cooperation and relationship between states and regional 
enforcement mechanisms, and peculiar social and cultural challenges.  
35 Beth Simmons, ‘Civil Rights in International Law: Compliance with Aspects of International Bill of 
Rights’ (2009) 16 (2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 437. 
36 Communication 319/06 – Interights and Ditshwanelo v Botswana, para 97. 
37 Communication 147/95 and 149/96 – Dawda Jawara v The Gambia. 
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and inspiring provisions for human rights protection, some constitutional 
provisions also limit and undermine human rights goals. This is because 
some AU state party constitutions bar the enforcement of some socio-
economic rights by recognising this category of rights as Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy.38 It is submitted that 
such constitutional limitation violates article 1 because it constitutes state 
party failure to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights guaranteed in 
the Charter.39  
This obligation shows the enormous responsibility of state parties. 
More specifically, it expects state parties to use their constitution to protect 
human rights according to contemporary human rights rules, directives, 
resolutions and treaties, as well as empower the national courts to interpret 
and adjudicate on a violation or threat of violation to human rights.40 It 
follows that a state would be deemed to have violated article 1 if violations 
of other rights guaranteed in the Charter occurs due to failure to adopt 
adequate legislative or other measures to give effect to the Charter rights.41  
5.2.2 State party obligation to guarantee the independence of the 
courts and establish appropriate national institutions  
The duty to ensure the independence of the court is a pillar of the right to 
a fair trial and has implications for the actual and apparent impartiality of 
the court.42 This obligation has its foundation in article 26 of the African 
Charter. This is because the right to a fair trial by an independent and 
impartial court is an absolute right under article 7 of the African Charter. A 
court has the mandate to interpret the provisions of a piece of legislation 
                                       
38 Countries with such constitutional provisions include Nigeria (Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution) 
and Tanzania (Part II of the 1977 Constitution). See also, Jacob Dada, ‘Impediments to Human Rights 
Protection in Nigeria’ (2012) 18 (6) Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law, 67.  
39 See, communication 368/09 - Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi and others v Sudan, para 91 and 92. 
40 Benjamin Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa: The Pillars Support Constitutional 
Democracy (Volume 3, Spectrum Book, 2003) 19. 
41 Communication 290/2004 - Open Society Justice Initiative (On behalf of Pius Njawe) v Republic of 
Cameroon, para 202-205; Communication 147/95, 145/96 – Jawara v The Gambia, para 46.  
42 Communication 322/2006 – Tsatsu Tsikata v Ghana, para 146. 
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and where necessary, grant redress to victims. The availability of 
independent courts gives one the needed platform to challenge legislation 
or acts likely to violate one’s basic rights. Indeed, a person may challenge 
the customary law, legislation, executive orders and policies on the ground 
of its contradiction with constitutional safeguards on fundamental rights and 
the courts may overturn such laws or orders.  
The obligation to provide independent court implies that the African 
Commission and the African Court would find a violation of this duty when 
there is government interference in the judicial process. The availability of 
remedies in national laws cannot guarantee full protection if the 
enforcement institutions are not independent of other arms of 
government.43 There will be a violation of article 26 if the manner of 
appointments and the duration of the terms of office to the judiciary are 
made in contemplation of specific cases by the executive.44 This implies that 
while mere appointments of judicial officers do not constitute a violation of 
this obligation, appointments viewed as targeted measures to achieve 
anticipated outcome is a violation of article 26. Thus, a reading of article 26 
brings to the fore the relevance of having access to appropriate institutions 
for the enforcement of human rights.  
Rights will be meaningless if appropriate institutions are lacking 
enforcement. The duty to guarantee independent and impartial courts and 
national institutions are essential to ensure that victims get redress within 
a reasonable time. It reassures state parties of the sovereignty which they 
exercise by first adjudicating on claims against them. Indeed, remedies 
from national courts must be exhausted before the African Court or African 
Commission can consider complaints submitted by an individual or NGO.45 
In particular, exhaustion of local remedies under article 56 (5) is a crucial 
                                       
43 David Gartner, ‘Transformational Rights Enforcement’ (2013) 31 (1) Berkeley Journal of International 
Law, 1. 
44 Campbell and Fell v UK, ECtHR App.7819/77; 7878/77, para 78.  
45 Article 56 (5) of the African Charter.  
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admissibility requirement.46 Therefore, articles 26 and 56 (5) requirements 
come with other state party duties such as ensuring the availability of courts 
and other institutions, the independence of courts, non-interference with 
judicial proceedings, and ensuring a timely and fair trial in the courts. This 
is not unusual because the judiciary has often been vested with 
responsibilities for the dispensation of justice, interpretation of legislation 
and being the custodian of constitutional values.47  
The consequences of article 26 provision in realising the effective 
enforcement of civil and political rights has led to the establishment of 
appropriate national institutions.48 For instance, there has been a 
remarkable increase in the number of National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs) across the African continent. In particular, while forty-four African 
countries have established human rights institutions,49 twenty-eight NHRIs 
have been granted Affiliate Status in accordance with the African 
Commission Resolution on the Granting of Affiliate Stats to NHRIs.50 
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, NHRIs are state bodies ‘established with a constitutional and 
legislative mandate to protect and promote human rights’.51 These bodies 
                                       
46 This precondition is also recognised in ECHR and the American Convention.  
47 Benedict Nchalla, ‘Tanzania Experience with Constitutionalism, Constitution-Making and 
Constitutional Reforms’ in Morris Mbondeyi and Tom Ojienda (eds), Constitutionalism and Democratic 
Governance in Africa: Contemporary Perspective from Sub-Sahara Africa (Pretorian University Press, 
2013) 35. 
48 For example, the following Nigerian institutions have been established by Acts of the National 
Assembly to support human rights protection and promotion; they include, the Nigerian Human Rights 
Commission, and the Independent National Electoral Commission established pursuant to section 153 
(f) of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria.  
49 United Nations Development Programme, Study on the State of National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs) in Africa (Blandford Consulting, 2016) 17-18; Christof Heyns and Morris Killander, 
Compendium of Key Human Rights Documents of the African Union (University of Pretoria Press, 2016) 
343. 
50 Final Communique of the 62nd Ordinary Session of the African Commission, available at > 
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/62nd_os/info/communique62/en_final_communique_62os.pdf< 
accessed 30 July 2018. In addition, these institutions in Africa are organised into a network and meet 
frequently at its permanent Secretariat at Kenya to exchange experiences and make declarations.  
51 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, National Human rights 
Institutions: History Principles, Roles and Responsibilities (2010) Professional Training Series No. 4, 
Revision 1, 13. 
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form part of the domestic apparatus for the enhancement of human rights 
promotion and protection and are funded by states.52 Equally important, 
not only are they recognised as part of the cornerstone of domestic human 
rights protection systems, these entities often participate as relay 
mechanisms between state parties and international human rights 
mechanisms.53 Suffice it to add that the term National Human rights 
Commissions and NHRIs are commonly used interchangeably in literature 
even though the UN Principles Relating to the Status of National Human 
Rights Institutions (Paris Principles) of 1993 referred to such entities as 
national institutions.54  
 NHRIs are vital in the enforcement of human rights. Their 
responsibilities include encouraging state parties to ratify international 
treaties,55 offering advice to state parties on the conformity or otherwise of 
any proposed legislation with international human rights principles or even 
recommending the enactment, amendment or adoption of legislation that 
will promote human rights.56 Although most of the NHRIs are quasi-judicial 
entities, they may submit shadow reports,57 cooperate with international 
bodies and agencies and NHRIs of other states to enhance human rights 
promotion and protection.58 On the other hand, NHRIs provide amicable 
solutions to human rights protection in a manner different from the court 
                                       
52 Paragraph 2 of Paris Principles; Bonolo Dinokopila and Igweta Rhoda, ‘The Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights under the 2010 Constitutional Dispensation’ (2018) 26 (2) African 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 205; Linda Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance 
and the International Human Rights System (Springer Science, 2004) 84; Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, National Human rights Institutions: History Principles, Roles 
and Responsibilities (2010) Professional Training Series No. 4, Revision 1, 16.  
53 Bonolo Dinokopila and Igweta Rhoda, ‘The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights under the 
2010 Constitutional Dispensation’ (n 52 above); Morten Kjaerum, National Human Rights Institutions 
Implementing Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 6-7. 
54 Bonolo Dinokopila and Igweta Rhoda, ‘The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights under the 
2010 Constitutional Dispensation’ (n 52 above); Mario Gomez, ‘Sri Lanka’s new Human Rights 
Commission’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly, 281; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, National Human rights Institutions: History Principles, Roles and Responsibilities 
(2010) Professional Training Series No. 4, Revision 1, 13.  
55 Paragraph 3 (c) of Paris Principles. 
56 Paragraph 3 (a) of Paris Principles. 
57 Paragraph 3 (d) of Paris Principles. 
58 Paragraph 3 (a) (i) of Paris Principles. 
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system. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of NHRIs in some AU state parties 
are limited by several factors such as inadequate knowledge and 
understanding of their functions by the majority of Africans; inadequate 
funding from government; and lack of independence.59 Indeed, a country 
to a country analysis of NHRIs would signpost the extent to which the state 
party prioritises human rights promotion and protection.60 For example, 
even with the constitutional recognition of independent judiciary in the 
constitutions of Nigeria and Tanzania, courts and NHRIs have remained 
inclined to pressure from other arms of government and influential 
individuals, leading to the constant influence of the judiciary.61  
5.2.3 State party obligation to comply with findings of the African 
Court and African Commission 
Compliance with findings of human rights is integral to the entire process 
of human rights protection because it ensures accountability and restores 
confidence to victims.62 However, compliance with findings is a critical 
challenge facing the international human rights system.63 Particularly in 
Africa, part of the challenge to effective enforcement of human rights law 
include disobedience or non-enforcement of decisions, lack of independence 
of the courts and the small number of courts.64 In order to comply with this 
                                       
59 Chris Peter, ‘Human Rights Commissions in Africa- Lesson and Challenges’ in Anton Bosl and Joseph 
Diescho (eds) Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspective on their Protection and Promotion (Macmillan 
Education, 2009) 370. 
60 Frans Viljoen, ‘Exploring the Theory and Practice of the Relationship between International Human 
Rights Law and Domestic Actors’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law, 177.  
61 In addition, there is widespread impunity in the police and other security forces and the police continue 
to act as prosecutors in some cases and sometimes, are able to manipulate evidence 2017 US Department 
Human Rights Report on Tanzania, available at > 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277299.pdf< accessed 06 June 2018; 2017 US 
Department Human Rights Report on Nigeria, available at > 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277277.pdf< accessed 06 June 2018. 
62 It is for this reason that article 30 of the Court Protocol enshrines that ‘state parties to the present 
Protocol undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time 
stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its execution’. However, the African Charter does not contain 
such an express provision.  
63 Daniel Abebe, ‘Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference? (2017) 56 (3) Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 527. 
64 Ibid.  
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obligation, the Commission has over time offered its assistance to states 
where they may have difficulties in the implementation of its 
recommendations. For example, in Malawi Africa Association and others v 
Mauritania, the Commission made elaborate recommendations and further 
offered its full cooperation and support in the application of its 
recommendations.65 Although Mauritania has not complied with the 
recommendation in this communication, this approach by the Commission 
suggests its resilience to ensure victims enjoy the benefits of the African 
Commission’s recommendations. It is argued, therefore, that 
noncompliance with findings of the Commission and Court amounts to an 
exercise in futility. It follows that the AU, the Court and the Commission 
need to do more to ensure state party compliance given the discouraging 
evidence of state compliance with findings.  
5.2.3.1 Analysis of relevant landmark jurisprudence at the African 
Court and the African Commission on Nigeria, Tanzania and Benin66 
This section will examine some landmark decisions of the African 
Commission and African Court on Nigeria, Tanzania and Benin to illustrate 
state party obligation to comply with decisions. It demonstrates that the 
African Court and African Commission landmark decisions have the 
potential to influence state party legislation to meet African Charter ideals 
if properly enforced. However, an attempt is made to follow-up on the 
compliance of African Commission communications and African Court cases 
in the appendix to this thesis. The information contained in the appendix on 
the status of compliance will focus on decisions that urge countries to carry 
out specific actions such as legislative amendments or compensation.67 The 
main reason for this emphasis is the difficulty in complying with declaratory 
                                       
65 Communication 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 to 210/98.  
66 Detailed information on the African Court and the African Commission case law jurisprudence are 
found in appendix 1 and 2, on page 415.  
67 See appendix I and II. An attempt is made to gather information on the case parties, alleged violations 
and violations found, and, decisions by the African Charter institution. Those cases where violations 
were not found are not included given the obvious reason that there was nothing to comply with.  
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judgments earlier adopted by the Commission. Nevertheless, the 
information gathered here is from the State Reports, Annual Activity 
Reports, scholarly works on African Charter jurisprudence, and verifiable 
media reports,68 and represents the first coordinated attempt from the 
Court and Commission.69 Perhaps compliance with international human 
rights decisions forms part of the yardstick for measuring the effectiveness 
of such international human rights systems.70 For instance, the African 
Court has been applauded for the number of cases completed within its first 
decade when compared to European and American regional courts.71  
5.2.3.1.1 Civil Liberty Organisation (in respect of the Nigeria Bar 
Association) v Nigeria72 
Civil Liberty Organisation (in respect of the Nigeria Bar Association) v 
Nigeria is the first case in which the African Commission ordered that 
                                       
68 The information gathered in the appendix of this thesis represents the first coordinated attempt at 
gathering information on enforcement of civil and political rights under the African human rights system. 
The information cannot claim to be complete or a fully accurate account of implementation due to some 
difficulties related to gathering first-hand information of follow-up from key role players such as 
individual parties, relevant state authorities for enforcement, overt unwillingness to release information 
by African Commission and African Court secretariats on the grounds of confidentiality, inability to visit 
and interview African Commissioners and African Court secretariat due to their location in the Gambia 
and Arusha, Tanzania.  
69 See appendix to this thesis. From the available information, the 7th Annual Activity Report was the 
first to be published by the African Commission on its findings under article 55 of the African Charter. 
Before this time, the African Commission strictly relied on the interpretation of the article 59 
confidentiality clause to justify non-publication of its findings. The information recorded in the appendix 
are gathered from the inception of both the African Commission and African Court up to February 2019. 
Besides, they reflect only cases with findings of violations of the African Charter. It does not include 
cases that were declared inadmissible or struck out by the Court and Commission such as: App. No. 
006/2011 – Association des Juristes d’Afrique pour la Bonne Gouvernance v. Republic of Cote d’ Ivoire; 
App. No. 005/2011 – Daniel Amare and Mulugeta Amare v. Republic of Mozambique and Mozambique 
Airlines; App. No. 008/2011 – Ekollo M. Alexandre v. Republic of Cameroon and Federal Republic of 
Nigeria; App. No. 002/2012 – Delta International Investments S.A, Mr and Mrs A.G.L De Lange v. 
Republic of South Africa; App. No.  004/2012 – Emmanuel Joseph Uko and Others v. Republic of South 
Africa; and App. No. 001/2012 – Frank David Omary and Others v. United Republic of Tanzania. 
70 Lutz Oette, ‘Bridging the Enforcement Gap: Compliance of States Parties with Decisions of Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies’ (n 59 above). 
71 Between 2006 and 2016 the African Court handed down merit decisions in 8 contentious cases, and 
declared 2 inadmissible; whereas, the European Court between 1959 and 1969 decided only 7 cases on 
their merit. On the other hand, the Inter-American decided only 3 contentions cases between 1979 and 
1989. See generally, Frans Viljoen, ‘Understanding and Overcoming Challenges in Accessing the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2018) 67 (1) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 63.  
72 Communication 101/93. 
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domestic law is annulled for ousting recourse to a court and for having 
retrospective force. This landmark decision was made after the African 
Commission missed such an opportunity in Constitutional Rights Project (in 
respect of Akamu, Adega and others) v Nigeria.73 This case concerned the 
Legal Practitioners’ Decree enacted by the government, which establishes 
a governing body called the Body of Benchers. Of the 128 members of this 
body, only 31 are nominees of the Bar Association while the rest are 
nominees of the government. Furthermore, the Decree is retrospective, 
excludes recourse to the court and further makes it an offence to commence 
or maintain any action or legal proceeding relating to or connected with or 
arising from the exercise and functions of the Body of Benchers.    
The practical significance of this case is twofold: Firstly, the decision 
signifies that the African Commission can interfere by making final 
judgments instead of declaratory judgments. For example, this case is the 
first recommendation made to an African Charter state party demanding 
annulment of violating domestic law. Secondly, this case establishes that 
the subject matter of a complaint determines whether the communication 
falls within the scope of the African Commission irrespective of the type of 
government in place in African Charter state parties.74 
However, the case above shows the consequences of claw-back 
clauses in the normative provisions of the African Charter. However, this 
decision has demonstrated that national laws that oust the jurisdiction of 
the African Charter are resolved to be a violation of the African Charter. 
Similar to this case, the Commission in Civil Liberties Organisation v 
Nigeria75 further held national laws that exclude recourse or jurisdiction of 
                                       
73 Communication 60/91. In this case, the complainant alleged impartial composition of the Robbery and 
Firearms Tribunal and exclusion of the right to appeal in Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) 
Decree No. 5 of 1984. In its ruling, the African Commission recommended that Nigeria should free all 
the complainants tried and sentenced to death under this Decree. However, this recommendation was 
later commuted to various prison terms by a High Court in Nigeria.  
74 This observation is made because the Decree was enacted by a military regime under General Sani 
Abacha.  
75 Communication 129/94. 
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the court or suspend the Constitution constitute a serious irregularity and 
violation of provisions of the African Charter. However, Nigeria did not 
comply with this decision until the death of General Sani Abacha, which 
later led to Nigeria’s transition to democracy and annulment of the Decree.  
5.2.3.1.2 Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media 
Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria76 
This communication is the first in which the African Commission delivered 
a recommendation on the impact of the absence of a derogation clause in 
the African Charter. This case concerned the promulgation of decrees 
ousting court jurisdiction and suspension of the Nigeria Constitution, 
expunging of the Newspaper Act and promulgation of the Newspaper 
Decree No. 43 of 1993, proscription and seizures of several newspapers and 
magazine publishers, arrest and detention of editors and vendors, and a 
retroactive commencement of the Decree. The promulgation was enacted 
because the military regime under General Sani Abacha was not 
comfortable with the role of the press. At the African Commission, the 
complainant alleged a violation of the African Charter provisions, especially 
articles 6, 7, 9 and 14. In its response, the respondent argued that there 
was nothing wrong in ouster clauses under a military regime because 
litigations would be too cumbersome for a military government to carry out 
its mandates.77  
 Looking at the communication on its merit, the African Commission 
re-emphasised that not only should governments refrain from enacting laws 
that oust or limit the powers of the courts or freedoms under the African 
Charter, they also should not override constitutional provisions or 
undermine fundamental rights.78 It further asserts that no situation justifies 
the wholesale violation of the African Charter rights because it diminishes 
                                       
76 Communication 105/93, 128/94, 152/96. 
77 Ibid, para 13, 14 and 15 
78 Ibid, para 64. See also, Communication 101/93 - Civil Liberty Organisation (in respect of the Nigeria 
Bar Association) v Nigeria.  
249 
 
 
the public confidence in the rule of law.79 Hence, the African Commission 
stated that the only legitimate reason for the limitation of the African 
Charter rights is found in article 27 because the African Charter does not 
contain a derogation clause.80 Therefore, no limitation can be justified by 
emergencies or special circumstances. In its recommendation, the African 
Commission ruled that the Nigerian government should take necessary 
steps to bring its laws into conformity with the African Charter.  
 This case demonstrates the position of the African Commission on 
the impact of the absence of a derogation clause in the African Charter. The 
practical significance of this communication is that no derogation is allowed 
except as provided under article 27. State parties are justified when they 
limit enjoyment of the African Charter rights and freedoms on any or all of 
the grounds listed under article 27.81 The overall recommendation of the 
African Commission appears to be narrow given the extent of the issues 
raised before the Commission. In particular, the Commission limited the 
overall recommendation to a general request for Nigeria to bring its law into 
conformity with the Charter without making orders as to annulment of the 
decree, the release of prisoners, or even request for a change of 
government to a democratic government. In other words, the Commission 
should be seen as having the power to make recommendations relating to 
a change of government where there seems to be a violation of article 13 
of the African Charter. Again, Nigeria did not comply with this decision until 
the death of General Sani Abacha and the subsequent transition to 
democracy.  
                                       
79 Ibid, para 65. 
80 Ibid, para 67 and 68. 
81 Article 27 (2) enshrines that the rights of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the 
rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.  
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5.2.3.1.3 Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre 
and Rev. Christopher Mtikila v Tanzania82 
The first opportunity for the African Court to assert its authority over issues 
concerning conflicting state party’s legislation presented itself in 
Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Rev. 
Christopher Mtikila v Tanzania. In this case, the African Court was asked to 
rule on the constitutionality and interpretation of provisions of national law 
which violated the citizens’ right to association, the right to participate in 
public/government affairs and the right against discrimination of 
independent candidates to contest Presidential, Parliamentary and Local 
Government elections. On the other hand, the respondent argued that the 
prohibition of independent candidates was a way of avoiding absolute and 
uncontrolled liberty, which would lead to disorder and anarchy. The 
respondent further argued that the prohibition of independent candidates is 
necessary for national security, defence, public order, public peace and 
morality;83 hence, qualifications for election are regulated by articles 39(1) 
and 67 (1) of 1977 Constitution of Tanzania and section 39 (f) of the Local 
Authorities (Election) Act, Cap 292, respectively.   
The significance of this case on state party obligation to adopt 
legislative measures to give effect to the Charter rights are two-fold. First, 
the Court, in this case, agrees with the African Commission that limitation 
of rights is only permissible according to article 27 of the African Charter.84 
The Court further agrees that it has jurisdiction to interpret the alleged 
rights vide the ICCPR and UDHR in line with its jurisdiction under article 3 
of the Court Protocol. The recognition given to the African Commission, the 
ICCPR and UDHR, in this case, signifies the broad extent to which its 
interpretative jurisdiction can go, and its ability to seek clarifications 
necessary for a decision in cases before it. Secondly, it clarifies the power 
                                       
82 App. No. 009/2011 and 011/2011.  
83 Ibid, para 90.  
84 Ibid, para 107.1.  
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of the African Court to order an amendment to state parties’ constitutional, 
legislative and other measures adopted to give effect to the Charter rights. 
From this decision, the African Court jurisdiction extends to cases where 
the subject matter of a complaint is national legislation, which violates the 
provisions of the African Charter.85 Tanzania has declined to comply with 
this judgment.  
5.2.3.1.4 SERAC v Nigeria86  
The next opportunity for the African Commission to clarify the unique 
normative feature of the African Charter recognition of all 
generations/categories of rights presented itself in SERAC v Nigeria. This 
communication concerns an allegation over the involvement of Nigeria’s 
military government in oil production through the State oil company, the 
Nigeria National Petroleum Company and Shell Petroleum Development 
Corporation, and these operations have caused environmental degradation, 
health problems and other threats to the indigenous people and villages. 
The communication further alleged the physical attacks and burning of 
villages by Nigerian security forces, shooting and killing of unarmed 
villagers, invasion of privacy of suspected members and supporters of 
Movement of the survival of the Ogoni people, and destruction of food 
source through a variety of means such as the killing of animals and crops. 
Although there was a transmission of government from military to 
democratic rule following the death of General Sani Abacha before the final 
recommendation was made, the African Commission still found the violation 
of the African Charter provisions.   
 The significance of this case on the recognition of all 
generations/categories of rights in the African Charter is that it establishes 
the enforceability of all rights, and in particular, the justiciability of socio-
                                       
85 Furthermore, in Lohe Issa Konate v Burkina Faso (App. No. 004/2013), the African Court ordered the 
respondent state to amend its legislation on defamation in order to make it complainant with article 9 of 
the African Charter.  
86 Communication 155/96.  
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economic rights.87 The Commission averred that the African Charter must 
be responsive to the African circumstances and that all rights contained in 
the African Charter are essential human rights to be enjoyed in Africa. This 
case establishes that every right included in the African Charter can and 
should be made effective by state parties. It follows from the African 
Commission analysis that where state parties omit, bar enforcement or limit 
any African Charter right and freedom in their constitution, such an act is 
to the extent of this case, a violation of the African Charter. Nigeria did not 
comply with this recommendation; however, upon its transition to 
democracy, it established the Niger Delta Development Commission to take 
care of some of the complaints in the region. To date, socio-economic rights 
are not enforceable in Nigeria and Tanzania.  
5.2.3.1.5 Armand Guehi v Tanzania88 
In this case, the African Court made an order for provisional measures 
against Tanzania regarding the execution of the death penalty against the 
applicant pending the determination of the application. In particular, 
Tanzania was asked to report to the Court within thirty days from the date 
of receipt of the order on measures taken to implement the order. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that a systematic interpretation of the African 
Court order shows that the order is rooted in other international agreements 
on the abolition of the death penalty given that the African Charter does 
not specifically prohibit the death penalty.89 
In response, however, Tanzania notified the Court that it would not 
implement this order of the Court. It is pertinent to clarify that Tanzania 
has outrightly rejected orders from the African Court requesting it to refrain 
from executing the death penalty.90 Moreover, Tanzania has always 
                                       
87 Ibid, para 68. 
88 App. No. 001/2015. 
89 Of course, the Court is aware of the existence of the African Commission Resolution Urging States to 
Envisage a Moratorium on Death Penalty. 
90 For instance, Tanzania has also notified the African Court that it will not refrain from executing the 
death penalty in the following cases- Ally Rajabu v Tanzania (App. No. 007/2015), John Lazaro v 
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objected to the African Court authority to make such orders in the absence 
of any risk of irreparable harm and without hearing the parties.91 Tanzania 
argues that the death penalty is recognised in its national statutes and that 
its national courts are right in invoking such national statutes where it 
applies. However, the outright refusal to obey African Court orders violates 
Tanzania’s obligation under the African Charter, and such violation 
undermines the development and enforcement of civil and political rights at 
the national level.  
5.2.3.1.6 Sebastine Germain Ajavon v Benin92 
An opportunity for the African Court to clarify the scope of disparaging or 
insulting language under article 56 (3) presented itself in this case. This 
case concerns an application against violation of the complainant’s right to 
equal protection of the law, the dignity of the human person, freedom and 
security of his person, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, 
the right to property and the duty to ensure the independence of the 
judiciary. The complainant alleged that these rights were violated through 
acts such as withdrawal of custom licenses, disruption of radio and 
television signals, and unfair trial. The respondent thereto objected to 
jurisdiction and admissibility of the case. However, in dismissing the 
admissibility objection on the use of disparaging language, the Court held 
that public figures, including those who hold high office, are legitimately 
subject to criticism.  
 This ruling to an extent settles the uncertainties in meeting the 
requirement under article 56 (3) in the African Commission decisions. Prior 
to this decision, previous decisions of the African Commission on the 
                                       
Tanzania (App. No. 003/2016), Evodius Rutachura v Tanzania (App. No. 004/2016), Habiyalimana 
Augustono and another v Tanzania (App. No. 015/2016), Deogratius Nicolas Jeshi v Tanzania (App. 
No. 017/2016), Cosma Faustine v Tanzania (App. No. 018/2016), Joseph Mukwano v Tanzania (App. 
No. 021/2016), Amini Juma v Tanzania (App. No. 024/2016), Dominick Domian v Tanzania (App. No. 
048/2016), Chrisant v Tanzania (App. No. 049/2016), Gozbert Henrico v Tanzania (App. No. 056/2016), 
Mulokozi Anatory v Tanzania (App. No. 057/2016).  
91 Ibid.  
92 App. No. 013/2017. 
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understanding of what constitutes disparaging language have seen almost 
all criticisms of a President or government as a violation of this 
requirement.93 Although article 56 (3) language makes what amounts to 
disparaging or insulting language significantly subjective, this decision is a 
complete departure from the African Commission’s understanding. The 
significance of this decision is that criticism of public officials on actions of 
government does not amount to disparaging or insulting language. 
5.3 Analysis of the scope of domestic protection of civil and 
political rights 
The previous section examined state party obligations under the African 
Charter and showed that state party commitment to these obligations 
determines the African Charter rights enjoyment at national level. This 
section will analyse whether there are national mechanisms that may be 
deployed to ensure effective realisation of human rights enforcement in 
selected countries in accordance with state obligations listed in previous 
sections. For instance, while article 1 ensures that state parties’ legislative 
frameworks harmonise with the regional human rights standards provided 
in the African Charter, article 26 ensures independent national mechanisms 
are guaranteed. Indeed, it is through the action and inaction of state 
parties’ courts, tribunals, and parliaments that the regional bodies assume 
jurisdiction. However, African Charter state parties have different legal and 
political systems;94 a reality which the drafters may have considered given 
                                       
93 For instance, in Communication 295/04, para 51, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Right v Zimbabwe, 
the Commission stated that ‘in determining whether a certain remark is disparaging or insulting and 
whether it has dampened the integrity of the judiciary or any other state institution, the Commission has 
to satisfy itself whether the said remark or language is aimed at unlawfully and intentionally violating 
the dignity, reputation for integrity of a judicial officer or body and whether it is used in a manner 
calculated to pollute the minds of the public or any reasonable man to cast aspersions on and weaken 
public confidence on the institution. The language must be aimed at undermining the integrity and status 
of the institution and bring it into disrepute’. See also, Communication 306/05 - Samuel T Muzerengwa 
and 11 others v Zimbabwe; Communication 268/03 - Ilesanmi v Nigeria; and, Communication 65/19 - 
Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de l’Homme v Cameroon. 
94 While it is true that the majority of AU state parties are democratic, there are still evidence of 
Monarchy, Military governments. African state are most either civil or common law countries.  
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article 1 language ‘legislative or other measures’ in giving effect to the 
Charter rights.  
This section examines selected countries constitutional provisions, 
enforcement mechanisms and challenges and prospects in order to 
ascertain national efforts towards meeting their obligations under the 
African Charter. The focus will extend to national institutions such as the 
courts and NHRIs. The NHRIs is considered because of the broad mandate 
which complements effective realisation of human rights at national levels. 
The overview of NHRIs shows that the optimal functioning of NHRIs can 
enhance protection of civil and political rights because they tend to be more 
flexible, accessible and less bureaucratic in terms of procedures and 
technicalities than the courts of law.95  
5.3.1 Nigeria 
Nigeria, a West African country, gained its independence in 1960 and has 
undergone several political crises, including a civil war from 1967 to 1970 
and several military regimes. However, Nigeria has been enjoying its 
longest uninterrupted democratic rule since 1999. Nigeria is also a signatory 
to many international human rights instruments, including the ICCPR. 
However, successive Nigerian constitutions since its independence in 1960 
have included provisions on human rights protection. The origin of human 
rights in Nigeria statutes dates back to the various conferences held in 
preparation for Nigeria’s independence, essentially to allay the fears of the 
minority tribes of being dominated by the majority tribes.96  
                                       
95 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, National Human rights 
Institutions: History Principles, Roles and Responsibilities (2010) Professional Training Series No. 4, 
Revision 1, 20-23; Chris Peter, ‘Human Rights Commissions in Africa- Lesson and Challenges’ in Anton 
Bosl and Joseph Diescho (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspective on their Protection and 
Promotion (n 59 above). 
96 Anthony Nwafor, ‘Enforcing Fundamental Rights in Nigerian Courts: Prospects and Challenges’ 
(2009) African Journal of Legal Studies, 1. 
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5.3.1.1 Constitutional protection of civil and political rights  
The first constitutional protection of human rights in Nigeria was 
promulgated in chapter III of the 1960 Independence Constitution and 
subsequently in the 1963 Republican Constitution, consisting of 15 sections 
under the heading ‘Fundamental Rights’.97 After witnessing several years of 
military rule starting from 1966, and a civil war between 1967 and 1970, 
Nigeria returned to democratic government in 1979 with a brand new and 
unique constitution. Although the 1979 Constitution recognised human 
rights protection, certain rights were classified as Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles of State Policy.98 The legal implication of this is that 
the courts cannot enforce the rights classified as Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles of State Policy. Despite this legal implication to 
effective human rights enforcement, the 1989 Constitution and the existing 
1999 Constitution of Nigeria adopted this approach.99 However, another 
common feature shared by the 1979 and 1999 constitutions is that military 
leaders promulgated them at different times in Nigerian history.  
It is necessary to acknowledge that several attempts have been 
made by the Nigeria National Assembly to amend the provisions of the 1999 
Constitution. Despite this, nothing significant has been done to the human 
rights chapter. At present, the Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy provisions cover mostly rights classified under 
social and economic rights such as the right to free education,100 
healthcare,101 housing, support for the elderly, unemployed and disabled,102 
and the right to work.103 To support this position, section 6 (6) (c) of the 
                                       
97 Nnamdi Ogbu, Human Rights Law and Practice in Nigeria: An Introduction (CIDJAP Publishers, 
1999) 33. 
98 Chapter IV of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. 
99 It is worth mentioning that the 1979 Constitution was nullified and replaced by a military decree after 
the 1984 military coup led by General Mohammad Buhari and the military continued to govern the 
country until 1999 when General Abdulsalami Abubakar handed over to a civilian government.   
100 Section 18 (3) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
101 Section 17 (3) (d) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
102 Section 16 (2) (d) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
103 Section 17 (3) (a) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
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1999 Constitution bars court jurisdiction to pronounce any decision on 
matters relating to the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of 
State Policy.104 Therefore, the Nigerian constitution contradicts Nigeria’s 
obligation under article 1 of the African Charter.  
However, Nigeria’s constitution permits the legal enforcement of 
fundamental rights, which primarily are civil and political rights. This 
position on human rights implementation in Nigeria has been reinforced by 
the Supreme Court in Federal Republic of Nigeria v Ifegwu when it held that 
though fundamental rights are part of human rights, the trend in modern 
society where the rule of law operates is to protect fundamental rights for 
the enhancement of human dignity and liberty.105 From this principle of law, 
human rights that are not recognised in the constitution cannot be regarded 
as fundamental rights. Furthermore, in Mustapha v Governor of Lagos 
State, the Nigeria Supreme Court similarly noted that human rights must 
encompass all humans and these rights must be clearly distinguished from 
civil rights, political rights, economic rights, and so on.106 It then follows 
that Nigeria does not allow a blanket human rights entitlement to 
individuals. 
In the Nigerian context, fundamental rights mean rights included in 
Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution and consist of any of the rights 
stipulated in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification 
                                       
104 This was obliterated in the case of Okojie and others v Attorney General of Lagos State (1981) Nigeria 
Constitutional Law Report, 218. See also, Taiwo Olaiya, ‘Interrogating the Non-Justiciability of 
Constitutional Directive Principles and Public Policy Failure in Nigeria’ (2015) 8 (3) Journal of Politics 
and Law, 23; Ajepe Shehu, ‘The Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in Africa: The Nigerian 
Experience’ (2013) 2 Afe Babalola University Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy, 101; 
Jacob Dada, ‘Impediment to Human rights Protection in Nigeria’ (n 38 above); Rhuks Ako, et al, 
‘Overcoming the (Non)justiciable Conundrum: The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction and the 
Interpretation of the Rights to a Healthy Environment in Nigeria’ in Alice Diver and Jacinta Miller (eds),  
Justiciability of Human Rights Law in Domestic Jurisdiction (Springer, Cham, 2016) 124.  
105 According to Justice Uwaifo in the case of Federal Republic of Nigeria v Ifegwu (2003) Federal 
Weekly Law Report (Part 167) 703 at 758.  
106 (1987) 2 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 58) 539 at 584. However, the court distinguish between 
human rights and fundamental rights by admitting that human rights are derived from the broader concept 
of natural rights which every society must accept as belonging to each person as a human being.  
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and Enforcement) Act of 1983.107 Nigeria ratified the African Charter in 1983 
in accordance with section 12 (1) of the then 1979 Constitution (now section 
12 of 1999 Constitution) which concerns treaties and their 
implementation.108 As a well-known international law principle of treaties, 
no state would be bound under a treaty to which it has not given its consent 
before being enjoined to institute domestic measures for implementation. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court in Sani Abacha v Gani Fawehinmi held that 
the re-enactment of international treaties into domestic law is what is 
referred to as the concept of domestication according to section 12(1) of 
the 1979 Constitution.109 Therefore, having ratified the African Charter, this 
section implies that all rights recognised in African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act are enforceable rights in 
Nigeria, thereby expanding the scope of what human rights the courts can 
enforce. 
However, the domestication of the African Charter has raised some 
fundamental constitutional issues in Nigeria. For clarity purposes, the 
constitution is the grundnorm and the supreme law of the land.110 First, the 
constitution ultimately draws a distinction between justiciable and non-
justiciable rights, which the African Charter fails to do.111 The issue here 
affects the domestication and enjoyment of the African Charter rights where 
there is a conflict between the constitution and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act of 1983. 
                                       
107 See El-Rufia v Senate of the National Assembly (2016) 1 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 1464) 
506.  
108 Section 12 states that (i) ‘no treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have force of 
law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly. 
(ii) The National Assembly make laws for the Federation or for any part thereof with respect to matters 
not included in the Exclusive List for the purpose of implementing a treaty’.  
109 Abacha v Fawehinmi, (2000) 6 Nigeria Weekly Law Report, 228. In Ohakosin v Commissioner of 
Police (2009) 15 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 1164) 229, the Supreme Court stated that the African 
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act being part of Nigerian laws 
must be respected and upheld by all courts in the country. 
110 Jacob Dada, ‘Impediments to Human Rights Protection in Nigeria’ (n 38 above). 
111 The justiciable rights are mainly civil and political rights under Chapter IV while the non-justiciable 
are mainly the socio-economic rights listed under chapter II fundamental objectives and directive 
principles of state policy.  
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Therefore, in Sani Abacha v Gani Fawehinmi, the Supreme Court 
unequivocally held that by virtue of the supremacy of the constitution, it 
has prominence over international law and other national laws in the event 
of conflicts, to the extent of such inconsistency.112 The position of the court 
is clear in giving the constitution primacy over domestic legislation in 
Nigeria. Accordingly, fundamental rights remain in the realm of domestic 
law and include rights guaranteed by the fundamental law of the country, 
that is by the constitution.113 It is therefore submitted by virtue of these 
decisions that the socio-economic rights covered in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act cannot still 
be enforced under section 6 (6) of 1999 Constitution.  
The fundamental rights protected under the 1999 constitution are the 
right to life;114 the right to dignity of the human person;115 the right to 
personal liberty;116 the right to fair hearing;117 the right to private and 
family life;118 the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;119 
the right to freedom of expression and the press;120 the right to peaceful 
assembly and association;121 the right to freedom of movement;122 the right 
to freedom from discrimination;123 and, the right to acquire and own 
property.124 However, section 45 of this constitution further indicates that 
fundamental rights under the 1999 Constitution are not absolute in all 
                                       
112 (2000) 6 Nigeria Weekly Law Report, 255. 
113 Uzoukwu and others v Ezeonu II and others- (1991) 6 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 200) 708 at 
763. 
114 Section 33 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
115 Section 34 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
116 Section 35 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
117 Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
118 Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
119 Section 38 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
120 Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
121 Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
122 Section 41 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
123 Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
124 Section 43 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
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ramifications.125 First, in Badejo v Minister of Education,126 Justice Kutigi of 
the Nigeria Supreme Court while agreeing that a fundamental right is 
undoubtedly a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land, 
however, added that no fundamental right should stand above the country, 
state or the people. This principle was further tested in Dokubo-Asari v 
Federal Republic of Nigeria where the Supreme Court reiterated that ‘human 
rights must be suspended until national security can be protected; the 
corporate existence of Nigeria as a united harmonious, indivisible and 
indissoluble sovereignty nation is certainly greater than any citizen’s liberty 
or right’.127  
From the preceding discussion, legislative protection of human rights 
in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria violates the African Charter position on 
derogation and limitations. An instance on constitutional violation of its 
African Charter obligation is seen under the freedom of expression and the 
press provision which has come under assault in Nigeria. The foundation 
laid in sections 39 (3) and 45 of 1999 Constitution affirms the legality that 
domestic laws can restrict freedom of the press and access to information. 
For instance, Nigeria has enacted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
2011, which confers broad powers to the executive arm of government to 
restrict state information on the grounds of national security. While it is 
undisputed that the essence of the FOIA is to guarantee the right of access 
to information held by public institutions, the same Act overwhelmingly 
gives power to public institutions to deny or refuse an application to certain 
restricted information. For instance, sections 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 19 
of FOIA fall under such exemptions or restriction where an application would 
be denied.128 In that regard, one can conclusively agree that Nigeria 
                                       
125 Section 45 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. This section enshrines restriction on and derogation 
from fundamental human rights.  
126 (1996) 8 Nigeria Weekly Law Report, (Part 464) 15. 
127 (2007) All Federation Weekly Law Report, (Part 375) 588. 
128 Section 11 prevents a public institution from disclosing which may be injurious to the conduct of 
international affairs and defence of the country. Section 12 restricts information of public institutions 
relating to administrative, investigative and enforcement proceedings.  Section 14 restricts information 
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constitution shows a disposition towards meeting Nigeria’s African Charter 
obligations under article 1.  
5.3.1.2 National institutions for civil and political rights enforcement  
The 1999 Constitution empowers certain institutions to interpret, protect 
and promote human rights in Nigeria. Primarily, section 46 enables the 
courts to grant redress in cases of fundamental rights abuses.129 In the light 
of this observation, the analysis below focuses on whether the courts and 
the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) are legally reinforced to 
enhance the effective realisation of civil and political rights enforcement and 
to meet the obligations under article 26.  
5.3.1.2.1 The courts 
The primary organ for the enforcement of civil and political rights in Nigeria 
is the State High Court or Federal High Court.130 Section 46 of the Nigerian 
Constitution empowers the High Courts to provide redress to victims of 
human rights violations. This section gives the High Court an original 
jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it concerning the 
violation of fundamental rights and may make orders, issue writs and give 
directions as may be considered appropriate for the enforcement of any 
right entitled to the victim.131 It should be reemphasised that the court’s 
jurisdiction under section 46 relates to fundamental rights and not the 
                                       
relating to personal privacy. Section 15 related to trade secrets or commercial or financial information 
that are confidential. Section 16 relates to information relating to professional privileges or other 
privileges conferred by law. Section 17 relates to information, which concerns course or research 
materials.  
129 Section 46 provides that ‘any person who alleges that any of the provision of this chapter has been, is 
being, or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State 
for redress’.  
130 Order 1 Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009. In Nigeria, the 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules remains the method of safeguarding the 
fundamental rights of citizens.  
131 Section 46 (2) of 1999 Constitution.  
262 
 
 
individual’s ideas of rights or rights barred under section 6 (6) of the 1999 
Constitution.132  
 It must be stated that assigning jurisdiction to the High Court and 
Federal High Court does not in itself guarantee the effective realisation of 
civil and political rights enforcement. However, for implementation of 
fundamental rights to be actualised, section 45 (3) of the 1999 Constitution 
requires the Chief Justice to make rules concerning the practice and 
procedure of the High Court. The rules act as the crucial pedestal for human 
rights enforcement in Nigeria.133 This implies that the court and parties 
before it must always adhere to the procedure explicitly provided for in the 
rules.134 Therefore, a person may invoke the rules in the following three 
instances; where provisions of Chapter IV ‘has been contravened’, ‘is being 
contravened’ or ‘is likely to be contravened’.135 This portrays the rules as 
strict concerning locus standi for instituting an action in court.   
At the outset, the Supreme Court decision in Adesanya v President136 
has interpreted the locus standi of an applicant in a fundamental human 
rights case as the actual person whose rights have been, is being or is likely 
to be contravened. This decision grants access to the court to victims of 
violations only. However, in subsequent decisions, the courts began to 
change this conservative application to accommodate public interest 
litigation. First, in Fawehinmi v Akilu,137 the Supreme Court in applying the 
brotherhood concept that all human beings are brothers and an asset to 
one another went beyond the Adesanya case; and later in Williams v 
Dawodu, the Court of Appeal extended the concept of locus standi for public 
                                       
132 However, with the original jurisdiction vested in the High Court, an appeal can lie to the Court of 
Appeal and further to the Supreme Court of Nigeria, in the event where parties are not satisfied with the 
outcome.  
133 Ikechukwu Uzo, Guide to Fundamental Rights Litigation (2nd edn, Law Digest Publishing Company, 
2016) 90-91. 
134 Abia State University v Anyaibe, (1996) 1 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 459) 646.  
135 Gov. Bornu State v Gadangari (2016) 1 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 1493) 396.  
136 Adesanya v President (1981) 1 All Nigeria Law Report; (1981) 5 S. C. 69. 
137 Fawehinmi v Akilu (1987) 4 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 67) 797. 
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good when it held that the objective of the rule of law is to ensure the 
observance of the law could best be achieved by permitting any person to 
put the judicial machinery in motion.138 At present, the principles from the 
above cases have been incorporated into paragraph 3 (e) of the preamble 
to Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules of 2009. It is 
therefore submitted in line with this provision that no human rights litigation 
would be struck out or dismissed for want of locus standi by the applicant. 
Suffice it to add that removing such a locus standi restriction empowers 
human rights activists, advocates, groups, and NGOs to institute human 
rights case on behalf of victims who may have died, disappeared or facing 
arbitrary detention.  
Nevertheless, the enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria face 
a number of challenges. Firstly, there is an inadequate number of courts. 
This is due to other constitutional restraints such as conferring exclusive 
jurisdiction for claims affecting the federal government and its agencies on 
the Federal High Court.139 For instance, only the Federal High Court has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights violations by federal agencies and 
institutions. However, the Federal High Courts in Nigeria are established 
one per state, and this poses a threat to litigants who may bear more 
financial burden in terms of logistics and delay in the trial due to an 
insufficient number of courts. Indeed, the economic factor involved can act 
as a deterrent to victims seeking redress.140  
 In addition to the preceding challenge, lack of independence of the 
courts is another crucial issue facing fundamental rights enforcement in 
Nigeria. Being an undying attribute of the common law, independence of 
the judiciary forbids pressure on judicial officers by any person whatsoever, 
                                       
138 Williams v Dawodu, (1988) 4 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 86) 189; see also, Nwankwo v 
Ononeze-Madu (2009) 1 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 1123) 671. 
139 See section 251 of 1999 Constitution.  
140 In NEPA v Edegbero, (2002) 18 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 798) 79, the Supreme Court made 
an explicit pronouncement on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to include matters 
contained in Decree No. 107 of 1993.  
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to decide any case in a particular way.141 At present, the appointment and 
removal of judges are sometimes marred by politics, nepotism, and ethnic 
and religious favouritism instead of merit and laid down guidelines of the 
National Judicial Council.142 It is therefore submitted that the lack of 
independence of the judiciary violates article 7 and 26 provisions of the 
African Charter and impacts negatively on the enforcement of constitutional 
rights in Nigeria. 
Likewise, effective enforcement of human rights is compromised by 
widespread corruption. Corrupt practices in Nigeria’s judicial system take 
the form of acceptance of bribes by judicial officials and investigating police 
officers to influence the outcome of court decisions.143 For example, in 
October 2016, eight judges were arrested by a Nigerian security agency on 
allegation of various corrupt practices.144 It is submitted that corrupt 
practices have somewhat characterised every stage of the court process 
and are sometimes encouraged by victims of human rights abuse who may 
want the speedy outcome of their claims. It is further submitted that 
corruption in the judiciary violates articles 7 and 26 of the African Charter, 
thereby limiting Nigeria’s obligation.  
5.3.1.2.2 Nigeria National Human Rights Commission 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) is another relevant national 
institution for the enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria. The former 
                                       
141 Garba v University of Maiduguri, (1986) 1 Nigeria |Weekly Law Report, 550.  
142 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Nigeria: Judicial Independence under Threat’, 
available at > 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24152&LangID=E< 
accessed 24 January 2019; Ibrahim Abdullahi, ‘Independence of the Judiciary in Nigeria: A Myth or a 
Reality?’ (2014) 3 International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research, 2. 
143 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Assessment of the Integrity and Capacity of the Justice 
System in Three Nigerian States: Technical Assessment Report (January 2006) 33, available at > 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2006/Assessment_of_the_Integrity_and_Ca
pacity_of_the_Justice_System_in_Three_Nigerian_States_TA_Report.pdf< accessed 01 June 2018; 
Adedokun Adeyemi, ‘The Impact of Corruption on the Administration of Justice in Nigeria’ in Ignatius 
Ayua and Ameze Guobadia (eds), Political Reform and Economic Recovery in Nigeria (Nigerian 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2001) 678-681.  
144 BBC News, ‘Nigeria Supreme Court judge charged with corruption’ (21 November, 2016) available 
at > http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38053755< accessed 01 June 2018.  
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Nigerian Head of State, General Sani Abacha, promulgated the National 
Human Rights Decree No. 22 of 1995, which established the Human Rights 
Commission in compliance with article 26 of the African Charter. In line with 
the view that gross human rights violations characterised General Sani 
Abacha's regime, it has been argued that the establishment of this entity 
was to deflect international and domestic attention from human rights 
atrocities perpetrated by this regime.145 Whatever reason may have 
prompted this promulgation, its establishment places Nigeria amongst 
African countries with a national quasi-judicial institution for human rights 
promotion and protection.  
Nevertheless, the NHRC survived the military regime that established 
it and has subsequently undergone a legislative amendment under the 
present democratic dispensation.146 The amendment became necessary to 
make it capable of enhancing government commitment to human rights 
obligations by strengthening its independence, composition and functions. 
For example, the amendment impacted on the independence of the conduct 
of the affairs of the NHRC; funding for the NHRC to be a direct charge on 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation; recognition and 
enforcement of the awards and recommendations of the African 
Commission as decisions of the High Court, and the establishment of the 
Human Rights Fund of the Federation.147 In addition, the NHRC is 
empowered to participate in international activities relating to human 
rights; cooperate with local and international organisations to advance 
human rights; publish and submit reports on the state of human rights; and 
assist the government in the formulation of appropriate policies on the 
guarantee of human rights.148 The NHRC has additional powers to institute 
                                       
145 Obiora Okafor and Shadreck Agbakwa, ‘On Legalism, Popular Agencies and ‘Voices of Suffering’: 
The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission in Context’ (2002) 24 (3) Human Rights Quarterly, 
662. 
146 Cap. 61. N46 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
147 Explanatory Memorandum to the National Human Rights Commission (Amendment) Act 2010. 
148 Section 5 of the National Human Rights Commission (Amendment) Act 2010. Under Section 5 (b) of 
the National Human Rights Commission (Amendment) Act 2010, the NHRC is also empowered to 
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civil actions, conduct investigations and inquiries, appoint a person as 
interpreter in matters before it, visit persons, police cells, prisons, or other 
places of detention to ascertain the conditions thereon, make determination 
as to damages or compensation payable to victims of human rights 
violations, cooperate with and consult other agencies, and do other things 
as incidental, necessary, conducive or expedient for the performance of its 
functions.149  
This amendment has on paper, improved several aspects capable of 
enhancing human rights protection in Nigeria, such as the independence of 
the NHRC, adequate funding, and domestic enforcement of African 
Commission recommendation through the High Court. What this means is 
that the NHRC, although a quasi-judicial body, is not under constraint to 
ensure human rights in Nigeria are realised. Because it places the NHRC in 
a position to investigate human rights violations, the NHRC has conducted 
several investigations concerning human rights abuses in Nigeria.150 
However, it is commonplace for the NHRC to make statements urging the 
Nigerian government to enforce human rights laws without invoking its 
powers such as summoning and interrogating persons suspected to have 
violated the human rights of others, issuing a warrant to compel the 
                                       
receive and investigate complaints concerning human rights violations and make appropriate 
determination necessary; examine the existing legislation and proposed bills to ensure they are consistent 
with human rights; promote public discussions on human rights; undertake research and educational 
programmes for the advancement of human rights; report to government on actions that should be taken 
to enhance compliance with human rights instruments; refer matters of human rights violations to the 
Attorney General of the Federation; and, intervene when appropriate in proceedings involving human 
rights. 
149 Section 6 National Human Rights Commission (Amendment) Act 2010.  
150 At present, the NHRC is also carrying out several investigations against the atrocities of Boko Haram 
and the clashes and killings between farmers and herdsmen in some parts of Northern Nigeria. Likewise, 
some key pronouncements from the NHRC are seen in findings relating to the government use of force 
against protesters, electoral impunity, detention of Boko Haram suspects in military facilities, and the 
abduction and disappearances of girls in parts of Northern Nigeria. Following the suggestion by the Chief 
Justice of Nigeria on the need for prison decongestion, the NHRC in June 2018 commenced a nationwide 
audit of detention centres to review if these centres are run in accordance with the applicable Nigerian 
laws and other international standards for detention centres. See, National Human Rights Commission, 
‘NHRC Commences Nationwide Audit of Detention Centres’, available at > 
https://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/read_more_press_release.php?newsid=66<, accessed 30 July 2018.  
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attendance of persons or authority before it, or instituting civil legal actions 
in court.151  
Notwithstanding, the NHRC can best be described as frivolous, as its 
human right responsibilities are rarely noticed.152 This is because, despite 
being well positioned to do significant and vital work in realising effective 
human rights enforcement, the NHRC is still confronted with difficulties in 
conducting its affairs.153 In addition, provisions of some legal instruments 
limit corporation needed in the investigation of human rights abuses 
between the NHRC and security agencies.154 After all, one can agree that 
tolerating legal and procedural defiance hardly ever commands obedience, 
particularly, improvement towards effective realisation of enforcement.  
5.3.1.3 Challenges and prospects of civil and political rights protection 
in Nigeria  
The challenges to the realisation of effective enforcement of human rights 
in Nigeria can be categorised as multifarious because it cuts across 
normative, institutional, cultural, economic and other weaknesses. 
However, significant challenges are normative shortcomings and post-
adjudication challenges, which involve disobedience to court orders or non-
compliance with judgments. Firstly, the constitutional rights contained in 
the 1999 Constitution are not absolute.155 Nigeria’s Supreme Court has so 
far interpreted section 45 intent in Medical and Dental Practitioners 
Disciplinary Tribunal v Emewulu and Another by holding that all 
fundamental rights are limited by state policy, overriding public interest or 
                                       
151 Section 6 (2) of the National Human Rights Commission (Amendment) Act 2010. 
152 Here the term frivolous is used because its findings are rarely implemented by violating state agents 
thereby, having little or no impact on human rights victims. 
153 Some difficulties experienced by the NHRC include inadequate funding, unskilled staff, lack of 
autonomy, etc. See, Nneka Amalu and Moyosore Adetu, ‘The role of the National Human Rights 
Commission in Post Conflict Situation in Nigeria’ (2019) 8 International Journal of Arts and Humanities, 
1; Nlerum Okogbule, ‘Access to Justice and Human Rights Protection in Nigeria’ (2005) 3 International 
Journal on Human Rights, 1. 
154 For example, Section 1 (5) and 2 (4) of the National Security Agencies Act of 1986 which establishes 
the National Intelligence Agency and the State Security Service makes access to information considered 
to be a threat to national security difficult to obtain.  
155 Section 45 of 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
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other factors considered by the constitution in section 45.156 It is therefore 
submitted in line with this decision that section 45 provision is a drawback 
to African Charter progress on state party mandatory obligation to respect 
and enforce human and peoples’ rights.157 For instance, such normative 
shortcomings in the constitution have been relied upon by security agents 
in Nigeria to violate fundamental rights in the course of suppressing 
peaceful demonstrations, effect arrest and detention, or defence of extra-
judicial killings.158  
 On the other hand, another significant challenge facing the 
realisation of fundamental rights enforcement in Nigeria is disobedience to 
court orders. This is mainly because the courts in Nigeria need the executive 
to enforce its orders and judgments,159 despite the view that the executive 
and its agencies are the most significant human rights violators.160 This view 
of the executive is correct in the Nigerian perspective despite having a 
democratic government. This has been demonstrated by the non-trial of 
security agents for serious human rights abuses despite court orders, and 
refusal to release persons under detention such as in the Sambo Dasuki and 
                                       
156 (2001) 3 Supreme Court of Nigeria Journal, 106. Nonetheless, the enforcement of court decisions in 
Nigeria is regulated under the Sheriff and Civil Process Act of 1990- Sheriff and Civil Process Act, 
Chapter 407, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. The provisions of this Act apply only to the High 
Courts and Magistrate courts in Nigeria. For instance, section 72 of this Act provides that any person 
who refuses or neglects to comply with an order made against him, other for the payment of money, the 
court may order that such a person be committed to prison and detained until such an order is obeyed. 
This section implies that once an order for committal for contempt is made, it is a conviction. However, 
this legislation is rarely invoked in Nigeria. For instance, the Nigeria Supreme Court in Boyo v Attorney 
General of Mid-West – (1971) 1 All Nigeria Law Report, 342, 352, posited that it is important for the 
court to bear in mind that its summary powers to punish for contempt must be used sparingly and that 
the court must always act with restraint at all times. See generally, the decisions in Military Governor of 
Kwara State v Rufus Afolabi, (1991) 6 Nigeria Weekly Law Report, (Part 196) 212; Federal Capital 
Development Authority v Koripamo-Agary (2010) 14 Nigeria Weekly Law Report, (Part 1213) 377.  
157 For instance, the right to life under article 33 (1) provides a long list of derogation such as execution 
of the sentence of the court, if a person dies as a result of the use of force that is reasonably necessary, 
for the defence of any person from unlawful violence or for defence of property, to effect legal arrest or 
prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained, for the purpose of supressing a riot, insurrection or 
mutiny.  
158 Council on Foreign Relations, Nigeria Security Tracker, available at > 
https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483< accessed 22 April 2019.  
159 Section 5 (1) of 1999 Constitution.  
160 Chidi Odinkalu, ‘Back to the Future: The Imperative of Prioritising for the Protection of Human 
Rights in Africa’ (2003) 47 Journal of African Law, 1. 
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El-Zakzaky cases. For instance, El-Zakzaky was in detention without trial 
for over 27 months despite several Federal High Court ordering his 
release.161 Non-compliance with court orders reduces victims’ confidence in 
the notion of justice and human rights in general. It demonstrates Nigeria’s 
weak commitment to the realisation of effective human rights enforcement.  
5.3.2 Tanzania 
Tanzania is an East African country consisting of Tanzania Mainland (former 
Tanganyika) and Zanzibar.162 Tanzania’s journey to constitutionally protect 
human rights differs between Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar. For 
instance, while Tanzania Mainland did not have a bill of rights in its 
Independence Constitution of 1961, Zanzibar had a bill of rights entrenched 
in its 1963 Independence Constitution. However, these rights disappeared 
after the Zanzibar revolution of 12 January 1964 by the Afro-Shirazi Party, 
which ousted the Zanzibar Nationalist Party representing the Zanzibar Arabs 
from power and abolishing the Sultanate.163 Remarkably, on April 26, 1964, 
Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar united to become the United Republic of 
Tanzania under President Julius Nyerere, the then President of Tanzania 
Mainland leading to the adoption of the 1964 Constitution of United Republic 
of Tanzania and Zanzibar.164 Moreover, while the 1965 Interim Constitution 
of Tanzania was adopted to establish a single party and the Ujamaa ideology 
                                       
161 The Kaduna State in August eventually charged him with murder amongst other crimes and has also 
kept him in an undisclosed detention centre. In addition, there has been no trial or investigation by the 
government for the over 347 of his Shiite group, IMN, killed during the clash that led to his arrest. See 
also, Premium Time Newspaper of 11 June 2017, Evelyn Okakwu, ‘Special Report: How Buhari 
Administration Serially Disobeys Court Orders’, available at > 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/233665-special-report-how-buhari-administration-
serially-disobeys-court-orders.html< accessed 06 June 2018. This situation also applied to Sambo 
Dasuki’s case. However, El-Zakzaky was only charged for murder and conspiracy in April 2018 by the 
Nigerian government. 
162 Zanzibar became independent on 10 December 1963.  
163 Peter Hansen, ‘Race, Revolution and the Struggle for Human Rights in Zanzibar: The Memoirs of Ali 
Sultan Issa and Seif Sharif Hamad’ (2011) 110 African Affairs, Issue 440, 509.   
164 Issa Shivji, ‘et al’, Constitutional and Legal Systems of Tanzania: A Civics Source Book (Mkuki Na 
Nyoka Publishers, 2004) 47. This was Tanzania’s third constitution after a short period of rule by 
presidential decree. In addition, Bill of rights was introduced in Zanzibar following the adoption of this 
constitution. 
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(socialist system),165 the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 
1977 was later enacted and became the permanent constitution of 
Tanzania.166  
 Constitution-making involves both amending an existing constitution 
as well as making a new constitution.167 In line with this submission, the 
1977 Constitution has undergone several amendments because of its poor 
enactment.168 For instance, the 1977 Constitution failed to include a bill of 
rights until when Fifth Amendment, Act No. 15 of 1984. This amendment is 
relevant because it set in motion Tanzania’s human rights journey.169 
However, it did not solve all the human rights gaps in the constitution, 
thereby leading to more amendments. For instance, the Eighth 
Amendment, Act 4 of 1992, abolished the single-party system and 
introduced the multiparty political system in Tanzania. Likewise, the 
Thirteenth Amendment, Act 3 of 2000, introduced a change to the election 
of the President, a proportion of seats in the National Assembly to be 
reserved for women, declaration that the judiciary has the final say on 
issues concerning rights and duties according to law and dispensation of 
justice, and the establishment of a Human Rights and Good Governance 
Commission (HRGCC).170 These amendments demonstrate Tanzania’s 
efforts and evolution toward the effective realisation of human rights. For 
instance, prior to 1984, mention of human rights was only found in the 
                                       
165 Ibid, 48. This fourth constitution of Tanzania was adopted to centralise power and exclude people 
opposing this dominant ideology. See also, Robert Martin, Personal Freedom and the law in Tanzania 
(Oxford University Press, 1975) 5. 
166 Benedict Nchalla, ‘Tanzania Experience with Constitutionalism, Constitution-Making and 
Constitutional Reforms’ in Morris Mbondeyi and Tom Ojienda (eds), Constitutionalism and Democratic 
Governance in Africa: Contemporary Perspective from Sub-Sahara Africa (n 47 above). The adoption 
of this constitution was a party matter rather than a public matter. 
167 Issa Shivji, ‘et al’, Constitutional and Legal Systems of Tanzania: A Civics Source Book (n 164 above) 
47. 
168 Ibid, 56. 
169 Tulia Ackson, ‘Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights in Tanzania’ (2015) 23 (3) African journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 359; Micheal Wambali, ‘The Enforcement of Basic Rights and 
Freedoms and the State of Judicial Activism in Tanzania’ (2009) 53 Journal of African Law, 34. 
170 Benedict Nchalla, ‘Tanzania Experience with Constitutionalism, Constitution-Making and 
Constitutional Reforms’ in Morris Mbondeyi and Tom Ojienda (eds), Constitutionalism and Democratic 
Governance in Africa: Contemporary Perspective from Sub-Sahara Africa (n 47 above) 34-35. 
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preamble of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania without any implementation 
mechanism or list of what these rights are.171 Nevertheless, the human 
rights situation in Tanzania before 1994 was worrisome,172 and the situation 
has not significantly changed to date.173  
5.3.1.1 Constitutional protection of civil and political rights  
Tanzania is a signatory to several international and regional human 
rights treaties.174 Accordingly, the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania enshrines 
a Bill of Rights in Part III and the Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy in Part II.175 However, while the Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in Part ll are not 
enforceable in Tanzania courts, the key right in this part is the right to 
education.176 For instance, this part urges the state to direct its policies 
towards the pursuit of human dignity; the eradication of injustice, 
intimidation, discrimination, oppression, favouritism, disease, poverty or 
corruption; and, ensuring that the country is governed according to 
principles of democracy and socialism.177 However, listing some African 
                                       
171 In the case of Adamji v East African Post and Telecommunication Corporation (1973) Law Report 
No. 6, the High Court of Tanzania held that the recognition given to human rights in the preamble are 
mere words on paper and lack the enforcement force of the law.  
172 Maina Peter observed that the most violated human rights by government agencies during this time 
were perpetrated through extrajudicial killings, restrictions on freedom of movement, association, 
assembly, and political participation, inhuman and degrading treatment, and personal liberty Mere 
mention of the bill of rights in the statute books of Tanzania did not have impact on the already battered 
human rights situation in Tanzania until the enactment of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act 
of 1994. See, Maina Peter, Human Rights in Tanzania: Selected Cases and Materials (Rodiger Koppe, 
1997) 2.  
173 Even in 2018, unlawful or arbitrary killings by state security forces, harsh and life-threatening prison 
conditions, arbitrary detention, unlawful interference with privacy, interference with rights of peaceful 
assembly and freedom of association, unlawful arrest and intimidation are a few of human rights issues 
commonly reported in Tanzania. See, United States Department of States, Tanzania 2018 Human Rights 
Report, available at > https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/289263.pdf< accessed 23 April 
2019.  
174 For instance, Tanzania ratified ICCPR on 11 June 1976. However, Tanzania, as a dualist state, needs 
more than just ratification. Such ratified international treaty must be re-enacted by the National 
Assembly.  
175 Like Nigeria’s constitution, the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in 
Part ll are not enforceable by any court. 
176 Article 11 (2) 1977 Tanzania Constitution.  
177 See Articles 9 and 11 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania.  
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Charter rights in Part II, Tanzania has failed to wholly meet its article 1 of 
the African Charter obligation.178 
The basic rights enshrined in Part III include some socio-economic 
rights as fundamental rights.179 Although this is different from the 
constitutional pattern adopted by 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, these rights 
are not privileges or available at the pleasure of the decision-making bodies 
as those under the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy.180 Therefore, Part III of the 1977 Constitution primarily recognises 
civil and political rights minimum standards such as the right to equality,181 
the right to life,182 the right to personal freedom,183 the right to privacy and 
personal security,184 the right to freedom of movement,185 the freedom of 
expression,186 religion,187 association,188 and participation in public 
affairs,189 and the right to own property.190 The protection against abuse of 
fair trial, discrimination as well as the prohibition of torture and inhuman 
treatment are contained in article 13. However, the socio-economic rights 
are not so broadly covered in this part.191 Although listing the basic rights 
in the constitution meets African Charter article 1 obligation, this alone does 
not amount to effective enforcement.  
In order to ensure that individuals enjoy these basic rights, the High 
Court is constitutionally granted original jurisdiction to entertain cases of 
                                       
178 See, communication 368/09 - Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi and others v Sudan, para 91 and 92.  
179 The socio-economic rights included as fundamental rights are the right to work and the right to just 
remuneration under articles 22 and 23.  
180 Micheal Wambali, ‘The Enforcement of Basic Rights and Freedoms and the State of Judicial Activism 
in Tanzania’ (2009) 53 Journal of African Law, 34.  
181 Article 12 and 13 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
182 Article 14 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
183 Article 15 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
184 Article 16 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
185 Article 17 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
186 Article 18 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
187 Article 19 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
188 Article 20 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
189 Article 21 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
190 Article 24 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
191 For instance, the right to adequate food and housing were neither covered in Part II nor Part III of the 
Constitution.  
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human rights violations.192 However, concerning the procedure that the 
High Court shall adopt in enforcing these basic rights, article 30 (4) gives 
the state authority the power to enact legislation for regulating procedures 
required for instituting proceedings and for specifying the powers of the 
High Court.193 Although this is different from section 46 (3) of Nigeria 1999 
Constitution which permits the Chief Justice to make rules for the 
enforcement of the fundamental rights provisions, it is submitted that this 
provision is restricting, especially, concerning the independence of the 
judiciary. This is because the judiciary should be empowered with duties 
concerning the dispensation of justice; thereby, it should be responsible for 
enacting rules and procedures for its smooth operation and relationship with 
litigants. 
Nevertheless, Tanzania had no proper mechanism for the 
implementation of the Bill of Rights until the promulgation of the Basic 
Rights and Duties Enforcement Act 1994 by the state authority.194 Coming 
ten years after the recognition of the Basic Rights in the constitution had 
an impact on human rights enforcement. However, the absence of rules and 
procedure did not wholly deter the High Court from carrying out its 
constitutional administration of justice mandate. This is because of the 
judicial activism of Tanzanian courts. For example, the High Court ruled in 
Chumchua s/o Marwa v Officer i/c of Musoma Prisons and the Attorney 
General,195 that it has inherent power to issue directions or orders or writs 
like habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari. In this case, the 
complainant raised whether the absence of a court procedure and rules of 
court for the enforcement of basic rights would invalidate any outcome of 
                                       
192 Article 30 (3) of 1977 Constitution of Tanzania.  
193 This is the position of Article 30 (4) (a) and (b) of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. This is different 
from the position under the Nigerian constitution which rather empowers the Chief Justice of Nigeria to 
make rules concerning the practice and procedure of the High Court for the enforcement of the 
fundamental rights under section 46 (3) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
194 The Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act 1994 came into force on 17 January 1995.  
195 High Court Miscellaneous (Criminal Cause No. 2 of 1998), Mwanza Registry (unreported). 
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the High Court in the enforcement of the constitutional rights provisions.196 
Following this ruling, the Attorney General pursued a bill before the National 
Assembly to amend the nullified Deportation Ordinance which the High 
Court ruled against for violating the freedom of movement under article 17 
of the 1977 Constitution. A similar ruling was given in Rev Christopher 
Mtikila v AG alleging the violation of freedom to participate in public affairs 
under article 21 of the constitution,197 and in Director of Prosecutions v Pete, 
an appeal against the decision of the High Court that section 148 (4) and 
(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985, were unconstitutional. This case 
concerns the constitutionality of section 148 (4) and (5) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1985, which prohibits bail in certain circumstances.198  
 Another reason why it is important to examine human rights 
enforcement in Tanzania is the High Court constraint in realising effective 
enforcement of human rights under the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania 
under article 30 (5) provision. This article provides that in proceedings 
where it is alleged that any law enacted or action taken by the government 
or its authority is in violation of the basic rights, the court is mandatorily 
required not to declare such act or law void immediately; instead, the court 
should give the government, or other authority concerned an opportunity 
to rectify the defect found in law within a reasonable time as it may deem 
necessary. Although this procedure allows the parliament to undertake 
corrective measures on its laws and actions, one would admit that it not 
only limits the power of the judiciary to make pronouncements on illegality 
and non-conforming legislation, it also erodes the separation of powers, and 
checks and balances under article 4.  
                                       
196 The position was also taken by the High Court in the case of Daudi s/o Pete v The United Republic of 
Tanzania, (Criminal cause No. 80 of 1989) Mwanza Registry (unreported).  
197 (1995) Tanzania Law Report 31. 
198 Director of Prosecutions v Pete, (Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 1990). Under Article 30 (4), the state 
Parliament has the unfettered power to regulate the procedure for instituting proceedings at the High 
Court; specify the powers of the High Court in relation to the hearing of the proceedings instituted; ensure 
the effective exercise of the powers of the High Court, the preservation and enforcement of the rights, 
freedoms and duties in accordance with the Constitution.  
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 Despite the peculiarity of article 30 (5), Wambali has argued that the 
court has discretion whether to give such opportunity or declare such acts 
void following the ambiguity of the term ’if it deems fit, or if the 
circumstances or the public interest so requires’ creates.199 However, the 
High Court in Christopher Mtikila v Attorney General declared the legislation 
barring independent candidates unconstitutional in the spirit of article 21 
and further ordered the state to put in place a mechanism that will regulate 
the activities of private candidates before the next general election.200 The 
petitioner instituted this case following a previous plea for court orders after 
successfully obtaining a previous order of the High Court to the same effect 
in 1993, that the constitutional provisions barring independent candidates 
in general elections is unconstitutional and a violation of political rights of 
Tanzanians in elections.201 On appeal, however, the Justices of the Court of 
Appeal stated that the issue of independent candidates has to be settled by 
parliaments which have the jurisdiction to amend the Constitution and not 
the courts which do not have that jurisdiction. This decision of the Court of 
Appeal implies that the courts lack the power to keep all state organs within 
bounds.  
5.3.1.2 National institutions for African Charter enforcement 
As seen at the outset concerning the development of human rights under 
the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania, the vital constitutional entities for human 
rights protection are the courts and the HRGCC. The High Court of Tanzania 
enjoys a dignified and crucial status as chief guardian and trustee of the 
Constitution, and is enjoined to perform its function boldly, responsibly and 
innovatively.202 However, these organs are not without challenges which 
will be discussed in the section below.   
                                       
199 Micheal Wambali, ‘The Enforcement of Basic Rights and Freedoms and the State of Judicial Activism 
in Tanzania’ (n 180 above).  
200 Miscellaneous (Civil Cause No. 10 of 2005) at the Der Es Salam High Court (unreported).   
201 Ibid, at paragraph 47.  
202 Barnabas Samatta, ‘Judicial Protection of Democratic Values’ (2011) 17 East African Lawyer, 10. 
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5.3.1.2.1 The courts 
Section 8 of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act and article 30 (3) 
of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania encapsulate that the High Court has 
jurisdiction in matters of human rights, thereby demonstrating that the 
judiciary is the final authority in the dispensation of justice.203 This implies 
that the findings of the judicial arm have the potential to guide other arms 
of government to pass new laws or amend existing laws that violate the 
basic rights of the people. As custodian of constitutional values bearing 
some responsibility in the checks and balances of power, the courts can be 
vital in the law-making process. For instance, the government of Tanzania 
can request that the Parliament pass new laws or amend existing laws 
based on the finding of the courts as evident in Chumchua s/o Marwa v 
Officer i/c of Musoma Prisons and the Attorney General.204 Following the 
High Court decision in this case that deportation of Tanzanians from one 
place to another within the country was unconstitutional, void and in 
violation of their human rights, the Attorney General approached the 
National Assembly for the amendment and nullification of the Deportation 
Ordinance. 
From the foregoing, it is essential to mention that while article 30 (3) 
gives the High Court full jurisdiction to determine human rights cases under 
the bill of rights, the constitution failed to empower the court to make its 
rules for the enforcement of these rights. One can argue that this has a 
potential to hinder effective enforcement because state authority may 
employ this opportunity to enact rules that conflict with justice, equity or 
expected performance of the court, thereby reducing the powers of the 
court to realise human rights enforcement effectively. For instance, one can 
argue that this may have caused the ten-year wait before state authority 
enacted the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act in 1994. However, the 
                                       
203 Article 107 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania.  
204 High Court Miscellaneous (Criminal Cause No. 2 of 1998), Mwanza Registry (unreported). 
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Court of Appeal in Director of Public Prosecutions v Pete205 had earlier ruled 
that until Parliament legislates under article 30 (4), the court duties may be 
effected under the procedure and practice available in the exercise of the 
original jurisdiction of the High Court. Although this decision eliminated the 
impact of the absence of court rules prior to 1994, this ruling suggests that 
High Court use of ordinary jurisdiction ends the moment the Parliament 
makes this law.  
 The enactment of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act 
provides the procedural rules for effective enforcement of rights under the 
1977 Constitution of Tanzania. According to Wambali, this Act was part of 
government reaction against the High Court independent and progressive 
interpretation following the several amendments to the 1977 Constitution 
of Tanzania.206 In particular, Shivji admitted that prior to the Eight 
Amendment, Act 4 of 1992, the High Court was perceived to be working 
against the Bill of Rights distortions by the executive, which informed the 
executive involvement to permanently deter the excessive judicial activism 
of some High Court judges.207 For instance, in Judge i/c High Court, Arusha 
and Attorney General v NIN Munuo Ng’uni, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania 
held that the court has power and discretion in appropriate cases to direct 
the relevant organ to correct the defect impugned in the violation of the 
basic rights of citizens.208  
Indeed, it is submitted that the Act is limiting in terms of the powers 
of the court to enforce human rights effectively. For instance, while section 
                                       
205 1991 LRC (Const) 553 at 561. 
206 Micheal Wambali, ‘The Enforcement of Basic Rights and Freedoms and the State of Judicial Activism 
in Tanzania’ (n 180 above).  
207 Issa Shivji, ‘The Changing State: From Extra-legal to an Intra-legal State in Tanzania’ in Cornel Mtaki 
and Michael Okema (eds), Constitutional Reform and Democratic Governance in Tanzania (Friederich 
Foundation and Faculty of Law, University of Dar Es Salaam, 1994) 89; Micheal Wambali, ‘The 
Enforcement of Basic Rights and Freedoms and the State of Judicial Activism in Tanzania’ (n 180 
above).  
208 Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Arusha, High Court No. 45 of 1998 (unreported). This decision was 
given against the backdrop of the Tanzanian Constitution that requires the court to give state authority 
the opportunity to rectify its action and inactions.  
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8 (2) restricts the court's power where an application is merely vexatious 
or frivolous, section 8 (3) and (4) excludes the power of the High Court to 
issue prerogative orders and further compels it to dismiss applications 
seeking for injunctions against passing any legislative bill alleged to 
contravene the basic rights provisions of the constitution. These provisions 
conflict with the understanding of court jurisdiction under article 30 (3), 
thereby limiting the African Charter obligation to guarantee independent 
and impartial courts for human rights enforcement. To put it differently, 
Samatta opined that the limitations in the Basic Rights and Duties 
Enforcement Act limit the constitutional functions of the High Court, which 
includes keeping all state organs within bounds.209  
5.3.1.2.2 Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance   
Chapter 6 of the 1977 Tanzania Constitution establishes the Commission 
for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRGG).210 The CHRGG was 
established by the Thirteenth Amendment, Act 3 of 2000, and became 
operational in the year 2001 following the enactment of CHRGG Act, 
2001.211 Upon coming into force, the CHRGG repealed and replaced 
Tanzania’s existing Permanent Commission of Enquiry, which was acting as 
a human rights institution linked to the Bill of Rights in Tanzania.212 It is 
submitted that the demand for a CHRGG is in line with the state party 
obligation under article 26 of the African Charter. Accordingly, functions of 
the CHRGG include nationwide sensitisation about human rights 
preservation; receiving human rights complaints; conducting inquiries on 
human rights violations; human rights education; instituting court 
proceedings to prevent human rights violation or to restore a violated right; 
and, advising government, public and private institutions in respect of 
                                       
209 Barnabas Samatta, ‘Judicial Protection of Democratic Values’ (n 202 above). 
210 Chapter 6, Part 1, articles 129-131 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
211 Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act of 2001 (Government Notice No.67 of 4 th 
May 2001).  
212 Chris Peter, ‘Human Rights Commissions in Africa- Lesson and Challenges’ in Anton Bosl and 
Joseph Diescho (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspective on their Protection and Promotion (n 
59 above) 367. 
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human rights.213 However, in exercising these functions, the constitution 
inserted that the CHRGG will be an autonomous entity and will not be bound 
to comply with orders and directives from persons, government 
departments, political party’s opinion or that of public or private sector 
institutions.214  
There are limits to the function and powers of CHRGG despite the 
constitutional provisions of its broad functions and independence.215 For 
instance, the findings of the Commission have the status of a mere 
recommendation and do not enjoy the binding force of law.216 This limitation 
affects its usefulness and tantamount to a mere fact-finding exercise. For 
instance, following a complaint from Nyamuma village in Serengeti 
concerning the burning of houses and in which all parties, including the 
Office of the Attorney General, were involved, the District Police Chief and 
District Commissioner were found culpable of human rights violations by 
CHRGG. However, the Attorney General of Tanzania, in a letter to the 
Commission, explicitly notified it that it would not implement its decision to 
compensate victims of these violations. In this instance, however, the 
CHRGG requested that parties should approach the court for redress.217 
Although the situation in the above case highlights one of the extreme cases 
where the CHRGG has been humiliated, government agents and personnel 
ignore or refuse to cooperate in investigations conducted by the 
Commission, thereby frustrating the work of the CHRGG.218 One can argue 
                                       
213 Article 130 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania.  
214 Article 130 (2) of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania.  
215 Article 130 (3) excludes orders, directives or investigation from the President in respect of any matter 
or state of affair considered to be of public interest.  
216 Section 17 (1) of the Human Rights and Good Governance Act, 2001.  
217 Ibrahimu Korosso and 134 others, Legal and Human Rights Centre v District Commissioner and the 
Police Officer in command of Serengeti District and Attorney General (Case No. 
HBUB/S/1032/2002/2003/MARA), unreported.  
218 Chris Peter, ‘Human Rights Commissions in Africa- Lesson and Challenges’ in Anton Bosl and 
Joseph Diescho (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspective on their Protection and Promotion (n 
59 above) 367. 
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that such reality increases the gradual public loss of confidence and faith in 
the CHRGG.  
However, following the non-implementation of the Commission’s 
ruling in the Serengeti case, the Court of Appeal held on 2nd January 2009, 
that the Legal and Human Rights Centre, a party before the Commission’s 
investigation, has a right to bring an action before the High Court for the 
enforcement of the recommendations from the Commission. The Court of 
Appeal ordered the High Court to entertain the matter on its merit.219 
Although this decision seems to have legally cured the flaws concerning the 
enforcement of CHRGG recommendations, compliance with decisions 
remains a challenge in Tanzania.220  
5.3.1.3 Challenges and prospects of civil and political rights protection 
in Tanzania 
Despite using the court and CHRGG to ensure adequate human rights 
enforcement, there are widespread violations of civil and political rights 
such as unlawful or arbitrary killings by state security forces; torture; 
unlawful arrest; interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and 
freedom of association; restriction on political participation; arbitrary 
detention; and, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions in Tanzania.221 
What this means is that Tanzania cannot be seen as having effectively 
realised civil and political enforcement. Therefore, it is essential to examine 
crucial factors that hinder effective enforcement in this section.  
                                       
219 Legal and Human Rights Centre v Thomas Sabaya and 4 others (Civil Appeal No. 88 of 2006) Court 
of Appeal of Tanzania, unreported.  
220 Again, on 6 September 2017, CHRGG had ordered an interim stop order on the eviction of people 
from Loliondo village in Ngorongoro District, Arusha following a complaint to it by severally affected 
villagers over the demolition and eviction since 2015. Furthermore, the Commission averred that this 
decision was reached in accordance with its powers under article 130(1) (f) and (h) of the Constitution 
and Article 25 (1) of the Human Rights and Good Governance Act, 2001. See, The Citizen, ‘Human 
Rights Commission stops Evictions in Loliondo’ available at > 
http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Human-Rights-Commission-stops-evictions-in-Loliondo/1840340-
4083752-5nes8w/index.html< accessed 26 May 2018. 
221 United States Department of States, Tanzania 2018 Human Rights Report, available at > 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/289263.pdf< accessed 26 April 2019.  
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First on this list is the substance and real objectives of the Basic 
Rights and Duties Act. Before the enactment of this Act, the judiciary was 
not deterred in the administration of justice given the absence of rules of 
procedure as evident in Chumchua s/o Marwa v Officer i/c of Musoma 
Prisons and the Attorney General,222 and Rev Christopher Mtikila v AG.223 
For instance, judges such as Justice James Mwalusanya, as he then was, 
gave judgments assumed as distorting the executive organ after the Eighth 
Amendment, Act 4 of 1992, which introduced the multiparty political system 
in Tanzania.224 Arguably, the Basic Rights and Duties Act was aimed at 
deterring and curbing the excessive judicial activism of some judges.225 For 
instance, section 8 (2) to (4) limits the powers of the High Court by 
excluding the power of the court to make orders against a bill that is yet to 
be passed by the Parliament as well as the power to issue prerogative orders 
in respect of all applications relating to the bill of rights. These limitations, 
in all ramifications, conflict with article 30 (3) of the constitution which gives 
the High Court original jurisdiction where the constitutional rights have 
been, is being or is likely to be violated by any person anywhere in the 
United Republic. In addition, restricting the High Court jurisdiction on the 
mere precondition that an application is vexatious and frivolous is 
detrimental to a meritorious determination of claims and the general 
development of human rights.  
From the foregoing, it is submitted that state authority in enacting 
the Basic Rights and Duties Act failed to ensure the effective exercise of the 
powers of the High Court, the preservation and enforcement of rights, 
freedoms and duties in accordance with the Constitution.226 For instance, 
                                       
222 High Court Miscellaneous (Criminal Cause No. 2 of 1998), Mwanza Registry (unreported). 
223 The ruling of the Court of Appeal was seen in this case to denounce the power of the High Court to 
nullify a legislation that is contrary to the basic rights of the citizens.  
224 In Daudi s/o Pete v R, the Mwalusanya J, as he then was, declared provision of section 148 (5) (d) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act unconstitutional for conflicting with article 13 (6) of the constitution which 
provides for the presumption of innocence.  
225 Micheal Wambali, ‘The Enforcement of Basic Rights and Freedoms and the State of Judicial Activism 
in Tanzania’ (n 180 above). 
226 Section 10 of the Basic Rights and Duties Act conflicts with article 30 (4) (c) of 1977 Constitution. 
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the requirement for a panel of three judges is counterproductive and has 
the potential of possibly limiting human rights enforcement due to the 
inadequate number of judges in Tanzania.227 This implies that in the 
absence of a structured High Court which allows three judges to sit, it would 
be difficult to always set up such a panel as the need arises, amidst constant 
human rights violations and growing awareness of civil rights.  
Secondly, the provisions of section 13 (2) of the Basic Rights and 
Duties Act are similar in content to article 30 (5) of the 1977 Constitution 
on the restriction of the award the High Court can grant. This crux in both 
provisions sets out to determine whether the High Court should have the 
power and discretion to allow the government to undertake corrective 
measures of its actions through parliament, instead of declaring such law 
or action void. Although the difference between section 13 (2) and article 
30 (5) is sematic, the constitution allows more power in its wording ‘’if it 
deems fit, or if the circumstances or the public interest so requires’. Under 
section 13 (2) of Basic Rights and Duties Act, the wording ‘shall, instead of 
declaring the law or action to be invalid’ removes the possibility of High 
Court discretion as suggested in the constitution. Whether these provisions 
influenced the ruling of the Court of Appeal not to assume its dignified and 
crucial status under the constitution in Rev Christopher Mtikila v AG,228 it is 
suggested that the courts should turn these provisions into a foundation for 
judicial activism instead of invoking it to limit effective enforcement of 
rights.  
Lastly, the government of Tanzania has shown great reluctance in 
enforcing court decisions. For example, twice the High Court has decided 
against Tanzania in Rev Christopher Mtikila case concerning independent 
                                       
227 See, The Citizen, ‘Chief Justice: We Need 150 Judges’ (2019, 30 January), available at > 
https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Chief-Justice--We-need-150-judges/1840340-4957756-
mn4m3pz/index.html< accessed 26 April 2019.  
228 The ruling of the Court of Appeal was seen in this case to denounce the power of the High Court to 
nullify a legislation that is contrary to the basic rights of the citizens.  
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candidates in general elections,229 and to date, Tanzania has not complied. 
Suffice to mention that government agencies and personnel display a 
similar attitude to the recommendations of CHRGG. While it is agreed that 
this attitude can reduce the individuals’ confidence in these institutions, it 
demonstrates Tanzania’s failure to meet its regional obligations under the 
African Charter.  
5.3.3  Benin 
Benin is a francophone constitutional democracy in the West African sub-
region. Benin has had its share of eventful political and constitutional 
history.230 For instance, between 1960 independence and 1972, Benin 
witnessed alternate civilian and military regimes resulting in bans on 
freedoms and human rights abuses.231 However, the lengthy ban on 
freedom and the obvious widespread human rights abuses powered 
discontent amongst Benin citizens, trade unions and groups, which resulted 
in industrial strikes and a nationwide protest in 1989 for regime change and 
the eventual demise of the regime.232 Because of these events, the regime 
agreed to the idea of the first national conference and new constitutionalism 
in Benin.233   
                                       
229 The first judgment was delivered in 1994 in the case of Rev. Christopher Mtikila v Attorney General, 
(1993) (Civil Case No. 5), (unreported), and secondly in 2006. However, the panel of judges in this case 
did not bother with the restrictions of section 13 when it declared the alleged amendment unconstitutional 
and contrary to international Covenants to which Tanzania is party and in true spirit of article 21 of the 
constitution. See Misc Civil Cause No. 10 of 2005, Dar Es Salaam High Court registry (unreported).  
230 After independence in 1960 and between 1963 and 1972, Benin witnessed eight military coups, 
adopted ten constitutions and had ten Presidents. Some of these constitutions were adopted in the year 
1959, 1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1974, 1977 and 1984.  
231 Anna Rotman, ‘Benin Constitutional Court: An Introduction Model for Guaranteeing Human Rights’ 
(2004) 17 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 283; Bruce Magnusson, ‘Testing Democracy in Benin’ in 
Richard Joseph (ed), State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 221.  
232 Related to this, during General Mathieu Kerekou’s 17-year reign as President of Benin from 1972, 
the country witnessed a total ban on civil and political rights and freedoms, and Benin was transformed 
into a police state. See, Charles Fombad and Nat Inegbedion, ‘Presidential Term Limits and their Impact 
on Constitutionalism in Africa’ in Charles Fombad and Christina Murray (ed) Fostering 
Constitutionalism in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, 2010) 7-8.  
233 The conference was held in February 1990 having human rights, constitutional democracy, and 
separation of power and rule of law as issues to be determined.  
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The new constitution of Benin emerged after the December 1990 
referendum for a constitution capable of healing Benin’s past political and 
constitutional instability, where human rights are paramount. This idea was 
addressed and adopted in the 1990 Constitution. The 1990 Constitution 
opted for a presidential system, separation of powers, the rule of law, 
human rights, and a constitutional court amongst other features of modern 
constitutionalism. For example, the preamble text to the 1990 Constitution 
of Benin sets forth the determination to establish a constitutional and 
pluralistic democratic state wherein fundamental rights, public freedoms, 
the dignity of the human being and justice are guaranteed, protected and 
espoused.  
5.3.1.1 Constitutional protection of civil and political rights  
In a bid to give effect to human rights, the provisions of the 1990 
Constitution of Benin bear testimony to the commitment laid down in both 
the UDHR and the African Charter. Starting from the preamble of the 1990 
Constitution, Benin reaffirmed its commitment to human rights principles 
as defined by the UDHR of 1948 and the African Charter of 1981 and further 
admitted that the values of these international instruments are superior to 
the internal law.234 By recognising these international instruments above 
domestic laws, Benin has put a check on the lurking dangers of authoritarian 
rule where human rights would be neglected and abused. It is, therefore, 
necessary to examine whether these constitutional provisions have 
effectively enhanced civil and political rights enforcement in Benin.  
The first article under Title II Rights and Duties of the Individual 
recognise the rights and duties guaranteed by the African Charter as an 
integral part of the constitution and Beninese law.235 By making the African 
Charter part and parcel of the Benin Constitution, it implies that any right, 
whatsoever, missing or limited in the constitution, are made constitutional, 
                                       
234 Paragraph 4 of the preamble and Article 40 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
235 Article 7 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin.  
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enforceable and fundamental rights if it is contained in the African Charter. 
For example, peoples’ rights, although not recognised in the 1990 
Constitution, are enforceable in Benin. Secondly, it suggests that the 
Beninese government must always ensure that its citizens have unlimited 
direct access to the African Commission and the African Court. Such direct 
access would entail the depositing of the declaration under article 34 (6) of 
the African Court Protocol which Benin has signed and deposited since 8 
February 2016. Indeed, not only is this normative style unknown to both 
Nigerian and Tanzanian constitutions, it shows the importance of human 
rights in building a new nation as well as the relevance of strong normative 
protection to the citizens of Benin.  
Despite article 7 recognising the African Charter rights as part of 
1990 Constitution, articles 8-40 of the constitution further guarantees 
individual rights spread across socio-economic rights,236 civil and political 
rights,237 the right to development,238 and the right to a sound 
environment.239 However, the guaranteed civil and political rights include 
the right to life;240 the prohibition of arbitrary arrest;241 the right to fair 
trial;242 the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment;243 the right to 
privacy;244 right to own property;245 freedom of thought, conscience, 
opinion, expression and religion;246 freedom of the press;247 freedom of 
                                       
236 Articles 8, 10-14, 30, and 31 of 1990 Constitution. In addition, unlike the Nigeria and Tanzania 
constitutions, Benin’s 1990 Constitution does not distinguish between justiciable and non-justiciable 
rights in the form of Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. The absence of 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy provisions implies that all rights 
enshrined in this constitution are enforceable in the court of law.  
237 Articles 8, 15-26 of 1990 Constitution.  
238 Article 9 of 1990 Constitution. 
239 Articles 27-29 of 1990 Constitution. What is clearly not protected in this constitution is peoples’ 
rights. 
240 Article 15 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
241 Article 16 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
242 Article 17 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
243 Article 18 and 19 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
244 Article 20 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
245 Article 22 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
246 Article 23 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
247 Article 24 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
286 
 
 
assembly;248 and, equality before the law.249 With 35 different articles 
covering various human rights protection, Benin’s devotion to human rights 
cannot be matched by many African countries, especially Nigeria and 
Tanzania. One can agree that Benin’s constitutional protection impacts on 
its exposure to the African Court and Commission. Moreso, it is essential to 
mention that Benin has the lowest number of cases and communications at 
the African Court and African Commission when compared to Nigeria and 
Tanzania.250  
It is clear from the constitutional provisions of Benin that there is no 
derogation for breach.251 What this means is that similar to the African 
Charter human rights ideology, human rights must be enforced despite the 
situation in the country. In the light of this consideration, the Constitutional 
Court in DCC 06-060 and DCC 06-062, ruled that the activities of the police, 
who acted on behalf of the State, violated human rights and ordered 
compensation to victims. In the same way, the Constitutional Court has 
found judges,252 domestic courts,253 and ministers254 in violation of 
constitutional human rights. In light of the above considerations, one can 
argue that the normative framework of Benin meets the African Charter 
standards.  
                                       
248 Article 25 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
249 Article 26 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
250 As at on the 1st day of May 2019, Benin has one decided case (Sabastine Ajavon v Benin, App. No. 
013/2017) and only four pending cases at the African Court. In addition, Benin has 6 communications at 
the African Commission of which three were ruled inadmissible, two had their files closed, and one was 
decided on merit.  
251 Article 118 and 119 of 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
252 DCC 03-125, the Constitutional Court finds the violation of the right to defence under article 7 (1) (d) 
of the African Charter and article 35 of the 1990 Constitution.  
253 DCC 06-046, this ruling was against the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court of Benin. Cases are 
not named as in Nigeria and Tanzania, rather they are numbered as DCC (Decision de la Cour 
Constitutionnelle) followed with the last two numbered of the year and the number of the case. 
254 DCC 01-058, the Minister and his offices were found in violation of the right to equality before the 
law under article 26 of 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
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5.3.1.2 National institutions for African Charter enforcement 
The courts and the Coimmission Beninoise des Droits de l’Homme remain 
two core institutions with authority to enforce human rights in Benin. 
However, the creation of a Constitutional Court has been cited as the most 
critical mechanism for constitutional enforcement in Benin.255 Aside from 
the Constitutional Court, judicial powers in Benin are exercised by the 
Supreme Court, and other courts and tribunals created by the 
Constitution.256 In spite of the constitutional role played by these courts, 
further efforts made by lawyers and jurists of the Benin Bar Association, 
and Benin National Assembly led to the enactment of Law 89-004 which 
established the Coimmission Beninoise des Droits de l’Homme (CBDH or 
Benin Human Rights Commission) of 1989.257 To ascertain the contribution 
of these institutions in realising effective enforcement of human rights, this 
section examines the provisions concerning the operation of the 
Constitutional Court and the CBDH.  
5.3.1.2.1 The Constitutional Court of Benin 
The Constitutional Court is the highest jurisdiction in constitutional matters, 
the judge of the constitutionality of the law, the regulatory body for the 
functioning of institutions as well as the body guaranteeing fundamental 
human rights and public liberties.258 The breadth of this mandate 
demonstrates Benin’s resilience to human rights, bearing in mind the events 
that led to the enactment of the constitution. In this light, access to the 
Constitutional Court is granted to all individuals, the state and its agencies, 
and this has contributed to developing the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court.259 However, indirect access is permitted for cases 
                                       
255 Title V, Article 114-124 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. Anna Rotman, ‘Benin Constitutional 
Court: An Introduction Model for Guaranteeing Human Rights’ (n 231 above).  
256 Article 125-138 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
257 The CBDH became operational on 30 March 1990.  
258 Article 114 of 1990 Constitution of Benin.  
259 An analysis of cases on civil and political rights violations at the Constitutional Court of Benin have 
shown a good number of abuses against individuals by the police and armed forces in carrying out their 
state responsibilities. For instance, see DDC 06-057, DCC 06-059 and DCC 06-060 on the allegation of 
violation of article 5 of the African Charter (article 18 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin), DCC 06-067 
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suspended in ordinary courts pending the decision of the Constitutional 
Court on matters concerning the interpretation of the constitution and 
human rights.260 This implication is twofold: first, while ordinary courts, 
such as the High Court up to Supreme Court can adjudicate on 
constitutional matters, the Constitutional Court, and not the Supreme Court 
has the final say on issues of constitutional interpretation. Secondly, their 
jurisdiction is not absolute because they have a duty to refer all 
constitutionality questions to the Constitutional Court under article 114 of 
the 1990 Constitution. For instance, although the decisions of the Supreme 
Court are final, the Constitutional Court can call such decisions to scrutiny 
if they infringe human rights provisions or are inconsistent with the 
Constitution.261 Therefore, to understand the scope of human rights 
enforcement in Benin, this section will emphasise the Constitutional Court 
because of its special and unique position in human rights enforcement.  
 The Constitutional Court of Benin performs more judicial functions 
concerning the governance and enforcement of constitutional provisions.262 
It enjoys a broad subject matter jurisdiction, especially in areas of human 
rights enforcement. This attribute gives the Constitutional Court an 
opportunity for a speedy and thorough interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions,263 thereby enjoying description as the cornerstone of liberal rule 
of law and the keystone of the entire politico-legal system.264 The 
                                       
relating to the violation of article 6 of the African Charter (article 15 and 16 of 1990 Constitution of 
Benin), and DCC 03-125 of 20 August 2003 on the violation of article 7 of the African Charter (Article 
35 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin).  
260 Article 122 of 1990 Constitution of Benin.  
261 Horace Adejolohoun, ‘Between Presidentialism and a Human Rights Approach to Constitutionalism: 
Twenty Years of Practice and the Dilemma of Revising the 1990 Constitution of Benin’ in Morris 
Mbondeyi and Tom Ojienda (eds), Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: 
Contemporary Perspective from Sub-Sahara Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, 2013) 262.  
262 Article 117 of the 1990 Constitution of Benin; Kwasi Prempeh, ‘Constitutionalism Revival: False 
Start or New Dawn?’ in Eunice Sahle (eds), Democracy, Constitutionalism, and Politics in Africa: 
Contemporary African Economy (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2017) 12. 
263 Horace Adejolohoun, ‘Between Presidentialism and a Human Rights Approach to Constitutionalism: 
Twenty Years of Practice and the Dilemma of Revising the 1990 Constitution of Benin’ in Morris 
Mbondeyi and Tom Ojienda (eds), Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: 
Contemporary Perspective from Sub-Sahara Africa (n 261 above) 246.  
264 See DCC 33-94 of 24 November 1994.  
289 
 
 
uniqueness of Benin’s human rights enforcement stems from the subject 
matter of the Constitutional Court, which is lacking in Nigeria and Tanzania. 
According to article 117 of the constitution, the wording ‘shall rule 
obligatorily’ implies that this court shall share its mandate at any time it is 
called upon to interpret the provisions of the constitution, including acts 
deemed to have infringed on fundamental rights and public liberties.  
 Article 146 further grants other human rights related jurisdiction to 
the Constitutional Court. For instance, it is expected that the Constitutional 
Court grants authorisation before members of the executive acquire or rent 
state-owned property or goods or declare a vacancy in the presidency. 
Further, article 146 requires the Constitutional Court to rule on the 
constitutionality of treaties and international agreements. Although the 
above jurisdiction concerns the right to own property and the right to 
participate in government, its broad influence has impacted on its 
competence in all aspects of human rights adjudication.265  
Despite these characteristics of the Constitutional Court, however, it 
is not without flaws. For instance, the procedural view of the Constitutional 
Court indicates that it investigates human rights violations.266 The 
implication of having an investigative jurisdiction is that it may encounter 
difficulty in getting the necessary support from security and government 
agencies appropriate in deciding cases against these institutions. According 
to Rotman, the Constitutional Court sometimes enjoy immense influence, 
administrative cooperation and responsiveness from other institutions 
because these institutions want to be seen as favourable as well as to 
ensure that they retain their public trust.267 For example, between the year 
2000 and 2006, the Constitutional Court passed 18 rulings against police 
                                       
265 Anna Rotman, ‘Benin’s Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model for Guaranteeing Human 
Rights’ (n 231 above). 
266 The Court assumed this position following the end of Coimmission Beninoise des Droits de l’Homme 
(CBDH), the National Human Rights Commission for Benin.  
267 Anna Rotman, ‘Benin’s Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model for Guaranteeing Human 
Rights’ (n 231 above). 
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and gendarmerie officers for violations of article 19 of the 1990 Constitution 
of Benin following the cooperation offered by the police.268   
 Another reason why it is essential to examine the Constitutional 
Court relates to its rules of standing. A key contributory factor to the 
success of the Court is primarily attributed to the fact that individuals, NGOs 
and the government have locus standi before it.269 To enjoy this privilege, 
there is no further requirement such as exhausting other legal remedies; 
however, this jurisdiction is set in motion when individuals are fearless in 
taking state agents and authorities to court. This implies that the 
Constitutional Court may not have the opportunity to decide many human 
rights cases of abuse for fear of repercussion by state agents on the victim. 
For instance, not many cases have been instituted in the Constitutional 
Court since the political crises that erupted following the outcome of the 
April 2019 election and the subsequent killing of protesters; the crackdown 
on the press and the prohibition of constitutional rights such as freedoms 
of association and assembly. Such repressive tactics of government instil 
fear in victims and lessen the full potential of the Constitutional Court.  
It is imperative to mention that article 121 (2) empowers the 
Constitutional Court to act on its own motion to determine the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations that threaten the fundamental 
rights of people. However, because this relates to laws and regulations, and 
not actual acts of abuses perpetrated by government agents, the court 
cannot substantially claim that dynamic government procedure in 
implementing laws are devoid of violating human rights and public 
liberties.270 This is because many human rights violations are carried out 
                                       
268 2008 Periodic Report of the Republic of Benin on the Implementation of the Rights and Freedoms 
Enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, page 6, available at 
>http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/45th/state-reports/2nd-2000-
2008/staterep2_benin_2008_eng.pdf< accessed 11 May 2018.  
269 Law No. 91-009 of May 31, 2001, article 22.  
270 For instance, prior to the 2019 Parliament elections, the internet access was restricted and social media 
was blocked. In addition, protest and unlawful gatherings were banned on the argument of forestalling 
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when applying a seemingly good law of the government. Thus, the authority 
of the Court should not only be focused on its capacity to initiate complaints 
on its own motion on laws and regulations but on ensuring that every 
individual whose right is abused brings a claim for redress. Thus, it is an 
important reason to have a promotional institution.  
Furthermore, the constitution failed to expressly grant power to the 
Constitutional Court to provide remedies when it finds a violation of right. 
Because of this gap, the early years of the Benin Constitutional Court were 
characterised by a restrictive approach during which the Constitutional 
Court decisions were simply declaratory orders and finding of violations.271 
It is imperative to mention that the Constitutional Court later started 
granting clear reparation orders, including injunctions against public 
authorities and monetary compensation.272 However, this judicial activism 
can be supported with the self-evident right to remedy in the jurisprudence 
of the African Commission, article 8 of UDHR and the African Court Protocol.   
5.3.1.2.2 Coimmission Beninoise des Droits de l’Homme  
Conversely, lawyers and jurists of the Benin Bar Association initiated the 
law creating a national human rights commission for Benin in their pursuit 
to ensure that the African Charter rights are actualised. This effort resulted 
in the Benin National Assembly enacting Law 89-004, which established the 
Coimmission Beninoise des Droits de l’Homme (CBDH or Benin Human 
Rights Commission) of 1989. Accordingly, the core function of the CBDH is 
enshrined under Article 4 and hinges on the promotion and safeguarding of 
human rights in Benin. The broad powers of the CBDH include receiving 
complaints about mediation between citizens and government; receiving 
                                       
violence and breakdown of law and order. In addition, only two political parties participated while the 
major opposition party was not cleared to meet the requirement under the new electoral rules.  
271 Horace Adejolohoun, ‘Between Presidentialism and a Human Rights Approach to Constitutionalism: 
Twenty Years of Practice and the Dilemma of Revising the 1990 Constitution of Benin’ in Morris 
Mbondeyi and Tom Ojienda (ed), Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: 
Contemporary Perspective from Sub-Sahara Africa (n 261 above) 255.  
272 For instance, in DCC 02-058 (Favi v State), the Court award monetary damages to the petitioner as 
compensation for degrading treatment.  
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complaints generally from citizens, groups and non-governmental 
organisations; conducting investigations into alleged complaints; order 
measures likely to resolve the reported case; finding just and equitable 
reparations by pursuing reconciliation; and to initiate a legal claim in court 
on behalf of complainants.273  
From the foregoing, one would agree that CBDH functions can be 
invoked to effectively realise civil and political rights enforcement. This is 
because it has jurisdiction to order reparations which the Constitutional 
Courts lack, and power to institute legal actions in courts. In addition, it can 
recommend the ratification of international human rights treaties and make 
recommendation to government bodies for the enactment of deliberations 
from international, regional and non-governmental bodies which are 
capable of enhancing human rights protection and enforcement. However, 
despite these outlined functions, the powers of the CBDH and its role in 
Benin’s transition to democracy, the CBDH was subsequently abolished in a 
bid to develop other institutional safeguards such as the Constitutional 
Court.274 At present, the CBDH has ceased functioning, and its functions are 
to date carried out by the Constitutional Court.  
Nevertheless, Benin is not the only African state that currently 
pursues human rights without NHRI. For example, both Mali and Botswana 
do not have national human rights institutions. This development violates 
article 26 of the African Charter. Therefore, Benin cannot claim to meet the 
requirement for effective enforcement of civil and political rights because 
there are many functions of NHRI that cannot be performed by a court.275 
For instance, some aspects of the investigation and promotional activities 
                                       
273 Article 5 of Law 89-004 of Benin.  
274 Anna Rotman, ‘Benin’s Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model for Guaranteeing Human 
Rights’ (n 231 above). 
275 Peter Rosemblum, ‘Tainted Origins and Uncertain Outcomes’ in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram 
(eds), Human Rights, State Compliance and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights 
Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 309.  
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such as conducting human rights education and publicity are typically not 
within the ambit of a court.  
5.3.1.3 Challenges and prospects of civil and political rights protection 
in Benin 
There are a number of reasons why it is essential to examine whether Benin 
has adequately realised effective enforcement of civil and political rights. 
Firstly, the absence of a national human rights commission implies that the 
Constitutional Court could be characterised as both a court and a quasi-
human rights institution.276 One would agree that these two features in one 
institution may impede the effectiveness of the Constitutional Court. This is 
because it is practically difficult for the Constitutional Court, primarily as a 
court, to carry out mandates outside the interpretation and judicial 
application of the constitution. Therefore, it is submitted that the 
Constitutional Court is overburdened, and this potentially would impact its 
effectiveness to enforce human rights. 
Secondly, the constitution expressly lacks provisions granting the 
Constitutional Court power to provide remedies or compensation when it 
finds a violation of human rights. Although the court adopted a restrictive 
approach by limiting its reparations to declaratory orders in its early years, 
the reparation jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has also shown a 
significant attempt to offer remedies to petitioners. This implies that the 
Constitutional Court is not constitutionally equipped to provide a traditional 
form of redress because clear remedies and power to award compensation 
need to come in through constitutional amendment.  
Suffice it to add that the only way to mitigate these shortcomings is 
through a constitutional amendment. However, attempts to amend and 
reform the constitution with the inclusion of the express right to remedy 
and reparation for human rights violations have failed on four occasions 
                                       
276 Anna Rotman, ‘Benin’s Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model for Guaranteeing Human 
Rights’ (n 231 above).  
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with the last being in March 2017.277 In addition, the Constitutional Court 
has unilaterally dismissed such attempts with the argument that the 
legitimacy of the constitution was obtained through a national conference 
by the people and so shall be its amendment. Accordingly, in DCC 06-074 
of 8 July 2006, the Constitutional Court noted that some principles of the 
constitution proceeded from the people and the National Conference; thus, 
no single entity had enough legitimacy to carry out amendment without the 
people.278 Because this decision makes it difficult to amend the constitution, 
the Constitutional Court realisation of effective enforcement of civil and 
political rights cannot be seen as effectively realised.  
Another significant challenge to human rights protection in Benin is 
the apparent lack of judicial activism in the Constitutional Court. For 
instance, in DCC 99-051 of 13 October 1999, the Constitutional Court had 
to determine whether article 381 of Benin Criminal Code on the death 
sentence violated the right to life in articles 8 and 15 of the constitution. 
Answering in the negative, the Constitutional Court emphasised that there 
is no express or implicit abolition of the death penalty and further stated 
that the right to life does not render the death penalty provision in the 
national criminal code inconsistent with the constitution. Although the 
Constitutional Court failed to set a progressive precedent for other courts, 
it corrected itself in DCC 12-153 of 4 August 2012, when it declared that 
death penalty provisions of the Criminal Code of Procedure are in violation 
of article 147 of the constitution because Benin ratified the Second Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR on 5 July 2012.  
Nevertheless, regional jurisprudence at the African Court and African 
Commission concerning Benin is insignificant when compared to Nigeria and 
Tanzania. Whether the exposure to the regional institutions is due to the 
                                       
277 The citizens have always voted against any amendment to the Constitution for fear of possible hijack 
by the politicians who may use the opportunity to limit their rights and freedoms under the Constitution. 
278 This case developed the principle of national consensus concerning issues on constitutional 
amendment.  
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approach adopted by the constitution or the Constitutional Court depends 
on the effectiveness of the Constitutional Court ability to interpret and 
enforce constitutional rights. However, a few human rights waves of abuse 
recorded in 2018 include incidents of torture, harsh prison conditions, rape 
and violence against girls and women with inadequate government action 
to ensure prosecution.279 Despite these abuses, Benin stepped up its efforts 
to enhance human rights enforcement by implementing measures that 
strengthened its judicial system, reduced prison overcrowding, and 
combated violence.280 Therefore, more effective measures are thereby 
needed to realise effective enforcement of civil and political rights in Benin. 
5.4 Conclusion  
Actualising state party obligations under the African Charter has a direct 
link to effective regional enforcement of human rights. However, this 
chapter has demonstrated that African countries are in one way or another 
not adequately complying with these obligations, thereby impeding 
effective enforcement of human rights at national level. Subsequently, civil 
and political rights enforcement varies from one state to another. Even 
while many African countries can be seen as having constitutionally 
protected civil and political rights, some institutional structure has stifled 
their capacity to provide remedies to victims of abuse, thereby posing a 
threat to regional and international human rights discourse. For instance, 
human rights seem to be better protected and enforced under the Benin 
national arrangement for two main reasons: a constitution with a strong 
foundation for adequate normative protection, and a purposely empowered 
Constitutional Court. However, it is submitted that Benin needs a national 
                                       
279 There was no report of arbitrary killings by government or its agencies. United States Department of 
State, Benin 2018 Human Rights Report, available at > 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/289177.pdf< accessed 24 April 2019.  
280 United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council, Benin National Report submitted in 
Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21 on August 7, 
2017, available at > https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/233/11/PDF/G1723311.pdf?OpenElement< accessed 07 June 2018.  
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human rights commission to complement the judicial organs, thereby 
providing human rights victims with another institution for the protection 
and enforcement of constitutional rights.  
 It is demonstrated that normative protection of human rights in state 
party constitutions alone does not guarantee the realisation of effective 
enforcement insofar that institutions are riddled with legal obstacles. It is 
submitted that enjoyment of human rights in illustrative countries has been 
impeded by multidimensional and peculiar factors extending to 
constitutional protection and national institutions. For example, Nigeria and 
Tanzania may adopt Benin’s normative and Constitutional Court approach 
while Benin adopts Nigeria NHRI’s approach, which allows the establishment 
of a NHRI with broad functions, in addition to the power of the court to 
recognise African Commission recommendations. In particular, Tanzania 
should consider adopting a more human rights-friendly constitution born 
out of people’s genuine participation and consensus. Therefore, effective 
domestic enforcement requires reforms in all facets of state party 
obligations to international human rights treaties. Such reform requires 
state parties to improve existing legislative and constitutional provisions as 
well as the judicial powers to eliminate any statutory and procedural 
obstacle. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ASSESSING THE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS UNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER 
6.0. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the challenges and prospects to reinvigorate effective 
enforcement of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter) civil and political rights provisions. The previous chapters have 
observed that there is a gap between civil and political rights protected in 
the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments, on the 
one side, and their enjoyment due to inadequate enforcement both at 
regional and national levels, on the other. As a result, suggesting new 
insights for reforms to the African Charter system invites a holistic 
assessment of the African Charter normative and institutional arrangements 
vis a vis state party obligations under the African Charter and present-day 
African regional organisation. This is intended to suggest possible insights 
that African Union (AU) policymakers can borrow, as well as refrain from, 
in order to make progress towards the realisation of effective enforcement 
of African Charter civil and political rights. However, this chapter does not 
deny some laudable contributions of the African Charter to international 
human rights growth. Instead, it presents a rigorous contemporary 
assessment of the real potential and actual performance of the African 
Charter and its institutional framework.  
6.1 Assessing the African Charter political and institutional 
framework  
The premise is that while the African Charter is enforced through the African 
Court and the African Commission, the African Union, through its organs, 
plays a crucial post-adjudication role. These organs can only do as much as 
their establishing instruments allow. As a result, it is imperative for this 
section to assess how these institutions have performed in carrying out their 
mandate towards realising effective enforcement of African Charter civil and 
political rights. This is contemplated because assessing the challenges faced 
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by the African Charter political and institutional framework provides the 
opportunity to make possible suggestions for reforms.  
6.1.1  Assessing the African Commission  
It is necessary to begin the analysis of accessing the African Charter political 
and institutional framework by acknowledging that the African Commission 
was the sole implementing institution for the African Charter enforcement 
until the adoption of the Court Protocol in 1998. As a result, the Commission 
single-handedly enforced the African Charter from 1987 when it became 
operational until 2004 when the African Court came in force. Since the 
African Commission is a quasi-judicial institution, it follows that 
enforcement of the African Charter rights and state party compliance with 
its decisions are common challenges expected within the African human 
rights system. Therefore, it is not surprising to have the volume of criticisms 
concerning the African Commission’s weaknesses in the conduct of its 
affairs.1 Nevertheless, it is essential to highlight the constraints the African 
Commission can act upon to enhance its mandate.  
6.1.1.1 Publicity of the African Commission mandate  
Substantively, article 45 of the African Charter imposes a broad mandate 
on the Commission. In particular, one would agree that seventeen years of 
having the African Commission as the single institution for the protection, 
promotion and interpretation of the African Charter requires a special 
relationship with Africans regarding its functions while also enhancing 
                                       
1 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than 
Never’ (2014) 3 (2) Yale human Rights and Development Journal, 45; Jean Boukongou, ‘The Appeal of 
the African System for Protecting Human Rights’ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal, 269; 
Timoty Yarima, ‘Comparative Evaluation of the Challenges of African Regional Human Rights Courts’ 
(2011) 4 (2) Journal of Politics and Law, 120; Christof Heyns, ‘The African Human Rights System: In 
Need of Reform’ (2001) 2 African Human Rights Journal, 155; Fatsah Onguergouz, The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable 
Democracy in Africa (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003) 791; Oji Umozuruike, ‘The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1983) 77 American Journal of International Law, 902; Nsongurua 
Udombana, ‘Can a Leopard change its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights’ (2002) 17 
American University International Law Review, 1177; Makau Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the 
African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of 
International Law, 339.  
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peoples’ knowledge and confidence in the Commission. Publicity is key to 
the success of the Commission because if Africans are unaware of its 
existence and mandate, it is practically impossible for them to appreciate 
or utilise it.2 This suggests that the African Commission may be 
underutilised. Ordinarily, one would expect numerous communications 
against the following respondent states due to rife human rights abuses - 
South Sudan, CAR, Mali, Ethiopia, Somalia, Zimbabwe and Cameroon; but 
in reality, it is not happening. 
 There is a correlation between publicity and enforcement of civil and 
political rights. The premise is that one needs to have a knowledge of 
something before it can be utilised or set on motion. One can establish this 
correlation by analysing the numerous communications instituted by NGOs 
on behalf of victims who often are members of rural communities. 
Therefore, there is a need for more publicity about the Commission which 
requires more than just visiting higher learning institutions to organising a 
village and town hall meeting and symposium for the many illiterate and 
rural dwelling Africans. In particular, the Commission may consider 
operating through a network of national, international and private 
organisations in sensitising these rural dwellers. 
On the other hand, it is agreed that the Activity Reports of the 
Commission disseminate information about the duties and operation of the 
Commission. However, these reports must be disseminated widely to make 
more people aware of the findings of the Commission. One could, however, 
question whether posting Activity Reports on the Commission’s website is 
enough publicity, especially in a continent where the majority are without 
internet access and electricity. Until many African countries adapt to 
modern technological realities, more cooperation with NGOs, media houses, 
                                       
2 Chidi Odinkalu, ‘The Role of Case and Complaint Procedure in the Reform of the African Regional 
Human Rights System’ (2001) 1 (2) African Human Rights Law Journal, 225; Frans Viljoen, 
‘Contemporary Challenges to International Human Rights Law and the Role of Human Rights 
Education’ (2011) De Jure, 208.  
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and learning institutions is advised to disseminate information on the 
activities of the Commission and provide access to people who lack the 
financial capacity to institute an action.3  
6.1.1.2 Composition, sitting pattern and structure of the African 
Commission 
The aspects of composition and sitting pattern relate to the number of 
Commissioners, which cover the mode of election, independence and 
impartiality, and how it conducts its business. The mandate of the African 
Commission is broader than its counterpart under the American system. 
Because of this difference, one would have expected the composition, 
sitting pattern and structure of the Commission to reflect such a broad 
mandate; more so, given that the Commission was established when 
human rights violation in many AU countries were heightened. Instead, 
Africa adopted a Commission consisting of eleven members, which holds 
two ordinary sessions per year and may meet, if need be, in extraordinary 
sessions. At this point, it is imperative to question whether this 
arrangement impacts the Commission’s capacity to effectively meet its 
mandate. In answering this question, it is imperative to mention that the 
AU consists of fifty-five countries with several legal, religious and cultural 
backgrounds. Therefore, adopting an eleven-member part-time sitting 
Commission, even when the Commission is the sole enforcement institution, 
illustrates regional failure to take human rights seriously. This structure 
makes it grossly impossible for the Commission to meet its tripartite 
mandate under article 45 of the Charter. For instance, this position under 
the African human rights system is in stark contrast with the abolished 
European Commission on Human Rights, which consisted of several 
Commissioners equal to that of member states.4  
                                       
3 As at March 2019, the African Commission has registered 518 NGOs with observer status before it. 
See 45rd Activity Report of the African Commission, page 12.  
4 However, the Commission under the American Convention on Human Rights consists of seven 
members.  
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It has been suggested that the African Commission’s mandate 
concerning human rights protection cannot be effectively realised by an 
eleven-member body sitting on a part-time basis.5 The impact of an eleven-
member Commission with a part-time sitting pattern can only be measured 
in terms of its functions and output. Although the Inter-American 
Commission consists of seven members, the nature of its mandate is 
majorly promotional, unlike the African Commission that still enjoys 
protective and interpretative mandates in addition to the promotional 
mandate. Therefore, Africa may consider either narrowing the 
Commission’s mandate to only promotional activities, allowing the Court to 
focus on the protective mandate,6 or increase both the number of sessions 
and members of the Commission.  
The above position is supported following an examination of the 
Commission’s output such as delay in concluding communications and its 
backlog of communications.7 Two core issues heighten such delay and the 
increasing number of backlog communications: firstly, these 
Commissioners double as special mechanism chair or rapporteurs, which 
requires state party visits amongst other promotional responsibilities. 
Secondly, the evident restricted access to the African Court by articles 5 (3) 
and 34 (6) of the Court Protocol makes the Commission a preferred 
institution for many individuals and NGOs whose countries have not made 
a declaration under 34 (6) of the Court Protocol. This observation, 
                                       
5 Michelo Hansungule, ‘African Court and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in 
Anton Bosl and Joseph Diescho (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspective on their Protection 
and Promotion (Macmillan Education, 2009) 233.  
6 This may imply adopting the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) approach that make state 
party acceptance of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) automatic for ECHR contracting 
states. 
7 In Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights 
Project v Nigeria, it took the Commission over 5 years from 1993 to reach its final decision in 1999 -
Communication 105/93-128/94-130/94-152/96. See also, Centre for Human Rights, Celebrating the 
African Charter at 30: A Guide to the African Huma Rights System (Pretoria University Press, 2011) 28. 
See also, Isaac Nguema, ‘Legal and Infrastructural Constraints on the Commission’ (1991) June 24-26, 
Paper presented at the Fund for Peace Conference on the African Commission at Ney York. 
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therefore, makes it essential for the composition and sitting arrangement 
of the African Commission to be reformed.  
On the other hand, it has been indicated that the Commission is 
largely under the control of the AHSG, thus, casting doubt on its 
independence and ability to enhance human rights protection.8 The 
following African Charter provisions attest to this fact: articles 30,9 31,10 
33,11 5812 and 59.13 It is clear from these provisions that the influence of 
the AHSG on the Commission is overbearing. For instance, while the 
practice of AHSG involvement in the election of Commissioners is similar to 
the European and American system, the language of article 30 of the African 
Charter raises a different dimension to AHSG influence over the 
Commission.14 The language suggests subordination and control by the 
AHSG, which indicate a lack of independence.  
Another means of assessing such influence over the Commission is 
through election and appointments to the Commission. For instance, it is 
on record that the AU state parties have over time nominated as 
Commissioners former appointees of government such as Ministers, 
Attorney-Generals, and Ambassadors, based on their good relationship with 
                                       
8 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘The African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Development 
of Fair Trial Norms in Africa’ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal, 311; Vincent Nmehielle, 
The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Institutions (Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) 172; 
Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Martinus Nijfoff, 1996) 
123. 
9 Article 30 provides that ‘the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights…shall be established 
within the Organisation of African Unity to promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure their 
protection in Africa’.  
10 The choice of 11-member body, sitting in part-time arrangement, in a continent with 55 countries and 
unpleasant human rights record has the potential to impact on human rights protection and protection. 
11 This article suggests that the Commissioners are political appointees of various states. It enshrines that 
Commissioners shall be elected from a list nominated by the state parties to the present Charter.  
12 This article instructs the African Commission to draw the attention of the AHSG in cases where it finds 
serious violation of the African Charter rights and freedoms.  
13 This article empower the AHSG to make approval before the Commission can make public its findings, 
and based on this provisions, the Commission has failed to release some of its Annual Activity Reports. 
14 What is not clearly enshrined both in the OAU Charter and AU Constitutive Act is whether the 
Commission can claim to be part of the regional organs as this is not expressly indicated.  
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governments and not based on article 31 requirements.15 Invariably, their 
partiality, inadequate human and peoples’ rights knowledge, and 
incompetence directly undermine the independence of the Commission, 
which ordinarily should be the cornerstone of the institution.16 It is the 
position of this thesis that the lack of independence of the Commission will 
have a negative impact on the ability to interpret and protect the Charter 
rights and freedoms. Therefore, National Human Rights Institutions may 
step in to suggest to state governments persons who to the best of its 
understanding, meet article 31 requirements. 
It is acknowledged that articles 58 and 59 of the Charter indicate 
further AHSG influence over the Commission. For instance, while article 59 
requires the AHSG to authorise publication of African Commission reports, 
article 58 mandates the Commission to draw the attention of the AHSG 
when the Commission finds cases of serious or massive violation of human 
rights. The impact of article 59 is the suspension of the 17th Activity Report, 
deletion of part of the 19th Activity Report of the Commission at the instance 
of the AHSG,17 and the delay in releasing Activity Reports 45 and 46 of the 
African Commission. On the other hand, article 58 impedes the mandate of 
the Commission under article 45. For instance, the structure of the African 
Commission is aggravated by the fact that it cannot make binding decisions 
against state parties because of its quasi-judicial nature.18 However, what 
                                       
15 Article 31 requires state parties to appoint persons of the highest reputation, morality, integrity, 
impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples’ rights. Racheal Murray, ‘The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1987-2000: An Overview of its Progress and Problem’ (2001) 1 
African Human Rights Law Journal, 1. 
16 This observation resonates an important development in the AU practice enshrined in the 2005 and 
2011 Note Verbale Guidelines for the nomination which excluded senior civil servants and diplomatic 
representatives. See African Union Executive Council nineteenth Ordinary Session of 2011, ‘Report on 
the Election of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ available at > 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-cl-683-xix-e.pdf< accessed 04 April 2018.  
17 Although the 19th Activity Report was later adopted by the AHSG at its 2006 Summit in Sudan, the 
decision to suspend it was because Zimbabwe claimed that it did not contain part of its response to a fact-
finding mission it embarked on.  
18 This position is supported by article 58 language which expects the Commission to draw the attention 
of the AHSG to situations where it finds a serious or severe violation of human rights.  
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is not clear in this provision is what the AHSG is expected to do when its 
attention has been drawn to serious human rights violations.   
The quasi-judicial position of the Commission makes it more of a 
toothless bulldog in the area of human rights protection.19 Bearing this in 
mind, Welch argued, and it is correct, that the Commission was not created 
to bite but act as a fact-finding or conciliatory body for the promotion and 
protection of human rights in Africa.20 Whether article 58 aims to 
demonstrate the quasi-judicial nature of the Commission by removing its 
power to grant orders or reliefs after its findings, it is clear that control of 
the Commission’s activities potentially affects its effectiveness to guarantee 
enforcement. Therefore, letting states have the final say in the 
Commission’s work through the back door, seems counterproductive. In 
this light, the Commission needs to dialogue with the AHSG to address such 
interference and adopt more guidelines and resolutions specially targeted 
at improving its independence and improved capacity to enforce the Charter 
rights. 
6.1.1.3   State reporting system 
Article 62 of the African Charter mandates state parties to submit reports 
detailing legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to 
the Charter rights. This system provides the forum for a constructive 
dialogue between the Commission and the state parties while enabling the 
Commission to monitor state party implementation of the Charter. Besides, 
it allows states and the African Commission to take stock of failures, 
challenges and achievements in the area of African Charter promotion and 
protection. However, state parties have not taken this requirement 
seriously.21 This unfortunate attitude by state parties makes it difficult for 
                                       
19 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Towards the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than 
Never’ (n 1 above).  
20 Claude Welch, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Five-Year Report and 
Assessment’ (1992) 14 Human Rights Quarterly, 43.  
21 Several state parties have not submitted their Initial Report or are late in submitting their Periodic 
Reports. For instance, the following six state parties have not submitted their Initial Reports; Comoros, 
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the African Commission to assess the level of state party obligations with 
African Charter rights.  
The assessment of state party reports is virtually the only means of 
monitoring domestic reality concerning human rights implementation. 
Therefore, late or non-submission of reports imply that the Commission will 
be hindered in assessing domestic protection as well as state party 
compliance with its recommendations. Accordingly, there may be a need 
for the establishment of a Special Unit or Committee to assist and liaise 
with state parties in gathering and analysing information needed for these 
reports. Such a special mechanism under the Commission must be 
pragmatic in ensuring that this obligation is complied with. Also, it is vital 
for the African Commission to collaborate with relevant AU organs in 
pressuring state parties to submit their reports and make recommendations 
in its Activity Report to the AHSG on action to be taken against non-
complying state parties.  
On the other hand, NGOs and National Human Rights Institutions 
could be made more visible in state reporting activities. These bodies can 
be required to submit independent, or shadow reports on their various 
states, which the Commission may act on in the absence of a state report. 
In events where state reports are submitted, such shadow reports can help 
the Commission to engage constructively with state parties on human rights 
protection. This suggestion has the potential to put pressure on state 
parties to submit their reports.  
                                       
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, South Sudan, and Somalia, whereas only 
twelve states are up to date with their reports. The following states are up to date with all their reports 
and they include Angola, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Mali, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda and Togo.  43rd Activity Report of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, page 5-6, available at > http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-
reports/43/43rd_activity_report_eng.pdf< accessed 19 March 2018.  However, South Sudan has 
indicated interest in submitting its Initial Report in August 2018. Whereas a state party submits the initial 
report two years after ratification and accession, the periodic report is required to be submitted every two 
years after the initial report.  
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6.1.1.4 Restricted individual access to the African Commission  
Within the African Commission mandate to protect human rights, it could 
be gleaned that ‘other communications’ and admissibility requirements in 
articles 55 and 56 are extensive when compared to article 35 ECHR. The 
first limitation observed under article 55 is that the consideration of 
communications is not automatic; whereas there is no knowledge of the 
criteria used in selecting communications. This is because article 55 
empowers the members of the Commission, by a simple majority, to 
indicate which communications should be considered from the list sent to 
them by the Secretary of the Commission. In the absence of criteria for 
selecting communications, the chances of the Commission ignoring claims 
that may need urgent attention is possible. This procedure may contribute 
to the reason for consideration of communications several months and 
years after violations may have occurred. For instance, Nnamdi Kalu and 
the Indigenous People of Biafra v Nigeria22 was filed to challenge the 
complainant’s detention by the Nigerian government but was never heard 
by the Commission until his release from detention more than one year 
after leading to the subsequent withdrawal of this communication.  
Equally important, article 56 of the African Charter contains a list of 
admissibility requirements the Commission must consider before assuming 
jurisdiction over a complaint. While this practice is in tandem with other 
regional instruments, the African Charter requirement under article 56 is 
more extensive, demanding and somewhat superficial, which potentially 
impact on its protective mandate. However, two key requirements are of 
concern: communication must not be written in disparaging or insulting 
language, and communications must not be based exclusively on the news 
disseminated through the media. While it is agreed that the media play a 
vital role in exposing human rights violations in contracting states, such 
open-ended restriction would hinder effective enforcement by African 
                                       
22 Communication 680/17. 
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Charter institutions. Therefore, it is correct to say that mandatory 
compliance with these provisions restricts unfettered access to the 
Commission while at the same time, weakening this form of evidence that 
may be presented to prove a violation. Although it is noteworthy that article 
56 requirements do not apply to inter-state communications under article 
47-54, the fact that state parties rarely invoke inter-state communications 
defeats whatever advantage it may have. 
6.1.1.5 Enforceability and follow-up procedure   
The Commission has to achieve a balance between interpreting the Charter 
provisions and ensuring compliance with its decisions. As part of the 
challenges facing the African Commission, non-compliance with decisions 
lowers the victim’s confidence in the regional human rights system.23 
Although non-compliance of human rights decisions is not particular to 
Africa alone, it has been observed with disdain that in the case of Africa, 
the African Commission lacks the teeth with which to bite non-complying 
state parties.24 In addition, the African Charter does not contain a provision 
on post-adjudication procedure except what is enshrined in article 58 
requiring it to draw the attention of the AHSG. In this light, non-compliance 
with African Commission recommendations has led to a continuing situation 
where state party laws are at variance with African Charter provisions. For 
instance, apart from Benin that incorporated the African Charter into its 
constitution, many other African countries either contain derogation clauses 
or make socio-economic rights non-enforceable rights, hence complicating 
enforcement at the national level. 
Furthermore, the African Commission lacks the power to sanction 
non-complying state parties.25 This power resides in the AU Assembly but 
                                       
23 Michelo Hansungule, ‘African Court and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in 
Anton Bosl and Joseph Diescho (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspective on their Protection 
and Promotion (n 5 above) 233.  
24 Ibid, 233.  
25 Jeremy Sarkin, ‘A Critique of the Decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Permitting the Demolition of SADC Tribunal: Politics versus Economic and Human Rights’ (2016) 24 
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has rarely been used to enhance human rights enforcement in the region. 
For instance, Rule 112 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission 
requires state parties to report to the Commission within 180 days on 
measures taken to give effect its decision. However, state parties do not 
take this obligation seriously given the long period of multiple requests by 
the Commission to state parties to comply. In this light, therefore, the 
Commission needs an effective procedure that is realistic, reliable and 
coherent to translate into concrete action and results. For instance, 
cooperating with other African and international institutions concerned with 
the promotion and protection of human rights will give the Commission an 
extended lead in ensuring enforcement of African Charter rights and 
freedoms.  
Moreover, African states are never comfortable when publicly 
exposed to issues concerning inadequate human rights commitment.26 For 
instance, African countries are more worried when they are under 
investigation or prosecution by international human rights bodies such as 
the International Criminal Court. Under this circumstance, the Commission 
should readily invoke article 45 (1) (c) of the Charter to collaborate with 
relevant institutions if that will guarantee the smooth operation of its 
mandate. 
                                       
(2) African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 215; Abadir Ibrahim, ‘Evaluating a Decade 
of the African Union’s Protection of Human Rights and Democracy: A Post-Tahrir Assessment’ (2012)  
12 African Human Rights Law Journal, 30; Zorola Motala, ‘Human Rights in Africa: A Cultural, 
Ideological and Legal Examination’ (1989) 12 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 
373; Kofi Kufuor, ‘Safeguarding Human Rights: A Critique of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ (1993) 18 (2) Africa Development, 65. 
26 Abadir Ibrahim, ‘Evaluating a Decade of the African Union’s Protection of Human Rights and 
Democracy: A Post-Tahrir Assessment’ (n 25 above); Kofi Quanshigah, ‘The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: Towards a more effective Reporting Mechanism’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights 
Law Journal, 273; George Wachira, ‘A Critical Examination of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights: Towards Strengthening the African Human Rights System to enable it effectively to 
meet the needs of the African Population’ (2006) 3 Judiciary Watch Report, 12.  
309 
 
 
6.1.1.6 Complementarity between the African Commission and the African 
Court 
Rule 118 of the African Commission Rules of Procedure promotes 
complementarity between the Court and the Commission. This rule is a 
driving force in the enforcement of African Charter rights. However, to 
ensure that justice is served at all times, there should be an obligatory need 
for the Commission to make referrals to the Court. In the first instance, this 
will reduce the impact of the Commission’s quasi-judicial nature in 
protecting human rights. On the side of the Court, it would circumvent the 
hindrances posed by non-ratification of the Court Protocol by state parties 
under articles 5 (3) and 34 (6). For this to happen, however, the language 
of Rule 118 of the African Commission Rules of Procedure must be made 
mandatory and not optional or discretional since the Commission enjoys 
unfettered access to the Court under article 5 (1) (a) of the Court Protocol.27 
The effect of a discretional wording of Rule 118 affects complementarity 
between the Commission and Court negatively and may have contributed 
to the scanty number of communications referred to the Court.28  
6.1.1.7  Lack of financial and human resources 
The Commission needs adequate personnel and funds to carry out its 
mandate. Inadequate personnel, whether in the number of Commissioners 
or other administrative staff, has the potential to limit the effectiveness of 
the African Commission in terms of output. At present, what is obtainable 
is a situation where one Commissioner monitors three or more states and 
                                       
27 Rule 118 of the African Commission Rules of Procedure states that ‘if the Commission has taken a 
decision with respect to a communication submitted under Articles 48, 49 or 55 of the Charter and 
considers that the state has not or is unwilling to comply with its recommendations in respect of the 
communication within the period stated in Rule 112 (2), it may submit the communication to the Court 
pursuant to Article 5 (1) of the Protocol and inform the parties accordingly’. For instance, see Rule 45(1) 
of 2011 Rule of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission which mandates the Commission to refer 
matters to the Court where it considers that a state party has not complied with the recommendation of 
the report approved in accordance with article 50 of the American Convention. 
28 Joseph Isanga, ‘The Constitutive Act of the African Union, African Courts and the Protection of 
Human Right: New Dispensation?’ (2013) 11 (2) Santa Clara Journal of International Law. See also, 
Elise Nalbandian, ‘The challenges facing African Court on Human and Peoples Rights’ (2007) 1 MIZAN 
Law Review, 63. 
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at the same time chairs other special mechanisms, deliberates on 
communications, albeit working part-time. There is a need for an increase 
in human resources if the Commission is to be positioned to meet its African 
Charter mandate effectively. The same goes for the issue of funds. The 
question of poor funding appears in several African Commission Resolutions 
to the African Union and Session Communique.29 Therefore, situations 
where money budgeted for the Commission in the AU budget is either 
reduced or not released must be discouraged.30 This issue has over time 
forced the Commission in several instances to rely on foreign donors31 as 
well as slowing the pace of conducting its affairs.  
6.1.2 Assessing the African Court  
From its inception to date, the African Court has been flooded with cases, 
all alleging different violations of African Charter rights and freedoms. This 
development allows the Court to stamp its authority on the African domain 
and improve its case law jurisprudence. However, this aspiration seems not 
firmly attained. Even the African Court itself has admitted that it encounters 
peculiar challenges in carrying out its mandate under the Protocol.32 
Problems affecting the Court include, but are not limited to non-compliance 
with decisions, lack of awareness of the Court, low-level ratification of Court 
Protocol, slow rate of deposit allowing individuals and NGOs direct access 
                                       
29 An instance can be seen in Part VII of the 2015-2019 Strategic Plan of the African Commission which 
explicitly requested an expanded budget vote by the AU and the elimination of all internal bureaucratic 
procedures that inhibit access to funding from the AU.  
30 For instance, the Commission admits that a substantial amount from its 2013 budget of US$8.5 million 
in 2013 was never released. See, 35th Activity Report of the African Commission, para 31. See also, 
Magnus Killander and Bright Nkrumah, ‘Human Rights in the African Union during 2012 and 2013’ 
(2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal, 275. Furthermore, the Commission lamented in its 43rd 
Activity Report that it currently has a staffing deficit of twenty-five out of forty-six approved regular 
positions in its structure.  
31 Centre for Human Rights, Celebrating the African Charter at 30: A Guide to the African Human Rights 
System (n 7 above) 58; Bience Gawanas, ‘The African Union: Concepts and Implementation Mechanisms 
relating to Human Rights’ in Anton Bosl and Joseph Diescho (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Legal 
Perspective on their Protection and Promotion (Macmillan Education, 2009) 135. 
32 Africa Union Executive Council, Report on the Activities of the African Court adopted January 2017, 
available at > http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/publications/activity-reports< accessed 25 
February 2018.  
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to the Court, part-time sitting arrangements, and insufficient human and 
material resources.33 Therefore, this section analyses these factors with the 
view of making suggestions for improvement.  
6.1.2.1 Restricted access to the African Court  
It is to be noted that access to the Court is granted to the following; namely, 
the Commission, the state party which had lodged a complaint to the 
Commission, the state party against whom a complaint has been lodged, 
the state party whose citizen is a victim of human rights abuse, and the 
African Intergovernmental Organisations. The Court Protocol further grants 
access to individuals and NGOs if article 34 (6) precondition are met.34 This 
implies that access to NGOs and individuals is not automatic, thereby 
undermining the usefulness of the Court to victims from countries unwilling 
to make an article 34 declaration. For instance, while only nine state parties 
to the African Charter have deposited the article 34 (6) declaration,35 thirty 
state parties have ratified the Court Protocol.36 
 On the other hand, only state parties that ratify the Court Protocol 
can be parties before it. Although this approach is similar to article 62 of 
the American Convention, it makes ratification a determining factor for 
African Court jurisdiction. Of course, this approach bars victims from non-
ratifying countries. It is agreed that lack of access to the courts erodes 
justice from the courts.37 It limits the African Court’s objective in 
strengthening human rights and is a barrier to victims who ordinarily would 
                                       
33 Ibid, page 20.  
34 Article 34 (6) requires state parties to deposit a declaration that it permits individuals and NGOs to 
bring actions to the Court against it.  
35 The countries that have made this declaration are – Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, 
Malawi, Tanzania, The Gambia and Tunisia.  
36 See Africa Union Executive Council, Report on the Activities of the African Court adopted January 
2017 on the list of countries that have ratified/acceded to the Court Protocol. The following have ratified 
the Court Protocol- Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Comoros, 
Republic of the Congo, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, Rwanda, Arab Saharawi Republic, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Togo and Tunisia.  
37 Attorney General Kaduna State v Mallam Umaru Hassan (1985) Nigerian Weekly Law Report, Pt. 8, 
483.  
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seek justice from a judicial institution.38 Therefore, it is a denial of adequate 
legal protection to human rights victims in Africa. This impact has been 
demonstrated in Michelot Yogogombaye v Senegal,39 where the Court 
declined jurisdiction because Senegal had not made a declaration under 
article 34 (6) irrespective of the apparent evidence of human rights 
violations.  
6.1.2.2 Enforceability of African Court decisions and the role of the 
Council of Ministers   
It is noteworthy that the Court makes appropriate orders when it is 
convinced that there has been a violation of human rights.40 To ensure that 
these findings are complied with, state parties undertake to comply with 
the judgment in cases where they are parties, whereas the Executive 
Council of Ministers monitors execution on behalf of the AU Assembly.41 This 
post-adjudication approach is similar to the ECHR.42 However, this approach 
and state parties’ voluntary compliance requirement under article 29 have 
not enhanced the African Court protection given the absence of political will 
by the AU and its member states.43 This is submitted because many of the 
African Court decisions are not complied with by violating state parties. For 
                                       
38 Frans Viljoen, ‘Understanding and Overcoming Challenges in Accessing the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, (2018) 67 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 63; Timothy Yerima, 
‘Comparative Evaluation of the Challenges of African Regional Human Rights Court’ (n 1 above); 
Makau Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A two-legged Stool?’ (1999) 21 Human Rights 
Quarterly, 346; Sonya Sceats, ‘Africa’s New Human Rights Court: Whistling in the Wind?’  (2009) 
Chatham House Briefing Paper, available at > 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/bp030
9sceats.pdf< accessed 21 March 2018.  
39 App. No. 001/2008.  
40 Article 27 of the Court Protocol. 
41 Article 30 and article 29 (2) of the Court Protocol.  
42 This approach evidences some improvement in monitoring the enforcement of the Charter rights. See, 
Frans Viljoen, ‘Understanding and Overcoming Challenges in Accessing the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 38 above); Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 414. 
43 Joseph Isanga, ‘The Constitutive Act of the African Union, African Courts and the Protection of 
Human Right: New Dispensation?’ (n 28 above); Timothy Yerima, ‘Comparative Evaluation of the 
Challenges of African Regional Human Rights Court’ (n 1 above); Julia Harrington, ‘The African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Evan Malcome and Racheal Murray (eds), The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
320. 
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example, Tanzania has, in several instances, notified the Court that it is 
unable to implement its order.44 
In the context of post-adjudication approach, it is essential to note 
that the Council of Ministers has remained invisible in getting state parties 
to comply with Court decisions. However, it cannot be ascertained whether 
this contributes to state party relegation and neglect of African Court 
decisions cannot be ascertained. Thus, it is imperative that the AU and the 
African Court give more attention to the poor compliance of decisions. 
Therefore, the AU may require a human rights department within the AU, 
such as the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner, with responsibilities 
that include ensuring state parties abide by decisions and 
recommendations. This is necessary to preserve the purpose of the Court, 
and faith in its ability to enforce the African Charter rights. This suggestion 
is made to fill the absence of a human rights department within the AU.  
6.1.2.3 Relationship with the African Commission and the AU 
A good relationship between the Court, on the one hand, and the 
Commission and AU, on the other hand, is crucial for the realisation of 
effective enforcement of human rights. This relationship is key for two main 
reasons. First, individuals and NGOs can access the Court through the 
Commission under article 5 (1) (a) of the Court Protocol, where their state 
has not made declaration article 34 (6). This is because of the Commission’s 
unfettered access to the Court. Besides, a good relationship between the 
Court and the Commission supports the idea of complementarity between 
the institutions which in its entirety enhances effective enforcement of 
African Charter rights.45 The idea of complementarity has the potential to 
reduce legal interference while also promoting collaboration between the 
Court and the Commission. However, there is a poor relationship between 
                                       
44 See App.No. 021/2016 -Joseph Mukwano v Tanzania; App. No. 024/2016 -Amini Juma v Tanzania; 
App. No. -Evodius Rutachura v Tanzania; App. No. -003/2016 John Lazaro v Tanzania; App. No. -
007/2015 Ally Rajabu v Tanzania; App.No.-Armand Guehi v Tanzania.   
45 See, articles 5, 6 (1) and (3), 8 and 33 of the Court Protocol, and Part 4, Rules 114, 115, 122 and 123 
of the rules of procedure of the African Commission.  
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the Court and the Commission, particularly concerning the transfer of 
cases.46 It is suggested that instead of the Court striking out cases or 
declaring them inadmissible based on article 34 (6) of the Court Protocol, 
such claims should automatically be transferred to the Commission for 
consideration. Therefore, the wording adopted in Rule 29 (5) of the Rules 
of the Court, which instead of making it mandatory, assume a discretionary 
approach on case transfer to the Commission should be amended. 
 On the other hand, the relationship between the Court and the AU is 
through the Executive Council of Ministers. This is crucial because it relates 
to one of the significant challenges facing the Court; that is, state party 
compliance with decisions. Although the Executive Council of Ministers has 
not adequately carried out its functions, its responsibility is crucial to the 
effective realisation of human rights in Africa.   
6.1.2.4 Composition and sitting pattern of the African Court  
The Court consists of eleven judges, nationals of member states of the OAU 
after due consideration is given to gender representation and coverage of 
the main regions of the continent.47 The sitting pattern of the African Court 
is on a part-time basis, similar to the African Commission.48 Undeniably, 
this has some consequences in the carrying out of its broad mandate and 
on effective enforcement. For instance, it can be directly linked to the 
numerous pending cases before the Court, thereby delaying justice to 
victims of human rights violations. Suffice to add that as of March 28, 2019, 
the African Court has 146 pending cases and 52 finalised cases. Therefore, 
there is a need for the AU to consider increasing the number of judges for 
                                       
46 For instance, while the Court has only transferred 4 cases to the Commission, the Commission has in 
turn transferred 3 cases to the Court.  See, for example, App. No. 004/2011 –African Commission v Libya; 
App. No. 006/2012 –African Commission v Kenya; and, App. No. 002/2013 –African Commission v 
Libya.  
47 Articles 11, 12 and 14 of the Court Protocol.  
48 Article 15 (4) and 21 (2) of the Court Protocol. It is noteworthy that this part-time sitting pattern does 
not affect the President of the African Court.  
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the African Court as well as changing its sitting pattern to a full-time pattern 
in line with article 15 (4) of the Court Protocol.49 
6.1.3 Assessing the AU political role in African Charter enforcement  
The African Charter and the Court Protocol impose human rights 
enforcement related duties on some AU organs; namely, the AHSG and the 
Council of Ministers.50 Both organs are involved in the monitoring of 
decisions from the African Charter institutions, but the AHSG is assigned a 
significant privilege in the entire operation of the African Charter system.51 
However, AHSG has more responsibility under the African Charter.52 For 
instance, the AHSG is involved in consideration of reports from the 
Commission on inter-state communication,53 consideration of activity 
reports from the Commission,54 activities related to the findings of the 
African Commission on serious or massive violations of human rights,55 and 
publication of African Commission reports.56 Furthermore, the AHSG is 
involved in monitoring the execution of the African Court’s judgment 
through the Council of Ministers.57 Even more, the Court is mandated to 
submit to the Assembly a report of its annual activities which must contain 
the cases in which a state party has not complied with the Court’s 
judgment.58 The presumption is that where these duties are optimally 
carried out, AU would use its position as a major stakeholder in African 
                                       
49 Article 15 (4) of the Court Protocol empowers the AU Assembly to change the sitting pattern of the 
Court at any time it deems necessary.  
50 Article 58 of the African Charter and Article 29 of the Court protocol. 
51 Fatsah Ouguergouz, ‘The Reform of the African System of Human Rights Protection’ (2007) 101 
American Society of International Law Proceedings, 423. 
52 See articles 52, 53, 54, 58, and 59 of the African Charter; Joseph Isanga, ‘The Constitutive Act of the 
African Union, African Courts and the Protection of Human Right: New Dispensation?’ (n 28 above).  
53 Article 52 and 53 of the African Charter. 
54 Article 54 of the African Charter.  
55 Article 58 of the African Charter. 
56 Article 59 of the African Charter.  
57 Article 29 (2) of the Court Protocol. This provision suggests that the Council of Ministers monitors 
execution on behalf of the Assembly. 
58 Article 31 of the Court Protocol.  
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regional human rights system to enhance the realisation of effective 
enforcement of the African Charter.  
6.1.3.1 Role of AU organs in executing judgments and follow-up of 
decisions  
From the privileges accorded AU organs, it is evident that the African human 
rights system leaves the bulk of monitoring and execution of findings of the 
AHSG (now, AU Assembly), thereby making the role of the AU Assembly 
very significant. This role requires it to use all legal means to ensure the 
protection of human and peoples’ rights, which is one of the principles and 
objectives of the AU. Of course, this involves state party compliance with 
findings of the Court and Commission. Yet, while it is correct to say that 
human rights violations are still prevalent in many AU countries, it is a fact 
that many AU member states either decline or fail to comply with decisions 
from the Court and Commission.59  
 However, in contrast with the OAU Charter, the AU Constitutive Act 
imposes broader human rights responsibilities on the AU Assembly.60 These 
responsibilities are carried out in its ordinary session.61 Arguably, increasing 
the ordinary session to twice a year presents more opportunity to carry out 
its mandates, especially those concerning human rights enforcement. 
However, this cannot be said to have optimally been achieved; maybe 
because no seriousness was attached to human rights from the outset 
                                       
59 Africa Union Executive Council, Report on the Activities of the African Court adopted January 2017 
at Thirtieth Ordinary Session. See also, Joseph Isanga, ‘The Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
African Courts and the Protection of Human Right: New Dispensation?’ (n 28 above); Julia Harrington, 
‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Evan Malcom and Racheal Murray (eds), The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2000 (n 43 above) 320; 
Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Can a Leopard Change its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights’ 
(n 1 above).  
60 Article 6-8 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The AU Assembly, as the supreme organ of 
the Union comprising Member States Heads of State and Government, meet at least once a year. See 
article 6 (3) of the Constitutive Act.  
61 At the 2004 Summit, the Assembly agreed to be meeting in Ordinary Session twice a year, in January 
and June/July. See, Assembly of the African Union, Decisions and Declaration (2004) 
Assembly/AU/Dec.53(III), available at >https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9550-
assembly_en_30_31_january_2005_auc_third_ordinary_session.pdf< accessed 17 April 2019.  
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under the auspices of the OAU. What this illustrates is that the AU Assembly 
still lacks the political will to task member states on their human rights 
obligations. Simply put, many member states do not abide by their 
obligations because of weakness or lack of pressure from the AU 
Assembly.62 There is a need to consider another method that can put 
pressure on state parties. 
 According to Odinkalu, AU member states’ attitude giving rise to the 
AHSG’s inability to influence and protect human rights may be due to 
member states’ unwillingness to crack down on others for violations that 
they may themselves commit or have committed.63 This may be correct 
because African leaders may not want to call out other leaders for violations 
they commit. In a situation like this, it becomes challenging to separate the 
AU Assembly from African leaders or heads of government that commit 
these violations. This observation supports this thesis insight into the 
creation of an independent human rights organ within the AU. For instance, 
the creation of such a body will reduce AU member states conflicts of 
interest in human rights resolutions against violation member states. This 
is essential in contemporary Africa because the conflict of interest by AU 
member states should not be allowed to take priority over the general 
principle and objective of human rights.64  
                                       
62 Frans Viljoen, ‘Contemporary Challenges to International Human Rights Law and the Role of Human 
Rights Education’ (n 2 above); Robert Eno, ‘The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, 223; Makau Mutua, ‘The African Human 
Rights Court: A Two Legged Stool?’ (n 38 above).  
63 Chidi Odinkalu, ‘The Individual Compliant Procedure of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights: A Preliminary Assessment’ (1998) 8 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 
359. See also, Arthur Anthony, ‘Beyond the Paper Tiger: The Challenge of a Human Rights Court in 
Africa’ (1997) 32 Texas International Law Journal, 511. 
64 Michelo Hansungule, ‘African Courts and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ in 
Anton Bosl and Joseph Diescho (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspective on their Protection 
and Promotion (n 5 above) 233; Carolyn Martorana, ‘The New African Union: Will it Promote 
Enforcement of the Decisions of the African Court of Human and Peoples Rights’ (2009) 40 George 
Washington International Law Review 583; Mirna Adjami, ‘African Court, International Law, and 
Comparative Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?’ (2002) 24 (1) Michigan 
Journal of International Law, 103; Arthur Anthony, ‘Beyond the Paper Tiger: The Challenge of a Human 
Rights Court in Africa’ (n 63 above) 511.  
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6.1.3.1.1 Impact of neglect of AU organs’ roles on human rights 
enforcement in Africa  
From the foregoing, AU organs are essential to the realisation of effective 
enforcement of civil and political rights in Africa. The question is whether 
their human rights related roles have been optimally performed. To answer 
this question, it is imperative to evaluate the evident human rights 
violations across African Charter state parties and the alarming instances 
of non-compliance with African Court and African Commission findings. This 
reality may lead to questioning the veracity of voluntary ratification and 
consent to comply with decisions under the African Charter system.65  
A state party to an international human rights treaty is deemed to 
have fully complied with decisions when it takes steps to carry out the 
directives in such decisions.66 This is because non-compliance with decisions 
is not only a source of frustration and injustice; it can cause further pain 
and suffering to victims who are at this point confused by uncertainty.67 
Non-compliance with decisions is likely to undermine the fulfilment derived 
from the recommendation or judgment. On the other hand, while non-
compliance with decisions cannot be interpreted as overall non-adherence 
to African Charter obligations, timely and full compliance indicates 
seriousness in meeting state party obligations.68 However, there are 
genuine circumstances that may prolong state compliance with decisions. 
For instance, it is reasonable that compliance may take a longer time in 
                                       
65 For example, article 30 of the Court Protocol enshrines that ‘state parties undertake to comply with the 
decisions of the Court in any case in which they are parties within the time stipulated by the Court’.   
66 REDRESS, ‘Enforcement of Awards for Victims of Torture and Other International Crimes’ (The 
REDRESS Trust, London, 2006) available at > 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/master_enforcement%2030%20May%202006.pdf< 
accessed 04 August 2017; Frans Viljoen and Lirette Louw, ‘State Compliance with the 
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994-2004’ (2007) 101 
(1) American Journal of International Law, 1.  
67 Ibid. The impact of late compliance or non-compliance is that victims may experience prolonged 
arbitrary detention, inhuman and degrading treatment, denial of equal protection of the law, or continuous 
placement in a financially disadvantaged position either through compensation or acts capable of 
affecting victims’ source of livelihood. 
68 Frans Viljoen and Lirette Louw, ‘State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994-2004’ (n 66 above).  
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cases where the decision requires the enactment of new legislation or an 
amendment of an existing one69 than where it relates to release of persons 
arbitrarily arrested and detained or payment of financial compensation.70  
For instance, the African Commission has over time noted that state 
compliance with its recommendations is relatively low.71 In addition, the 
Commission pointed out that the entire recommendations and provisional 
measures to states concluded in its 45th Activity Report were not complied 
with by affected countries.72 Suffice it to state at this juncture that prevalent 
non-compliance by state parties has a potential to make victims or those at 
risk losing confidence in the efficiency of the regional human rights system. 
Furthermore, it exposes the weakness of AU organs in monitoring execution 
and enforcement of human rights. For instance, to date, the African Court 
first judgement on merit delivered 14th June 2013, Tanganyika Law Society 
and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v 
United Republic of Tanzania,73 has not been complied with by Tanzania.74  
6.2 Assessing normative provisions of the African Charter 
This section will assess the African Charter, an innovative human rights 
document with 68 articles, with a view to suggesting how its normative 
                                       
69 See for instance the duration it took Zambia to amend its constitution in 2016 after a recommendation 
was delivered 7th May 2001 in communication 211/98 between Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia. 
70 Reasons for non-compliance may include vague decisions, inadequate domestic legal frameworks, lack 
of institutional follow-up mechanisms, and lack of political will. See, Lutz Oette, ‘Bridging the 
Enforcement Gap: Compliance of States Parties with Decisions of Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2010) 
16 (2) Interights Bulletin, 51.  
71 45th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, para 25-27.  
72 The following states are in violation of compliance under this Activity Report: Zimbabwe, Liberia, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, Gambia, Zambia, South Sudan, Lesotho, and Burundi.   
73 App N0. 009 and 011/2011, Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and 
Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v. United Republic of Tanzania. It was alleged in this case that Articles 
39, 67 and 77 of the 1977 Constitution of Tanzania, and Section 39 of 1979 Local Authorities (Elections) 
Act violated provisions of the African Charter for barring independent candidates from contesting 
Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government elections. The African Court, in this case, ordered 
Tanzania to take constitutional, legislative and all other necessary measures within a reasonable time to 
remedy the violations and to inform the Court of the measures taken.  
74 Report of the Activity of the African Court, Executive Council Thirtieth Ordinary Session, 22-27 
January 2017, available at > http://www.african-
court.org/en/images/Activity%20Reports/AfCHPR_Activity_Report_2016_E.pdf< accessed 06 
November 2018. 
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shortcomings can be reformed. It is agreed that the African Charter is 
universal in character and distinctively African in its scope and principle.75 
The African Charter norms comprise various human rights categories; 
however, its norms are not to be comprehensive when contrasted with other 
regional and relevant UN human rights instruments. This section, therefore, 
will assess how normative insufficiency has impeded realising effective 
enforcement within the region.  
6.2.1 Assessing African Charter civil and political rights norms   
Before the enactment of the African Charter, existing international and 
regional human rights instruments enshrined several civil and political 
rights norms. One would have thought that the African Charter emergence 
afterwards would make the African Charter norms more comprehensive. 
This is because the exclusion of rights denies individuals the benefits or 
protection accruable to them. However, the African Charter omitted several 
internationally recognised civil and political rights, which has over time 
contributed to the increasing human rights violations in AU member states. 
Take, for instance, the omission of the right to privacy.76 A significant 
advantage of the right to privacy is the protection against unnecessary 
interference by others, including state agents. It protects against 
unwarranted searches of the home, one’s property, or the seizure of one’s 
possessions as well as protection against any unnecessary requirement of 
information about one’s family or communications. Such omission is 
regrettable, more especially given that violation of this right is 
commonplace in many African states by state security agents.77  
                                       
75 Moussa Samb, ‘Fundamental Issues and Practical Challenges of Human Rights in the Context of the 
African Union’ (2009) 15 (5) Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law, 61.  
76 Article 12 UDHR; article 8 ECHR; article 11 American Convention. It is necessary to acknowledge 
that some state parties to the Charter have gone ahead to recognise this right in the constitutions. See, 
Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria; Article 16 of 1977 Constitution of Tanzania; Section 76 
of the 1963 Constitution of Kenya.  
77 Oji Umozurike, ‘The Significance of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Awa Kalu 
and Yemi Osibanjo (eds), Perspectives of Human Rights (Federal Ministry of Justice Lagos, 1992) 45.   
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Another significant omission is the protection against forced labour.78 
The omission of forced labour exposes individuals to torture and cruel, 
inhuman treatment and would have offered regional protection against 
domestic laws containing criminal sentencing with hard labour.79 The 
prohibition of forced labour could best fit into article 5 of the African Charter 
to complement the prohibition against cruel inhuman and degrading 
treatment, the slave trade, and torture. However, this is not the case in the 
African Charter.  
It is correct to say that the right to liberty and security of the human 
person and the right to a fair hearing under articles 6 and 7 of the African 
Charter are inadequate and do not meet international standards.80 For 
instance, article 7 omitted some rights of an accused person such as the 
right to be informed promptly, in a language one understands, of the reason 
for the arrest, and the right to remain silent and the consequences of not 
remaining silent. Another significant omission in article 7 is an accused 
person’s right to bail and the right to be brought before a competent court 
or tribunal as soon as practically possible.81 Such oversights restrict a 
person’s enjoyment of other civil and political rights such as arbitrary 
detention and the right to liberty. However, it is clear that the African 
Charter provides for trial within a reasonable time, but without suggesting 
what amounts to this reasonable time. This oversight, therefore, leaves the 
state party with the choice of deciding what amounts to a reasonable time 
in instances where bail is not granted. One would have agreed that since 
the rationale for trial within a reasonable time is to guarantee speedy 
proceedings, the Charter should have been more specific with the 
                                       
78 Article 4 ECHR; article 8 (3) ICCPR; article 6 (2) American Convention.  
79 See, section 34 (2) of 1999 Constitution of Nigeria; Morris Mbondenyi, ‘Improving the Substance and 
Content of Civil and Political Rights under the African Human Rights System’ (2008) 17 (2) Lesotho 
Law Journal, 1.  
80 Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (n 8 above) 123; 
Nsongurua Udombana, ‘The African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Development 
of Fair Trial Norms in Africa’ (n 8 above); Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its 
Laws, Practice and Institutions (n 8 above) 98.  
81 Article 7 of American Convention; article 9 ICCPR; article 5 ECHR.  
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suggestion that an accused person may be brought before a court or 
tribunal not later than 48 hours after being arrested or be granted bail 
pending commencement of trial or completion of the investigation. 
Furthermore, article 7 (1) (c) of the African Charter acknowledges 
the right of an accused person to a legal representative of one’s choice but 
fails to recognise state party obligation to ensure legal assistance and 
representation for indigent persons or persons facing criminal offences 
where a death sentence is a penalty.82 This oversight puts several poor 
Africans at risk of not having a legal representative unless the state party 
involved has enacted legal aid laws in accordance with other international 
treaties’ obligations. At present, however, some African countries have 
established legal aid offices for the representation of indigent citizens in 
criminal matters.83 Nevertheless, many African countries with legal aid 
programmes have their activities hindered by inadequate funding by the 
state authorities.84 
It is clear from the provisions of the African Charter that the 
protection of the right to association under article 10 fails to recognise the 
right to form and belong to trade unions.85 Trade unions are a significant 
means of expressing the right to association and act as pressure groups 
against government policies. However, whether such oversight was 
intentional to avert pressure on African government cannot be ascertained. 
What is relevant is that the exclusion of the right to form and join trade 
unions can be relied upon by African governments to ban and interfere in 
trade union operations or even the proscription of such entities. 
                                       
82 Article 6 (c) ECHR, and article 8 (f) American Convention.  
83 For example, the Legal Aid Act (No 56) 1976 of Nigeria. 
84 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Institutions (n 8 above) 
98.  
85 Article 11 ECHR and article 22 (1) ICCPR.  
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6. 3  Assessing state party obligations under the African Charter 
This section analyses state parties’ obligations towards realising effective 
enforcement of African Charter civil and political rights. This section is 
relevant because realising effective enforcement of the African Charter 
rights depends on state party commitment to the African Charter as well as 
compliance with decisions from the Court and Commission. In addition, AU 
membership automatically comes with some human rights responsibility 
under the Constitutive Act.86 However, this section will focus on the 
constitutional oversights in protecting civil and political rights in Nigeria, 
Tanzania, and Benin. Also, this section ascertains whether domestic 
recognition of the African Charter civil and political rights has adequately 
enhanced enforcement in focus states.  
6.3.1 Constitutional protection of civil and political rights norms 
In order to ensure implementation of the African Charter, state parties are 
mandated to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to the 
Charter rights. However, the procedure for the adoption of international 
treaties in national legislation depends on whether the state is a dualist or 
monist state. For instance, in dualist states, such as Nigeria, the procedure 
for adoption requires re-enactment by the legislative organ of 
government.87 On the other hand, the procedure in monist countries such 
as Benin is that international treaties come into effect upon the state signing 
up to such treaty.  
6.3.1.1 Approach to state party constitutional protection of human rights 
One visible constitutional pattern relating to human rights protection in 
African countries is the divide between fundamental rights and Fundamental 
                                       
86 Therefore, without being a state party to the African Charter, the AU has some level of control to 
interfere in cases of serious human rights violations in member states.  
87 Nigeria has domesticated the African Charter as African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(Ratification and Enforcement) Act 1983, in line with the provision of section 12 of the 1999 
Constitution. Section 12 of 1999 Constitution provides that ‘no treaty between the Federation and any 
other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted 
into law by the National Assembly’. Similar provision is missing in 1977 Constitution of Tanzania. 
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Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. This divide impacts on 
state party enforcement of African Charter rights and freedoms. However, 
while the majority of civil and political rights fall under the enforceable 
fundamental or basic rights in the constitutions of Nigeria, Tanzania and 
Benin,88 the non-justiciable Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles 
of State Policy affect mainly socio-economic rights found in the ICESCR. 
Indeed, one would expect to have broader human rights protection in state 
party constitutions, particularly, where such country is a party to other 
international human rights treaties such as the ICCPR. However, some 
constitutions either vaguely protect rights or omit certain civil and political 
rights. For instance, both Tanzania and Nigeria Constitutions neither 
recognised the right to name and nationality nor abolish the death penalty 
and forced labour.89  
6.3.1.2 Use of derogations, limitations and claw-back clauses in state party 
constitutions 
It is clear from the provisions of the African Charter that the majority of its 
rights are not absolute. Whether the African Charter drafters adopted this 
approach because having an absolute right will affect how a society 
functions,90 it is also essential to mention that the ICCPR and ECHR contain 
some absolute rights. For instance, the Nigerian Supreme Court in Okoro v 
State91 and Kalu v State92 upheld that a person can not rely on the 
constitutional right to life where the individual is facing a death sentence. 
This decision upholds the death sentence as being part of the domestic law 
punishment for capital offences in Nigeria. Thus, it acts as one of the 
                                       
88 Article 7 (2) of 1977 Constitution of Tanzania and section 6 (6) (c) of 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. In 
all, the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy concerns mainly socio-economic 
rights mainly find under the ICESCR such as the right to work and the right to education.  
89 For forced labour, see section 34 (2) and for death penalty, see section 33 (1) of 1999 Constitution. 
See also article 15 (2) (b) of 1977 Constitution of Tanzania.  
90 For example, if the right to personal liberty and freedom of movement are absolute, every society 
would be violating human rights by lawfully restricting movement or imprisoning law offenders. 
91 (1998) 12 Supreme Court of Nigeria Judgment, 84. 
92 12 Supreme Court of Nigeria Judgment, 1; Odunlami v Nigeria Navy (2013) 12 Nigeria Weekly Law 
Report (Part 1367) 20. 
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grounds for which the right to life may be deprived when issued by a 
competent court of justice. Similarly, the Nigerian Court of Appeal has held 
in Udeh v Federal Republic of Nigeria93 that the right to personal liberty is 
not absolute, given that it may be interfered with in certain circumstances 
justified by law such as section 263 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Law.94  
 Furthermore, except for Benin and DRC, other AU member states 
constitutions, including Tanzania and Nigeria, contain derogation 
provisions. It is surprising to have derogation clauses in state constitutions 
given the absence of a derogation clause in the African Charter.95 For Benin, 
the implication is that all rights accruable under the African Charter are 
enforceable constitutional rights even in time of war or conflict, and bind all 
individuals, state and its agencies, private or social organisations and 
corporate entities.96 However, this reality signposts the liberty as well as 
the confusion of African countries in their quest to provide domestic human 
rights amidst ratification of ICCPR and the African Charter.   
Equally, the provisions of Nigerian and Tanzanian constitutions 
contain claw-back clauses. For instance, whereas the clause ‘permitted by 
                                       
93 All Federation Weekly Law Report (Pt. 61). 
94 (2001) 5 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Part 706) 312. Section 263 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Law 
empowers a Magistrate to grant bail or remand a person who has been arrested and brought before him 
pending the arraignment before an appropriate court in custody. 
95 For instance, section 45 of the Nigerian Constitution allows derogation in the interest of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality or public health, protecting the rights and freedoms of others, and 
war through an act of the National Assembly or the proclamation of the state of emergency declared by 
the President pursuant to section 305. Whereas Article 30 (2) of the Tanzanian Constitution has all 
grounds for derogation as contained in the Nigerian Constitution, it further provided for a more robust 
ground for limitations as rural and urban development planning; the exploitation and utilisation of 
minerals or the increase and development of property for public benefit; imposing restrictions, 
supervising and controlling the formation, management and activities of private societies; and, enabling 
any other thing which promotes, or preserves the national interest. In addition to this provision, Article 
31 permits any other law enacted by the Parliament, which enables measures to be taken during a period 
of emergency in Tanzania. 
96 For example, in DCC 06-062, DCC 06-060 and DCC 06-059 the Constitutional Court had found police 
and armed forces officers to be in violation of illegal arrest and degrading and inhuman treatment. 
Nonetheless, in DCC 03-084 of 28 May 2003, the Constitutional Court ruled that an investigation and 
trial that lasted for 15 years without judgment is a violation of article 7 (d) of the African Charter. 
Furthermore, in DCC 03-125 of 20 August 2003 it was held that the investigation judge was in violation 
of Article 7 (c) of the African Charter and article 35 of the Constitution through acts that constitute delay 
to justice.  
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law’ and ‘established by law’ were used in the right to life, the right to 
personal liberty, and the right to fair hearing under the Nigerian 
Constitution; the Tanzanian constitution applied the use of ‘accordance with 
the law’ in guaranteeing the right to own property, the right to participate 
in public affairs, and the right to life. However, while the issue of claw-back 
clauses has been settled at the African Commission to mean recourse to 
other international human rights instruments, domestic use of claw-back 
seem not to have a similar meaning. For instance, because the right to life 
and the right to privacy in 1990 Benin Constitution contains claw-back 
causes, the court in determining whether article 381 of the Benin Criminal 
Code which authorises the death sentence violated the right to life under 
article 8 and 15 of the Constitution held that there is no express abolition 
of the death penalty given that a subsisting law still upholds it.97 This implies 
that claw-back clauses in national laws refer to other related national 
legislation irrespective of whether they violate the African Charter 
objectives or not.  
 Another unique constitutional approach that limits the realisation of 
effective enforcement of fundamental rights at the state level is found in 
the Tanzanian constitution under article 30 (5) and article 13 (2) of the 
Basic Rights and Duties Act. These articles limit the power of the High Court 
to declare any law or action taken by the government invalid until the 
government or the relevant authority rectify the defect. This implies that a 
court may lose its jurisdiction where such acts or law have the potential to 
violate human rights despite the constitutional power to provide redress to 
human rights victims.98 Thus, not all allegations of infringement of 
constitutional rights should be redressed through litigation in Tanzania 
courts. However, this position conflicts with the concept under the Nigerian 
                                       
97 DCC 99-051 of 13 October 1999. Although the Constitutional Court has abolished the death penalty 
in Benin following Benin’s ratification of Protocol to the ICCPR abolishing same, the claw-back is still 
inserted in the 1990 Constitution pending amendment of the constitution.  
98 Article 30 (3) of 1977 Constitution of Tanzania.  
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constitution.99 For instance, in Andee Iheme v Chief of Defence State and 
others, the Nigeria Court of Appeal considered this appeal on a sole issue 
for determination- ‘whether the trial court was right in declining jurisdiction 
to entertain the appellant's case’. In its ruling, the Court of Appeal held that 
no citizen should be shut out from seeking redress for his fundamental 
rights and subsequently ordered the trial court to entertain this matter.100 
The principle reemphasised that every individual has a right to seek redress 
and that the state has a responsibility to ensure the institutions are 
available.101    
6.4 Conclusion  
So far, it can be seen that the successes of the African Court and the African 
Commission have not adequately reduced gross human rights abuses and 
weak enforcement at both regional and national levels. The analysis in this 
chapter is illustrative of the fact that the challenges to effective enforcement 
of civil and political rights in Africa are multifaceted due to normative and 
institutional shortcomings at regional and domestic levels. Of course, the 
journey towards realising effective enforcement of civil and political rights 
requires the AU to take steps in order to further close these gaps by 
removing remaining obstacles to both normative and institutional 
framework of the African Charter rights and freedoms. The member states 
of the AU equally need to eliminate obstacles at the national level by 
accepting good practice necessary to remedy the shortcomings. 
 However, one must commend both the AU and its member states on 
the progress made so far towards realising effective enforcement. There is 
much progress to be made, such as an amendment to the African Charter 
that will consider improving its norms as well as the enforcement 
institutions. Of course, this improvement will boost the African human rights 
                                       
99 Section 46 of 1999 Constitution of Nigeria and article 114 of 1990 Constitution of Benin. 
100 CA/J/264/2017.  
101 The victims need to have unhindered access to the courts, in the first instance, before redress can be 
sought and obtained. Arguably, when access to court is not guaranteed, redress is denied. 
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system jurisprudence as well as enhance effective enforcement. to this 
effect, the call for amendment should not be the prerogative of state parties 
alone under 68 of the African Charter. One would expect that the 
enforcement institutions, because of their burden and mandate under the 
Charter, should also be allowed to submit proposals for amendment as is 
obtainable under articles 76 and 77 of American Convention.  
 It is necessary that regional constraints that hinder AU’s organs from 
performing their human rights duties are eliminated. Whether this may 
entail creating a new department solely for human rights, one will agree 
that there is a greater need for AU to show more commitment to 
guaranteeing its human rights objectives. The importance of such a 
department would help the AU in articulating, promoting and following-up 
on state party implementation, compliance and other human rights 
obligations.   
Nevertheless, the AU must be seen as more forceful and aggressive 
in pursuing its human rights goals under the Constitutive Act, and not 
merely seen as helpless due to the politics of member states. It becomes 
necessary that state parties do things differently in order to ensure effective 
enforcement. Notably, African Charter state parties must ensure the 
Charter rights are given effect to, without discrimination, within their 
jurisdiction. Consequently, it can be taken that state parties should also 
adopt best standards from ICCPR or good practices from other states to 
enhance the effective realisation of civil and political rights both at the 
regional and domestic levels.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.0  Introduction 
This chapter reaffirms the central idea which guided the thesis and seeks 
to consolidate answers to research questions raised, and the justifications 
raised. Apart from the preceding, this thesis agrees that Africa’s journey 
towards effective human rights enforcement is far from being completed. 
This observation is posited given the rife human rights violations in many 
African Charter state parties despite some positive efforts in the region to 
enhance human rights. This chapter seeks to highlight the limitations of the 
study, suggest directions for further research as well as make 
recommendations for potential reforms.  
7.1 Limitations of the thesis 
This thesis analyses the enforcement of civil and political rights from an 
African Charter perspective. First, because human rights comprise various 
categories, this thesis focuses primarily on civil and political rights. It is 
consequently impracticable for this thesis to claim a comprehensive analysis 
of all categories of human rights recognised under the African Charter. 
However, an attempt is made to recognise the African Charter’s unique 
protection of various categories of human rights such as socio-economic, 
peoples’ and environmental rights. The focus on the African Charter allows 
extensive analysis of its case law jurisprudence and normative protections 
while recognising the impact of other instruments in the subject area. 
Furthermore, the fact that all AU member states, except Morocco, have 
ratified the African Charter makes this thesis focus realistic.  
Another limitation of this thesis concerns the analysis of African 
Charter state parties. The fulcrum of this thesis remains the African Charter 
enforcement in Africa, which is a continent of fifty-five independent states 
with different legal systems and cultural inclinations. In other words, this 
thesis does not exhaustively deal with all the possible issues relating to civil 
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and political rights in the fifty-five African countries; thus, the risk of over-
generalisation. This thesis, in essence, limits its scope to state party 
obligations under the African Charter in three countries. In addition, this 
approach helped to eliminate the possibility of a dearth of case laws from 
regional institutions in some of these countries. Nevertheless, this thesis 
allowed an examination of the African Commission and the African Court 
communications and cases from all relevant African countries in order to 
emphasise the prospects and challenges by the regional institutions.  
 Generally, this thesis is not ignorant of the merger between the Court 
of Justice of the African Union1 and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights2 under the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights. The merger Protocol was adopted during the 11th African 
Union Summit in July 2008 and the Court, just as the African Court, is based 
in Arusha, Tanzania.3 While the new regional court is still awaiting fifteen 
member state ratification to come into effect, the following seven countries 
have ratified it: Libya 2009; Mali 2009; Burkina Faso 2010; Benin 2010; 
Congo 2011, Liberia 2014 and Gambia 2018.4 The limitation envisaged is 
that, while the new court has both human rights and international criminal 
jurisdiction, it replaces the African Court when it comes into force.5 In the 
main, relevant research on the incoming court is necessary, although not 
covered, because the focus of this thesis is on working institutions and not 
futuristic ones. However, it is noteworthy that the African Court of Justice 
                                       
1 Adopted at the Maputo Summit in July 2003. 
2 Article 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 2008. 
3 Known as the Protocol for the Establishment of African Court of Justice and Human Rights. According 
to article 3 of this Protocol, reference made to the Court of Justice under the Constitutive Act will be 
deemed to mean the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.  
4 See article 9 of the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Information available as 
of April 2019. For the ratification of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, see > https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36396-sl-
protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights.pdf< accessed 29 April 
2019.  
5 Article 1, 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.  
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and Human Rights has a broader competence in terms of jurisdiction6 and 
access than the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.7  
 One of the limitations of this thesis is the use of a library-based 
research method instead of conducting interviews for information 
gathering. The problem envisaged is that conducting interviews would have 
provided more information on whether victims are happy with redress 
granted by the institutions if victims encountered any procedural 
frustrations, efforts and private steps taken to ensure compliance with 
decisions and other relevant opinions regarding African Charter procedures 
and enforcement. However, because this could not have been feasible given 
the task of tracing every victim; reliance on academic literature, NGO 
reports and media information for information gathering seem to have been 
the most positive method of meeting the set objectives of this thesis.  
The quest for Africa to have an Africanised human rights system is a 
limitation of the thesis. This idea, as demonstrated in paragraphs 5 and 8 
of the African Charter preamble, suggests that post-colonial Africa would 
most likely welcome ideas underpinning African solutions to African 
problems. In this regard, the recognition of African history, values and 
tradition amidst the aspects of aspiration for African peoples upon which 
the African Charter is based indicates that if possible, Africa can adopt 
unique procedural models so long as it promotes the UDHR as well as not 
conflicting with African values and tradition. With this in mind, this thesis 
will not aim at transplanting from other pre-existing regional or 
international human rights instruments. This is because a legal transplant 
may involve a complete displacement of the African Charter and may simply 
be asking for stronger realignment with the Western model that both the 
                                       
6 Article 28 of the Protocol included the interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act, other 
Union Treaties and instruments adopted within the framework of the AU or the OAU, the African 
Charter, the Charter on the Rights of the Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the African Charter on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, or any other legal instrument relating to human rights, ratified by the State 
Parties.  
7 Article 29 and 30 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
332 
 
 
relativistic cultural scholars and the idea of an Africanised human rights 
system stand against. Instead, it is an investigation into what is in existence 
for the protection of civil and political rights within the African region with 
a view to suggesting how this category of rights can be effectively realised. 
7.1.1 Common study limitations 
Over and above the preceding limitations, the main contribution of this 
thesis shows the researchers’ conscious efforts to suggest insights for the 
effective realisation of African Charter civil and political rights provisions. 
This thesis sought to devise analytically what ought to enhance the regional 
protection of human rights enshrined in the African Charter. It is through 
the framing of the African Charter and its Court Protocol that the thesis 
questions, aim and objectives are derived. This is because this thesis 
considers some norms enshrined in these regional frameworks an inherent 
limitation towards realising effective enforcement of civil and political rights.  
 This thesis imagines that the transformation of the African human 
rights system is a process that needs a progressive periodic review to 
ascertain whether they are registering any improvement. This will relate to 
ways of improving the effectiveness of the regional institutions because 
whatever suggestion is made in this study and elsewhere cannot be final 
and perfect. This thinking finds philosophical expression in the idea that 
human rights are dynamic and should be allowed to develop with the 
contemporary need of societies. This thesis agrees that while sustained 
scholarly debate and investigation are essential, it is not in dispute that a 
significant volume of literature exists concerning the African human rights 
system. This thesis has presupposed that the AU and its member states 
dedication to human rights protection would be amenable to rational 
thoughts regarding enhanced human rights protection and promotion. 
Nonetheless, the AU organs seem not to have changed their attitude to 
member states failing to meet human rights obligations. Thus, it seems 
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difficult to say that the existing structure of the AU might enhance member 
states human rights commitments.  
 Nevetheless, the thesis argument has been that the African human 
rights system is inadequate to meet contemporary enforcement need of 
ideal human and peoples’ rights. Therefore, the AU should be at the 
forefront of canvassing member state ratification of the Court Protocol and 
other related human rights instruments. Where AU member states fail to 
ratify international human rights instruments, the ideas of international 
politics and diplomacy, and inter-state party politics become necessary 
tools to check excesses and limitations. This is because non-ratification of 
international treaties limits the international law’s scope in terms of 
enforcement and accountability.  
  It is acknowledged that given the numerous international human 
rights treaties which many AU member states are a signatory to, it cannot 
then be maintained that the thesis is an encompassing discourse on 
international human rights realisation. In other words, this thesis has not 
presented conclusive arguments about realising international human rights 
for AU member states. Instead, its analysis is significantly directed to the 
effective realisation of the African Charter civil and political rights 
provisions. In brief, this thesis substantially delved into actual and potential 
challenges to the enforcement of the African Charter civil and political 
rights.  
7.2  Summary of findings   
This study was premised on the fact that the human rights enforcement 
under the African regional human rights system since the emergence of the 
OAU has been murky because both AU and its member states seem not to 
be committed to their human rights obligations.8 Generally, this thesis 
                                       
8 Christof Heyns and Morris Killander, ‘Africa’ in Daniel Moeckli and Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh 
Sivakumaram (eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 441; George 
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analysed Africa’s progress towards enhancing human rights protection as 
well as the regional prospects and challenges in the enforcement of the 
African Charter civil and political rights provisions.  
This study agrees that, though the African Charter system is 
burdened with multifaceted challenges, it has, without doubt, made many 
strides as well as meaningful contributions to the international human rights 
discourse.9 Likewise, this thesis agrees that important reforms must be 
allowed for the African Charter to attain its prospects towards effective 
human rights realisation.10 On the other hand, this thesis agrees that the 
AU has over time shown lack of political will to hold state parties’ 
accountable and the persuasiveness to carry out its regional human rights 
enforcement role.  
Indeed, the above observation summarises the core findings of this 
thesis. Likewise, every chapter embodies some specific findings and a 
conclusion that sum up the general thesis aim and objectives. In this vein, 
chapter one laid the foundation for this thesis by outlining the aim and 
objectives, and the statement of the problem which this entire thesis seeks 
to resolve. Through discussions of research methodology, a literature 
review, and thesis argument, chapter one outlines the research questions 
and how the findings of this thesis will contribute to knowledge in the area 
of the African human rights system.  
                                       
Mugwanya, Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African Regional Human 
Rights System (Brill Nijhoff, 2003) xv. 
9 Jeremy Sarkin, ‘The Need to Reform the Political Role of the African Union in Promoting Democracy 
and Human Rights in Domestic States: Making States more Accountable and less able to avoid Scrutiny 
at the United Nations, Using Swaziland to Spotlight the Issue’ (2018) 26 African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, 84; George Mugwanya, Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights 
through the African Regional Human Rights System (n 8 above) xv.  
10 Frans Viljoen, ‘Understanding and Overcoming Challenges in Accessing the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’ (2018) 67 International and Comparative Law, 63; Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Eyeing 
the Promised Land: The Wearisome Quest for an Effective Regional Human Rights Enforcement 
Mechanism in Africa’ (2014) 1 Transnational Human Rights Review, 179; Christof Heyns, ‘The African 
Human Rights System: In need of Reform’ (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, 155; Makau 
Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of 
Duties’, (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law, 342. 
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 Chapter two discussed the historical, philosophical and contemporary 
backgrounds to international human rights with particular concern for the 
protection of civil and political rights. This chapter observed that 
contemporary human rights law has succeeded in its universal objective by 
converting natural rights into legal rights through codification of both 
national and international laws. However, this chapter argued that there is 
a need for international human rights institutions such as the HRC to have 
teeth and act as a safety net for countries and regions with weak 
enforcement mechanisms. In that way, more involvement of the UNSC or 
collaboration with ICC is suggested. 
 Chapter three examined the normative framework for civil and 
political rights protection under the African Charter. This chapter found that 
contrary to the fears of many writers, the African Charter institutions have 
developed enviable case law jurisprudence and have continued to use their 
interpretation mandate to correct some normative anomalies in the African 
Charter. For example, this chapter agrees that the decisions about the 
absence of a derogation clause11 and the meaning of claw-back clauses12 
emphasised the intent of the drafters, which supports total state party 
obligation to the Charter at all times. While this chapter highlighted that 
many of the decisions of the African Commission and the African Court 
aligned and met universal human rights law goals, it is suggested that these 
decisions can act as a viable tool and direction for future reforms to the 
African Charter norms.  
Furthermore, chapter three highlighted some normative features that 
distinguish the African Charter and other regional human rights 
instruments. In addition, by examining how these features have impacted 
on the enhancement or otherwise of the African Charter enforcement, this 
chapter supports some radical shifts in the African Charter normative 
                                       
11 Communication 70/92- Commission Nationale des Driots de l’Homme et des Liberties V Chad. 
12 Communication 101/93- Civil Liberties Organisation (in respect of the Nigerian Bar Association) v 
Nigeria. 
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features given the region’s human rights history and contemporary human 
rights violations in many African states.  
 Although the institutional framework of the African Charter is one 
aspect of the regional human rights system that has received crucial 
reforms because of the emergence of the African Court, chapter four 
reviewed the political and institutional framework for human rights 
protection of African Charter rights and freedoms and concluded that it is 
far from being complete. Although the analysis focused on the three crucial 
institutions for the African Charter enforcement; namely, the AU, the 
African Commission and the African Court, this chapter found that these 
institutions are hindered in ensuring the full realisation of the African 
Charter rights. For instance, it is agreed that the AU organs seem 
unprepared to advance human rights protection given their role under the 
African Charter and the Court Protocol. This chapter suggests the 
establishment of a human rights unit or department within the AU.  
 Consequently, this chapter found some gaps in the African Charter 
and the Court Protocol, which impact on the ability of the African 
Commission and the African Court to effectively guarantee African Charter 
enjoyment. While it is agreed that the shortcomings in these instruments 
form the bedrock for some state parties’ unserious and bullish attitude to 
the African Court and African Commission, it suggested the use of pressure 
and collaboration with relevant regional and international organs.  
 The central position of state parties in the African Charter discourse 
makes it imperative for this thesis to conduct an analysis of domestic 
obligations in the enforcement of the African Charter civil and political rights 
provisions. This investigation became crucial because the African Court and 
African Commission assume jurisdiction from state party action and 
inaction. Therefore, chapter five analyses selected state parties’ civil and 
political rights protection and the prospects and challenges thereto. This 
chapter found that state parties often fail to guarantee the independence of 
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the enforcement institutions or comply with decisions therefrom. Other 
shortcomings which were identified include inadequate or limited state 
party constitutional provisions and insignificant complementing institutions. 
It is suggested that the African Charter can only be as strong as the support 
from states; thus, there is a need for state parties to take their obligations 
seriously for the Charter rights and freedoms to be fully realised. 
 As shown in preceding chapters, the African Charter is besieged with 
both normative and institutional deficiencies. Therefore, the analysis in 
chapter six investigated the challenges and strategies that invigorate the 
enforcement of the African Charter civil and political rights provisions. The 
chapter assessed, inter alia, the prospects and challenges faced by the 
African Charter political and institutional enforcement framework, the 
extent of the African Charter normative shortcomings, state party 
commitment to African Charter obligations, and further suggested 
approaches for reform.  
This chapter posited that the challenges facing the African regional 
system are not only related to the normative and institutional mechanisms 
of the African Charter. Suffice it to add that member states rarely comply 
with decisions from the African Court and the African Commission. This 
chapter reinforced the argument that the African Charter reforms should 
consider a direct relationship between the regional institutions and the 
national institutions in the area of post-adjudication procedure. Besides, 
this chapter found that African Charter enforcement could undoubtedly be 
improved through reforms that grant unhindered access, innovative 
interpretation, and implementation, and use sanctions against non-
complying states parties.  
 The novel suggestions in this research would aid in the future reforms 
of the African Charter, its Court Protocol and the constitutions of the 
selected countries. It would if applied, contribute to reducing the research 
problem. Indeed, it is incumbent upon all role-players, stakeholders and 
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individuals to ensure that the African Charter rights are fully implemented. 
Of course, this will require broad and innovative interpretation by both 
regional and national institutions to correct the exposed inadequacies and 
flawed provisions of the African Charter. While this suggestion is against 
the backdrop of articles 60 and 61 that require the African Charter 
institutions to interpret the Charter in the light of general international law, 
articles 66 and 68 of the African Charter ensures that the Charter is not 
static by allowing the promulgation of an additional Protocol, or its 
amendment. For example, the adoption of the Court Protocol in 1998 
indicates that further reforms to the African Charter system cannot be ruled 
out. What this adoption has proved is that the drafters of the African Charter 
did not envisage static treaty given their understanding that law, especially 
human rights, is dynamic and must be allowed to develop with the people.  
7.3 Recommendations  
This thesis has understudied the African Charter, and in particular, the 
enforcement of civil and political rights provisions. It is crucial to emphasise 
that this thesis does not intend to obliterate the African Charter and its 
Court Protocol. Instead, this thesis proffers explicit recommendations to 
enhance African Charter civil and political rights enforcement having 
considered contemporary regional human rights realities. To aid relevant 
decision-makers set a clear path for future reform, the characteristics of 
this thesis recommendations concern the amendment of the African Charter 
and the Court Protocol, and reforms to the political framework for the 
African Charter protection.  
7.3.1 Establishment of a human rights department within the AU 
headed by the Commissioner for Human Rights  
Contemporary efforts in protecting human rights in Africa must involve 
taking progressive steps that ensure the effective realisation of the African 
Charter rights and freedoms at national and regional levels. This is 
submitted against the background that the African human rights system 
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has faced difficulties with enforcement of the African Charter rights and 
freedoms since its inception. In order to try and strengthen human rights 
enforcement, the AU needs to establish unequivocal human rights unit or 
department.13  This suggestion will respond to the apparent slow pace and 
the insignificant role played by the Council of Ministers, the AHSG and also 
the AU Department of Political Affairs in carrying out their human rights 
duties.14 Unnoticed activities of these African human rights bodies, when 
compared to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), calls for reforms. Conversely, while the sole mandate of the 
OHCHR focuses on the promotion and protection of human rights for all, the 
Department of Political Affairs is entrusted with more mandate by the AU. 
Hence, it is recommended that a regional office, similar to the OHCHR, be 
established to solely ensure that the protection and enjoyment of the 
African Charter rights is a reality in peoples’ lives across Africa.   
 It is suggested that the UN model on OHCHR be adopted. Like the 
UN OHCHR, such African department/office on human rights will strengthen 
AU expertise on human rights monitoring, reporting and prevention of 
violations by identifying, highlighting and developing responses to 
contemporary regional human rights challenges, and act as the principal 
human rights hub for public information, education, research and advocacy 
activities in the AU system. In addition, this model allows for such a regional 
                                       
13 The eight departments/offices headed by various Commissioners that presently exist at the AU are: 
Peace and Security; Political Affairs; Trade and Industry; Infrastructure and Energy; Social Affairs; 
Rural Economy and Agriculture; Human Resources, Science and Technology; and Economic Affairs.  
14 At present, the Department of Political Affairs of the AU is responsible for the promoting, facilitating, 
coordinating and encouraging democratic principles and the rule of law, respect for human rights, 
participation of civil society in the development process of the continent and the achievement of durable 
solutions for addressing humanitarian crisis. However, it is submitted also that the recommendation to 
establish a specific human rights department/office similar to the UN system would be more efficient 
and realistic because of its position within the AU organisation and the structure such department/office 
would establish in dealing with human rights concerns in the region. In addition, it will be more robust 
than the African Task Force on the Implementation of Court Decision, which was established by the 
African Court via Gazette Notice Number GN/10944/2017 as amended by Gazette Notice Number 
GN/2446/2018, dated 28 February 2018. Arguably, the establishment of the Task Force invariably 
supports this thesis argument that AU organs involved in the enforcement of the African Charter rights 
and freedoms are not adequately performing, which supports the call for innovations to meet 
contemporary challenges.  
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office to assist AU member states by providing expertise and technical 
training in the area of the electoral process, legislative reform, and 
administration of justice, to help implement international human rights 
standards at domestic levels. Specifically, the role covered by this 
department/office should include those performed by the Secretary of the 
OAU under articles 47, 49, and 52 of the African Charter,  the role of the 
AHSG under articles 58 and 59 of the African Charter, and article 29 (2) of 
the Court Protocol. In all, this department/office should be able to support 
and assist those with a responsibility to fulfil their human rights obligations 
and individuals to realise their rights in the face of human rights violations.   
 The AU department/office will be headed by a Commissioner for 
Human Rights. The Commissioner must endeavour to carry out human 
rights tasks with clear goals and speak objectively in the face of human 
rights violations across the African region.  Such goals must include 
identifying and removing obstacles to effective implementation of the 
African Charter, improving cooperation and coordination of human rights 
activities between states and AU organs and within the AU, follow-up on 
state party implementation, and make suggestions during the amendment 
of the African Charter and its Court Protocol. The Commissioner for Human 
Rights will need to prioritise African Charter state parties’ obligations and 
the strengthening of NHRIs. The Commissioner for Human Rights must 
spearhead the African Union’s human rights efforts.  
The creation of the office of the Commissioner for Human Right within 
the AU deduces the need to reform the African Commission special 
mechanisms. The tasks of the special mechanisms of the African 
Commission such as the special rapporteurs, committees and working 
groups would be merged into the AU human rights department/office. The 
need to merge the African Commission special procedures are twofold. First, 
it gives the African region the opportunity to reduce cost by not duplicating 
its workforce. Second, it provides a unified regional entity for a human 
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rights mandate for all people and all human rights institutions. Hence, the 
Commissioner for Human Rights would be empowered to establish 
specialised structure, if necessary, to support its regional mandate, in 
particular by supporting the work of the African Court and the African 
Commission in ensuring that human rights is a reality in the lives of all 
peoples across the African region. Generally, this proposed 
department/office will work to promote and protect the human rights that 
are guaranteed under the African Charter, other regional and international 
human rights treaties, as well as domestic human rights legislation.15   
7.3 2 Participation of national judicial institutions in the 
enforcement of the African Charter institutions’ decisions  
The low rate of enforcement of African Court and Commission decisions is 
discouraging and unacceptable. As one of the crucial challenges facing the 
regional human rights system, another progressive approach to curb this 
anomaly is to allow participation of national institutions in the enforcement 
of regional judgments and recommendations. This recommendation builds 
on Liwanga’s assertion that the low rate of enforcement may be partially 
due to the ‘lack of involvement and/or competence of national courts in the 
post jurisdiction stage of international proceedings’.16 In further striking a 
balance created by the tension between the national courts' role and 
international judgments, Oppong asserted that while up-to-date national 
legislation is needed, regional research and careful deliberation should 
guide such national legislation to avert legal and policy issues.17 It follows 
that empowering national courts to have jurisdiction in the process of 
enforcing African Court and African Commission decisions is essential for 
two compelling reasons. First, it leaves the respondent state with the only 
                                       
15 However, the establishment of this department requires amendment of the AU Constitutive Act under 
article 32.  
16 Roger-Claude Liwanga, ‘From Commitment to Compliance: Enforceability of Remedial Orders of 
African Human Rights Bodies’ (2015) 41 (2) Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 99. 
17 Richard Oppong and Lisa Niro, ‘Enforcing Judgments of International Courts in National Courts’ 
(2014) 5 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 344.  
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option of enforcement since national courts recognise such decisions. In this 
instance, a national procedure for enforcement could be invoked to expedite 
compliance. It is submitted that this process would guarantee more 
likelihood of enforcement because of the local and international pressure 
that it invokes. Secondly, it would make a follow-up on compliance more 
straightforward for regional bodies, NGOs and AU organs charged with such 
mandate. For instance, it should be expressly stated as thus- ‘a decision or 
recommendation from the African Charter institutions shall be recognised 
as binding and shall upon application in writing to the respondent state 
party court, be enforced by the court’. However, this can be supported by 
an AU resolution on the recognition and enforcement of regional judgments. 
The approach of having a regional resolution is necessary because it would 
provide more details on procedures and enforcement. For instance, it is 
essential to emphasise that domestic enforcement must be done in 
accordance with the national rules and procedures of the State of 
enforcement, using national courts and bailiffs, as may be applicable by 
national law of the state where enforcement is sought. In such an instance, 
the South African principle in the case of Jones v Krok18 is a good model to 
use. The South Africa Supreme Court of Appeal held in this case that 
conditions to be met before a foreign judgment is enforced include (a) that 
the judgment is final; (b) not contrary to public order; (c) not concerning 
revenue or the penal law of the foreign country. Thus, given that the African 
Court and African Commission decisions are not subject to appeal, the 
involvement of national courts in their enforcement remains a good strategy 
to be explored. 
 Participation of state party judicial institutions in the enforcement of 
African Court and Commission decisions would enhance human rights 
respect and state party obligations. This is because it would reduce the 
                                       
18 See, Jones v Krok, 1995 (1) SA 677 (AD) (South Africa). See also, Code of Organisation and Judicial 
Competence of DRC. Under this Code, foreign judgments can be enforced in DRC upon meeting certain 
conditions, including, conformity of the judgment with local legislation and compliance with DRC public 
order. 
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politics of post-adjudication procedure that require the AHSG or the Council 
of Ministers to monitor enforcement. Already, while some African countries 
will not allow domestic enforcement of international decisions,19 some allow 
it only if conditions of a bilateral treaty between the countries or legislation 
to that effect are met.20 This recommendation would increase domestic 
pressure on state parties to enforce international judgments. This would 
allow national institutions to have a direct relationship with African Charter 
institutions. By so doing, enforcement of the African Charter will become a 
matter of national and regional concern. 
7.3.3 Empower NHRIs to monitor the enforcement of the African 
Court and African Commission decisions 
The foundation for this recommendation stems from the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Article 25 of this 
Protocol grants NHRIs the competence to directly lodge complaints 
concerning violations committed in their countries.21 In the meantime, this 
thesis agrees that such an approach is laudable and progressive. However, 
the NHRIs as a national human rights stakeholder and a mandatory 
obligation under article 26 of the African Charter22 should also be allowed a 
role in monitoring state party compliance with the African Charter 
institutions’ findings. Empowering NHRIs to monitor the enforcement of 
regional decisions can play a pivotal role in strengthening the post-
                                       
19 The Supreme Court of Ghana in Republic v High Court, Accra, Ex parte Attorney General, NML 
Capital Ltd, and Republic of Argentina, (Case J5/10/2013, 3) held that the orders of the International 
Tribunal of the Law of the Sea cannot be binding on Ghanaian courts, in the absence of a legislation 
making the order binding on Ghanaian courts. 
20 Ralf Micheals, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’, in Max Planck Encyclopaedia 
of Public International Law, available at > 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2699&context=faculty_scholarship< 
accessed 20 March 2019. For instance, South Africa.  
21 Article 30 (f) of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
However, under the African Charter and the 1998 Protocol, NHRIs only enjoys access to the Court if 
state parties make a declaration under article 34 (6).  
22 There is no explicit mention of NHRIs in the African Charter. However, article 26 infers ‘the 
improvement of national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights’ have often 
been accepted as NHRIs by scholars.   
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adjudication procedures, and respond to an ever-increasing number of 
judgments from the African Court and the African Commission. This can be 
initiated through transmission to the NHRI of the findings, and the NHRIs 
shall invite the respondent state, through its Attorney General, to inform it 
on steps taken to enforce such decisions. According to the Paris Principles, 
NHRIS enjoy broad mandate to protect human rights, and this places it in 
a central position to monitor state party human rights activities, including 
implementation of decisions at the national level. Hence, until the State 
adopts adequate steps, the NHRIs continues to be a pressure institution 
and an informal link between relevant regional organs and the parties. As 
noted earlier, this procedure adds towards creating a smooth post-
adjudication follow-up in the region. Besides, this provides an opportunity 
for NHRIs to engage directly with treaty bodies.23 This idea has earlier been 
suggested in 2007 by NHRIs participating in the International Co-ordinating 
Committee meeting.24 However, whether NHRIs take the lead in this aspect, 
the role of civil society in pressuring states to abide by their obligations 
cannot be overlooked. This is because funding and the independence of 
NHRIs can be issues in some countries. In this regard, empowering civil 
society remains an essential strategy for monitoring state party 
enforcement and general human rights obligations.  
7.3.4 AU use of sanctions against defaulting state parties 
Although the use of sanctions requires the strong political will of the 
member states to an international organisation against one of its own, its 
effectiveness has somewhat been a subject of controversy. Indeed, several 
mechanisms exist for enforcing regional judgments, and these include 
                                       
23 For instance, article 30 (e) of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights empowers NHRIs to submit cases to the Court.  
24 At the end of this meeting in 2007, this Committee adopted ‘The Harmonised approached/conclusions 
of NHRIs and Treaty Body interaction’ to support this idea regarding follow-up and implementation of 
decisions by Human Rights Treaty Bodies.  See, Lisa Sekaggya, The Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs), available at > http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-
library/sites/law/migrated/documents/lisasekaggyapres.pdf< accessed 12 October 2019.  
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diplomatic negotiation, self-help, and the AU; however, some of these 
options, including the role of the AU, seem political. Their political inclination 
may sound discouraging, sometimes. While there is a need for the AU to 
readily use its power to sanction erring member states, especially when it 
involves human rights violations, it has to be careful to ensure that such 
sanction does not violate human rights or precipitate human-made 
humanitarian catastrophes. To arrive at a workable sanction that may not 
violate human rights such as the suspension from the AU to the use of 
peacekeeping military forces, the AU may consider using human rights 
goals as eligibility for specific regional programmes such as participation in 
summits, continental games, and trade such as membership of the African 
Continental Free Trade Agreement. Such methods would potentially 
intensify domestic clamour for proper human rights practices without 
further undermining the human rights of citizens. With the present 
challenges facing the African human rights system, stakeholders request 
that the AU adopts sanctions that work. Hence, the need for increased 
pressure on the AU, especially by civil society, to review its mode of 
sanctions in the Constitutive Act, and further use of such sanctions against 
member states to ensure the effective realisation of civil and political rights 
enforcement.  
7.3.5 Composition and access to the African Court and African 
Commission   
The African Court and the African Commission needs to undergo significant 
improvement concerning their composition, structure and access. First, on 
the issue of composition, expanded African Court and African Commission 
is suggested. This implies an increase in the number of 
judges/commissioners to at least half the number of AU member states. 
Why it is essential at this time to consider this is because it would avail the 
regional system of an opportunity to split the Commission/Court sittings 
into sessions, thereby increasing the number of 
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complaints/communications that are considered. With this suggestion, for 
instance, the formation of the court/commission in considering cases before 
it should be of seven judges, which entails having a minimum of three court 
divisions, sitting and adjudicating cases at every session. The core 
advantages of this include quick adjudication of claims, enhancement of 
regional integration by allowing more state parties’ 
participation/representation, and promotion of the rule of law, and access 
to justice. Also, it is in the best interest of the region to have the sitting 
arrangement of these institutions changed to a full-time basis. However, 
this implies an increase in the financial burden of the AU amidst its current 
funding challenges. To this effect, the UN model which allows substantial 
funding from the leading intergovernmental body and voluntary 
contributions from donors, including member states, should be adopted and 
incorporated. The obligatory state party budget formula must be approved 
after due consideration of the size and strength of AU member states’ 
national economies. This is necessary to avoid the current situation where 
member states fail to pay the regional mandatory financial contribution.  
 Secondly, this legal obstacle relating to limited access to the African 
Court should be removed. This recommendation builds on Viljoen’s 
assertion25 relating to the impact of restricted access through the 
admissibility requirement or direct and indirect access under article 5 of the 
Court Protocol. However, when the highlighted limitation on African Court 
access is removed and its composition and structure reviewed, the mandate 
of the African Commission may be streamlined to core promotional and 
purely fact-finding activities. This recommendation eliminates the legal 
challenges that come with requesting state parties to implement 
recommendations from the quasi-judicial African Commission. In the 
meantime, however, the African Commission must step up in exercising its 
indirect access to the African Court under article 5 (1) (a) of the Court 
                                       
25 Frans Viljoen, ‘Understanding and Overcoming Challenges in Accessing the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 10 above). 
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Protocol to enhance NGO and individual access where article 34 (6) barrier 
applies. This recommendation circumvents state party refusal to make the 
declaration that gives individuals and NGOs the opportunity to get a binding 
decision against them at the African Court. That notwithstanding, enhanced 
access to justice through the African Court creates a regional need for an 
improved legal aid system for victims who do not have sufficient financial 
resources to meet the cost of a court case and legal representation. 
Although legal aid exists in the domestic law of some member states of the 
AU, its non-recognition in the African Charter is a gap that must be closed 
to expressly indicate support for access to justice, both domestically and at 
the regional levels. In the meanwhile, civil society should be encouraged, 
more than ever before, to continue their support in ensuring that indigent 
victims access the African Court. 
7.3.6 Publicity of African Court and African Commission activities  
A clear picture of the position of the state’s obligation concerning assurance 
of human rights cannot be the duty for state parties alone in the 21st 
century. This thesis holds that inadequate enlightenment persists in the 
African region concerning the African Court and the African Commission 
activities. Such inadequacy is a serious human right concern despite the 
contemporary observation that communication and knowledge are crucial 
to the progressive actions of such human rights institutions. Therefore, 
enhanced wide publicity would improve understanding of the activities of 
these institutions. This is because publicity has the potential to strengthen 
protection, thereby putting pressure on states and the AU regarding the 
enforcement of human rights. Thus, human rights NGOs have a 
considerable role both at the national and regional levels. There is a need 
for more active involvement of NGOs in the African human rights system. 
Active participation of NGOs have played a tremendous role in the activities 
of the UN and can do the same for the African human rights system. For 
instance, NGOs should be seen as leading in the activities and strategies 
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which foster the enforcement of human rights in Africa such as human 
education, monitoring, standard-setting and procedure, investigating and 
documenting human rights, advocacy and lobbying. This assertion is made 
against the backdrop that states generally detest negative publicity, 
especially about human rights violations. NGO activities in human rights 
publicity in Africa should be rooted primarily in their desire to put issues on 
the public agenda that would otherwise not be noticed by the public. By this 
core agenda, NGO strategies in Africa will make a significant contribution 
beside the efforts of the AU and its member states in advancing an effective 
human rights regime in the African region and encourage a culture of 
human rights enforcement both at national and regional levels. In this 
regard, it is imperative to use international and local media publicity to 
highlight the findings of human rights violations against state parties. 
7.4 Challenges in achieving the above recommendations  
Overall, this research admits that sound laws are critical to a successful 
governance foundation, but it is only part of the path to success without 
adequate enforcement mechanisms, which is often more challenging. On 
the African regional system, this assertion is evident by the apparent lack 
of political will and interest by the AU in meeting its human rights goals and 
objectives under the AU Constitutive Act. Hence, there is a need for a 
change in attitude by both the AU and its member states concerning human 
rights protection on the continent.  
 In spite of the recommendations above, a question that remains is 
whether the AU is ready for change through amendment of the African 
Charter and its Court Protocol. Given that these recommendations would 
realistically enhance human rights protection, particularly, the civil and 
political rights category, one of the difficulties with the amendment or 
promulgating new instruments is getting state parties to ratify. This 
difficulty is not strange to Africa going by the lack of interest in ratifying the 
Court Protocol, Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
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and other regional instruments. However, this calls for a change of strategy 
in increasing the political will of the state party and the AU. Such 
modifications may include integrating and enhancing the role of civil society 
in the entire human rights corpus in the region. This strategy will create a 
vibrant civil society that continually puts pressure on governments and 
regional institutions in ensuring that concerned parties meet treaty 
obligations.  
7.5 Conclusion  
This thesis sets out the findings in realising effective enforcement of civil 
and political rights in Africa and contributes to knowledge by advancing the 
academic debate on this subject area. In particular, it considers the extent 
to which the African Charter normative and institutional framework has 
enhanced civil and political rights enforcement in the African region. It 
assesses the African Charter and other relevant international and regional 
treaties as well as the constitutional frameworks of selected African 
countries. Accordingly, this thesis agrees that the African Charter text need 
not wholly reflect the American Convention or the ECHR because of the 
diverse events that led to their adoption. However, considering the 
complete eradication of some underpinning ideas leading to the African 
Charter adoption such as colonisation, this thesis submits that it is 
imperative for the AU to update its primary regional human rights 
instrument in order to meet contemporary human rights challenges in the 
region. It is submitted that this reform is now essential given that the 
African Charter was drafted at a time when African leaders viewed some 
ideologies such as human rights as foreign and neo-colonial, as well as when 
the OAU had a low interest in human rights protection in its member states.  
Furthermore, this thesis has demonstrated that the causes of 
contemporary enforcement gaps in the African Charter can be a 
combination of legal, political, cultural, economic and social factors or any 
of these factors independently. The analysis of this thesis is largely based 
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on the realisation of the effective enforcement of African Charter civil and 
political rights, which has been impacted by some or all these factors. 
Indeed, the enjoyment of some civil and political rights remain unwelcome 
in many African countries due to its scope. Increasingly, there are several 
cases relating to the violation of civil and political rights provisions in many 
African countries despite state parties’ obligations in international, regional 
and national laws. One thing the situation in contemporary African countries 
indicates is Africa’s need to improve the quality of laws and enhance the 
entities that have the mandate of enforcement. Therefore, realising 
effective enforcement of civil and political rights in Africa entails reforms to 
the scope, functions and operation of vital entities both at the regional and 
national levels, such as the African Charter institutions and the AU.  
Hence, the significance of this thesis is to support the debate for 
reform to the regional human rights system. It is an added voice to the call 
for reform and an improvement on what has already been said in the 
reforms debate. Indeed, its findings, conclusion, and recommendations 
cannot be a conclusion to the discussion of the African human rights system 
because human rights are dynamic. Accordingly, this thesis establishes that 
future reform to the normative framework of the African Charter presents 
an opportunity for Africa to borrow heavily from its own civilisation through 
the African Court and African Commission jurisprudence, as well as, positive 
international and domestic human rights practice and state party 
constitutional and legislative approaches.  
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Appendices  
Appendix I - Information about member states’ compliance with the 
African Commission decisions between 1987 and 2018 
Communicati
on Details 
 
 
Alleged 
violations 
Violations 
found  
Decision/Recomme
ndation 
State 
Implementation 
          1st Annual Activity Report - 6th Annual Activity Report (1987-1992)26 
                   7th Annual Activity Report (December 1993-April 1994)27 
                                       
26 Communications received between the 1st and 6th Annual Activity Reports were treated and kept 
confidential based on the African Commission’s strict reliance on article 59 of the Charter. However, 
under the 1st Annual Activity Report (1987-1988), the Commission acknowledged receipt of 
communication even before the installation of the Commission but failed to disclose the number of 
communications received. Under the 2nd Annual Activity Report (1988-1989), the Commission settled 
10 communications whereas the Commission admitted having received 105 communications since its 
beginning of which 16 are directed against State Parties to the Charter in its 3rd Annual Activity Report 
(1989-1990). 16 communications against state parties were considered of which 6 were new under the 
4th Annual Activity Report (1990-1991) and another 16 communications and a follow-up on the old 
communications were highlighted in 5th Annual Activity Report (1991-1992). The Commission reported 
a receipt of 14 communications in its 6th Annual Activity Report (1992-1993) and further followed up 
on 41 communications.  
27 1993-1994 - the African Commission received 33 communications and have so far completed 78 
communications with 58 pending communications. It is noteworthy to mention that it was with the 
publication of the 7th Annual Activity Report that the African Commission for the first time published its 
findings on communications decided under article 55 of the African Charter. This new procedure ended 
an era of strict reliance on article 59 confidentiality clause interpretation of the African Charter. However, 
majority of the communications reported in the annexed 7th Annual Activity Report were found 
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Comm. 64/92 
Krishna 
Achuthan v 
Malawi; 
Comm. 68/92 
Amnesty 
International 
v Malawi; 
Comm. 78/92 
Amnesty 
International 
v Malawi 
 
Wrongful 
detentions and 
denial of rights 
Articles 4, 
5, and 7.  
No specific 
recommendation 
but referred the 
situation to the 
AHSG under article 
58(1) of the 
Charter. 
The AHSG took 
no specific action 
and the AHSG 
further failed to 
act under article 
58 (2).  
Comm. 47/90 
Lawyers 
Committee for 
Human Rights 
v Zaire 
Arbitrary 
arrest, 
detention, and 
torture. 
Undisclos
ed.  
Undisclosed but 
admitted evidence 
of the existence of 
a serious or 
massive human 
rights violation and 
referred the 
situation to the 
AHSG under article 
58(1) of the 
Charter. 
The AHSG took 
no specific action 
and the AHSG 
did not act under 
article 58 (2).  
                  8th Annual Activity Report (October 1994 – March 1995)28 
                                       
inadmissible for the following reasons: non-exhaustion of local remedies, amicable settlement, 
withdrawal of communications, and communications directed against non-state parties to the African 
Charter.  
28 The African Commission during the period under review received 6 new communications and 
concluded work on 23 communications.  
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Comm. 59/91 
Embga 
Mekongo 
Louis v 
Cameroon 
False 
imprisonment 
and 
miscarriage of 
justice.  
Article 7 Finds that the 
complainant had 
been denied due 
process and 
subsequently 
suffered damages. 
It recommended 
that quantum of 
damages accruable 
to the complainant 
be determined 
under the law of 
Cameroon. 
No record of 
implementation 
by Cameroon. 
Comm. 60/91 
Constitution 
Rights Project 
v Nigeria (In 
respect of 
Akamu, 
Adega, and 
others) 
Alleged that 
the 
composition of 
the Robbery 
and Firearms 
Tribunal does 
not guarantee 
impartiality. 
Further alleged 
that the 
Robbery and 
Firearms 
(Special 
Article 7 
(a), (c), 
and (d) 
Recommended that 
Nigeria should free 
the complainants.  
Nigeria did not 
release 
complainants, 
but they later 
had death 
sentences 
commuted to 
various prison 
terms by a High 
Court in 
Nigeria.29  
                                       
29 See the unreported judgement in the case of Registered Trustees of the Constitutional Rights Projects 
n The President, Federal Republic of Nigeria and 2 ors, Suit No. m/102/93. See also, Evelyn Ankumah, 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights- Practice and Procedure (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Netherlands, 1996) 72.  
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Provision) 
Decree No. 5 
of 1984 
excluded the 
right to appeal 
against 
decisions of 
the Tribunal. 
Comm. 64/92 
Krischna 
Achutan (On 
behalf of 
Aleke Banda) 
Comm. 68/92 
Amnesty 
International 
(on behalf of 
Orton and 
Chirwa) 
Comm. 78/92 
Amnesty 
International 
(On behalf of 
Orton and 
Chirwa) v 
Malawi 
Alleged 
conditions of 
overcrowding, 
beating and 
torture, 
excessive 
solitary 
confinement, 
shackling 
within a prison 
cell, extremely 
poor-quality 
food and denial 
of access to 
medical care in 
Malawi prison, 
and arbitrary 
Articles 
4,5,6,7 
(1) (a), 
(c) and 
(d). 
The Commission 
made no 
recommendation 
rather referred the 
situation to AHSG 
under article 58.1. 
The AHSG did 
not take any 
specific action. 30 
However, the 
new government 
of Malawi later 
compensated 
Chirwa with the 
sum of 5.5 
million Mluzi and 
amended its 
legislation to 
outlaw the 
traditional courts 
such as the 
Southern Region 
Traditional 
Court, that tried 
                                       
30 Paragraph 11 and 12 of the communication contained in the 8th Annual Activity Report, the 
Commission admitted that although Malawi has undergone important political change resulting in a new 
government since the submission of this communication, principles of international law stipulate that a 
new government inherits the previous government’s obligation and liabilities.  
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detention of 
Banda.  
Vera and Orton 
Chirwa.31 Vera 
Chirwa later 
became a 
Special 
Rapporteur on 
Prisons and 
Detention 
Conditions in 
Africa.32 
Comm. 87/93 
The 
Constitutional 
Rights Project 
(in respect of 
Zamani 
Lakwot and 
others) v 
Nigeria  
Alleged that 
the Civil 
Disobedience 
(Special 
Tribunal) 
Decree No. 2 
of 1987 
excluded 
judicial appeal 
and review 
against 
tribunal 
decisions, 
constant 
harassment 
Article 7 
(a), (c) 
and (d) 
Recommended that 
Nigeria should free 
the complainants 
Complainants 
sentenced to 
death by 
hanging were 
later commuted 
to prison terms 
and years 
afterwards 
released from 
prison.33 
                                       
31 Sarai Chisala-Tempelhoff and Seun Bakara, ‘Malawi’ in Victor Ayeni (ed) The Impact of the African 
Charter and the MAPUTO Protocol in Malawi (Pretoria University Law Press, 2016) 149.  
32 31st Ordinary Session of the African Commission (May 2002). 
33 Racheal Murray, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 56. 
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and 
intimidation of 
accused 
persons’ legal 
representative
s leading to 
their 
withdrawal 
from the case.    
Comm. 
101/93 Civil 
Liberties 
Organisation 
(in respect of 
the Nigeria 
Bar 
Association) v 
Nigeria 
Alleged that 
the Legal 
Practitioners 
(Amendment) 
Decree 1993 
excluded 
recourse to a 
court and was 
given a 
retrospective 
force.  
Articles 6, 
7 and 10. 
Recommended that 
the Decree be 
annulled.  
The Decree was 
not annulled 
until the 
emergence of a 
democratic era 
in 1999 and 
subsequent 
amendment in 
2004.  
                              9th Annual Activity Report (October 1995- April 1996) 
Comm. 
25/89, 47/90, 
56/91, 
100/93 
(joint). Free 
Legal 
Assistance 
Alleged 
torture, arrest 
and arbitrary 
detention, 
extra-judicial 
executions, 
unfair trials, 
Articles 
4,5,6,7, 
and 8. 
Held that the acts 
constituted serious 
and massive 
violations of the 
Charter and 
referred to AHSG. 
No 
implementation. 
The AHSG did 
not act under 
article 58(2). 
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Group, 
Lawyers’ 
Committee for 
Human 
Rights, Uion 
Interafricaine 
des Droits de 
l’Homme, Les 
Temoins de 
Jehovah v 
Zaire 
restrictions on 
the right to 
association 
and peaceful 
assembly, 
suppression of 
freedom of the 
press, 
prosecution of 
Jehovah 
witness 
members and 
their exclusion 
from access to 
education.  
Comm. 74/92 
Commission 
Nationale des 
Droits de 
l’Homme et 
des Libertes v 
Chad 
Arbitrary 
arrest, 
detention 
without trial, 
extra-judicial 
executions, 
disappearance
, 
assassinations
, harassment 
of journalists.   
Articles 4, 
5, 6, and 
7. 
Finds serious and 
massive violations 
of human rights. 
The AHSG did 
not act under 
article 58 (2).  
Comm. 
129/94 Civil 
Alleged that 
the 
Article 7 Finds the act of 
Nigerian 
No 
implementation. 
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Liberties 
Organisation 
v Nigeria  
Constitution 
(Suspension 
and 
Modification) 
Decree No. 
107 of 1993 
suspends the 
constitution 
and powers of 
the Nigerian 
court; Political 
Parties 
(Dissolution) 
Decree No. 
114 of 1993 
also oust the 
jurisdiction of 
the courts and 
nullifies any 
domestic effect 
of the African 
Charter. 
government as 
constituting a 
serious 
irregularity.  
Nigeria evolved 
into a 
democratic state 
in 1999.  
                      10th Annual Activity Report (October 1996- April 1997) 
Comm. 
27/89, 46/91, 
49/91, 99/93 
Organisation 
Mondiale 
Alleged 
expulsion of 
Burundi 
nationals from 
Rwanda 
Articles 
4,5,6,7, 
12 (3) 
and (5). 
Held that facts 
constituted a 
serious and 
massive violation 
of human rights. 
No 
implementation 
and the AHSG 
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Contre La 
Torture and 
Association 
Internationale 
des jurists 
Democrates 
Commission, 
Commission 
Intenationale 
des jurists, 
Union 
Interafricaine 
des Driots de 
l’Homme v 
Rwanda 
because of 
their ethnic 
origin and 
without the 
opportunity to 
defend 
themselves 
before a 
competent 
court, arrest 
and extra-
judicial 
executions, 
arbitrary 
detention.  
Urged Rwanda to 
adopt measures in 
conformity with its 
decision. 
did not act under 
article 58 (2).34 
Comm. 39/90 
Annette 
Pgnoulle (on 
behalf of 
Abdoulaye 
Mazou) v 
Cameroon 
Alleged 
imprisonment 
for five years 
by a military 
tribunal 
without the 
right to 
defence and 
witnesses, 
continuous 
detention after 
serving a 5-
Articles 
6,7 (1) 
(b), (d)  
Recommended that 
Cameroon draw all 
necessary legal 
conclusions to 
reinstate the victim 
in his rights. 
No evidence 
showing that 
Cameroon 
reinstated mr 
Mazou in its 
state reports. 
                                       
34 The situation in Rwanda subsequently advanced into a genocidal war where many Rwandans were 
killed along ethnic lines in 1994. 
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year prison 
term, non-
reinstatement 
to his former 
position as 
Magistrate 
after state 
Amnesty was 
granted and 
others 
reinstated. 
Comm. 71/92 
rencontre 
Africaine pour 
la defence des 
Droits de 
l’Homme v 
Zambia 
Expulsion of 
517 West 
Africans from 
Zambia, 
detention, 
denial of the 
right to access 
to court 
Articles 2, 
7 (1)(a) 
and 12 
(5) 
Commission 
resolves to pursue 
an amicable 
resolution to this 
case. 
No specific 
action was taken 
to remedy 
violations to 
victims. Thus 
victims were not 
compensated, 
and Zambia did 
not report back 
to the 
Commission on 
measures taken.  
Comm. 
103/93 
Alhassan 
Alleged 
detention for 
seven years 
without charge 
Article 6, 
7 (1)(d) 
Urged the 
government of 
Ghana to take 
No specific 
information can 
be obtained.35 
                                       
35 There was no mention of steps taken by Ghana in its State Reports to the African Commission.   
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Abubakar v 
Ghana 
steps to repair the 
prejudice suffered. 
                       11th Annual Activity Report (June 1997- April 1998) 
Comm. 
159/96 
Union Inter 
Africaine des 
Droits de 
l’Homme, 
Federation 
Internationale 
des Ligues 
des Droits de 
l’Homme, 
Rencontre 
Africaine des 
Droits de 
L’Homme, 
Organisation 
Nationale des 
Droits de 
l’Homme au 
Alleged 
expulsion of 
West African 
nationals from 
Angola    
Articles 2, 
7 (1) (a), 
12 (4) 
and (5), 
and 14. 
Urged the Angola 
government and 
the complainants 
to draw all the legal 
consequences 
arising from the 
present decisions.  
No steps were 
taken by Angola 
to implement the 
recommendation
.36 
                                       
36 Equally important, it is worthy of note that non-compliance of this recommendation by the Angola 
government may be the cause of continuous mass expulsion recorded over time in Angola. For example, 
whereas another incident of mass expulsions of West Africans was witnessed in May 2004, another 
involving the rape and assault of over 650 women and girls in November 2010 during their mass 
expulsion from Angola to DRC by Angolan security forces. See, Gina Bekker, ‘Mass Expulsion of 
Foreign Nationals: A Special Violation of Human Rights’ – Communication 292/2004 Institute of 
Human Rights and Development in Africa v Republic of Angola’ (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law 
Journal, 262; Human Rights Brief, ‘Reciprocal Violence: Mass expulsions Between Angola and DRC’ 
Available at > http://hrbrief.org/2011/02/reciprocal-violence-mass-expulsions-between-angola-and-the-
drc/< accessed 06 March 2018.  
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Senegal and 
Association 
Malienne des 
Droits de 
l’Homme au 
Angola  
                           12th Annual Activity Report (June 1998- April 1999) 
Comm. 
102/93 
Constitutional 
Rights Project 
and Civil 
Liberties 
Organisations 
v Nigeria  
Alleged 
annulment of 
1993 general 
elections; the 
promulgation 
of several 
Decrees 
ousting the 
jurisdiction of 
the court; 
arrest and 
detention of 
activists and 
journalists who 
protested the 
annulment; 
seizure of 
copies of 
Articles 1, 
6, 9, and 
13. 
Appealed to the 
Nigerian 
government to 
release all persons 
detained for 
protesting the 
annulment of the 
elections; to 
preserve the 
traditional 
functions of the 
court by not 
curtailing its 
jurisdiction.  
Nigeria did not 
comply with this 
recommendation
. However, some 
of the detained 
persons were 
released 
following 
national court 
decisions 
whereas some 
remained in 
custody until the 
death of the then 
Head of State, 
Sani Abacha.37 
                                       
37 Bukola Akintola, ‘The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Mobilisation in Nigeria’ in Wale 
Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadere (ed) Encountering the Nigerian State (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 111; 
Human Rights Watch Africa, ‘Nigeria’ available at > 
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_52396.html< accessed 06 March 2018.  
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magazines and 
eventual 
proscription of 
the ‘The News 
Magazine’. 
Comm. 
105/93, 
128/94, 
152/96 Media 
Rights 
Agenda, 
Constitutional 
Rights 
Project, Media 
Rights Agenda 
and 
Constitutional 
Rights Project 
v Nigeria  
Proscription 
and seizures of 
several 
newspaper and 
magazine 
publishers; 
arrest and 
detention of 
vendors and 
editors of such 
magazines and 
newspapers; 
promulgation 
of decrees 
ousting court 
jurisdiction 
and 
suspension of 
the 
constitution; 
expunged the 
Newspaper Act 
and 
Articles 6, 
9(1) and 
(2), 7 (2), 
and 14. 
Requested that the 
Nigerian 
government take 
necessary steps to 
bring its law into 
conformity with the 
Charter 
This 
recommendation 
was never 
complied with. 
However, by 
October 31st, 
1998 when the 
Commission 
ruled on this 
communication, 
the newspaper 
and magazines 
publishers have 
become 
functional 
following the 
death of the then 
Head of State, 
Sani Abacha on 
8th June 1998. 
Also, persons 
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promulgated 
the Newspaper 
Decree No. 43 
of 1993 and 
given a 
retroactive 
commenceme
nt. 
detained were 
released.38  
Comm. 
137/94, 
154/96, 
161/97 
International 
Pen, 
Constitutional 
Rights 
Project, 
Interights on 
behalf of Ken 
Saro Wiwa Jr. 
and Civil 
Liberties 
Organisation 
v Nigeria 
Alleged 
detention and 
trial of Ken 
Saro Wiwa and 
others; denial 
of access to a 
lawyer, 
medicine; 
inadequate 
time to 
prepare a 
defence; 
denied the 
right of 
appeal; torture 
of detained 
persons; 
discontinuance 
of the 
Articles 1, 
4, 5, 6, 
7(1) (a), 
(b), (c) 
and (d), 9 
(2), 10 
(1) and 
11. 
Commission found 
violation of articles 
5 in relation to 
detention and 
treatment in 
detention in 1993, 
1994 and 1995; 
article 6 in relation 
to detention of 
victims under the 
State Security 
(Detention of 
Persons) Act of 
1984 and State 
Security 
(Detention of 
Persons) Amended 
Decree No. 14 of 
1984 and further 
Nigeria did not 
comply with the 
decision to annul 
the decrees until 
its return to 
democracy 
following the 
death of Sani 
Abacha. Interim 
provisional 
measure issued 
by the 
Commission not 
to execute the 
victims pending 
its determination 
of the case was 
not respected.   
                                       
38 Linus Malu, Media Law and Policy in Nigeria (Malthouse Press, 2016) 298. 
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execution of 
Ken Sara Wiwa 
and others.  
obliged the 
government to 
annul these 
decrees; violation 
of article 7 with 
regard to the 
establishment of 
the Civil 
Disturbances 
Tribunal; violation 
of articles 4 and 7 
in relation to the 
conduct of the trial 
and the execution 
of the victims. 
Comm. 
212/98 
Amnesty 
International 
(on behalf of 
Banda and 
Chinula) v 
Zambia 
Unlawful 
deportation of 
Banda and 
Chinula to 
Malawi; 
Chinula was 
denied access 
to Zambia 
courts for 
redress and 
was prevented 
from returning 
Alleged 
violation 
of articles 
2, 5, 7 (1) 
(a), 8, 9, 
10, 
12(2), 
and 
13(1).  
Commission holds 
a violation of article 
2, 7(1) (a), 8, 9(2), 
and 10 of the 
African Charter. It, 
however, averred 
that Zambian 
government should 
grant Chinula’s 
family wish to 
return his body for 
burial in Zambia39 
While Chinula 
did not live to 
witness this 
ruling, Zambia 
did grant Banda 
the right to 
return and 
continued to use 
deportation or 
threat of 
deportation as a 
method of 
                                       
39 Para 40 of the communication.  
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to Zambia by 
threats of 
imprisonment 
by Zambia 
authorities.  
and allow the 
return of Banda to 
Zambia.  
suppressing 
dissents.40 
However, Banda 
was later 
allowed by the 
Zambian 
government to 
return after the 
2002 elections.41 
                         13th Annual Activity Report (June 1999 – May 2000) 
Comm. 
140/94, 
145/95, 
Constitutional 
Rights 
Project, Civil 
Liberties 
Organisation 
and Media 
Rights Agenda 
v Nigeria 
The alleged 
proscription of 
several 
national 
newspapers; 
arrest and 
detention of 
democracy 
activists; 
physical 
assault on 
democracy 
activists by 
security 
Articles 5, 
6, 7(1) 
(a), 9(1) 
and 14.  
Invites the 
government to 
take all necessary 
steps to comply 
with its obligations 
under the Charter.  
By the time this 
decision was 
reached 
(15/11/1999), 
many of the 
victims have 
been released, 
newspaper 
houses were 
back to 
business, and a 
change in 
government has 
taken place 
                                       
40 Dean Zagorac, ‘International Courts and Compliance Bodies: The Experience of Amnesty 
International’ in Tullio Treves ‘et al’ (ed) Civil Society, International Courts and Compliance Bodies 
(T.M.C. Asser Press, Hague, 2005) 37. 
41 Open Society Foundation, ‘Abusing Citizenship in Zambia-Again’, available at > 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/abusing-citizenship-zambia-again< accessed 06 March 
2018. 
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agents; 
promulgation 
of decree 
restricting the 
right to 
information 
and to express 
and 
disseminate 
opinions; 
promulgated 
decree ousting 
the jurisdiction 
of the court; 
concealment of 
private 
property by 
security 
agents.  
following the 
death of the Sani 
Abacha, the then 
Head of State.  
Comm. 
143/95, 
150/96 
Constitutional 
Rights Project 
and Civil 
Liberties 
Organisation 
v Nigeria 
Prohibition of 
courts to issue 
a writ of 
habeas corpus, 
or any other 
prerogative 
order for the 
production of 
persons 
Articles 5, 
6, 7(1) 
(a), (c) 
and (d). 
Recommends that 
Nigeria brings its 
laws in line with the 
Charter 
The decree was 
abated upon the 
death of the then 
Head of State, 
Sani Abacha, 
even before the 
recommendation 
by the 
441 
 
 
detained under 
Decree No. 2 
of 1984. 
Commission on 
15/11/1999.42 
Comm. 
148/96 
Constitutional 
Rights Project 
v Nigeria 
Arrest and 
continued 
detention of 11 
soldiers of the 
Nigerian army 
after been 
tried and found 
innocent twice 
and also 
granted state 
pardon by the 
then Armed 
Forces Ruling 
Council.  
Article 6. Urged Nigeria to 
respect the 
judgements of its 
courts and free the 
11 soldiers. 
The soldiers 
were released 
even before the 
decision of the 
Commission on 
15/11/1999 
following 
developments 
after the death 
of Sani Abacha, 
the then Head of 
State. However, 
no compensation 
was paid to 
them.43 
Comm. 
151/96 Civil 
Liberties 
Organisation 
V Nigeria 
Arrest, 
detention and 
trial of several 
people 
including 
civilians by a 
military 
tribunal; 
Articles 5 
and 7 (1) 
Appeals to Nigeria 
to allow accused 
persons a civil re-
trial with full access 
to lawyers of their 
choice, and 
improve their 
The accused 
were released in 
July 1998 even 
before the 
recommendation 
was made on 
15/11/1999 
following the 
                                       
42 Nigeria transited into a democracy in May 29 1999 following the death of Sani Abacha on 8 June 1998. 
43 Victor Ayeni, ‘Nigeria’ in Victor Ayeni (ed) The Impact of the African Charter and the Maputo 
Protocol in Selected African Countries (Pretoria University law Press, South Africa, 2016) 199.  
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secret trial and 
no appeal are 
allowed 
against its 
decision; 
denial of the 
right to a 
lawyer their 
choice and 
right to 
defence; 
detention in 
military 
facilities under 
inhuman and 
degrading 
conditions. 
condition of 
detention.  
death of the then 
Head of State, 
Sani Abacha. 
Hence, there 
was no re-trial of 
the accused 
persons.44  
Comm. 
153/96 
Constitutional 
Rights Project 
v Nigeria 
Arrest and 
detention 
without charge 
of several 
persons under 
Decree No. 2 
of 1984. 
Articles 6 
and 7 (1) 
(a) and 
(d). 
Appealed to Nigeria 
to charge the 
detainees, or 
release them. 
They were 
subsequently 
charged with 
armed robbery, 
kidnapping, 
sentenced to 
death by firing 
squad and 
executed on 31 
                                       
44 Frans Viljeon and Lirette Louw, ‘State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 1994-2004’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International 
Law, 1. 
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July 1997, long 
before the 
decision of the 
Commission on 
15 November 
1999.45 
Comm. 
206/97 
Centre for 
Free Speech v 
Nigeria 
Unlawful 
arrest, 
detention, trial 
and conviction 
of four 
journalists by a 
military 
tribunal; 
secret trial; 
denial of 
access to 
lawyers of 
their choice; 
Decree ousted 
the right to 
appeal against 
the decision 
Articles 6 
and 7 (1) 
(a) and 
(c). 
Urged Nigeria to 
order the release of 
the four 
journalists.  
The journalists 
were released 
soon after the 
death of the then 
Head of State, 
Sani Abacha in 
1998 and long 
before the 
recommendation 
by the African 
Commission on 
15 November 
1999.  
                                       
45 Amnesty International Index: AFR 44/18/97 of 29 August 1997, available at > 
file:///H:/afr440181997en.pdf< accessed 07 March 2018; Punch Newspaper, ‘Otokoto Ritual Murders: 
20 Things to know about Convict Hanged 20 years after crime’ (November 19, 2016) available at > 
file:///H:/afr440181997en.pdf< accessed 07 March 2018.  
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Comm. 
215/98 Rights 
International 
v Nigeria 
Arrest and 
torture at a 
military camp; 
denied access 
to legal 
counsel. 
Articles 5, 
6, 7 (1) © 
and 12 
(1) and 
(2). 
The Commission 
made no 
recommendation. 
Nigeria did not 
take any action 
with respect to 
the violations 
found. However, 
the victim fled to 
the United 
States on 
17/09/1996 and 
was granted a 
refugee status 
long before the 
findings of the 
Commission on 
15/11/1999.46 
Comm. 
147/95 and 
149/96 
Sir Dawda k. 
Jawara v The 
Gambia  
Alleged 
abolition of the 
Bill of Rights 
and ousting of 
court 
jurisdiction; 
ban of political 
parties and 
activities; 
restriction of 
freedom of 
expression, 
Articles 2, 
6, 7(2), 
9(1) and 
(2), 11, 
12(1) and 
(2), 
13(1). 
Urged the Gambia 
to bring its laws in 
conformity with the 
provisions of the 
Charter. 
There is no 
record of 
compliance by 
the Gambia. 
Thus, these 
recommendation
s were not 
complied with 
because the 
military officer 
(Yahya Jammeh) 
who toppled 
                                       
46 See para 16 and 17 of the communication. 
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movement and 
religion; extra-
judicial 
killings; arrest 
and detention 
of people 
without 
charge.  
Dawda Jawara 
remained in 
office from 1994 
until 2017.47 
Comm. 
205/97 
Kazeem 
Aminu v 
Nigeria 
Alleged 
arbitrary 
arrest, 
detention, 
torture by 
security 
officials, denial 
of access to 
court in line 
with Decree 
No. 2 of 1984; 
accused went 
into hiding to 
avoid military 
tribunal 
prosecution. 
Article 
3(2), 4, 
5, 6 and 
10 (1). 
Request Nigeria to 
take necessary 
actions to comply 
with its obligations 
under the charter.  
No information 
could be 
obtained in 
respect of 
compliance. 
However, 
Nigeria had 
become a 
democratic state 
by the time of 
this 
recommendation 
on 11 May 2000.  
Comm. 
48/90, 50/91, 
52/91, 89/93 
Alleged 
arbitrary 
arrest and 
Articles 2, 
4, 5, 6, 
7(1) (a), 
Recommend that 
Sudan put an end 
to these violations 
The commission 
noted that the 
situation had 
                                       
47 BBC News, ‘Profile: Former Gambia President Yahya Jammeh’ (22 January 2017), available at > 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24383225< accessed 07 March 2018. 
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Amnesty 
International 
v Sudan, 
Comite Loosli 
Bachelard v 
Sudan, 
Lawyers 
Committee for 
Human Rights 
v Sudan, 
Association of 
Members of 
the Episcopal 
Conference of 
East Africa v 
Sudan. 
detention 
without trial or 
charge; 
torture; 
suspension of 
the 
constitution; 
power under 
Decree No 2 of 
1989 to detain 
persons 
without reason 
or charge and 
trial in special 
courts; extra-
judicial 
executions. 
(c), and 
(d), 8, 9, 
10. 
in order to abide by 
its obligations 
under the Charter. 
improved 
significantly 
even before its 
recommendation
48 but it is trite 
that the ongoing 
war in South 
Sudan (formerly 
part of Sudan) 
has recorded 
massive human 
rights 
violations.49 
There is no 
record of 
compliance and 
the Decree 
remained in 
force until 
December 
2002.50 
Comm. 
54/91, Malawi 
African 
association v 
Alleged 
communicatio
ns relate to 
situations 
Articles 2, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 
9 (2), 10 
(1), 11, 
Declared that, 
during the period 
1989-1992, there 
were massive 
Despite 
Mauritania’s 
admission to 
have complied 
                                       
48 Paragraph 83 of the communication.  
49 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan’ thirty-fourth 
session (27 february-24 March 2017) A/HRC/34/63. 
50 United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31st 
December 2004 (United Nations Publications, New York, 2005) 216. 
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Mauritania; 
61/91, 
Amnesty 
International 
v Mauritania; 
98/93, Ms 
Sarr Diop, 
Union 
Interafricaine 
des Droits de 
l’Homme and 
RADDHO v 
Mauritania;  
164/97, 
Collctif des 
Veuves et 
Ayants-droit v 
Mauritania; 
210/98 
Association 
Mauritanienne 
des Droits de 
L Hommes v 
Mauritania.  
prevailing in 
Mauritania 
between 1986 
and 1992 
following a 
military coup 
in 1984-
racially 
induced arrest, 
detention and 
trial of 
persons; lack 
of adequate 
time to 
prepare 
defence; trial 
conducted in 
Arabic without 
interpreters for 
persons who 
cannot 
understand it; 
no appeal was 
permitted for 
decisions from 
the military 
12 (1), 
14. 
violations of 
human rights and 
recommended that 
Mauritania 
commence an 
independent 
enquiry in order to 
clarify the fate of 
persons considered 
disappeared, 
identify and 
prosecute 
offenders; take 
diligent measures 
to replace the 
national identity 
documents taken 
from some citizens 
as well as 
restitution of 
belongings looted 
from them; take 
appropriate 
measures to 
ensure payment of 
a compensatory 
with the 
recommendation
s of the 
Commission in 
its Initial State 
Report 1986-
2001 delivered 
at the 31st 
Ordinary Session 
of the African 
Commission, the 
Commission’s 
concluding 
observation 
highlights more 
concerns and 
made further 
recommendation
s for Mauritania 
which relates to 
slavery, needs of 
minority groups, 
arrest and 
detention of 
opposition party 
members.51 
                                       
51 Thirty first Ordinary Session, ‘Concluding Observations and Recommendations on the Initial Report 
of the Republic of Mauritania’ 2 to 16 May 2002, Pretoria, South Africa. As at 2012, this citizenship has 
not been conferred on the returnees; see, ‘IHRDA Statement on World Refugee Day’ available at > 
https://www.ihrda.org/2011/06/3125/< accessed 16 April 2018.  
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tribunals; 
restriction on 
association 
and assembly; 
torture and 
hard labour 
while in 
detention; 
extra-judicial 
killings and 
forceful 
disappearance
s.  
benefit to the 
beneficiaries of the 
victims of the dead 
and other above-
cited violations; 
reinstate the rights 
due to the unduly 
and/or forcibly 
retired workers; 
carry out an 
assessment on the 
status of degrading 
practices in the 
country with a view 
to identify the 
deep-rooted 
causes for their 
persistence 
towards its 
eradication; take 
appropriate 
administrative 
measure on the 
abolition of slavery 
in the country.  
                       14 Annual Activity Report (October 2000- May 2001) 
Comm. 97/93 
John k. 
Alleged that he 
was unjustly 
Articles 3 
(2), 5, 12 
Urged Botswana to 
take appropriate 
No record of 
compliance can 
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Modise v 
Botswana  
denied his 
nationality. 
(1) and 
(2), 13 
(1) and 
(2) and 
14.  
measures to 
recognise Mr John 
Modise as its 
citizen by descent 
and also 
compensate him 
adequately for the 
violations 
occasioned.  
be obtained. 
However, based 
on the follow-up 
by Interights, 
the NGO that 
represented Mr 
Modise, 
Botswana has 
agreed to 
restore his 
citizenship, but 
up to 2002, 
nothing has been 
heard from the 
government. 
Botswana also 
refused to pay 
any form of 
compensation.52  
Comm. 
223/98 Forum 
of Conscience 
v Sierra Leone  
Alleged that 24 
soldiers were 
tried and 
sentenced to 
death by a 
court-martial 
which allowed 
Articles 4 
and 7 (1).  
Did not make any 
recommendation. 
The Commission 
noted with 
satisfaction that 
the law denying 
the right to 
appeal had been 
amended to 
                                       
52 Botswana Centre for Human Rights, ‘Press Release on the 31st Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission’ available at > http://www.ditshwanelo.org.bw/may1pres.html< accessed 07 March 2018; 
Chidi Odinkalu, ‘Back to the Future: The Imperative of Prioritising for the Protection of Human Rights 
in Africa’ (2003) 47 Journal of African Law, 1. 
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no right to 
appeal; 
arbitrary 
deprivation of 
life. 
bring it in 
conformity with 
the Charter.53 
Comm. 
224/98 Media 
Rights Agenda 
v Nigeria 
Alleged arrest, 
detention and 
trial of Niran 
Malaolu 
(newspaper 
editor) before 
a special 
military 
tribunal and 
sentenced to 
life 
imprisonment; 
denial of 
access to a 
lawyer; denial 
of the right to 
appeal under 
Decree No. 1 
of 1986. 
Articles 
3(2), 5, 
6, 7 (1), 
9. 
Urged Nigeria to 
bring its laws in 
conformity with the 
Charter. 
Following the 
political 
developments 
after the death 
of Sani Abacha, 
Niran Malaolu 
was released 
even before the 
decision of the 
Commission on 
23rd October 
2000.  
Comm. 
225/98 Huri-
Laws v Nigeria 
Alleged arrest, 
detention, 
harassment 
Article 5, 
6, 7 )1), 
9, 10, 12 
The Commission 
made no 
recommendation.  
Following the 
political 
developments 
                                       
53 Para 20 of the Communication. It further averred that the right of life is fulcrum of all rights and thus, 
Sierra Leone arbitrarily deprived these soldiers their right to life.   
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and 
persecution of 
members of 
Civil Liberties 
Organisation 
from Nigerian 
government 
(CLO); 
torture; denial 
of access to a 
lawyer; denial 
of access to 
court based on 
Decree No 2 of 
1984; seizure 
of personal 
property.  
(1) and 
(2) and 
14 
after the death 
of Sani Abacha, 
Nigeria became 
a democratic 
state long before 
the findings of 
the Commission 
on 23rd October 
2000.  
Comm. 
231/99 
Avocats Sans 
Frontieres (on 
behalf of 
Gaetan 
Bwampamye) 
v Burundi  
Alleged denial 
of access to a 
lawyer;  
Article 7 
(1) (c).  
Request Burundi to 
take appropriate 
measures to allow 
the reopening of 
the case and the 
reconsideration in 
conformity with 
domestic laws and 
pertinent 
Burundi did not 
comply with this 
recommendation 
because its 
domestic 
legislation does 
not recognise 
reopening of a 
criminal case.54 
                                       
54 Amnesty International, ‘Burundi: Summary of Human Rights Concerns’ available at > 
https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-summary-human-rights-concerns< accessed 07 March 
2018.  
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provisions of the 
Charter; calls on 
Burundi to bring its 
criminal legislation 
in conformity with 
its Charter 
obligations.  
Comm. 
232/99 John 
D. Ouko v 
Kenya  
Alleged arrest 
and detention 
without trial; 
torture; forced 
to flee from 
Kenya. 
Articles 5, 
6, 9, 10, 
12 (1) 
and (2).  
Urged Kenya to 
facilitate the safe 
return of the 
complainant.  
There is no 
record of 
implementation 
by Kenya. 
Comm. 
204/97 
Mouvement 
Burkinabe des 
Droits de 
l’Homme et 
des Peuple v 
Burkina Faso 
Alleged reports 
of human 
rights 
violations 
committed 
from the days 
of the 
revolutionary 
government to 
date (1983-
1991) - the 
destruction of 
personal 
property, 
Articles 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7 
(1) (d), 
and 12 
(2).  
Urged Burkina Faso 
to identify and take 
to account those 
responsible for 
these violations; 
compensate 
victims; accelerate 
the judicial process 
of pending cases in 
domestic courts. 
Burkina Faso 
reported 
compliance 
efforts in its 2nd 
Periodic Report 
delivered at the 
35th ordinary 
Session of the 
Commission 
which covered 
the period of 
October 1998 to 
December 
2002.55  
                                       
55 It stated to have compensated some of the victims and also elaborated on some of the pending cases in 
court. 
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extra-judicial 
killings, 
forceful 
disappearance
. 
Comm. 
211/98 Legal 
Resources 
Foundation v 
Zambia 
Alleged the 
amended 
Zambian 
constitutions 
violates the 
rights of its 
citizens to 
participate in 
government, 
and equality 
before the law 
freely. 
Articles 2, 
3 (1) and 
13. 
Urged Zambia to 
take necessary 
steps to bring its 
laws in conformity 
with the Charter. 
Zambia did not 
comply with this 
recommendation 
but it later in 
2016 amended 
its constitution 
repealing the 
affected sections 
of this 
recommendation
. 
Comm. 
218/98 Civil 
Liberties 
Organisation, 
Legal Defence 
Centre, Legal 
Defence and 
Assistance 
Project v 
Nigeria 
Alleged unfair 
trial and 
conviction of 
persons by 
Special Military 
Tribunal and 
were 
sentenced to 
death; arrest 
and detention.  
Article 7 
(1) (a) 
and (c). 
Urged Nigeria to 
bring its laws into 
conformity with the 
Charter by 
repealing the 
Decree; to 
compensate the 
victims as 
appropriate.  
The victims were 
released after 
the death of the 
then Head of 
State long before 
the findings of 
the Commission 
on 23rd April 
2001, and there 
is no record of 
any 
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compensation to 
them. The 
Decree was 
automatically 
repealed upon 
Nigeria 
transition into 
democracy in 
1999. 
                 15th Annual Activity Report (October 2001- May 2002)56 
                 16th Annual Activity Report (October 2002- May 2003) 
Comm. 
222/98 and 
229/99 Law 
Office of 
Ghazi 
Suleiman v 
Sudan 
Alleged that 
some three 
persons were 
jailed and 
investigated 
under the 
1994 National 
Security Act 
without charge 
and access to 
lawyers and 
families; 
Articles 5, 
6, and 7 
(1) 
Urged Sudan to 
bring its legislation 
in conformity with 
the African 
Charter; request 
that the 
Government of 
Sudan adequately 
compensates 
victims.  
Sudan did not 
implement these 
recommendation
s and no record 
of compliance in 
all state reports 
submitted by 
Sudan.57 
                                       
56 This report dealt only communication 155/96 - The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, and this complaint is in relation to social and economic 
rights and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.  
57 Frans Viljeon and Lirette Louw, ‘State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 1994-2004’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International 
Law, 1. The use of secret military trials are still ongoing in Sudan. See, U.S. Department of States, 
‘Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor: 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on 
Sudan’ available at, > https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2016/af/265306.htm< accessed 07 April 
2018. 
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alleged torture 
of the victims; 
and also the 
trial of another 
26 civilians 
under a 
military court 
established by 
a Presidential 
Decree; denial 
of access to 
lawyers of 
their choice.  
Comm. 
228/99 Law 
Office of 
Ghazi 
Suleiman (on 
behalf of 
Ghazi 
Suleiman) v 
Sudan 
Alleged 
restriction of 
movement by 
security 
officers; 
several arrests 
made on the 
complainant; 
physical attack 
on his person 
and property.  
Articles 6, 
9, 10, 11, 
and 12 
Request the 
government of 
Sudan to amend its 
existing laws to 
provide for de jure 
protection of the 
human rights to 
freedom of 
expression, 
assembly, 
association and 
movement. 
Sudan did not 
implement these 
recommendation
s. Security 
forces are still 
used and 
controlled by 
President Al-
Bashir, and his 
inner circle 
maintain control 
of the 
government.58  
                                       
58 Frans Viljeon and Lirette Louw, ‘State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 1994-2004’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International 
Law, 1. The use of secret military trials are still ongoing in Sudan. See, U.S. Department of States, 
‘Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor: 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on 
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Comm. 
236/2000 
Curtis Francis 
Doebbler v 
Sudan  
Alleged 
beating and 
arrest of 
several 
students by 
security 
agents; cruel, 
inhuman and 
degrading 
punishment. 
Article 5 Request the 
government of 
Sudan to 
immediately 
amend its criminal 
law of 1991 to 
conform to the 
African charter; 
abolish the penalty 
of lashes; to take 
measures to 
ensure 
compensation of 
the victims.  
There is no 
record of 
compliance in 
the state reports 
submitted by 
Sudan.59 Sudan 
has not 
amended its 
legislation on 
lashes.60 
Comm. 
241/2001 
Purohit and 
Moore v The 
Gambia  
Allegation that 
the legislation 
governing 
mental health 
(Lunatic 
Detention Act) 
Articles 2, 
3, 5, 7 (1) 
(a) and 
(c), 13 
(1) 
Urged the 
government of The 
Gambia to repeal 
the Act and replace 
it with new 
legislation that is 
The Gambia 
accepted that 
there was a plan 
to amend this 
Act.61 However, 
The Gambia still 
                                       
Sudan’ available at, > https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2016/af/265306.htm< accessed 07 April 
2018. 
59 The criminal Code of 1991 which provides for lashing has not been amended. See United Nations 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Young Woman Risks 20 Lashes for Indecent Dressing 
‘ available at > 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16355&LangID=E< 
accessed 07 April 2018.  
60 Amnesty International, ‘Sudan: Abolish the Flogging of Women’ available at > 
https://amnesty.dk/media/1691/sudan_law91.pdf< accessed 07 April 2018.  
61 Paragraph 33-35 of the communication. This, however, led to a series of workshops by World Health 
Organisation and several others bodies on the review that led to the emergence of the Mental Health 
Policy and Strategic Plan in 2007, available at > 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/country/GambiaSummary_7May2007NOPics.pdf?ua=1< , 
accessed 07 April 2018.  
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in the Gambia 
is outdated 
and violates 
several 
provisions of 
the African 
Charter.  
compatible with 
the African 
Charter; review all 
cases of persons 
detained under this 
Act and make 
appropriate 
recommendations 
for treatment or 
release; provide 
adequate medical 
and material care 
for persons 
suffering from 
mental health 
problems; report 
back to the 
Commission on 
measures taken in 
its next periodic 
report. 
retain the 
outdated Lunatic 
Detention Act.62 
Thus, no report 
on compliance 
was found given 
that The Gambia 
has not 
submitted any 
state report 
since 1994.63 
                    17th Annual Activity Report (November 2003- June 2004) 
Comm. 
197/97 – Bah 
Alleged 
forceful 
expulsion from 
Article 14 Recommends that 
Mauritania takes 
appropriate steps 
There is no 
record of 
compliance in 
                                       
62 Mental Health Leadership and Advocacy Programme, Gambia Mental Health Report 2012, available 
at > http://www.mhlap.org/jdownloads/mhlap%202012/mental_health_gambia_report.pdf< accessed 07 
April 2018. 
63 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights ‘State Reporting’ available at > 
http://www.achpr.org/states/< accessed 07 April 2018.  
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Ould v 
Mauritania 
ancestral 
domicile.  
to restore the 
plaintiff his rights. 
Mauritania 
combined 10th, 
11th, 12th, 13th 
and 14th State 
Periodic Reports 
despite the 
commission 
express request 
for in its Initial 
Report, 1986-
2001 for 
measures taken 
to implement 
recommendation
s. 
Comm. 
199/97 – 
Odjouuoribt 
Cossi Paul V 
Benin 
Alleged denial 
of justice by 
Benin 
judiciary. 
Article 7 
(1) (d). 
Request Benin to 
take appropriate 
measures to 
ensure the 
complainant’s 
appeal is 
determined; urged 
Benin to take 
necessary steps to 
pay appropriate 
compensation for 
damages due to 
unduly prolonged 
Benin has not 
submitted any 
state report 
since after its 1st 
Periodic Report, 
1993-1998; 
thus, there is no 
record of 
compliance with 
this 
recommendation 
despite appeal 
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proceedings in the 
processing of his 
case. 
letters from the 
Commission.64 
Comm. 
240/2001 – 
Interights et 
al. (on behalf 
of Mariette 
Sonjaleen 
Bosch) v 
Botswana  
Alleged that 
Mrs Bosch was 
convicted 
wrongly and 
sentenced to 
death; alleged 
violation of the 
right to life by 
the imposition 
of death 
sentence. 
No 
violation 
of the 
African 
charter 
was 
found.  
Urged Botswana to 
take measure to 
abolish the death 
penalty; request 
that Botswana 
report back on 
measures taken in 
its next periodic 
report.  
No step was 
taken by 
Botswana to 
implement this 
recommendation
. Death sentence 
is still on the 
statute books of 
Botswana.65   
Comm. 
242/2001 
Interights, 
IHRDA, and 
Association 
Mauritanienne 
des I’Homme 
v Mauritania  
Alleged that 
the dissolution 
of a political 
party, seizure 
of their 
movable and 
immovable 
property and 
arrest of its 
leaders violate 
provisions of 
the African 
Charter. 
Article 10 Finds a violation of 
article 10. No 
recommendation 
was made.  
No specific 
action was 
taken.  
                                       
64 43rd Activity Report on the African commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, page 6.  
65 Section 26 (1) of the 1964 Penal Code of Botswana.  
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Comm. 
250/2002 – 
Lisebeth 
Zegveld and 
Mussie 
Ephrem v 
Eritrea  
Alleged 
detention for 
their political 
belief, without 
access to 
lawyers, 
families, and 
without trial.  
Articles 2, 
6, 7 (1) 
and 9 (2) 
Urged Eritrea to 
order the 
immediate release 
of the 11 detainees 
and compensate 
them. 
Although Eritrea 
released some 
political 
prisoners, the 
complainants, in 
this case, have 
since their arrest 
and detention in 
2001, not been 
seen.66 
                        18th Activity Report (November 2004- May 2005) 
Comm. 
251/2002 – 
Lawyers for 
Human Rights 
v Swaziland  
Alleges that 
King’s 
Proclamation 
No. 12 of 1973 
which repeals 
the 1968 
constitution of 
Swaziland 
violates the 
rights and 
freedom of 
Swaziland 
citizens as 
incorporated in 
Articles 1, 
7, 10, 11 
and 13 
Recommends that 
the Proclamation 
and subsequent 
Decree No.3 of 
2001 be brought in 
conformity with the 
provisions of the 
charter; that the 
state should 
engage with 
stakeholders and 
draft a new 
constitution; 
Swaziland to 
There is no 
record of 
implementation 
of this 
recommendation
. Swaziland has 
only submitted 
its 1st Periodic 
Report for the 
period 1995-
2000. However, 
a new 
constitution of 
the Kingdom of 
                                       
66 Centre for Human Rights, ‘Centre urges Implementation of Shumba case and calls on African 
Commission to reassert its own independence’ available at > http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/centre-
news-a-events-2016/1618-centre-urges-implementation-of-shuma-case-and-calls-on-african-
commission-to-reassert-its-own-independence.html< accessed 19 April 2018. 
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the African 
charter; 
alleges that 
the king’s 
power to 
overturn court 
decisions 
deposes the 
Swazi people 
of an effective 
judiciary. 
inform the 
Commission on 
measures taken to 
implement the 
above 
recommendations.  
Swaziland was 
adopted on July 
26, 2005, but 
does not repeal 
powers 
enshrined in the 
Proclamation to 
the Nation, 
1973.67  
                      19th Activity Report (July 2005- December 2005)68 
                              20th Activity Report (January –June 2006) 
Comm. 
227/1999 – 
DRC v 
Burundi, 
Rwanda, 
Uganda  
Alleges grave 
and massive 
violations of 
human rights 
committed by 
the armed 
forces of the 
respondent 
states in the 
DRC. 
Articles 2, 
4, 5, 
12(1), 
14.  
Urges the 
respondent states 
to abide by their 
African charter 
obligations and 
other international 
treaties and 
withdraw their 
troops immediately 
from the DRC; 
reparation is paid 
to the complainant 
The commission 
acknowledged 
the withdrawal 
of respondent 
armed forces 
from the 
complainant 
state.69 
However, no 
reparation was 
paid to DRC. 
                                       
67 For instance, see section 79 of the constitution; Buhle Dube and Alfred Magagula, ‘Update: The Law 
and Legal Research in Swaziland’ available at > 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Swaziland1.html< accessed 19 April 2018.  
68 No communication was finalised or decided. 
69 Ruling of the commission in the above case, paragraph 99.  
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state for and on 
behalf of the 
victims of the 
human rights 
abuses. 
Comm. 
249/2002 – 
African 
Institute for 
Human Rights 
and 
Development 
(on behalf of 
Sierra 
Leonean 
refugees in 
Guinea) v 
Guinea 
Alleged that 
President 
Conte’s speech 
on 9th 
September 
2000 for the 
arrest, search 
and 
confinement of 
Sierra 
Leoneans 
incited 
massive 
human rights 
violation 
against Sierra 
Leoneans in 
Guinea. 
Articles 2, 
4, 5, 12 
(5) and 
14. 
Recommends that 
a joint commission 
of the Sierra 
Leonean and 
Guinea 
governments be 
established to 
assess the losses 
by various victims 
with a view to 
compensate them. 
Guinea did not 
comply with this 
recommendation
; also, Guinea 
has never 
submitted any 
State Report to 
the Commission 
pursuant to 
article 62 of the 
African 
Charter.70 
21st Activity Report (May- November 2006) 
Comm. 
253/2002 – 
Antoine 
Alleged 
violation of 
articles 2, 3 
Articles 3, 
7 and 14.  
Urged Congo to 
harmonise its 
legislation with 
The AHSG took 
no record of 
implementation 
                                       
70 43rd Activity Report on the African commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, page 6.  
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Bissangou v 
Republic of 
Congo 
and 21(2) of 
the African 
Charter. 
that of African 
charter; request 
Congo to 
compensate the 
complainant by 
paying him the 
amount fixed by 
the High Court of 
Brazzaville, to 
compensate for the 
loss suffered by the 
complainant as 
determined by 
Congolese 
legislation.  
and no specific 
action under 
article 58 (2). 
However, Congo 
has not 
submitted any 
report since after 
its Initial and 
Cumulative 
Report in 2008, 
covering the 
period 2001 – 
2007. 
Comm. 
245/2002 – 
Zimbabwe 
Human Rights 
NGO Forum v 
Zimbabwe 
Alleges that 
political 
violence 
followed 
because of 
Constitutional 
Referendum in 
February 2000 
which was 
targeted 
towards the 
white farmers, 
teachers, civil 
Articles 1 
and 7. 
Calls on Zimbabwe 
government to 
establish a 
Commission of 
inquiry for 
investigation of 
causes of the 
violence and bring 
violators to justice; 
identify victims of 
the violence and 
compensate them; 
report to the 
This 
recommendation 
was not 
complied with, 
rather Zimbabwe 
responded to the 
African 
commission’s 
decision 
justifying the 
reason for 
actions that took 
place between 
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servants and 
others 
believed to be 
supporting 
opposition 
parties; 
torture, rape, 
arson, death 
threats and 
extra-judicial 
killings of 
opposition 
members;  
commission during 
its next periodic 
report. 
February and 
June 2000.71 
22nd Activity Report (November 2006- May 2007) 
Comm. 
275/2003 – 
Article 19 v 
Eritrea  
Alleged arrest 
and continuous 
detention 
incommunicad
o of 18 
journalists in 
Eritrea for 
criticising 
President 
Afewerki’s 
Articles 1, 
5, 6, 7 
(1), 9. 
Urged the 
government of 
Eritrea to release 
or commence trial 
of detained 
persons; to lift the 
ban of the press; 
grant detainees 
immediate access 
to lawyers and 
Although Eritrea 
released some 
political 
prisoners, the 
complainants, in 
this case, have 
since their arrest 
and detention in 
2001, not been 
seen.72  
                                       
71 Executive Council, Eleventh Ordinary Session, 25-29 June 2007, at Accra Ghana, EX.CL/364(XI), 
page 103.  
72 Centre for Human Rights, ‘Centre urges Implementation of Shumba case and calls on African 
Commission to reassert its own independence’ available at >http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/centre-
news-a-events-2016/1618-centre-urges-implementation-of-shuma-case-and-calls-on-african-
commission-to-reassert-its-own-independence.html< accessed 19 April 2018.  
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rule; a ban on 
private press.  
families; take 
measures to pay 
compensation to 
the detainees. 
23rd Activity Report (May 2007- May 2008)73 
24th Activity Report (November 2007- May 2008) 
Comm. 
292/2004 – 
IHRDA (on 
behalf of Mr 
Esmaila 
Connateh and 
13 other 
Gambians) v 
Angola 
Alleged arrest, 
assault, 
detention and 
deportation of 
complainants 
from Angola 
without any 
legal 
protection; 
deportation 
was carried out 
due to the 
origin of 
affected 
persons; 
denial of 
access to 
courts of law; 
Articles 1, 
2, 5, 6, 7, 
(1) (a), 
12 (4), 12 
(5), 14.  
Request Angola to 
take necessary 
measures to 
redress the 
violations; ensure 
its immigration 
policies, measures 
and legislations do 
not have the effect 
of discriminating 
against persons on 
the basis of race, 
origin, sex; ensure 
medical care is 
given to persons in 
detention; initiate 
procedures that 
guarantee effective 
No specific 
action was taken 
to remedy this 
situation and the 
AHSG did not act 
in accordance 
with article 58 
(2).74 
Meanwhile, 
Angola 
acknowledged 
some measures 
taken in the area 
of training on law 
enforcement 
agents and the 
prevention of 
promotion of 
                                       
73 The Commission decided only one communication on merit- comm. 307/2005, Mr Obert Chinhamo v 
Zimbabwe, and ruled that the complainant did not fulfil requirement under article 56 (5) of the charter. 
74 See, ‘Statement by IHHRDA to the African Commission at its 58th Ordinary session in Banjul, The 
Gambia’ available at > https://www.ihrda.org/2016/04/ihrdas-statement-on-implementation-of-the-
african-commissions-decision-in-communication-29204-ihra-angola-58th-ordinary-session-of-the-
commission/< accessed 18 April 2018.  
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and seizure of 
property.  
access to 
competent 
authorities such as 
courts for 
detainees; ensure 
adequate 
compensation is 
paid to victims; 
institute safeguard 
to ensure 
individuals are not 
deported to 
countries where 
they might face 
torture; allow 
access to detainees 
on the request of 
relevant bodies; 
institute human 
rights training for 
law enforcement 
agencies; report to 
the commission on 
measures taken to 
implement the 
recommendations.  
individual, 
organisational 
and media-
sponsored 
discrimination in 
accordance with 
article 44 of its 
constitution.75 
                                          25th Activity Report (May-November 2008) 
                                       
75 2nd Period Report of Angola, submitted 24 September 2011, period covered 1999-2010.  
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Comm. 
246/2002 – 
Mouvement 
Ivorien des 
Droits 
Humains 
(MIDH) v Cote 
d'Ivoire  
Alleged that 
the newly 
adopted 
constitution of 
Cote d'Ivoire 
contains 
discriminatory 
provisions that 
restrict 
freedom of 
political 
activities and 
functions.   
Articles 
1,2 3 (2), 
7 and 13 
Request Cote 
d'Ivoire to take 
appropriate 
measures to 
remedy the 
situation; request 
parties to inform 
the commission on 
the progress made 
in reviewing the 
discriminatory 
provisions of the 
constitution. 
No specific 
action was taken 
to remedy this 
situation, and 
the AHSG did not 
act in 
accordance with 
article 58 (2). 
However, Cote 
d'Ivoire has 
promulgated and 
adopted a new 
constitution in 
2016. Although 
the 2016 
constitution 
scrapped the 
discriminatory 
eligibility 
requirement for 
political offices 
of both parents 
being natural 
born Ivoirians, it 
empowers the 
president to 
appoint 1/3 of 
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the members of 
the Senate.76 
                         26th Activity Report (December 2008-May 2009)  
Comm. 
262/2002 – 
Ivorian 
Human Rights 
Movement 
(MIDH) v Cote 
D’Ivoire  
Alleged 
discrimination 
through 
policies of 
denial of 
identity; denial 
of rights to 
participate in 
government 
due to ethnic 
origin.    
Articles 2 
and 14. 
To ensure effective 
application of Law 
2004-412 of 14th 
August 2004 
amending article 
26 of Law 98-750; 
restore all land 
where to owners 
who were deprived 
under article 26; 
pay, if need be, fair 
and equitable 
compensation to 
victims. 
Law 2004-412 of 
14th August 
2004 has 
amended article 
26 of the Law 
98-750 of 23rd 
December 1998 
which introduced 
a policy of 
discrimination;77 
takes note of the 
ongoing 
reconciliation 
process and 
negotiations.78 
Comm. 
281/2003 – 
Marcel Wetsh’ 
Okonda Koso 
and others v 
DRC 
Alleged arrest 
and trial of a 
civilian for civil 
action by a 
military court 
without the 
right to appeal 
or review. 
Article 7 
(a) (b) 
and (d) 
Recommends the 
guarantee of the 
independence of 
the tribunals; grant 
the victims a fair 
and equitable 
amount as 
compensation; 
No specific 
action was taken 
to remedy this 
situation, and 
there is no 
record of 
implementation 
in the DRC’s up-
                                       
76 Article 87 of the 2016 constitution of Cote D’Ivoire.  
77 Paragraph 73 of the Communication 262/2002  
78 Paragraph 74 and 77 of the communication.  
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harmonise its 
legislation with its 
international 
commitments.  
to-date State 
Reports. Also,   
the AHSG did not 
act in 
accordance with 
article 58 (2). 
DRC, however, 
accepted to have 
taken note of the 
recommendation 
to safeguard the 
independence of 
its judiciary and 
is implementing 
it.79 
Comm. 
284/2003 – 
Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for 
Human Rights 
and 
Associated 
Newspapers 
of Zimbabwe 
v Zimbabwe 
Alleged that 
some 
provisions of a 
new media 
law, the Access 
to Information 
and Protection 
of Privacy Act 
of 2002 
prohibits 
‘media mass 
Articles 1, 
3, 7, 9 (2) 
and 14. 
Recommends that 
victims be 
adequately 
compensated.  
No specific 
action was taken 
to compensate 
the victims. The 
AHSG did not act 
in accordance 
with article 58 
(2). Meanwhile, 
Zimbabwe has 
not submitted 
any State Report 
                                       
79 Initial report and Periodic Report of DRC, period covered from 2005 to 2015, page 14, available at > 
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/61st/state-reports/2005---
2015/drc_periodic_report_2005_2015_eng.pdf< accessed 18 April 2018.  
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services’ from 
operating until 
they have 
registered with 
the Media and 
Information 
Commission 
and alleged 
seizure of 
property and 
threat to arrest 
by security 
agents 
following 
media houses 
refusal to 
adhere to this 
law.  
in compliance 
with article 62 
after the 
submission of its 
7th to 10th 
Periodic Report 
covering 1996-
2006.80  
Comm. 
294/2004 - 
Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for 
Human Rights 
and Institute 
for human 
rights and 
Development 
Alleged 
violation of 
freedom of 
expression and 
freedom to 
disseminate 
information; 
alleged illegal 
Articles 1, 
2, 3, 7 (1) 
(b), 9, 12 
(4). 
Recommends state 
to ensure court 
decisions are 
respected and 
implemented; 
rescind the 
deportation orders 
and allow Mr 
Meldrum to return 
No specific 
action was taken 
to compensate 
the victims. The 
AHSG did not act 
in accordance 
with article 58 
(2). However, 
the commission 
                                       
80 The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of 2002 has been amended by Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, No. 20 of 2007, which came into force 11 January 2008.  
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(on behalf of 
Andrew 
Barclay 
Meldrum) v 
Zimbabwe  
deportation of 
Mr Meldrum. 
to Zimbabwe, if he 
so wishes; ensure 
the Supreme court 
finalises on cases 
filed by Mr 
Meldrum; grant 
accreditation to Mr 
Meldrum to 
practice 
journalism; report 
to the commission 
on the 
implementation of 
these 
recommendations. 
admits the 
amendment of 
section 80 (1) 
(b) of AIPPA 
which was the 
ground to deny 
Mr Meldrum right 
to accreditation 
as a journalist.81 
Furthermore, 
Meanwhile, 
Zimbabwe has 
not submitted 
any State Report 
in compliance 
with article 62 
after the 
submission of its 
7th to 10th 
Periodic Report 
covering 1996-
2006.  
Comm. 
297/2005 – 
Scanlen and 
Alleged 
violation of 
freedom of 
expression and 
Article 9 Recommends a 
repeal of section 79 
and 80 of the 
AIPPA; 
Although the 
AHSG did not act 
under article 58 
(2), Zimbabwe 
                                       
81 Paragraph 3 of communication. It is worth noting that the Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act of 2002 has been amended by Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, No. 20 
of 2007, which came into force 11 January 2008. 
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Holderness v 
Zimbabwe  
information by 
sections 79 
and 80 of 
Access to 
Information 
and Protection 
of Privacy Act 
demanding for 
a compulsory 
accreditation 
for journalists 
and payment 
of fee violates 
their human 
rights.   
decriminalise 
offences relating to 
accreditation and 
the practice of 
journalism; adopt 
legislation 
providing a 
framework for self-
regulation of a 
journalist; report 
on the 
implementation of 
these 
recommendations 
within six months.  
has repealed in 
its amended 
Access to 
Information and 
Protection of 
Privacy Act, the 
affected 
provisions.82 
Comm. 
266/2003 – 
Kevin 
Mgwanga 
Gunme, et al. 
v Cameroon 
Alleged 
political and 
economic 
marginalisatio
n of the people 
of southern 
Cameroon; 
discrimination; 
Articles 1, 
2, 4, 5, 6, 
7 (1), 10, 
11, 12, 
13 
amongst 
other 
articles.  
Recommends that 
Cameroon abolish 
all discriminatory 
practices; stop the 
transfer of accused 
persons from 
Anglophone 
provinces to 
No 
implementation 
and the ASH did 
not act under 
article 58 (2).83 
                                       
82 See the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, No. 20 of 2007, which came into force 
11 January 2008.  
83 In its Concluding Observation for Cameroon’s Third Periodic State Report for 2008-2011, Cameroon 
admitted to have launched a national study on indigenous population in its bid to curb the existing 
discrimination. Human rights violations has continued in Cameroon and to the knowledge of the African 
Commission Rapporteur for Cameroon; see, ‘Press Release for Human Rights Situation in Cameroon 
Following Strike Actions by Lawyers, Teachers and Civil Society’, available at > 
http://www.achpr.org/press/2016/12/d340/< accessed 18 April 2018.   
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constant arrest 
and detention; 
torture, killings 
of the people 
of southern 
Cameroon.   
Francophone 
provinces for trial; 
ensures persons 
facing criminal 
charges are tried in 
languages they 
understand and 
ensure interpreters 
are employed; pay 
compensation to 
victims of 
discrimination; 
dialogue with 
affected parties; 
report on the 
implementation 
within 180 days.   
                          27th Activity Report (June 2009- Novemeber 2009) 
Comm. 
272/2003 – 
Association of 
Victims of 
Post Electoral 
Violence and 
Alleged 
destruction of 
property; 
arrest; serious 
bodily harm 
and injury. 
Articles 2, 
4, 7 and 
14. 
To take necessary 
measures to 
guarantee the 
protection of 
human rights at all 
times; pursue its 
commitment for 
No 
implementation 
and the ASH did 
not act under 
article 58 (2).84 
                                       
84 Human rights violations has continued in Cameroon and to the knowledge of the African Commission 
Rapporteur for Cameroon; see, ‘Press Release for Human Rights Situation in Cameroon Following Strike 
Actions by Lawyers, Teachers and Civil Society’, available at > 
http://www.achpr.org/press/2016/12/d340/< accessed 18 April 2018.  
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INTERIGHTS 
v Cameroon  
fair and equitable 
compensation to 
victims or their 
beneficiaries. 
Comm. 
276/2003 – 
Centre for 
Minority 
Rights 
Development 
(Kenya and 
Minority 
Rights Group 
International 
on behalf of 
Endorois 
Welfare 
Council v 
Kenya 
Alleged 
displacement 
of Endorois 
people from 
the ancestral 
land without 
compensation; 
denial of the 
right to 
practice 
religion. 
Articles 1, 
8, and 
14, 
amongst 
other 
articles.  
Urged that the 
right of ownership 
of Endorois 
ancestral land be 
recognised; grant 
unrestricted access 
to Lake Bogoria 
and its surrounding 
sites for religious 
and cultural rites; 
pay adequate 
compensation to 
the community for 
all the loss 
suffered; report on 
implementation 
within three 
months.  
Following the 
decision on 2 
February 2010, 
Kenya 
established a 
Taskforce in 
September 2014 
to implement the 
decision.85 
Whereas the 
recommendation 
has not yet been 
complied with, 
the combined 
state report did 
not provide 
information on 
the legislative 
measure taken 
to protect 
indigenous 
                                       
85 However, the Commission noticed with dismay that CSOs and members of the Endorois community 
are not part of the Taskforce, see concluding observation of the African commission on Kenya combined 
8th-11th Periodic Report, 2008-2014, available at > http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/19th-eo/conc-
obs/8th-11th-2008-2014/kenya_concluding_observations_8th_to_11th_periodic_report_.pdf< accessed 
18 April 2018. 
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people and acts 
of investigation 
to harassment, 
assault.86 
                         28th Activity Report (November 2009 – May 2010) 
Comm. 
373/2009 
(formerly 
242/2001) – 
Interights, 
IHRDA, and 
Association 
Mauritanienne 
des Droits de 
l’Hommes v 
Mauritania  
A review of the 
Commission’s 
decision on the 
merit of 
communicatio
n 242/2001 
adopted in May 
2006 for being 
infra petita and 
for not 
representing 
the required 
guaranteed of 
impartiality.   
Articles 1 
and 14 
Recommends state 
pay adequate 
compensation to 
the victim; take 
steps to ensure 
that its law on 
freedom of 
association, in 
particular, the 
establishment and 
functioning of 
political parties, 
conforms with the 
Charter; inform the 
commission of 
measures taken 
within 180 days.   
There is no 
record of 
compliance by 
Mauritania, and 
the AHSG has 
not acted to 
ensure state 
party complies 
with this 
recommendation
.87  
Comm. 
313/05 – 
Alleged 
expulsion of an 
Australian 
Articles 2, 
7, (1) (a), 
9, 12 (4). 
That adequate 
compensation is 
provided which 
Botswana 
explicitly noted 
that it is not 
                                       
86 Ibid. however, as at May 2017, Kenya has not implemented this recommendation; see, Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Concluding Observation of the Fifth to Seventh Periodic 
Reports of Kenya’, available at > http://minorityrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/INT_CERD_COC_KEN_27475_E.pdf< accessed 18 April 2018.  
87 Mauritania combined Period State Report 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th for the period 2006-2014.  
476 
 
 
Kenneth Good 
v Botswana  
national for his 
political views 
on Botswana 
and denial of 
justice. 
shall include his 
remuneration last 
during his 
expulsion; take 
steps to ensure 
sections 7 (f), 11 
(6) and 36 of the 
Botswana 
Immigration Act 
and its practices 
conform to 
international 
human rights 
standards and the 
charter.    
bound by this 
decision.88 
Comm. 
279/03 – 
Sudan Human 
Rights 
Organisation 
v Sudan 
Merged  
Alleged gross, 
massive and 
systematic 
violations of 
human rights 
against 
indigenous 
black African 
Articles 1, 
4, 5, 6, 7 
(1), 12 
(1) and 
(2) 14 
and 
amongst 
others.  
Urged Sudan to 
take steps to 
ensure protection 
of victims in Darfur 
region; conduct 
official 
investigation into 
abuses committed 
No 
implementation.
89 
                                       
88 Botswana through a Diplomatic Note Ref: 10/12BEA5/21 C VIII (4) AMB of 23rd March 2012, 
unequivocally stated its position on this cases; see page 9 combined 32nd and 33rd Activity Report of the 
African commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
89 The complaint was based on massive violations of human rights during the war in Sudan between 
Sudanese army and some armed militia groups which later resulted in the first genocide in the 21st 
century; see Al-Jazeera, Human Rights Lost in Darfur’ available at > 
https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/humanrightsun/2008/12/200812810113311766.html< accessed 18 
April 2018.  
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Comm. 
296/05 – 
Centre on 
Housing 
Rights and 
Evictions v 
Sudan  
tribes in the 
Darfur region; 
large-scale 
killings, forced 
displacement 
of populations; 
destruction of 
property; 
arrest and 
detention 
without trials; 
torture and 
inhuman 
treatment and 
punishment; 
rape; trial by 
special military 
courts; arming 
and 
sponsoring of a 
militia group.  
by military forces 
and militia groups; 
undertake 
legislative and 
judicial reforms; 
prosecute those 
responsible for the 
human rights 
violations; take 
steps to give 
remedy to victims 
of human rights 
abuses including 
restitution and 
compensation; 
resist adopting 
amnesty laws for 
perpetrators of 
human rights.  
                                 29th Activity Report (May – November 2010)90 
                                 30th Activity Report (November 2010- April 2011)91 
                                 31st Activity Report (April – November 2011) 
                                       
90 All four communications entertained in this activity report were declared inadmissible for non-
compliance with article 56 of the African charter and they are communications 305/05 – Article 19 and 
other v Zimbabwe; 338/07- SERAP v Nigeria; 306/05 – Samuel T. Muzerengwa and 110 others v 
Zimbabwe; 361/08 – J. E. and P. J. L. Zitha v Mozambique.  
91 The commission seized five communications, struck out one, ruled one to be inadmissible while the 
others are pending before the commission.  
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Comm. 
232/06 
Egyptian 
Initiative for 
Personal 
rights v Egypt  
Alleged 
physical and 
sexual assault 
due to 
expressing 
their political 
views by 
unidentified 
men and 
security 
agents; 
seizure and 
destruction of 
personal 
property; 
threats of 
more physical 
harm if court 
cases 
continue. 
Articles 1, 
2, 3, 5, 
9(2). 
Ordered Egypt to 
commence an 
investigation into 
the allegation and 
bring perpetrators 
to justice; and 
compensate the 
victims in the 
amount of EP57, 
000; urges it to 
ratify the Women’s 
Protocol; to report 
back on measures 
taken within 180 
days. 
Egypt reported 
that it had made 
efforts to protect 
the rights of 
women 36th 
Activity Report.  
Comm. 
277/03 Spilg 
and Mack and 
Ditshwashlo v 
Botswana  
Alleged 
wrongful 
sentence to 
death by 
hanging. 
Article 5 Urged Botswana to 
impose a 
moratorium on 
execution with a 
view to abolishing 
death penalty; 
report back to it in 
Botswana did not 
comply with this 
recommendation
. Botswana is a 
retentionist 
country and 
execute persons 
sentenced to 
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its next state 
report 
death by 
hanging.92 
                Combined 32nd and 33rd Activity Report (February – October 2012)            
Comm. 
288/04 – 
Gabriel 
Shumba v 
Zimbabwe  
Alleged arrest, 
seizure of 
property; 
detention 
without charge 
and denial of 
access to 
lawyers or 
family; torture 
and death 
threat by 
security 
agents.   
Article 5 Recommend that 
victim be paid 
adequate 
compensation; 
inquiry be initiated 
to bring 
perpetrators to 
justice; report on 
implementation 
within three 
months 
Recommendatio
n not complied 
with.93 
Comm. 
295/04 – 
Zimbabwe 
Human Rights 
NGO Forum 
(on behalf of 
Noah 
Kazimgachire, 
john 
Alleged killings 
by security 
agents;  
Article 1 
and 4. 
Urged to undertake 
domestic law 
reform to bring the 
domestic law on 
compensation in 
conformity with 
African charter; 
pay compensatory 
damages to the 
There is no 
record of 
compliance with 
this 
recommendation
. However, 
Zimbabwe has 
not submitted its 
                                       
92 Section 26 of 1964 Penal Code and section 128 of the Botswana Defence Act of 1977.  
93 The complainant has over time sent correspondence to the commission, with the last one being sent on 
the 24th February 2017, indicating that the state has not yet implemented the recommendation.  See page 
14 of 42nd Activity Report of the African commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
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Chitsenga, 
Elias 
Chemvura 
and Batania 
Hadzisi) v 
Zimbabwe 
heirs and next of 
kin of four 
deceased persons.  
periodic report 
since 2006.  
Comm. 
310/05 – 
Haregewoin 
Gabre-
Selassie and 
IHRDA v 
Ethiopia  
Alleged arrest 
and detention 
without trial; 
Proclamation 
by Special 
Public 
Prosecutor’s 
Office 
suspending the 
applicability of 
time limitation 
for trial in 
criminal trials 
and habeas 
corpus making 
their trial to 
last for more 
than 15 years. 
Article 7 
(1) (b) 
(d) 
Urged state to pay 
adequate 
compensation to 
victims; report on 
implementation 
within three 
months. 
Many of the 
victims could not 
be contacted; 
there is no 
record of 
enforcement.94 
Comm. 
286/04 – Dino 
Noca v DRC  
Allegation of 
revocation and 
withdrawal of 
Article 3, 
7 (1) (c) 
and 14 
Enjoins DRC to 
restore the right to 
property of the 
No record of 
compliance with 
this 
                                       
94 Bright Theu, ‘Human Rights Litigation using International Human Rights Law: The IHRDA 
Experience’ (2013) 17 Law, Democracy and Development, 504.  
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building under 
the ordinance 
No. 74-152 of 
July 2, 1974, 
relating to 
abandoned 
property.  
beneficiaries of late 
Mr Noca by 
reinstating their 
title deed; pay 
them expeditious, 
just and fair 
compensation; 
compensate 
without delay for 
all damages 
suffered by Mr 
Noca family; 
submit a report on 
implementation 
within 180 days.  
recommendation 
in its state 
periodic report; 
however, it is 
observed that Mr 
Noca was later 
offered a title 
deed, but no 
financial 
compensation 
was offered.95 
Comm. 
365/08 – 
Christopher 
Byagonza v 
Uganda  
Alleged death 
sentence on a 
minor.  
Article 4. Urged Uganda to 
reform its domestic 
law in conformity 
with the African 
Charter; to report 
on implementation 
within 180 days.  
Uganda partly 
implemented the 
African 
commission 
decision by re-
sentencing the 
complainant 
under the Kigula 
judgement.96 
                                       
95 Racheal Murray and Dabra Long, ‘What Role should the African Commission play in following up its 
own findings?’ in The Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 119.  
96 See page 9 of 36th Activity Report of the African commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; see also 
Amnesty international, Death Sentences and Executions 2013, available at > 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/act500012014en.pdf< accessed 18 April 2018.  
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However, the 
death penalty is 
still retained in 
the statute 
books of Uganda 
although the last 
execution took 
place in 2005.97  
                          34th Activity Report (February – April 2013) 
Comm. 
270/03 – 
Access to 
justice v 
Nigeria  
   Not yet 
published by the 
commission at 
the time of 
writing.  
Comm. 
302/05 Mr 
Mamboleo M. 
Itundamilamb
a v DRC 
Alleged non-
protection by 
the law in his 
suit against 
the 
government 
Articles 3 
and 7 (1) 
(a) and 
(c)  
Urged DRC to 
recognise or cause 
to be recognised 
the complainants’ 
right to claim; 
request DRC to 
grant a fair 
compensation to 
the complainant 
according to its 
No specific 
information 
could be 
obtained on the 
actions taken by 
DRC.98 
                                       
97 Concluding Observation and Recommendations on the 5th Periodic State Report of the republic of 
Uganda (2010-2012), available at > http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/57th/conc-obs/5-2010-
2012/concluding_observations_5th_state_report_uganda.pdf< accessed 18 April 2018; Amnesty 
International, ‘Uganda 2017/2018’ available at > 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/uganda/report-uganda/< accessed 18 April 2018. 
98 There was no mention of steps taken by DRC in its up-to-date state periodic reports.  
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law; grant 
complainant 
compensation for 
the cost of 
procedure; report 
back to it on 
measures of 
implementation 
within 180 days.    
                         35th Activity Report (July – November 2013) 
Comm. 
259/02 – 
Groupe de 
Travail sur les 
Dossiers 
Judicires 
Stategiques v 
DRC 
Alleged 
wrongful death 
sentences 
pursuant to 
Executive 
Order No. 019 
of 23 August 
1997 
establishing 
the military 
court in DRC.  
Articles 1, 
4, 7 (1) 
(c)  
To harmonise its 
legislation with the 
African charter; 
pay compensation 
to the victims; 
report back to the 
commission within 
180 days.  
All persons 
sentenced to 
death had it 
commuted to life 
imprisonment 
except one 
person.99 
However, the 
death sentence 
is still on the 
statute books of 
DRC. 
Comm.274/0
3 – 
INTERIGHTS, 
ASADHO and 
Alleged that in 
the days 
following the 
assassination 
of President 
Articles 5, 
6, 7.  
To align the 
provisions of 
Decree-Law No. 
019 of 23 August 
1997 establishing a 
Death sentence 
remains in the 
statute books of 
DRC even 
though no 
                                       
99 Para 4 of the communication.  
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Advocate O. 
Disu v DRC  
Kabila several 
arrests were 
made; 
detention 
without trial 
for months; 
torture and 
inhuman 
treatment at a 
military facility 
used for the 
detention; trial 
of both 
civilians and 
military 
personnel by a 
special military 
tribunal 
established by 
Decree-Law 
No. 019 of 23 
August 1997 
and 
subsequent 
death 
sentence. 
military court with 
international 
standards of fair 
trial; to open and 
review the case for 
persons in 
detention; to 
maintain a 
moratorium with a 
view to abolishing 
death penalty; to 
compensate 
complainants fairly 
violations suffered; 
report back to the 
commission within 
180 days.    
execution has 
taken place since 
2003 and this 
includes the 
victims of this 
communication. 
However, this 
Decree was 
supressed on 25 
March 2003 
when laws Nos. 
023/2002 and 
024/2002 of 18 
November 2002 
came into force 
providing a code 
of military 
justice and 
military criminal 
code.100  
                                       
100 Attacks on Justice: Democratic Republic of Congo, available at > 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48abdd680.pdf< accessed 21 April 2018.  
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Comm. 
368/09 – 
Abdelhadi Ali 
Radi and 
others v 
Sudan  
Alleged killings 
of police 
officers and 
displaced 
persons 
following 
violence from 
forceful 
removal from a 
refugee camp; 
arrest and 
detention 
without trial 
for more than 
12 months; 
alleged torture 
and inhuman 
treatment 
during the 
period of 
detention; 
death as a 
result of 
inhuman 
Articles 1, 
5, 6, 7 (1) 
(c) (d) 
Pay adequate 
compensation to 
the victims in 
accordance with 
domestic law for 
the rights violated; 
initiate an effective 
and impartial 
investigation into 
the circumstances 
of arrest and 
detention; amend 
legislation 
incompatible with 
the charter; inform 
the commission in 
180 days of steps 
taken to implement 
the decision.  
Whereas some of 
the dead victims 
were identified, 
there is no 
record of 
payment to their 
families of any 
compensation.
101 Sudan did not 
initiate an 
independent 
investigation 
over the 
circumstances of 
arrest and 
detention.102 
                                       
101 Submission to the UN Human Rights Committee ahead of its emanation of Sudan’s Fourth Periodic 
Report under the ICCPR, June 2014, available at > 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/SDN/INT_CCPR_CSS_SDN_17479
_E.pdf< accessed 21 April 2018. 
102 African Commission Concluding Observation and Recommendations on the 4th and 5th Periodic 
Report of the Republic of Sudan, available at > http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/12th-eo/conc-
obs/4thand5th-2008-2012/concluding_observation_.pdf< accessed 24 April 2018.  
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treatment and 
physical 
assault at 
detention.   
                         36th Activity Report (November 2013- May 2014) 
Comm. 
287/04 – 
Tijani Duga 
Ernest (on 
behalf of 
Cheonumo 
and others) v 
Cameroon 
Alleged arrest 
and detention 
without trial; 
torture and 
inhuman 
treatment; 
trial by a 
special military 
court; 
wrongful 
sentence to 
various prison 
terms.  
Articles 5 
and 7 
Take immediate 
steps to retrial 
those in detention; 
to pay 
compensation to 
victims; 
investigate and 
punish 
perpetrators of 
torture and 
inhuman 
treatments; 
educate staff of its 
law enforcement 
institutions on 
international 
human rights; 
amend its laws to 
conform to the 
African charter; 
report to the 
Cameroon did 
not take any 
specific action 
and the AHSG 
did not act under 
article 58; 
however, the 
African 
Commission 
requested 
Cameroon in 
2014 to 
investigate and 
punish actors in 
its continued 
torture and 
amend its laws in 
conformity with 
its obligation 
under the 
Charter.103 
                                       
103 African Commission Concluding Observation and Recommendations on the 3rd Periodic Report of 
the Republic of Cameroon, available at >http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/54th/conc-obs/3-2008-
2011/concluding_observations_cameroon_eng.pdf< accessed 23 April 2018.  
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commission within 
180 days.  
Comm. 
379/09 – 
Monim Elgak, 
Osman 
Hummeida 
and Amir 
Suliman v 
Sudan  
Alleged arrest 
and detention 
by men of the 
National 
Security and 
Intelligence 
Services 
because of 
their working 
relationship 
with the ICC; 
physical 
assault; threat 
of death.  
Articles 1, 
5, 6, 9, 
10, 12 
Pay adequate 
compensation to 
the complainants; 
investigate and 
prosecute persons 
involved in the 
incarceration and 
torture of 
complainants; 
reopen and 
unfreeze bank 
accounts; inform 
the commission 
within 180 days of 
measures taken. 
Sudan did not 
report to the 
Commission on 
steps taken to 
comply with this 
decision and 
there is no 
evidence of 
prosecution of 
the security 
agents that were 
involved in the 
violation.104 No 
action was taken 
by the AHSG 
under article 58.  
                                  37th Activity Report (June – December 2014)105 
                                   38th Activity Report (January – May 2015) 
Comm. 
317/2006 The 
Nubian 
Alleged non- 
recognition as 
citizens and 
Articles 1, 
2, 3, 5, 
Request that Kenya 
establish objective, 
the transparent 
Recommendatio
n not complied 
with.106 
                                       
104 ESCR-Net Case Law Database, ‘Monim Elgak, Osman Hummeida and Amir Suliman v Sudan, 
Communication 379/09’, available at > https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2016/monim-elgak-osman-
hummeida-and-amir-suliman-v-sudan-communication-37909< accessed 23 April 2018.  
105 The two communications considered on the merit have been authorised for publication by the AHSG; 
see page 9 of the Activity Report, available at > http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-
reports/37/actrep37_2015_eng.pdf< accessed 18 April 2018.  
106 The complainant sent a correspondence to the commission on December 2015 indicating that the state 
has not complied with its recommendation; see, page 9 of the 40th Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
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Community in 
Kenya v 
Kenya 
treatment as 
aliens by 
Kenyan 
government; 
alleged 
disenfranchise
ment and 
exclusion from 
both political 
and social 
development; 
denial of 
fundamental 
rights under 
the Kenyan 
constitution; 
displacement 
from their 
dwelling place 
and land.  
12, 13, 
14 
and non-
discriminatory 
procedure for 
determining 
citizenship; 
recognise Nubian 
land rights over 
Kibera; ensure that 
any eviction from 
Kibera is carried 
out in accordance 
with international 
human rights 
standard; report 
back on measures 
taken within 180 
days.  
Comm. 
318/06 Open 
Society 
Justice 
Initiative v 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Alleged that 
the concept of 
‘ivorite’ which 
grants 
nationality to 
only persons 
Articles 1, 
2, 3, 5, 
12, 13, 
14 
Amend the 
provisions of 
sections 35 and 65 
of the constitution 
in accordance with 
the provisions of 
Recommendatio
n not complied 
with.107  
                                       
107 The complainant sent a correspondence to the commission on 21 December 2015 indicating that the 
state has not yet complied with its recommendation; see, page 9 of the 40th Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Humana and Peoples’ Rights.  
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born in the 
country by two 
Ivorian 
parents as 
discriminatory
; xenophobic 
behaviour 
against the 
Dioulas; 
extrajudicial 
killings; arrest 
and illegal 
detention by 
government 
officials; denial 
of political and 
social benefits. 
articles 2 and 13 of 
African charter; 
recommend that 
Cote d’Ivorie 
ensure that its 
nationality law 
should be 
consistent with 
articles 2 and 5 of 
the charter; adopt 
more legislative 
and administrative 
mechanisms to 
implement 
measures 
necessary for the 
recognition of 
Ivorian nationality 
by origin of the 
Dioulas through a 
simplified 
declaration 
procedure; 
improve upon an 
effective non-
discriminatory 
birth registration 
system; return the 
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lands or 
compensate 
victims  whose 
lands were 
expropriated; 
forward a written 
report on the 
implementation 
within 180 days.  
Comm. 
389/10 
Mbiankeu 
Genevieve v 
Cameroon  
Alleged 
prevention 
from enjoying 
ownership of 
land; 
destruction of 
property; 
assault and 
death threat. 
Article 1 
and 14 
Request that a plot 
of land of equal 
value and nature 
be given to the 
complainant or 
compensate in 
cash with the sum 
of 50, 692, 185 
CFA francs; to pay 
further damages 
assessed as 
compensation for 
material damage; 
pay the sum of 15, 
391, 460 CFA 
francs as 
compensation for 
Recommendatio
n not complied 
with.108 
                                       
108 The complainant sent a correspondence to the commission on 21 December 2015 indicating that the 
state has not yet complied with its recommendation; see, page 9 of the 40th Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Humana and Peoples’ Rights.  
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the deprivation and 
enjoyment of the 
right to property, 
pay the sum of 5, 
000, 000 CFA 
francs as non-
material damages 
suffered as a result 
of frustration since 
the land was 
expropriated; 
report in 180 day of 
measures taken to 
implement this 
decision.  
                                39th Activity Report (May – November 2015) 
Comm. 
346/07 
Mouvement 
du 17 Mai v 
DRC 
Alleged tactical 
refusal to 
register a 
political party 
despite court 
ruling on it. 
Articles 7 
(1) and 
13.  
Draw all legal 
consequences of 
the infringement of 
court’s judgment 
REC 158; 
determine the 
number of M17 
candidates actually 
elected at the 2006 
national legislative 
election; pay 
financial 
No specific 
information from 
DRC on the 
implementation 
of this 
recommendation 
and the AHSG 
did not act under 
article 58 of the 
African Charter.  
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compensation to 
M17 candidates 
whose seats have 
not been allocated; 
ensure that the 
M17 participates 
freely in then 
political exercises 
in DRC; report back 
in writing within 
180 days.  
Comm. 
416/12 Jean 
Marie 
Atangana 
Mebara v 
Cameroon 
Alleged illegal 
detention; 
indictment 
over a matter 
already 
decided by the 
court.  
Articles 6 
and 7 (1) 
(b), (c) 
and (d)  
Order immediate 
release of the 
complainant; take 
prompt and 
appropriate 
measures to 
sanction 
government 
employees 
responsible for 
violation; pay 400, 
000, 000 CFA 
francs as 
compensation for 
material and non-
No specific 
information from 
Cameroon on the 
implementation 
of this 
recommendation 
and the AHSG 
did not act under 
article 58 of the 
African 
Charter.109 
                                       
109 African Commission Concluding Observation and Recommendations on the 3rd Periodic Report of 
the Republic of Cameroon, available at >http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/54th/conc-obs/3-2008-
2011/concluding_observations_cameroon_eng.pdf< accessed 23 April 2018.  
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material damages 
suffered; report in 
writing within 180 
days. 
Comm. 
319/06 
INTERIGHTS 
and 
Ditshwanelo v 
Botswana  
Alleged 
sentence to 
death by 
hanging; 
denial of 
access by 
family and 
counsel before 
his execution; 
violation of 
rights to life 
and inhuman 
treatment by 
the imposition 
of death 
penalty.  
Articles 5 
and 1 
Review relevant 
legislation to 
provide for the 
compensation to 
the family of the 
victim; to observe 
a moratorium on 
the death penalty 
and to abolish the 
death penalty; 
report to the 
commission within 
180 days on 
measures taken.  
Botswana did not 
comply with this 
decision. 
Botswana is a 
retentionist 
country and 
execute persons 
sentenced to 
death by 
hanging.110  
Comm. 
325/06 OMCT 
and LIZADEEL 
v DRC 
Alleged sexual 
and physical 
abuse of 17-
year-old girl; 
threat to life.  
Articles 2, 
4, 5, 7 (1) 
(a).  
Take appropriate 
measures to 
prosecute 
perpetrators of 
Celine’s rape; 
grant adequate 
compensation to 
No specific steps 
were taken by 
DRC and the 
AHSG did not act 
under article 58.  
                                       
110 Section 26 of 1964 Penal Code and section 128 of the Botswana Defence Act of 1977.  
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the victim as well 
as medical and 
psychological 
assistance; adopt 
measures to 
repress sexual 
violence; organise 
awareness 
campaign for the 
public on social 
behavioural 
violence against 
women; organise 
training sessions 
for law 
enforcement 
agents and 
magistrate; report 
to it on 
implementation 
within 180. 
Comm. 
341/07 
Equality Now 
v Ethiopia  
Alleged 
abduction, 
rape and 
forceful 
marriage; 
dismissal of 
appeal at 
Articles 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7 
(1) (a) 
Pay the sum of 
USD$150, 000 as 
compensation for 
non-material 
damages; adopt 
and implement 
legislative measure 
No specific steps 
were taken by 
DRC and the 
AHSG did not act 
under article 58. 
495 
 
 
various judicial 
bodies.  
to address 
marriage by 
abduction and 
rape; prosecute 
offenders; train 
judicial officers 
handling human 
rights cases 
against women; 
report within 180 
days on measure 
taken.    
                       40th Annual Activity Report (Febuary – April 2016)111 
                      41st Annual Activity Report (May – November 2016)                                     
Comm. 
393/10 
IHRDA v DRC 
Alleged 
killings, 
torture, 
inhuman 
treatment, 
arbitrary 
arrest, 
displacement 
Articles 1, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 
14. 
Ordered the 
payment of USD$2, 
5000, 000 to the 
victims and their 
families; identify 
and compensate 
victims who are not 
party to this 
This 
recommendation 
has not been 
implemented.112 
                                       
111 Details on communications not publicly available at the time of writing. Cases decided include: 
Comm. 355/07 Ezzat and Enayet v Egypt, Comm. 385/10 ICJ v Kenya, Comm. 392/10 Me. Theogene 
Muhayeyezu v Rwanda, Comm. 408/11 Alidor Kabambi v DRC, Comm. 423/12 Mack Kit v Cameroon, 
Comm. 428/12 Dawit lssak v Eritrea, and, Comm. 433/12 Ngandu v DRC. See also Micheal Nyarko and 
Ademola Jegede, ‘Recent Development: Human Rights Development in the African Union during 2016’ 
(2017) 17 African Human Rights Law Journal, 295.  
112 IHRDA, ‘Questions and Answers: The Kilwa Massacre and the Landmark Decision of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, available at > https://www.ihrda.org/2017/08/questions-
and-answers-the-kilwa-massacre-and-the-landmark-decision-of-the-african-commission-of-human-
and-peoples-rights/< accessed 19 April 2018.  
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and forceful 
disappearance 
by security 
agencies in 
collaboration 
with a foreign 
mining 
company 
against the 
habitants of 
the eastern 
town of Kilwa; 
destruction of 
homes and 
property; 
summary 
execution of 
28 persons;  
communications; 
lunch a new 
criminal 
investigation and 
take measures to 
prosecute and 
punish all agents of 
the state and the 
mining company 
involved in these 
violations; issue an 
apology to victims 
of these violations; 
exhume and re-
bury with dignity 
the bodies dumped 
in mass graves; 
rebuild social 
amenities 
destroyed and 
provide counselling 
for victims; report 
back within 180 
days on measures 
taken.  
42nd Activity Report (Febuary – May 2017)113 
                                       
113 The Commission did not grant any decision on the merit; rather it was seized of some communications 
and issued some provisional measures. 
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43rd Activity Report (June – November 2017)114 
44th Activity Report (November 2017- May 2018)115 
45th Activity Report (June – November 2018)116 
 
Appendix II - Information about member state compliance with 
African Court decisions  
 
Case 
information/ 
App. No. 
Recom
mendat
ion 
year 
Alleged violated 
Articles of African 
Charter 
Violations 
found/ 
Recommendati
on 
State 
implementation  
App. No. 
001/2014  
 
Actions pour 
la protection 
des Droits 
de l’Homme 
(APDH) v. 
Republic of 
Cote d’Ivoire 
2014 3, 13  Ordered the 
Amendment of 
State Electoral 
Law. 
 
No implementation.  
The composition of 
the Ivorian Electoral 
Board in Law No. 
2014-335 of June 
18, 2014 has not 
been amended.  The 
Council of Ministers 
did not act under 
article 29(2) of the 
Court Protocol. 
                                       
114 The Commission decided only one communication on merit and details on this finding is yet to be 
published: the communication is - Comm. 339/2007 - Patrick Okiring and Agupio Samson (Represented 
by Human Rights Network and ISIS-WICCE v Uganda.  
115 The Commission did not grant any decision on the merit; rather it was seized of some communications 
and struck out thirteen communications for diligent prosecution and deferred six communications.  
116 The Commission considered thirty-nine communications of which only one communication was 
decided on the merit (details not available at the time of writing this thesis- communication 348/07- 
Collective of Families of Missing Persons in Algeria v Algeria). Also, no information was received 
regarding the implementation of decisions on communications in accordance with Rule 112 of Procedure 
of 2010.  
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App. No. 
007/2013  
 
Mohamed 
Abubakari v. 
United 
Republic of 
Tanzania 
2016 7 Declined to 
make specific 
release order 
from prison but 
ordered State 
to take 
Measures to 
remedy. 
No implementation 
has been made by 
Tanzania.117 
App. No. 
006/2013  
 
Wilfred 
Onyango 
Nganyi & 9 
Others v. 
United 
Republic of 
Tanzania 
2016 7 Ordered State 
to give legal aid 
to the 
applicant; 
expedite and 
finalise criminal 
appeals by and 
against the 
applicant.  
Criminal appeal was 
concluded before 
the Court decisions 
and judgment 
delivered on 10 
December 2015. 
However, Legal Act 
of 2007 was signed 
and gazetted on 
March 3, 2017.  
App. No. 
004/2013  
 
Lohe Issa 
Konate v. 
Burkina 
Faso 
2015 9 Ordered State 
to amend 
legislation on 
defamation in 
order to make it 
complaint with 
article 9 by 
repealing 
By email dated 11 
April 2018, the 
Respondent State 
informed the Court 
that it has complied 
with all the Court 
orders. For instance, 
it promulgated Law 
                                       
117 See Africa Union Executive Council, Report on the Activities of the African Court adopted January 
2017 at Thirtieth Ordinary Session, available at > http://www.african-
court.org/en/index.php/publications/activity-reports< accessed 25 February 2018.  
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custodial 
sentences for 
acts of 
defamation and 
to ensure that 
other sanctions 
of defamation 
meet 
international 
standards.  
Number 057-
2015/CNT of 04 
September 2015 
and Law Number 
058-2015/CNT of 04 
September 2015 as 
legislative measures 
to remedy the 
violations found.  
App. No. 
002/2013 
 
The African 
Commission 
on Human 
and Peoples’ 
Rights v. 
Libya 
2016 6, 7  Ordered State 
to take 
measures to 
guarantee Mr 
Kadhafi’s rights   
implementation. The 
Council of Ministers 
did not act under 
article 29(2) of the 
Court Protocol. 
However, the victim 
was released in 
2017 by a rebel 
group that took 
control of the 
location where the 
victim was 
imprisoned.118 
App. No. 
005/2013  
2015 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 Take measures 
to remedy 
No specific 
information could be 
                                       
118 It is worth mentioning that Saif Al-Islam’s release from prison was not due to the decisions of the 
African Charter mechanisms; rather, on an instruction of a House of Representatives of an armed group 
based in the eastern city of Tobruk- see Aljazeera News, ‘Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi freed from prison in 
Zintan’ available at > http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/saif-al-islam-gaddafi-freed-prison-
zintan-170610190700610.html< accessed 29 September 2017. 
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Alex Thomas 
v. United 
Republic of 
Tanzania 
violations; 
reopen the 
defence and the 
retrial of the 
applicant. 
obtained on 
measures taken to 
comply with this 
decision.119  
App. No. 
013/2011  
 
Abdoulaye 
Nikiema, 
Ernest 
Zongo, 
Blaise 
Ilboudo & 
Burkinabe 
Human and 
Peoples’ 
Rights 
Movement v 
Burkina 
Faso 
2014 1, 7, 9(2)  Damages 
awarded; 
ordered State 
to take 
measures to 
remedy 
violations 
Burkina Faso paid 
the applicant the 
sum of 233,135,409 
(two hundred and 
thirty-three million 
one hundred and 
thirty-five thousand 
four hundred and 
nine) CFA francs, 
representing the 
amount owed to the 
beneficiaries of 
Norbert Zongo and 
his three 
companions. The 
respondent State 
has by email dated 
11 and 27 April 2018 
informed the Court 
on measures taken 
                                       
119 See Africa Union Executive Council, Report on the Activities of the African Court (adopted January 
2017) 10, available at > http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/publications/activity-reports< 
accessed 25 February 2018,  
501 
 
 
to implement the 
decision.120 
App. No. 
009/2011  
 
Tanganyika 
Law Society 
and Legal 
and Human 
Rights 
Centre and 
Reverend 
Christopher 
R. Mtikila v. 
United 
Republic of 
Tanzania 
 2013 2, 3, 10, 13 Ordered State 
to take 
constitutional, 
legislative and 
other measures 
to remedy 
violations 
No implementation. 
The affected articles 
of the constitution 
are not yet repealed 
or amended.121  
App. No. 
006/2012 
 
African 
Commission 
on Human 
and Peoples’ 
Rights v. 
2017 1, 2, 8, 14, 17, 
21, and 22. 
State to take 
appropriate 
measures to 
remedy all the 
violations 
established.  
Kenya has not 
provided the Court 
with comments on 
steps taken to effect 
recommendation, no 
implementation.122 
                                       
120 Ibid, 9. 
121 Ibid, 8-9. No legislative or other measures has been taken by government to remedy the violations 
found. However, the referendum on the proposed new constitution which proposed for independent 
candidates is pending.  
122 Ibid, 11.  
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Republic of 
Kenya  
App. 
003/2014 
 
Ingabire 
Victoire 
Umuhoza 
V Rwanda  
 
2017 7 and 9,  Ordered 
Rwanda to 
restore the 
rights of the 
applicants but 
declined to 
order direct 
release of the 
applicant, 
without 
prejudice to the 
Respondent 
State’s power 
to take the 
measure itself.  
Applicant has been 
granted presidential 
pardon, although no 
official notification 
has been submitted 
to the Court. 
App. No. 
003/2015 
Kennedy 
Onyachi 
V Tanzania  
2017 1, 6, and 7.  Ordered 
Tanzania to 
erase 
consequences 
of violations 
established and 
establish the 
rights of the 
applicants.  
Tanzania has not 
implemented this 
decision.   
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App. 
011/2015 
Christopher 
Jonas v 
Tanzania  
2017 7 and 1.  Declined to 
make direct 
order to release 
the applicant, 
without 
prejudice to the 
Respondent 
State’s power 
to take the 
measure itself 
but held that 
the 30 years 
prison sentence 
was not in force 
at the time the 
offence was 
committed.   
Tanzania has not 
implemented this 
decision.   
App. No. 
Aundo 
Ochien 
Anudo 
V Tanzania  
2018 7 and 14 Held the 
Tanzania 
violated the 
applicant’s 
right not to be 
expelled 
arbitrarily, 
ordered 
Tanzania to 
amend its 
legislation. 
Tanzania has not 
complied with this 
decision and no 
legislation measures 
has been taken to 
remedy the 
violation. 
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App. No 
Thobias 
Mango and 
another v 
Tanzania  
2018 1, 7, 13 Orders 
Tanzania to 
restore the 
rights of the 
applicants but 
declined to 
make direct 
order to release 
the applicant, 
without 
prejudice to the 
Respondent 
State’s power 
to take the 
measure itself 
Tanzania has not 
complied with this 
decision.  
 
 
 
